WING FUNG CREDIT LTD v. LAM SIN YEE

DCMP2843/2025

[2026] HKDC 1341

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2843 OF 2025

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DECISION

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A.  GENERAL BACKGROUND

1.  The Defendant in these proceedings (“D”) borrowed from the Plaintiff (“P”), a licensed money lender, a sum of HK$1,400,000 on 27 January 2025 (“the 2025 Loan”) and had pledged a car parking space owned by her as security for the loan. D was supposed to repay the 2025 Loan by instalments, each payable on the 27^th day of the ensuing 360 months. She did not repay the monthly instalment due on 27 April 2025, and said she refrained from doing so because of P’s promise.

2.  As a response to the lack of instalment repayment on 27 April 2025, P commenced the present proceedings on 26 May 2025 to seek (i) repayment of the outstanding principal and interest of the 2025 Loan and (ii) enforcement of the security. D repaid P a sum totaling HK$1,422,088.48 on around 31 July 2025, yet P and D were unable to settle the ultimate amount which D should pay P and these proceedings.

3.  When P’s Originating Summons (“OS”) came before Master Vivian Lee for an appointment on 26 February 2026, the outstanding sum specified in the Notice of Appointment was HK$38,261.63 plus daily interest of HK$13.10 (at the interest rate of 12.50% per annum) starting from 1 August 2025 until full payment. Vacant possession of the car parking space and legal costs are also sought.

4.  Although the amount sought to be recovered falls below the ceiling of the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunal, by law, an action by a licensed money lender cannot be proceeded with in the Tribunal (see: paragraph 1, Schedule to the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338)). Moreover, as the purpose of these proceedings is to enforce a security by way of obtaining vacant possession of a mortgaged real property, the District Court is the suitable forum.  

5.  Shortly before the said appointment before Master Lee, D issued a summons on 23 February 2026 (“the XXN Summons”) seeking orders of cross-examination of the deponents of P’s affirmations[1] under Order 28, rule 4 of the Rules of the District Court (“RDC”); D also tendered herself for cross-examination by P if any is required.

6.  In view of the XXN Summons, Master Lee adjourned the OS for a call-over hearing before a Judge on 9 April 2026. Shortly before the hearing on 9 April 2026, D issued a further summons on 31 March 2026 seeking to file and serve her 2^nd affirmation (“the Aff Summons”), but attached no draft of such affirmation to the summons. There was also a typographical error as to what rule under the RDC was being relied on for this summons.

7.  In the hearing on 9 April 2026, I adjourned the OS, the XXN Summons and the Aff Summons to 30 April 2026 for further argument with 2 hours reserved, upon the undertaking of D’s solicitors that they would file and serve an amendment summons to amend the Aff Summons within 3 working days.   

8.  There was a breach of this undertaking in terms of (i) promptness and (ii) the mode of amending the Aff Summons. By my previous paper direction, the non-compliance was relieved and D was treated as having filed and served an amended version of the Aff Summons on 15 April 2026 (“the Amended Aff Summons”), to which a draft of her 2^nd affirmation was enclosed. Shortly before the resumed hearing on 30 April 2026, D’s solicitors ceased to act and D started acting in person.

9.  On 30 April 2026, having heard P’s solicitor and D herself on the merits of the OS, the XXN Summons and the Amended Aff Summons, and having read their respective written submissions in English, this Court:

9.1.  allowed D to file and serve her 2^nd affirmation as per the draft attached to the Amended Aff Summons (which D subsequently did on 5 May 2026); and

9.2.  reserved the decisions on the XXN Summons and P’s request for obtaining the substantive reliefs pleaded in the OS summarily (which are now handed down with reasons).

10.  The existence of the 2025 Loan, its drawdown and a mortgage in favour of P to secure the loan, as well as the substantive terms of the loan agreement and the amounts having been repaid by D, are not in dispute. At this stage of the proceedings, the burden falls on D to show why she has a credible defence to the outstanding claim of HK$38,261.63 plus daily interest of HK$13.10 from 1 August 2025. In accordance with the principles set out in Golden Rich Finance Limited v Lam Sau Fa [2018] HKCA 952, the defence is to be tested against the evidence adduced in the case, including whether the defence is inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents or D’s previous admissions and position. The Court should also consider the inherent probability of the defence, but the Court should not conduct a mini‑trial of the case on the affidavit evidence.

