SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v. YIP SIN MAN

HCMP 539/2022

[2023] HKCFI 983

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 539 OF 2022

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R E A S O N S   F O R

D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.  These are my reasons for deciding as I did, following the hearing relating to committal proceedings brought by the Secretary for Justice (“SJ”) as Plaintiff against the Defendant, for her breach of Court orders relating to what has been called ‘doxxing’ of police officers (“Police Doxxing Injunction”).  The relevant Court orders of the Police Doxxing Injunction were made in October and November 2019, and the alleged – and now admitted – breach by the Defendant occurred in September 2020.

2.  The Defendant’s acknowledgement of liability for the breach comprising the contempt of court was given by her in November 2022, on the first day of what had originally been listed as a trial.  In light of that acknowledgement, the matter was adjourned for a mitigation and sentencing hearing.  That hearing eventually took place on 12 April 2023.

3.  The SJ was represented at the hearing by Ms Bianca Yu of Counsel, instructed by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  The Defendant appeared in person.

4.  At the end of the hearing, I imposed a penalty of 21 days’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months, and ordered the Defendant to make a contribution to the SJ’s costs in the sum of $30,000.  I also said I would give reasons to be handed down subsequently.

5.  These are my Reasons for Decision.

B.     The Injunction

6.  On 25 October 2019, the SJ and the Commissioner of Police (suing on his own behalf and on behalf of all other Police Officers and Auxiliary Officers) as plaintiffs commenced the underlying action HCA 1957/2019 and made an ex parte application for an injunction against the defendants, being named as persons unlawfully and wilfully conducting themselves in any of the acts prohibited under paragraphs 1(a), (b) or (c) of the Indorsement of Claim.

7.  The acts sought to be prohibited under paragraphs 1(a), (b) or (c) of the Indorsement of Claim are:

(a)     using, publishing, communicating or disclosing to any other person the personal data of and concerning any Police Officer(s) and/or their spouses and/or their respective family members (namely parents, children or siblings), including but not limited to their name, job title, residential address, office address, school address, email address, date of birth, telephone number, Hong Kong Identity Card number or identification number of any other official identity documents, Facebook Account ID, Instagram Account ID, car plate number, and any photograph of the Police Officer(s) and/or their spouses and/or their respective family members (namely parents, children and siblings) (“Personal Data”), without the consent of the Police Officer(s) and/or their family member(s) (as the case may be) concerned;

(b)     intimidating, molesting, harassing, threatening, pestering or interfering with any Police Officer(s) and/or their spouses and/or their respective family members (namely parents, children or siblings); and/or

(c)     assisting, causing, counselling, procuring, instigating, inciting, aiding, abetting or authorizing others to commit any of the aforesaid acts or participate in any of the aforesaid acts.

8.  On the same day, Chow J granted an injunction order (“Interim Injunction Order”) effective until the return date on 8 November 2019.  The granting of the Interim Injunction Order was widely reported in the mass media including, inter alia, English and Chinese newspapers with wide circulation in Hong Kong, major radio and television service providers such as Radio Television Hong Kong and various sources on the internet (“Local Media”).

9.  On 28 October 2019, Chow J made an order to amend the Interim Injunction Order (“Amended Interim Injunction Order”).  The material terms of the Amended Interim Injunction Order are as follows:

The Defendants and each of them, whether acting by themselves, their servants or agents, or otherwise howsoever, be restrained from doing any of the following acts:

(a)     using, publishing, communicating or disclosing to any other person the Personal Data, intended or likely to intimidate, molest, harass, threaten, pester or interfere with any Police Officer(s) and/or their spouses and/or their respective family members (namely parents, children or siblings), without the consent of the Police Officer(s) and/or their family member(s) (as the case may be) concerned;

(b)     intimidating, molesting, harassing, threatening, pestering or interfering with any Police Officer(s) and/or their spouses and/or their respective family members (namely parents, children or siblings); and

(c)     assisting, causing, counselling, procuring, instigating, inciting, aiding, abetting or authorizing others to commit any of the aforesaid acts or participate in any of the aforesaid acts.

10.  The granting of the Amended Interim Injunction Order – to remain in force up to and including 8 November 2019 – was widely reported by the Local Media.

11.  On 29 October 2019, the Plaintiffs made an inter partes application against the Defendants for continuation of the Amended Interim Injunction Order.  The hearing of the inter partes application was fixed for 8 November 2019.

