GINI INDRAWATI AND OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD AND ANOTHER

HCAL 2106/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3802

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2106 of 2020

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicants in open court;

1.  On this court’s own motion, “Gini Indrawati” be named as the 1^st applicant, the names of the 2^nd to 5^th applicants be amended to “Gini Indrawati Donnie Parvaiz (a minor) by Gini Indrawati, his next friend”, “Gini Indrawati Danniel Parvaiz (a minor) by Gini Indrawati, his next friend”, “Gini Indrawati Dannies Parvaiz (a minor) by Gini Indrawati, his next friend”, and “Gini Indrawati Azril Dhani Parvaiz (a minor) by Gini Indrawati, his next friend” respectively, the names of the putative respondents be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” as the 1^st putative respondent and “Director of Immigration” as the 2^nd putative respondent, and the decisions in respect of which relief is sought be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 16 January 2020 in respect of the 1^st to 4^th applicants” and “Director of Immigration’s decision dated 25 November 2019 in respect of the 5^th applicant”.

2.  The 1^st and 5^th applicants’ application for extension of time to file the application for leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

3.  Extension of time be granted to the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants to file the application for leave to apply for judicial review on 21 October 2020.

4.  The 1^st applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 16 January 2020 be dismissed.

5.  The 5^th applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Director of Immigration’s decision dated 25 November 2019 be dismissed.

6.  Leave granted to the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 16 January 2020.

7.  The 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants are directed to issue an originating summons for the intended judicial review on or before 29 July 2026 pursuant to Order 53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.

Observations for the applicants:

The Leave Application

1.  By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 21 October 2020, the applicants applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 16 January 2020 (“the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision”).

2.  The Board’s A1 to A4 Decision was only made in respect of the 1^st to 4^th applicants’ appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 29 March 2018 (“the Director’s A1 to A4 Decision”).

3.  As to the 5^th applicant’s case, his appeal/petition against the Director’s decision dated 25 November 2019 (“the Director’s A5 Decision”) had not yet been determined by the Board when the Leave Application was filed. The Board’s decision concerning the 5^th applicant’s appeal/petition against the Director’s A5 Decision was only made on 9 February 2022 (the Board’s A5 Decision”), more than 15 months after the Leave Application was filed.

4.  In a handwritten letter dated 21 October 2020 attached to Form 86, the 1^st applicant stated that she would like to add the 5^th applicant in the Leave Application. However, when the Leave Application was filed, only the Director’s A5 Decision was made. The Board’s A5 Decision was not yet in existence.

5.  As held by the Court of Appeal in Dangaran Meynard Gaspar v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2026] HKCA 871, “A judicial review cannot possibly be mounted against any decision which had not yet come into existence at the time of the Leave Application.”  Thus, the Board’s A5 Decision, which was non-existent when the Leave Application was filed, cannot be the subject matter of the Leave Application.

6.  Since the 1^st applicant would like to add the 5^th applicant in the Leave Application, the Leave Application regarding the 5^th applicant could only be made in respect of the Director’s A5 Decision.

7.  In the circumstances, the decisions in respect of which relief is sought are the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision and the Director’s A5 Decision. The Board’s A1 to A4 Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL002106_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

8.  The Board found that the 1^st and 2^nd applicants’ claims for non-refoulement protection were not made out on the grounds of BOR 2 Risk[1], BOR 3 Risk[2] and Persecution Risk[3] under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”), while the 3^rd and 4^th applicants’ claims were not made out on any of the applicable grounds under the USM, including Torture Risk[4], BOR 2 Risk, BOR 3 Risk and Persecution Risk.

9.  Accordingly, the Board confirmed the Director’s A1 to A4 Decision, which rejected the 1^st and 2^nd applicants’ non-refoulement claims on the grounds of BOR 2 Risk, BOR 3 Risk and Persecution Risk, and the 3^rd and 4^th applicants’ non-refoulement claims on all the applicable grounds under the USM.

10.  The 1^st and 2^nd applicants had previously made a torture claim and their claims were rejected by the Director on 25 May 2012. Their appeals against the Director’s said decision were dismissed by the Board on 11 July 2012. Thus, the Torture Risk of the 1^st and 2^nd applicants had been finally determined and it was not necessary for the Board to assess their Torture Risk again in the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision.