11.  As the questions before this Court are whether the XXN Summons should be allowed and whether P should be granted substantive reliefs summarily, in line with the above approach, this Court will outline in Sections B-C below facts which are either undisputed, indisputable or stated in D’s two affirmations. This Court will then analyze whether a credible defence and any triable issues exist on the basis of those facts. This approach, however, should not be taken to mean that P’s contrary factual assertions are outright rejected.    

B.  THE BORROWINGS, THE MORTGAGE AND THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT

12.  The 2025 Loan did not represent a fresh dealing between P and D. According to evidence, D first borrowed from P on 12 January 2021 the same amount of HK$1,400,000, but the terms of that loan differed from those of the 2025 Loan. The mortgage instrument sought to be enforced by P in these proceedings (of memorial number 21012701710065) was executed by D in favour of P three days after the very first loan agreement (i.e., 15 January 2021) (“the Mortgage”).

13.  In January 2022, January 2023 and January 2024 respectively, D made new loan agreements with P to borrow either the same amount of HK$1,400,000 or the slightly different amount of HK$1,412,250. The amount borrowed every time was used to cover the amount owed under the loan agreement made in the previous year. The Mortgage continued to cover the new loan which replaced the old loan.

14.  After the signing of the facility letter for the 2025 Loan, D duly repaid the first two instalments on 27 February 2025 and 27 March 2025 at the agreed monthly amount of HK$14,942.

15.  According to D, on 22 April 2025, she contacted Ms Leung Ka Bo (“Ms Leung”), a manager of P’s loan business development department, to enquire about an early full repayment of the 2025 Loan and redemption of the Mortgage. On 23 April 2025, D attended P’s office to meet Ms Leung and sign a “Customer Service Application Form” to apply for the early settlement of the entire 2025 Loan (“the Signed Form”).

16.  The Signed Form was a two-page document. The form began with details about the borrower, the 2025 Loan and the mortgaged property. There was then a section for making the application, in which the box next to the Chinese words “提早全數還款，償還日期為 ______” (“Early repayment of the entire sum, repayment date being _______)” was checked. However, no one had set out a specific date of repayment in the blank.

17.  Another box next to “其他 (請註明 _____ )” “Others (please specify _____ )” was also checked as the reason for making an early full repayment, but again the blank was not filled in. D’s signature and the pre-typed date of “23 April 2025” can be found on the second page of the document.

18.  It is D’s case that, during the meeting on 23 April 2025, D expressly discussed with Ms Leung of her intention to repay the entire outstanding amount of the 2025 Loan in one go, including the upcoming instalment payment due on 27 April 2025. Ms Leung did not object to that, inquired about the exact repayment date and stated that a handling fee would be required. D said she and Ms Leung agreed that D would not need to make a payment on 27 April 2025 and the outstanding sums would be paid altogether in the final arrangement to discharge D’s liability. D called this the “Oral Agreement” in her affirmations and written submissions.

19.  In D’s 1^st affirmation, D did not mention if she responded to Ms Leung’s enquiry about repayment date and gave Ms Leung a specific repayment date. In her 2^nd affirmation, D said it was her clear understanding that the early redemption could only occur on or after 22 May 2025. Yet, she was silent on whether this date was specifically mentioned to Ms Leung on the spot.

20.  After the meeting on 23 April 2025, D approached a solicitors’ firm, K.B. Chau & Co (“KBC”), to handle the discharge of the Mortgage.