12.  On 31 October 2019, Chow J further made a technical amendment to the Amended Interim Injunction Order by amending the date of the Order (“Re-Amended Interim Injunction Order”).

13.  On 5 November 2019, the Hong Kong Journalist Association (“HKJA”) applied for the Re-Amended Interim Injunction Order to be varied by including the following terms:

(1)     Paragraph 1 of the Re-Amended Interim Injunction Order does not prohibit any lawful act(s) which are done solely for the purpose of a “news activity” as defined in section 61 of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) (“PDPO”); and

(2)     Paragraph 1(a) of the Re-Amended Interim Injunction Order does not prohibit the disclosure of Personal Data to a data user whose business, or part of whose business, consists of a “news activity” where the requirements of section 61(2)(b) of the PDPO are satisfied.

14.  At the hearing of the inter partes application and the HKJA’s Summons on 8 November 2019, I granted the inter partes application by ordering the Re-Amended Interim Injunction Order to be continued, except with the removal of the reference to “interfere” in paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Re-Amended Interim Injunction Order.  As regards the HKJA’s Summons, I granted an order in terms as set out in paragraph (1) but refused to include the terms as set out in paragraph (2) (“Return Date Order”).  I gave a fully-reasoned Ruling, since reported at [2019] 5 HKLRD 500.  The handing down of the Ruling and the sealing of the Return Date Order were widely reported by the Local Media.

15.  On 29 November 2019, the Plaintiffs made an application to amend the Return Date Order.  On 11 December 2019, I granted the application by amending the Return Date Order to include Special Constable(s), their spouses and their respective family members (namely parents, children or siblings) (“Amended Return Date Order”).  The granting of the Amended Return Date Order was widely reported by the Local Media.

16.  The various orders described above collectively constitute the Police Doxxing Injunction.  Pursuant to the grant of leave to the Plaintiffs to effect service by way of substituted service, by publishing a copy of the Orders on the webpages of the Police as well as that of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Police Doxxing Injunction was duly and validly served.

C.     Procedural History

17.  On 6 May 2022, the SJ applied ex parte for leave to commence committal proceedings against the Defendant, in relation to her alleged breach of the Police Doxxing Injunction.

18.  On 12 May 2022, I granted leave to apply for an order of committal.  The originating summons was issued on the same date, together with a notice of appointment setting the first hearing on 2 August 2022.

19.  But, by that date, the Defendant had failed to file any acknowledgement of service, so as to indicate her stance towards the proceedings, notwithstanding certain reminders having been given to her.

20.  At that hearing, and notwithstanding the Defendant’s absence, I thought it appropriate to give procedural directions for the resolution of this matter, at a trial if necessary.  Accordingly, I made orders granting the Defendant leave to file and serve affidavit/affirmation evidence on or before 9 September 2022, and the SJ leave to file and serve affidavit/affirmation evidence in reply, if any, on or before 20 September 2022.  I also set provisional trial dates for 22 November 2022 (with 23 and 24 November 2022 reserved).

21.  I also gave further directions on 12 October 2022, in light of the fact that the Defendant had by that date not yet filed any evidence.

22.  However, by 22 November 2022, still no further evidence had been filed.  Nevertheless, at the hearing on that day, the Defendant confirmed that she did not wish to contest liability.  Instead, she sought an extension of time within which to file evidence in mitigation.  I extended the time for the Defendant to file that evidence, and for any reply from the SJ, by 16 and 23 December 2022 respectively.  I fixed the mitigation hearing for 30 December 2022.

23.  The Defendant then made an application for Legal Aid on 6 December 2022. In light of that, and the automatic stay triggered, I was invited to and agreed to vacate the 30 December hearing date, and to postpone the directions as to evidence.  I re-fixed the hearing for 12 April 2023.

24.  I understand that the application for Legal Aid was refused on 28 December 2022.

25.  Subsequently, I also granted leave to the SJ to file further evidence relating to the time taken to bring this application, and again postponed the timetable for evidence.  The further extended deadline for the Defendant to file her evidence was 27 March 2023.  No evidence was filed by that date, nor did the Defendant explain why she had not filed evidence or seek any extension of time to do so.

26.  I also gave directions as to the filing of written submissions, if any, by both the SJ and the Defendant with a deadline of 12 noon on 11 April 2023.  The SJ filed written submissions.  The Defendant did not.

27.  Instead, the Defendant made a second application for Legal Aid on 11 April 2023, the day before the hearing.  The Court received the relevant memorandum on the day of the hearing.  Also, the Court received a letter from the DOJ inviting me to lift the otherwise automatic stay of proceedings for 42 days following the making of the application for Legal Aid.

