RE NAWAZ HABIB

CACV 189/2025, [2025] HKCA 900

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 591

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 189 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2813 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 2 July 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 26 June 2025 (“the Judgment”)  ([2025] HKCA 591). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Levy (“the Judge”)  dated 7 April 2025, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1120).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“The Decision is the result of misreading and nonreading. The points of my case was ignored and the Decision were not transparent. The Decision illegal, unlawful, the Decision is against the Law and facts of the case. It is hard for him to live and stand is front of his enemies.” (sic)

5.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 9 July 2025.  In those submissions, he claimed that the Judgment did not attain the high standard of fairness, as it failed to consider the grave risks he would face upon refoulement.  He also complained that the Judgment was illegal, unlawful, self-contradictory and capricious, and that the court failed to appreciate the importance of state acquiescence in his case.  He also claimed that his case was ignored and that the decision was not transparent.  He then asserted that torture and deaths were common in police custody in Pakistan and that it would be impossible for him to return to his home country.

6.  The applicant’s application is devoid of merit.  The applicant’s assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  As seen from [6] - [14] of the Judgment, his case has been fully considered and rejected by this court, as well as by the court below.  His bare assertions regarding state acquiescence also lack particulars, and in any event, were never raised before the Judge or this court on appeal.  It is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed before it, or which are fact-sensitive: see Re Orense Marian Masangkay [2022] HKCA 33 at [7] and Re Dandiwal Sandeep Singh [2021] HKCA 870 at [7].

7.  Further and in any event, even taking his case at its highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

9.  The Notice of Motion filed on 2 July 2025 is hereby dismissed.