C.  FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS IN MAY 2025, COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AND REPAYMENT

21.  On 15 May 2025, D received a demand letter from P’s solicitors Tony Kan & Co (“TKC”) claiming an aggregate sum of HK$1,422,088.48 (“the 15/5 Demand Letter”), which was inclusive of the outstanding principal, interest and overdue interest accrued up to 13 May 2025. According to D, she called Ms Leung on 21 May 2025 in response, but the call was transferred to one Mr Chandler Lam (“Mr Lam”) for handling. D described the conversations she had with Mr Lam in her 2^nd affirmation (“the Telephone Conversation”) as follows:

“… This is the first time I made contact with Mr. Lam and Mr. Lam was a stranger to me at that time. During the call, I asked Mr. Lam whether [P] had instructed any lawyers to issue any letters to me and expressed to Mr. Lam that I wished to early redeem the [2025] Loan in one go. Then, Mr. Lam asked me if I was applying for re-mortgage or if the bank had delayed the redemption process. After I answered in the negative and replied that the early redemption matter was being handled by my then solicitors. Then, Mr. Lam asked me when I could fully repay the [2025] Loan (“Mr. Lam’s Inquiry”), and I answered around 28 and 29 May 2025. Mr. Lam asked for an exact date of the early full repayment of the [2025] Loan, I replied that I would confirm with my then solicitor and revert to Mr. Lam in relation to the exact date of the early full repayment of the [2025] Loan. Mr. Lam responded “okay” in the Telephone Conversation.”

22.  According to an exhibit to D’s 2^nd affirmation, D signed a facility agreement with Dah Sing Bank on 22 May 2025 to borrow HK$3,470,000 from the bank. It was said, after the drawdown, the funds from Dah Sing Bank could be used by D to repay P in full the 2025 Loan and discharge the Mortgage.

23.  P issued the OS on 26 May 2025, slightly less than two weeks after the issuance of the 15/5 Demand Letter.

24.  Another exhibit to D’s 2^nd affirmation showed that on 28 May 2025, D sent to one Mr Mok of KBC copies of the 15/5 Demand Letter, the “Confirmation of Loan Repayment and Interest” of the 2025 Loan, the Signed Form and the OS by WhatsApp. It is fair to say that D had referred to her version of the Oral Agreement and how the Signed Form was signed in the relevant text messages. However, D did not explicitly inform Mr Mok when the early full repayment of the 2025 Loan to P could be made in those disclosed WhatsApp texts. D also mentioned that the 15/5 Demand Letter was not immediately responded to because it fell to the bottom of her drawer and she could only locate it on around 27 or 28 May 2025.

25.  On 2 June 2025, KBC wrote a letter to TKC, indicating that D wanted to be released/discharged from the Mortgage (“the 2/6 KBC Letter”). KBC requested TKC to send them the title deeds relating to the mortgaged property and let them know the amount payable to P upon the release/discharge of the property “calculated up to 2 July 2025”. An authorization from D was enclosed to the letter.

26.  On 12 June 2025, TKC responded to KBC by saying that the total amount of principal and interest payable under the 2025 Loan, on or before 2 July 2025, should be HK$1,445,937. In addition, TKC said D should be responsible for the separate sums of HK$3,800 (being TKC’s costs in preparing the Receipt/Discharge instrument) and HK$23,000 (being TKC’s costs in commencing the present proceedings up to that stage – including the costs of a Notice of Discontinuance which would be filed after receipt of the redemption money). This letter will be called “the 12/6 TKC Letter” in the following.

27.  D ultimately delivered a cashier’s order to P at around 5:27pm on 31 July 2025, for which a “Temporary Receipt” was issued by P to D. The amount paid was, however, HK$1,422,088.48, i.e., the sum demanded in the 15/5 Demand Letter which included interest accrued up to 13 May 2025 only, but not the aggregate of the latest sums set out in the 12/6 TKC Letter.

28.  This meant that D did not intend to settle any additional interest accrued after 13 May 2025 and the legal costs requested in the 12/6 TKC Letter (assuming P is entitled to them). This difference explains why parties still need to litigate this matter in year 2026.

29.  The cashier’s order was banked in with fund transferred the next day, i.e., 1 August 2025. While parties apparently have a slight dispute as to when the repayment became effective, for simplicity’s sake I will just refer to the repayment as being “on around 31 July 2025”.

