RE RAJBIR MASIH

CACV 120/2026, [2026] HKCA 668

On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 536

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 120 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 329/2021)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Michael Wong (“the Judge”)  given on 4 February 2026[1] (“the Leave Decision”)  refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review[2] was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”)  dated 5 March 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”)  dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 12 July 2019 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

2.  The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the Board’s reasons in reaching the Board’s Decision have been set out therein[3] as well as by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [6] and [14]-[19], which will not be repeated.

3.  After considering the documents filed by the applicant as well as the applicant’s oral submissions made at the hearing of the leave application, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated at [12]-[23] of the Leave Decision.

Appeal to this court

4.  By a Notice of Appeal dated 11 February 2026, the applicant contended that he would face hardship should he be refouled, and that the Board had, inter alia, relied on “source of news which is not officially recognised” and on “some cases which are outdated considering the dramatic changes”.  

5.  By written submissions dated 27 February 2026, the applicant referred, inter alia, to the well-established principles in ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[4] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514.

6.  We heard the appeal on 1 April 2026, at which the applicant appeared in person.  At the hearing, the applicant stated that he “feared danger in Punjab” and that “the relationship matter is serious”.

Discussion

7.  As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review.  It is necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that would justify this court in intervening: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  An appeal is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge.  In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

8.  The applicant has failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant were bare assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].

9.  In the present case, the applicant claimed that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his former girlfriend (Baban Preet Kaur; “Baban”)’s family by way of an “honour killing”, because he (being from a lower social class to her)  formed a relationship with her in 2016.  The Board found various inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities in the applicant’s evidence as regards his relationship with Baban, and held on the facts and evidence that no such relationship existed (Board’s Decision, [16]-[20]).  The applicant was therefore unable to establish the core basis to his alleged fear of harm in returning to India.  The Board further opined that in any event, suitable options of internal relocation were available to the applicant in order to minimise the risks of harm, if any.  These were factual findings open to the Board on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [12]-[23].  We see no basis to interfere.  

10.  The applicant has failed to demonstrate how the Board had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.

11.  Further, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate on whether and, if so, how the trite principles referred to in his written submissions had not been applied in the consideration of his leave application by the Judge and in the processing of his non-refoulement claim.

12.  As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision.  There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.