28.  At the hearing, I heard submissions as to whether or not I should lift the Legal Aid triggered stay.  Having considered those submissions, I ordered the stay to be lifted so that the mitigation and sentencing hearing would go ahead.  I did so for the following broad reasons:

(1)     The case against the Defendant has not changed since it was originally advanced.

(2)     The Defendant has in any event admitted liability for the contempt.

(3)     One previous application for Legal Aid was refused.

(4)     There does not seem to me to be any evidence of a material change in circumstances after the refusal of the first application to justify a further application or further adjournment of these proceedings.

(5)     The Defendant’s offered explanation that the first application was affected by her contracting Covid-19 does not seem to me to explain the significant delay in making a further application.

(6)     The Defendant’s offered explanation that she has been busy in her student studies also does not seem to me to explain the significant delay in making a further application.

(7)     The Defendant’s belated request for a further six weeks in which to file mitigation evidence might also have suggested that the renewed Legal Aid application was in effect to “buy” additional time.

(8)     In any event, from the chronology and development of the proceedings, I was left with the deep impression that the Defendant has at least found it difficult to engage properly with these important proceedings.  She has rather taken a “head in the sand” approach, such that the grant of yet further time might not lead to the production of further material.

(9)     The proceedings had already taken considerable time to reach the point of the mitigation and sentencing hearing, also to be viewed against the unfortunate delay in the commencement of these proceedings.

(10)     There appeared to be little prejudice to the Defendant if the hearing were to go ahead, and she were permitted to make whatever submissions (including factual submissions) she felt appropriate to identify any relevant mitigating circumstances to be taken into account.

29.  Therefore, the mitigation and sentencing hearing went ahead.  As part of the hearing, I invited the Defendant to put forward her mitigation (including in answer to questions put to her by me).  Ms Yu agreed that it was not necessary for the Defendant to have taken an oath or affirmation before so doing.

D.     The Breach

30.  On 6 September 2020, a police officer was deployed to disperse the crowds and effect arrests in an unlawful public procession in Hong Kong.  During that operation, the police officer intercepted and subdued a 12-year-old girl who fell on the ground (“Incident”).  The Instant was widely reported in the media.

31.  On the following day, 7 September 2020, the Defendant published a post on her Facebook account (“Post”), showing the personal data of and concerning a police officer (“Officer”), who was said to be the officer involved in the incident, including his Chinese full name, religious belief, previous church, primary and secondary schools and photos.  The Post also contained a link to a message in the Telegram Channel (“TG Message”), which contained the personal data of the Officer and his family member (his sister), including the Officer’s Chinese full name, religious belief, previous church, primary and secondary schools, Facebook account, Instagram account and photos, and the Chinese and English names and Instagram account of the Officer’s sister.

32.  The post also stated “記得唔好share出去呀” (translation: remember, do not shed to others); “為大家介紹” (translation: introducing to everyone) “2020/9/6 推跌12歲小妹妹個隻狗” (The dog who pushed the 12-year-old little girl on 2020/9/6) and “老豆搵仔料” (Material from ‘Dadfindboy’).

33.  The Post was publicly accessible by anyone with connection to the internet.  The TG Message was publicly accessible by any Telegram user, including non-members of the Telegram Channel ‘Dadfindboy’.  The Post was discovered by the police during a cyber patrol, also on 7 September 2020.  When the Post remained posted and available to the public, it attracted some publicity.  By the end of that day, it seems that the Post had been shared with others 1,161 times and had attracted a total of 1,983 counts of “angry”, “like” and “wow” and 327 comments from other Facebook users.

34.  As it turns out, the Officer was not the officer involved in the Incident, and was not even deployed in Mong Kok on 6 September 2020.  Nevertheless, the Officer and his sister was soon subjected to widespread doxxing on social media platforms.  He was subject to nuisance, harassment and intimidation of varying degrees of severity, including receiving harassing messages in Instagram.  The personal data disclosed was accurate, but neither he nor his family members had ever consented to their personal data being so disclosed.

E.     Applicable Principles on Sentencing

35.  In my previous decisions of Secretary for Justice v Chan Oi Yau Riyo [2020] 3 HKLRD 494 and Secretary for Justice v Cheng Lai King [2020] HKCFI 2687, and in other later cases, I set out the appropriate principles.  The gist of those principles can be repeated here.