D.  GROUNDS OF OPPOSITION TO OS

30.  D primarily relies on the Oral Agreement to resist the OS. It is D’s position that P is estopped, under the principle of promissory estoppel, from enforcing its full rights under the agreement for the 2025 Loan and the Mortgage by reason of D’s signing of the Signed Form and her making of the Oral Agreement with Ms Leung on 23 April 2025. Apparently, the subsequent Telephone Conversation with Mr Lam is also relied on for this defence. D contends that by reason of such history, she had no default on her part. Two consequences are said to follow from that position:

30.1.  D was not required to pay the instalment on 27 April 2025 and the next instalment would only be due on 27 May 2025. Hence, the filing of the OS on 26 May 2025 was premature; and

30.2.  Clause 5 of the facility agreement for the 2025 Loan provides for a “default interest” to be paid from the date of default. The timing of the occurrence of the alleged default would affect the calculation of the sum to be claimed by P.

31.  D further relies on s.19(1) of the Money Lenders Ordinance (“MLO”) (Cap. 163), which requires a money lender to supply to the borrower a statement signed by the money lender consisting of various items of information upon the borrower’s “demand in writing”. In this connection, several challenges against P’s documentation were made; they will be set out in greater detail in Section G below.

32.  The duty under MLO s.19(1) is relevant because, under MLO s.19(4), a money lender which fails without reasonable excuse to comply with the borrower’s demand for a statement shall not, so long as the default continues, be entitled to sue for or recover any sum due under the agreement on account either of principal or interest, and interest shall not be chargeable in respect of the period of default.

E.  PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESENT DISPUTE

33.  Before I proceed to consider each of D’s grounds of opposition, it is necessary to understand how these grounds are related to P’s outstanding claim.

34.  First, D’s argument about P’s premature commencement of proceedings does not provide a substantive defence to P’s claim, especially when part of the outstanding claim relates to interests accrued after the date of the OS (i.e., 26 May 2025) till now. Prematurity of legal action can at most feature in the Court’s consideration of what is a proper costs order in case the OS is allowed.

35.  Secondly, while D says that P’s entitlement to “default interest” is disputed because D had no default, D has not set out what amount within the outstanding claim (HK$38,261.63 plus daily interest of HK$13.10 from 1 August 2025) should be deducted if her argument of promissory estoppel succeeds; neither has she set out the extent of suspension of interest the Court should arrive at if her MLO argument succeeds. From this Court’s reading of the latest calculation of the outstanding amount presented by P’s side (exhibit WMY-18), such “default interest” (or “overdue interest”) was only around HK$491.31 as matters stood on 1 August 2025. The outstanding claim is, in fact, about the outstanding principal because the repayment on 31 July 2025 (of HK$1,422,088.48) was applied to settle the then outstanding “general/default interest” first. But certainly, if P was actually not entitled to any “default interest” as at 1 August 2025, the relevant part of the repayment should have been contributed to further deduction of the outstanding principal instead.

36.  This Court has not seen or heard any argument from D that she does not even need to pay the “general interest” of the 2025 Loan from either 15 May 2025 (date of the Demand Letter) or 27 May 2025 (the subsequent instalment date) to 31 July 2025 (the date she made the repayment) at the contractual rate of 12.50% per annum. On one view, it seems D does not dispute P’s entitlement to any “general interest” at all.

37.  At first sight, litigating a sum of HK$38,261.63 plus daily interest of HK$13.10 from 1 August 2025, so substantively in the District Court, is already quite disproportional. Looking deeper into the case, the disproportionality is even more drastic as the real difference between the parties, leaving aside the dispute on legal costs, can be as low as a few hundred Hong Kong dollars of “default/overdue interest” only. This Court is doubtful if the parties, and those advising them, had really drawn their minds to the true extent of this dispute, in money’s terms, before they moved on to incur more legal costs.

38.  In any event, when D argues on promissory estoppel and the “suspension” of P’s right to sue/recover principal and interest under MLO s.19(4), the interest accrued in the period from 27 April 2025 (the date P says D first failed to repay monthly instalment) to 13 May 2025 does not matter, for such interest has already been paid. The dispute of the present case actually goes to the extent of P’s interest entitlement since 14 May 2025 and whether, after taking into account such entitlement, D had sufficiently repaid P by the repayment on around 31 July 2025.