Amendments

11.  The applicants are a mother and her 4 sons born in Hong Kong with the same Pakistani father.

12.  In Form 86, the applicants’ names were not stated in proper sequence. For the avoidance of confusion and for ease of reference, the names of the 1^st to 4^th applicants should be re-arranged in the same order as they appeared in the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision. The applicant who is not included in the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision should be named as the 5^th applicant.

13.  Thus, on this court’s own motion, Gini Indrawati, the mother of the other applicants, is named as the 1^st applicant.

14.  All the remaining applicants are represented by the 1^st applicant as their next friend. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the names of the 2^nd to 5^th applicants are amended to “Gini Indrawati Donnie Parvaiz (a minor) by Gini Indrawati, his next friend”, “Gini Indrawati Danniel Parvaiz (a minor) by Gini Indrawati, his next friend”, “Gini Indrawati Dannies Parvaiz (a minor) by Gini Indrawati, his next friend”, and “Gini Indrawati Azril Dhani Parvaiz (a minor) by Gini Indrawati, his next friend” respectively.

15.  The applicants named “The Turture Claims Appeal board / non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office” as the sole putative respondent in Form 86. As aforesaid, the Leave Application regarding the 1^st to 4^th applicants should be in respect of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision, whereas the Leave Application concerning the 5^th applicant can only be in respect of the Director’s A5 Decision.

16.  The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.

17.  In view of this, the Board should be named as the 1^st putative respondent, and the Director should be named as the 2^nd putative respondent. Accordingly, the names of the putative respondents are so amended on this court’s own motion.

18.  As aforesaid, the decision in respect of which relief is sought in the Leave Application regarding the 1^st to 4^th applicants should be the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision, and the decision in respect of which relief is sought in the Leave Application regarding the 5^th applicant should be the Director’s A5 Decision.

19.  Thus, on this court’s own motion, the decisions in respect of which relief is sought in the Leave Application are amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 16 January 2020 in respect of the 1^st to 4^th applicants” and “Director of Immigration’s decision dated 25 November 2019 in respect of the 5^th applicant”.

Legal representation of the 2^nd to 5^th applicants

20.  As said, the 1^st applicant is the mother of the 2^nd to 5^th applicants. The 2^nd to 5^th applicants are all minors, born out of wedlock in Hong Kong on 9 April 2010, 28 December 2012, 19 December 2014 and 18 October 2018 respectively. They are all represented by the 1^st applicant as their next friend in the Leave Application.

21.  The 1^st applicant applied for legal aid for herself and the 2^nd to 5^th applicants. However, all their applications were refused by the Director of Legal Aid on 26 March 2026.

22.  At the hearing before this court on 25 June 2026, the 1^st applicant confirmed that she would not engage any private lawyer to represent the 2^nd to 5^th applicants.

23.  As the 2^nd to 5^th applicants were legally represented before the Director and no new evidence would be advanced in the Leave Application, this court considered that the lack of legal representation for the 2^nd to 5^th applicants in the Leave Application was a mere irregularity and it would not prejudice them. Hence, this court waived the irregularity and proceeded to deal with the Leave Application.

Late application

24.  By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, the applicants had to make the Leave Application within 3 months when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision and the Director’s A5 Decision were made.

25.  However, the applicants filed Form 86 on 21 October 2020, which was more than 9 months after the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision (made on 16 January 2020), and more than 10 months after the Director’s A5 Decision (made on 25 November 2019). The 1^st to 4^th applicants and the 5^th applicant were hence late for more than 6 and 7 months respectively in making the Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good reason to extend the time for the applicants to make the Leave Application.

26.  As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria for granting an extension of time are:

(i)  the length of the delay;

(ii)  the reason for the delay;

(iii)  the merits of the intended application; and

(iv)  any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration.

27.  The applicants did not explicitly make an application for extension of time when they filed the Leave Application. However, the 1^st applicant did give her reason for late filing of the application in Form 86 and also in her letter dated 21 October 2020 which was annexed to Form 86. This court will treat it as an application for extension of time to file the Leave Application.

28.  The 1^st applicant stated in Form 86 that she did not understand that she needed to go to High Court and to pay some money to make the Leave Application until she was told by the Immigration / someone in the cafeteria of the Immigration, and she started to save money to file the Leave Application.