36.  As a superior court of record, the Court of First Instance is invested with the inherent power to punish for contempt in maintaining its authority and preventing its process from being obstructed and abused.  The common law powers to fine or imprison, to give an immediate sentence or to postpone it, remain intact.  The power of the Court to hand down a suspended sentence is specifically codified in Order 52 rule 7(1). The power to order payment of a fine, or giving security for good behaviour, is preserved by Order 52 rule 9.

37.  The general principles on sentencing in cases of civil contempt are as follows:

(1)     In civil contempt, the prime consideration in sentencing is to demonstrate to litigants that orders of the court are to be obeyed.  Contempt of civil court orders is a serious matter.

(2)     However, a delicate balance has to be maintained in the imposition of the penalty for civil contempt between the strong public interest in ensuring that orders of the Hong Kong Courts will not be flouted and the evaluation of the individual circumstances of each case.

(3)     Subject to mitigating factors, if any, the starting and primary penalty for contempt of court in breaching an order in the nature of an injunction is imprisonment.  The normal penalty for breaches of injunction orders is imprisonment measured in months.

(4)     In a case where there has been a failure to comply with an order of the court and where there is no evidence to suggest that compliance was in any way difficult or impossible, a sentence of imprisonment would not be inappropriate.  This would be particularly so in a case where the sentence was designed to enforce compliance.  A sentence of imprisonment for a wilful failure to observe a court order can often be appropriate.

(5)     The court is empowered with quite a few sentencing options under its inherent powers and the common law.

(6)     Imprisonment should be regarded as a sanction of last resort in civil contempt, and any custodial term should be as short as possible and consistent with the circumstances of the case.

(7)     The court has an absolute discretion to suspend the sentence of imprisonment for such period and on such terms as it deems fit.

(8)     Where the conclusion is reached that the contempt was not deliberate or not contumelious, it would be only in very rare circumstances that a sentence of imprisonment would be appropriate.

38.  Encompassed within the above principles are the factors that the Court should take into account when sentencing for civil contempt, the degree of culpability (including considering whether the contempt was contumacious or unintentional), the reasons and motives and state of mind of the contemnor as well as whether the contempt has been purged.

39.  The purpose of the law of contempt is not to protect the dignity of judges, but to prevent interference with the due administration of justice.  The first principle is that court orders are made to be obeyed.  They are not guidelines, to be ignored or paid lip service to at the behest of the parties affected.  They are the building blocks by which the administration of justice is made workable.  Litigants who wilfully breach orders do so at the risk of losing their liberty for being in contempt of court.

40.  Indeed, it is fundamental to the rule of law that orders of the court are obeyed.  Injunctions generally are granted, and the particular injunction in this case was granted, by the court only after careful consideration of the evidence and the applicable law and arguments advanced. If anyone suggests that the court has made an error in granting the injunction, there is the possibility of an appeal, or of a variation application.

41.  In the Chan Oi Yau Riyo case, I also accepted as being particularly relevant to cases like this one that there is a difference between today and the pre-internet and social media era.  That difference is the very easy practical way any individual can breach an order of the court and widely disseminate information.  The facility to broadcast and publish material widely makes these breaches worse, rather than less serious.

42.  Again, there can be a reminder that rights and freedoms do not exist in a vacuum.  They come with responsibilities.

F.     The Delay

43.  In Secretary for Justice v Sung Ho Tak Edward [2022] HKCFI 227, I commented on the long period of delay in that case.  There, the relevant breach was not sought to be brought back to this Court until almost 2 years after the date of the breach.  I described that (at §27) as “more than just disappointing”.  At §§28-30, I stated:

28.     By nearly 2 years after the date of the breach, committed in the midst of the deep social unrest, that social unrest had largely calmed down.  Of course, I do not say that it is improper to bring these contempt proceedings (or else I would not have granted leave).  But it might be said that pursuing the contempt so long after the event, well after the fraught social situation at the time of the Incitement Injunction has calmed down, risks unhelpfully raking over the embers.

29.     Further, I think the Court is entitled to expect actions which are said to be clear breaches of Court orders to be brought to the attention of the Court within a fairly short time, if the matter is to be pursued at all.  Court orders are not advisory; they mandate what must be done or not done.  In a case such as the present, the Court itself is unlikely to be aware of any specific details of breaches of the Court’s order.  The Court relies on one of the parties to the proceedings – here the SJ, who sought and obtained the injunction – to bring the matter to the attention of the Court timeously, so that the Court is in a position to enforce its order through contempt proceedings and orders for committal if necessary.