F.  PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

39.  P had an original contractual right to be paid an instalment by D on 27 April 2025. As there was no consideration moving from D to P in respect of the alleged Oral Agreement (no amount of handling fee had been actually agreed or paid even under D’s case), the Oral Agreement cannot take effect as an actual contract variation. D can at best rely on its existence as a basis of promissory estoppel to suspend P’s rights under the agreement for the 2025 Loan.

40.  Parties do not appear to differ on the legal principles about promissory estoppel. They are thus not repeated in this judgment. Parties’ difference only lies on how the principles should be applied to the facts of this case. I will therefore go directly to the substantive analyses of the different limbs of this equitable defence.  

F1.  Any Promise?

41.  For the present purpose, let us assume Ms Leung indeed told D on 23 April 2025 that she could skip the instalment repayment on 27 April 2025, repay “in one go” when the full amount covering all outstanding principal and interest would be transferred to P and such arrangement would not cause P to treat the non-payment on 27 April 2025 as an “event of default”.

42.  From a reading of D’s affirmations and submissions, it is however unclear what such a representation from Ms Leung meant to D:- 

42.1.  Did it mean P had agreed that no more “general interest”, or just no “default interest”, would accrue after 27 April 2025 until D confirmed the date of repayment or actually made the full repayment?

42.2.  Or did it mean “general interest”, or even “default interest”, would still be accruing after the non-payment on 27 April 2025 but it would be suspended after D was able to confirm her date of full repayment until the date of full repayment? 

42.3.  Or did it mean any other right P has against D under the agreement of the 2025 Loan (such as a right to sue to recover the outstanding amount) would be suspended from 23 April 2025 or 27 April 2025? But if that was the meaning, until when would the suspension last?

43.  In fact, there is no evidence that D had ever communicated to Ms Leung, in writing or orally, any targeted date of repayment – not even an estimated date of repayment was provided. According to D’s affirmations, she only had a planned repayment date of 22 May 2025 in her mind; she did not say it was communicated to Ms Leung. At the end, the evidence shows that D only managed to obtain a loan offer from another financial institution to assist her repayment of the 2025 Loan in late May 2025. The actual repayment only took place on or around 31 July 2025.

44.  In such circumstances, even if Ms Leung had indicated on 23 April 2025 that the instalment repayment on 27 April 2025 could be skipped for the indebtedness to be repaid in one go, there could not have been any effective representation from P to D that P’s right to demand repayment and any of its interest entitlement would be suspended until an uncertain future date.

45.  Leaving aside the lack of any clear indication of what D understood to be the effect of Ms Leung’s alleged representation, such a notion of an “indefinite” suspension of P’s right is itself highly improbable and unbelievable:

45.1.  There was no commercial sense for P to agree to suspend its rights when not even a proposed date of repayment was known;

45.2.  The Signed Form contained a specific section for the borrower, an applicant for early full repayment of loan, to indicate when the repayment would be made. In the light of such documentary evidence, P could not have possibly ignored this factor and represented to D that P’s right would be “indefinitely” suspended; and

45.3.  As P’s solicitors rightly pointed out, both the facility letter of the 2025 Loan (Clause 6(3)) and the Mortgage (Clause 2.01) actually contained a provision for P’s unconditional right to demand repayment of all outstanding indebtedness at any time even without default on D’s part. The existence of such “Demand Right” is fundamentally at odds with any “indefinite” suspension of P’s rights. The reality is that P did not even need to establish a “default” on D’s part in order to sue for recovery of the outstanding loan and be entitled to “general interest”.

46.  By the same token, I am unable to derive from the Telephone Conversation between Mr Lam and D any representation that can operate in favour of D’s case of promissory estoppel. D only provided estimated repayment date (28-29 May 2025, which did not hold good at the end), to which Mr Lam simply said that would be “okay”. Mr Lam did not make reference to any substantive rights of P under the agreement of the 2025 Loan. Even on D’s own version, that conversation does not assist her case.

47.  In my judgment, even taking D’s case to its highest, there was no clear or unambiguous representation/assurance from P’s side to enable D’s purported defence of promissory estoppel to get off the ground.