29.  At the oral hearing before this court on 25 June 2026, the applicants did not provide any further explanation for the delay.

30.  The 1^st to 4^th applicants’ Leave Application was more than 6 months late, which is significant, and the explanations given by the 1^st applicant in said letter dated 21 October 2020 were clearly not satisfactory. Ignorance of the court’s procedures is generally not an excuse.

31.  However, the merit of the intended application is an important consideration when this court decides whether extension of time should be granted for the applicants to file the Leave Application. For reasons to be elaborated below, there is no merit of the 1^st applicant’s intended judicial review at all. Thus, this court is not prepared to extend the time for the 1^st applicant to file the Leave Application.

32.  However, this court is of the view that the cases for the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants are reasonably arguable as discussed below. Thus, this court will grant an extension of time for the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants to file the Leave Application in respect of them out of time on 21 October 2020.

33.  As to the 5^th applicant’s case, his intended judicial review is wholly devoid of merits as discussed below. In the circumstances, this court will not allow his application for extension of time to file the Leave Application.

34.  Thus, the Leave Application concerning the 1^st and 5^th applicants can be dismissed for being made out of time alone. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, this court will discuss the merits of each of the applicants’ cases below.

The applicants’ case

35.  It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicants’ case here as the same were set out in the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above. The 5^th applicant’s case was basically the same as the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants who are his 3 elder brothers with the same father.

36.  In sum, the 1^st applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Indonesia, she would face harm or even be killed by Mr Iqbal (“Iqbal”) as the 1^st applicant had refused to marry him. The 1^st applicant claimed that Iqbal had threatened to kill her and her child/children.

37.  The 1^st applicant also claimed that both she and her children, ie the 2^nd to 5^th applicants, would face discrimination from the community, as the 2^nd to 5^th applicants were born out of wedlock. The biological father of the 2^nd to 5^th applicants was a Pakistani whom the 1^st applicant met in Hong Kong and had returned to Pakistan. Thus, the 2^nd to 5^th applicants also faced discrimination as children of mixed-race ethnicity.

Oral hearing

38.  The applicants requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application and their case was heard on 25 June 2026.

39.  As aforesaid, the 2^nd to 5^th applicants are minors and were represented by their mother, ie the 1^st applicant, at the hearing.

40.  When this court asked the applicants for the grounds of their intended judicial review, the 1^st applicant merely replied that she and all the other applicants would rely on what were stated in her letter dated 21 October 2020. The 1^st applicant only added that she was forced to marry in Indonesia and she refused the arrangement, she escaped to Singapore and the family would kill her if she refused to get married.

41.  In respect of the cases of the 2^nd to 5^th applicants, the 1^st applicant confirmed that they were all born out of wedlock with the same father. Their Pakistani father had returned to Pakistan and had already passed away. The 1^st applicant claimed that the 2^nd to 5^th applicants would also be killed by the man who proposed to marry her. Moreover, as illegitimate children of mixed-race ethnicity, they would face bully and discrimination if they were returned to Indonesia.

42.  Lastly, the 1^st applicant said that she did not know if the 2^nd to 5^th applicants could obtain Indonesian citizenship and she asked that she and her children be allowed to remain in Hong Kong for their safety.

Grounds for judicial review

43.  The applicants are required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

44.  As aforesaid, the applicants relied on the grounds stated in the said letter annexed to their Form 86, where the 1^st applicant stated that she wanted to appeal because “they” (taken to mean the Board and the Director) did not consider about what would happen to her sons if she brought them back to Indonesia. Their lives would be in danger and it would be like bringing them to their graves. Her sons and herself would be in danger because Iqbal said he would kill the 1^st applicant and her sons if he saw them, and the 1^st applicant knew he would do what he said. The 1^st applicant claimed that they have the right to live.

45.  The 1^st applicant also mentioned at the oral hearing that the 2^nd to 5^th applicants were all born out of wedlock, they would be killed by the man who proposed to marry her. Moreover, as illegitimate children of mixed-race ethnicity, they would face bully and discrimination if they were returned to Indonesia. The 1^st applicant also said that she was not sure if the 2^nd to 5^th applicants could obtain Indonesian citizenship.

Discussion

46.  This court will first deal with the 5^th applicant’s case.

47.  As aforesaid, the Board’s A5 Decision was only made after the Leave Application was filed and cannot be one of the subject matters of the Leave Application. Thus, the 5^th applicant could only make the Leave Application in respect of the Director’s A5 Decision.