30.     Significant delay is almost bound to frustrate the Court’s ability properly to police its own orders.  The value of late steps may well be less than the value of steps taken timeously.  Enforcement steps which are considered to be necessary, appropriate and proportionate if taken within weeks or months of the breach of the order may no longer be considered either necessary or appropriate or proportionate if only pursued years later.

44.  In other cases, where leave to bring committal proceedings was sought, I recognised potential public concerns about why there was significant delay between the act alleged to constitute the contempt and the first commencement of the proceedings.  Cognizant of these comments, the SJ sought and obtained leave to file affirmation evidence to explain the delay – or lapse of time – in this case.

45.  Essentially, the explanation offered was to point to the workload of the DOJ officers during the relevant period in relation to these proceedings.  As summarised by Ms Yu, the explanation was:

(1)     Upon referral of the matter from the Police, between October 2020 in January 2021, the DOJ sought detailed instructions and clarifications from the Police for consideration of the matter and assessment of the merits in bringing any contempt proceedings.

(2)     Upon gathering sufficient information and evidence from the police, the DOJ handling Counsel assigned to the matter then proceeded to prepare the merits assessment, and to obtain internal clearance to commence committal proceedings.  The internal process took approximately 13 months, up to March 2022.

(3)     Whilst recognising that the timeframe is not satisfactory, proper context should be given to the time lapse by judging the timeframe against the sheer number of matters which the DOJ litigation team had to attend to for the period between 2020 and 2022.  During this period, on contempt matters alone, there were approximately 70 new files referred to the DOJ for advice.

(4)     The DOJ has confirmed that the only factors taken into consideration in coming to the decision to apply for committal for contempt are to ensure that there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the intended contempt law is guilty, and it is in the public interest to pursue such action, and the application for leave was made as soon as all the papers were ready.

(5)     There was never any intention on the DOJ’s part to “sit on” or “warehouse” these proceedings, or any other committal proceedings commenced on behalf of the SJ.

46.  I acknowledge that explanation provides some information in relation to the significant lapse of time before the commencement of proceedings in this case.  It also refutes any concerns that there might have been some deliberate choice of timing as to the commencement of proceedings.  However, there is rather little information specifically about this case, except to identify the broad periods over which any particular part of the process took place (though that may in part be the result of not wishing to disclose interim considerations or privileged information).  The explanation essentially boils down to saying that the DOJ was very busy with a large number of cases or potential cases, and it took a long time to bring this case and many other cases to fruition.

47.  I suppose, at bottom, that simply identifies that the DOJ did not think this particular case to be one requiring any real priority.  That may be a reflection of the relevant end of the spectrum of seriousness, which Ms Yu has also recognised (see below).

48.  But the point remains that delay is almost bound to frustrate the Court’s ability properly to police its own orders.  I emphasise that the value of late steps may well be less than the value of steps taken timeously.  Enforcement steps which are considered to be necessary, appropriate and proportionate if taken within weeks or months of the breach of the order may no longer be considered either necessary or appropriate or proportionate if only pursued years later.  It may even be, not least in relation to cases regarded as being at the least serious end of the spectrum, that the public interest in pursuit of committal proceedings will significantly lessen over a lengthy period of delay.

49.  In this case, it seems to me the proper way to reflect the passage of time since the original act which was the breach and contempt is to factor that in to the consideration of the appropriate and proportionate penalty now being passed.

G.     Appropriate Sentence in this Case

50.  In accordance with the principles I have canvassed, the appropriate starting point is a sentence of imprisonment.  Ms Yu submits that the starting point is also the appropriate end point, not just as a matter of principle but also on the facts of this case.

51.  Ms Yu acknowledges that the Post was short-lived, but says this is beside the point.  This is because, as I observed in Secretary for Justice v Chan Kin Chung [2021] 1 HKLRD 563 at §51, once personal data has been publicly revealed on the internet or social media, even if the original point of revelation is subsequently removed, that personal data will almost certainly forever remain publicly available.  That is the very nature of the internet and social media, and is the obvious consequence of the repeated re-posting of earlier posts: it is impossible to ‘put the genie back into the bottle’.

52.  Connected to that, Ms Yu points to the fact that the Defendant’s statement in the Post “remember, do not share to others” (with the ‘innocent’ emoji) was evidently an attempt to incite viewers of the Post to share the personal data of the Officer to others, in other words to encourage other persons to breach the Injunction.  I agree and I accept that is an aggravating factor, not least in the context that the Post was made accessible to the general public and the dissemination of this type of information happens quickly and widely.  That does make the breach more serious.