F2.  Any Detrimental Reliance?

48.  There was also plainly no detrimental reliance. D affirmed that she had received the 15/5 Demand Letter, which clarified that “general interest” and “default interest” were still accruing after 27 April 2025. D later chose to pay interest accrued up to 13 May 2025.

49.  D’s former counsel submitted in the hearing on 9 April 2026 that the time of assessment of detriment/prejudice is when the promise is withdrawn. This, in my view, is correct. If D said she had been led/misled by Ms Leung to believe that she would not be sued by reason of the non-payment on 27 April 2025 and there would be no accrual of any general/default interest as a result of that non-payment, the “prejudice” she had in believing so would include P’s asserted interest entitlement from 27 April 2025 to around 14 May 2025.   

50.  Ironically, D chose to pay the interest accrued from 27 April 2025 to 13 May 2025, including default interest of HK$86.99 (see the breakdown in the 15/5 Demand Letter), which fell within such “prejudice” part of her own case. It is difficult for the Court to accept that there was any detrimental reliance when D has chosen to repay something she apparently suggested to be detrimental. D did try to explain she repaid that relevant sum on around 31 July 2025 because of a voluntary lawyer’s advice at a District Office. I do not find that to be relevant. That lawyer could not possibly control the precise sum D repaid to P and might not have all the information about D’s case. It was always for D to decide how much she should repay and the rationale behind it.

51.  D also mentioned other aspects of “prejudice” such as her engagement of KBC and gathering of funds to repay. They cannot be any “prejudice”. D needed to engage solicitors and gather funds to repay anyway if she wanted to repay the 2025 Loan and get her property released from the Mortgage in favour of P. These acts did not arise from the Oral Agreement, the Signed Form or any conversation she had with Ms Leung and/or Mr Lam. They arose from D’s original desire to end her borrowing from P.

52.  As mentioned by P’s solicitors in one of their written submissions, the 15/5 Demand Letter represented a fresh exercise of the “Demand Right”. Cutting to the chase, what D tried to establish in this case was that the Oral Agreement on 23 April 2025 had the effect of depriving P’s rights not just temporarily, but also after 15 May 2025 notwithstanding the 15/5 Demand Letter, as if the Oral Agreement constituted a binding and irrevocable contract between the parties. This must be firmly rejected – as aforesaid, there was no consideration moving from D to P, and the Oral Agreement itself was devoid of certainty in its terms.  

53.  The OS was later served on D on around 26 May 2025, making P’s position even clearer. When D by the 2/6 KBC Letter requested to be advised of the total amount of indebtedness calculated up to 2 July 2025, it became even harder for D to claim that she still harboured any belief, arising from the Oral Agreement, that P’s rights (including any interest entitlement) would be suspended.

54.  In both her affirmations and submissions, D mentioned that the 2/6 KBC Letter was issued without her authorization. As KBC was no doubt D’s agent in handling this matter in June 2025, KBC must have apparent authority and the Court ought to analyze this case on that basis. D’s grievance against KBC should not be a factor featuring in my analysis of the present case.

F3.  Conclusion on Promissory Estoppel

55.  After all, there is no evidence that D did not repay earlier than 31 July 2025 because of the Oral Agreement or anything P’s side told her. It is unsure why D could not immediately repay P after her execution of the Dah Sing Bank facility letter and why she could not repay even after the date of 2 July 2025 suggested in the 2/6 KBC Letter.   

56.  There is nothing inequitable for P to be paid general interest of 12.50% per annum on or before 31 July 2025. The rate is applicable whether D was in default or not. It is also equitable for D to pay default interest accrued after 14 May 2025 because there was no clear/unambiguous representation from Ms Leung in the first place (even on D’s case) and there was no detrimental reliance. In any event, the 15/5 Demand Letter, which D said she had timely received (just it was misplaced by her until around 27 or 28 May 2025), made it clear that P would exercise its rights against D to claim default interest and there could be no misunderstanding that should D continue not repaying, P would sue D for the outstanding principal and interest (including default interest) under the 2025 Loan.