48.  As held by the Court of Appeal in Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549, only the Board’s A5 Decision is reviewable by judicial process and not the Director’s A5 Decision. There are established statutory procedures of appeal from the Director to the Board and the 5^th applicant had in fact invoked those procedures. The Director’s A5 Decision was superseded by the Board’s A5 Decision and is no longer susceptible to judicial review.

49.  Thus, the 5^th applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Director’s A5 Decision is dismissed for lack of merits and also for being made out of time.

50.  This court will further consider the Leave Application in respect of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision concerning the 1^st to 4^th applicants’ cases only.

51.  First of all, this court notes that at the time of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision, the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants were minors. They were not legally represented at the Board’s hearing and was only represented by their mother, ie the 1^st applicant. Thus, with the lack of legal representation, it was possible that the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants’ own cases might not have been properly presented to the Board for its consideration.

52.  The Board did not make separate consideration for each of them in the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision. It could be that their claims were based on the same set of primary facts asserted by the 1^st applicant, but it is still wrong not to give consideration to their personal circumstances separately.

53.  As held by the Court of Appeal in Fabio Arlyn Timogan and Ors v Evan Ruth and Anor [2020] HKCA 971:-

“Even if the claims were based on the same set of primary facts, it would be an error of law if the decision-maker simply decided all the claims as if they were one composite claim without giving separate consideration to the personal circumstances of each claimant separately. It does not necessarily follow from the dismissal of the claim by a parent that the children’s claims could be dismissed without further consideration of their personal situations”.

54.  As can be seen from paragraph 58 to the first half of paragraph 61 of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision, the Board rejected the 1^st applicant’s claimed fear of Iqbal, and the social stigma and discrimination that the 1^st applicant faced would amount to any of the proscribed forms of harm. The Board then stated in the second half of paragraph 61 as follows:-

“Similarly, the Board accepts that the second, third and fourth named Appellants may be labelled as illegitimate and experience some social discrimination as children born out of wedlock, however it does not accept such treatment constitutes any of the proscribed forms of harm”.

55.  The Board then concluded that there was not a real risk the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants would face any of the proscribed forms of harm should they return to Indonesia.

56.  The above-quoted paragraph was the only part of the Board’s Decision where the Board considered the risks faced by the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants separately from the 1^st applicant. Clearly, the Board had only considered the discrimination or social stigma they would face as children born out of wedlock.

57.  However, the Board was fully aware that they were also of mixed-race ethnicity when their cases were assessed (see paragraphs 51 of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision). Nevertheless, the Board did not separately consider the difficulties and/or discrimination they might face upon refoulement as children of mixed-race.

58.  As held in Re Shahul Hameed Beer Mohamed and Others, 08/04/2026, CACV 77/2024, [2026] HKCA 632 and Re Bantigue Susan Banes and Another, 29/09/2025, CACV 234/2024, [2025] HKCA 853, the Board should have considered the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants’ unique situation as children of mixed-race, which might be a cause for discrimination. It is therefore arguable that the Board had failed to give adequate consideration to the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants’ claims under the principles as set out in the aforesaid cases.

59.  Thus, it is this court’s view that the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants’ cases for the intended judicial review are arguable and leave should be granted to them to apply for judicial review in respect of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision concerning their own cases.

60.  For the sake of completeness, this court notes that the 1^st applicant asserted at the oral hearing before this court that she did not know if the 2^nd to 5^th applicants could obtain Indonesian citizenship. However, this assertion was not placed before the Director and the Board for assessment when the Director and the Board were assessing the cases for all the applicants. In fact, in the Director’s A1 to A4 Decision, the Director’s A5 Decision, the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision and the Board’s A5 Decision, all the applicants’ cases were assessed on the basis that they were nationals of Indonesia.

61.  In any event, the Court of Appeal has held in Trinh Thuy Huyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1090 that the Board had no duty to make investigation into any matter without the applicant raising it and it should not be considered by this court at this stage. Thus, the issue of whether the 2^nd to 5^th applicants could obtain Indonesian citizenship cannot amount to any valid grounds for the intended judicial review.

62.  As to the 1^st applicant, her danger from Iqbal and the hardship she might face as a mother with children born out of wedlock had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.