53.  On the other hand, Ms Yu fairly accepts that there are certain mitigating factors which may be advanced on behalf of the Defendant which include:

(1)     The Defendant removed the Post of her own volition.  The Post was published at around 8:19pm on 7 September 2020, but removed by 9:37am the following morning, 8 September 2020.

(2)     The Defendant did not contest liability, although the indication was made only at the first day of the trial.

(3)     It could be said that the doxxing act of the Defendant was not at the most serious end of the spectrum.

(4)     The Defendant has a clear record.

54.  I accept that those are all mitigating factors to be taken into account.

55.  I also take into account the Defendant’s explanation that the breach occurred because of a reaction taken by her on the spur of the moment or on impulse and because of her ignorance.  But, even if the doxxing act of the Defendant was not at the most serious end of the spectrum, I have remarked previously in other cases that it is not a strong mitigating factor to suggest that the breach occurred unthinkingly, impulsively or out of anger.  Perhaps particularly in the context of the spread of personal data over the internet or social media, the importance of thinking and/or of calming down before making a few keystrokes that could have significant and lasting effect should be apparent.  Indeed, it seems to me that the nature of the Post – in effect encouraging its wider spread of the personal data of the Officer and family member – identifies that the Defendant must have known and intended what the Post might achieve.

56.  However, it seems to me that the following matters mentioned by the Defendant can be considered as mitigating factors or are relevant to the overall assessment as to the appropriate penalty in this case:

(1)     She took down the Post the morning following the evening publishing of the Post – apparently having changed her mind as to the appropriateness of the Post, which suggests that the offending conduct was a one-off event out of her general character.

(2)     The Post was a reposting, rather than the initiation of the personal data breach (although I have noted her apparent encouragement of others to widen the breach).

(3)     The Defendant is young and at the start of her adult life, still engaged in education before moving to a full-time job or career.

(4)     She is a part-time student studying hotel management at a Vocational Training Centre, due to graduate in July 2023.

(5)     After graduation, the Defendant plans to obtain employment in a hotel business in Hong Kong.

(6)     Currently, she works part time, with an income of around HK$5,000 per month.

(7)     Her parents are divorced and the Defendant lives with her mother and brother, for whom she helps to care.

(8)     The mother is a housewife, the family is on CSSA, and the Defendant contributes, from her earnings, half of the family expenditure.

(9)     The Defendant now understands the importance of complying with Court orders.

(10)     The Defendant is unlikely to repeat the kind of activity, as she now accepts that it was wrong and she feels very sorry about it.

(11)     The Defendant acknowledges that acting as she did not only would affect herself but also affect others.

57.  I have also already identified that the lengthy delay between the publishing of the Post (and its removal within a few hours) and the commencement of these proceedings is also something to be taken into account and reflected in the sentence imposed.  To an extent, the consequences of her having made the Post have hung over the Defendant for a considerable period of time.  I also note that this may in part be reflected in her apparent unwillingness or inability to engage in these proceedings, perhaps in the (vain) hope that the proceedings might somehow go away.

58.  After taking into account the circumstances of the present case and balancing all matters, I came to the view that the appropriate and proportionate sentence would be one of 21 days’ imprisonment, but that in the circumstances it should be suspended for 12 months. I so ordered.

H.     Costs

59.  As to costs, it is trite that the usual order in a successful committal procedure is for costs to follow the event and should be payable by the person found guilty of contempt, and such costs are usually ordered to be paid on an indemnity basis.

60.  Nevertheless, in previous cases, I have noted that in an appropriate case the correct order may be an order for payment of a contribution only.  Approaching costs by requiring payment of a contribution only, rather than on a full indemnity basis, may in appropriate circumstances also reflect the appropriate degree of proportionality when the penalty and costs might be regarded as composite elements of the proceedings’ impact on a defendant.

61.  In the particular circumstances of this case, I thought such an approach to be apposite.  The SJ sought costs to be summarily assessed in the sum of just over HK$166,000.  Whilst at one point the Defendant suggested that I might reduce the amount to 30% of that figure, it was not clear how the Defendant might pay even that amount without receiving support or funding from someone else.  Against the financial circumstances she identified, which I accept as accurate, it therefore seemed to me that the appropriate amount of contribution for the Defendant to pay in this case was HK$30,000.  I so ordered.