G.  COMPLIANCE WITH MLO

57.  The MLO argument can be more quickly disposed of. I accept P’s argument that for the effect of MLO s.19(4) to kick in, a written demand from the borrower is required and D is unable to point to any in the present case. The 2/6 KBC Letter cannot serve that purpose. In that letter, KBC on behalf of D only requested to be advised of the outstanding amount under the 2025 Loan for D to use her funds to repay. It did not draw reference to MLO s.19(1) or any particular items under that subsection other than the outstanding amount.

58.  Moreover, P has replied to the 2/6 KBC Letter by the 12/6 TKC Letter. Even though the reply was not in the specific format required under MLO s.19(1), it is obvious that the information requested in the 2/6 KBC Letter was provided and D should have no difficulty to understand the amount she had to repay should repayment occur on 2 July 2025.  Even if MLO s.19 is applicable, I would also say in these circumstances, P had a reasonable excuse in not complying with any demand technically. One should also take note of the various “Statements Records Showing the Amount Due” exhibited to P’s affirmations at different stages of the proceedings (e.g., WMY-9 and WMY-10 produced on 11 July 2025 and WMY-18 produced on 23 March 2026). In fact, before the repayment on around 31 July 2025, there was already information showing how the general/default interests P set out in the 15/5 Demand Letter and the OS were arrived at. The exhibits produced on 11 July 2025 also served to respond to another letter from KBC dated 13 June 2025 requesting breakdown of principal and interest in a timely manner.

59.  In her written submissions prepared in person for the hearing on 30 April 2026, D made a point that the number of repayment instalments for the 2025 Loan was “unilaterally changed” to 360 without her consent. However, the “Confirmation of Loan Repayment and Interest” for the 2025 Loan dated 27 January 2025 contains her signature on every page and a schedule showing 360 months of repayment is clearly shown there. D has not mentioned in any affirmation that the agreement for the 2025 Loan was involuntarily entered into; she actually repaid on 27 February 2025 and 27 March 2025 in accordance with this schedule. Nothing turns on this late and unmeritorious allegation.  

60.  D further said in those in-person submissions that the instruments for the 2025 Loan and the prior loans contained no date. This Court has carefully read those documents; what D submitted is not the truth and I can see the relevant dates in the copies of those documents exhibited. Moreover, the situation of the previous loans for years 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 had nothing to do with the present dispute; P needed not produce any “Confirmation” schedule for those previous years. By the same token, I have also found D’s assertion regarding the lack of a receipt for her repayment of interest in January 2025 irrelevant as it should relate to the previous loan starting in January 2024 and repaid by the 2025 Loan.

61.  D also challenges the inconsistency between the amount of daily interest stated in Wong Man Yi’s 1^st affirmation (paragraph 27) (HK$5.12) and the amount stated subsequently (HK$13.10). D should read the documents more carefully.

62.  That 1^st affirmation was produced before the repayment on around 31 July 2025. There, the deponent Ms Wong was setting out the daily “general interest” on the then outstanding principal sum (HK$479.21) and, separately, the daily “default interest” arising from the arrears of interest not paid (HK$5.12). Since the repayment on around 31 July 2025 of HK$1,422,088.48 was applied to settle the outstanding interest ahead of the outstanding principal, the daily interest after 1 August 2025 becomes different (outstanding principal of HK$38,261.63 x 12.50% pa / 365 days = around HK$13.10).

63.  None of the grounds related to MLO or set out more specifically in D’s in-person submission for 30 April 2026 has substance.  

H.  FILING OF OS PREMATURE?

64.  By reason that P had issued the 15/5 Demand Letter to advise D of its positions on D’s liability to repay and P’s entitlement to interest, I do not think P filed the OS prematurely. In fact, the repayment did not arrive at P until over 2 months after the service of the OS. The filing of the OS was necessary by reason of D’s inaction to the 15/5 Demand Letter, and it was obviously instrumental to P’s subsequent receipt of the repayment. After the repayment on around 31 July 2025, P needed/needs to continue with the proceedings because D has still failed to fully repay.