63.  The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

64.  Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the lack of any valid grounds being advanced by the 1^st applicant for her intended judicial review.

65.  In assessing the appeal/petition by the 1^st to 4^th applicants, the Board held an oral hearing on 8 November 2018. The 2^nd to 4^th applicants were represented by the 1^st applicant at the said hearing. However, the adjudicator who conducted the said hearing was unable to complete the 1^st to 4^th applicants’ appeal/petition and their case was re-assigned to another adjudicator, the one who finally made the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision.

66.  The new Board arranged a second hearing on 2 December 2019 to allow the applicants to raise any new issues and clarify any issues that the new adjudicator might have. Although a notice of hearing was sent to the applicants at their last known address and multiple telephone calls were made to the 1^st applicant’s last known telephone number, the applicants were absent at the second hearing.

67.  The Board then wrote to the 1^st applicant on 2 December 2019 inviting written submissions explaining her non-attendance. The Board subsequently made further enquiries with the Director regarding the applicants’ contact details and was advised of a new postal address. Accordingly, the Board resent the letter to the updated address on 6 December 2019. The Board did not receive any response to either letter.

68.  On 30 December 2019, the registered letter dated 6 December 2019 was returned to the Board unclaimed.

69.  The Board then proceeded to determine the applicants’ claims based on all the materials before it, including the recording of the Board’s hearing held on 8 November 2018.

70.  Noting the above-mentioned sequence of events, this court is satisfied that due effort had been made by the new Board to contact the applicants for a second hearing. There is no flaw on the part of the Board to proceed to determine the applicants’ claims on this basis.

71.  The Board had laid out its consideration of the 1^st applicant’s claims in paragraphs 53 to 58 of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision, and it is not necessary for this court to repeat the same here.

72.  In gist, the Board was not satisfied that (1) the 1^st applicant’s parents arranged a marriage between her and Iqbal; (2) the 1^st applicant left Indonesia because she did not want to marry and that as a result her family had to give Iqbal one of their three pieces of land; (3) the 1^st applicant was threatened by Iqbal when she happened to call her friend several years later and Iqbal was by chance also present; and (4) Iqbal visited the 1^st applicant’s family home every day or whenever he had time, to make enquiries about the 1^st applicant or threaten her family.

73.  Despite its findings, the Board also found that even if the 1^st applicant was given the benefit of the doubt and the Board accepted that her parents arranged the marriage to Iqbal in 1999, the Board still found it utterly implausible that Iqbal would have any interest in her, let alone would want to harm or kill her and her children after 20 years. The Board found it unbelievable that Iqbal, whom the 1^st applicant had never laid eyes on and did not appear to actually know, would be pining over the 1^st applicant for a period of two decades.

74.  In any event, the Board found that if the 1^st applicant wished to avoid Iqbal, she could join her family members living in Kalimantan, which was some distance away from her home area. The Board found it viable for the 1^st applicant to return to Indonesia and stay with her siblings who could support her and her children. Further, the Board was of the view that the 1^st applicant would have access to the assistance of non-government organisations that helped women and children in need, in addition to the support of her family (see paragraph 60 of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision).

75.  Thus, the Board considered that there was not a real risk the 1^st applicant would face any of the proscribed forms of harm should she return to Indonesia.

76.  The finding of facts including the assessment of evidence, country of origin information and risk of harm was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion regarding the case for the 1^st applicant.

77.  As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the 1^st applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused in respect of the 1^st applicant.

78.  As aforesaid, the Board has clearly committed an error of law when it failed to give separate consideration to the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants’ claims when they were minors without legal representation at that time, and the harm or discrimination they might face not just as illegitimate children but also as children of mixed-race. The 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants’ cases are therefore reasonably arguable and have realistic prospects of success. Leave should be granted for the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants to apply for judicial review in respect of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision.

Conclusion

79.  For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application in respect of the 1^st applicant regarding the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision, and the 5^th applicant’s application regarding the Director’s A5 Decision, are both dismissed for being made out of time and also for devoid of merits. Leave is granted to the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants to apply for judicial review in respect of the Board’s A1 to A4 Decision.

80.  The 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th applicants are directed to issue an originating summons for the intended judicial review on or before 29 July 2026 pursuant to Order 53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1