65.  In fact, from P’s angle, the information most favourable to D, which was known to P on around 26 May 2025, was that (i) D submitted a Signed Form to request early full repayment of the 2025 Loan on 23 April 2025 and (ii) in the Telephone Conversation D indicated the repayment date might be 28-29 May 2025 (but it was not confirmed in writing and no payment was received on those days after all). On the basis of such information, some money lenders may choose to further communicate and ascertain the repayment date before instituting legal proceedings. However, this Court is unable to say such further communication and ascertainment is anything required by the laws.

66.  There are something P could have done better, e.g. (i) they could have disclosed the existence of the Signed Form at an earlier juncture of the proceedings before D’s defence came out by her 1^st affirmation; and (ii) they could have got the “Statement Records Showing the Amount Due” (e.g., WMY-9 – which was produced on 11 July 2025) ready earlier and served it together with the OS when it was issued in May 2025. That said, I am unable to say those shortcomings are abuse of process in nature or should have caused P to delay commencement of proceedings. I accept the submissions from P’s solicitors that, in a way, their choice of issuing just the OS but not the supporting affirmation on 26 May 2025 would have been more conducive to an early settlement of the action – they were just trying to incur less costs before further costs became necessary. There is nothing in this case which should cause me to depart from the general principle that costs should follow the event.

I.  CONCLUSION AND COSTS

67.  I have found none of D’s proposed defence arguable. Reliefs should be granted to P summarily. There is no real factual issue in this case warranting cross-examination of affirmation deponents. Even accepting D’s factual assertions, her case is still bound to fail.

68.  I allow the reliefs sought in the Notice of Appointment placed before Master Lee in February 2026 (which modified those sought in the OS as a result of subsequent development). I order as follows:

68.1.  The XXN Summons be dismissed;

68.2.  D shall pay P the sum of HK$38,261.63, together with daily interest on the same sum at the rate of HK$13.10 (i.e. 12.50% per annum) for the period from 1 August 2025 until the date of full payment. Such payment is secured by the Mortgage dated 15 January 2021;

68.3.  D shall, within 28 days after service upon her of the present order, deliver to P vacant possession of the property pledged by the said Mortgage, namely ALL THOSE 5 equal undivided 82,533^rd parts or shares of and in ALL THAT piece or parcel of ground registered in the Land Registry as THE REMAINING PORTION OF TAI PO TOWN LOT NO.183 and of and in the messuages erections and buildings constructed thereon now known as “MONT VERT (嵐山)”, No.9 Fung Yuen Road, Tai Po, New Territories (“the Development”) TOGETHER with the sole and exclusive right and privilege to hold use occupy and enjoy ALL THAT RESIDENTIAL PARKING SPACE NO.P046 on the BASEMENT FLOOR of the Development (“Mortgaged Property”);

68.4.  Upon D paying to P all the money ordered to be paid herein and all other moneys (if any) secured to P by the same Mortgage, P (subject and without prejudice to the due exercise of any power of sale for the time being vested in it) shall redeliver to D possession of the Mortgaged Property and release to D the security constituted by the said Mortgage as D may agree or this Court may further direct;

68.5.  D shall pay P the costs of these proceedings, including the costs reserved by Master Lee in previous hearings of this case and by this Court on 9 April 2026;

68.6.  In accordance with Clause 21.01(b) of the Mortgage, such costs should be taxed on solicitor-and-client basis if parties are unable to agree on the relevant amount;

68.7.  The aforesaid costs order is granted on a nisi basis and it will become absolute automatically if no party seeks to vary it within 14 days from the date hereof; and

68.8.  There be liberty to apply.

69.  As mentioned by this Court in the previous hearing on 9 April 2026, the legal costs of these proceedings are likely to be wholly disproportional to the financial interest of concern. Proceedings begun by OS do not usually have the benefit of a mediation protocol or case settlement conference. Parties’ legal representatives have a greater role in testing the realities of such disputes. Lawyers handling this type of proceedings should seriously assess how a legal argument would actually impact on their clients’ financial interest (even if the point is truly arguable), before they raise the argument in formal litigation documents and let it drive up the costs of the proceedings. Lawyers must always act in the best interest of their clients.