VU THANH THUY AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5892 · HCAL 641/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 641/2026
[2026] HKCFI 5892
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 641 OF 2026
BETWEEN
| |Vu Thanh Thuy |1st Applicant |
| |Trinh Ngoc Mai (a minor) |2nd Applicant |
| |by Vu Thanh Thuy, her next friend | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the 2nd applicant being absent |
| |in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The 2nd applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial
review be dismissed.
Observations for the 2nd applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 26 March 2026, the 1st and 2nd
applicants applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 27 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
0641_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. However, the Board’s Decision concerned only the 2nd applicant, not
the 1st applicant. Thus, on 5 August 2026, this court ordered that
the 1st applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed. This court also ordered that the Leave Application in
respect of the 2nd applicant be fixed for an oral hearing pending the
outcome of her legal aid application (see Form CALL-1 dated 5 August
2026).
3. The 2nd applicant’s legal aid application was refused on 7 September
2026, and hence her case was fixed for hearing on 15 October 2026.
However, the 2nd applicant was absent at the hearing on 15 October
2026.
4. The Board found that the 2nd applicant’s non-refoulement claim failed
on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism
(“the USM”). Hence, the Board rejected her appeal/petition against
the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 7
September 2020 (“the Director’s Decision”) and confirmed the same,
which rejected her non-refoulement claim.
5. In the document with the title “Grounds on which relief is sought”,
which was annexed to the applicants’ Form 86, the applicants sought
relief in respect of both the Board’s Decision and the Director’s
Decision.
6. Nevertheless, only the Board’s Decision is reviewable by judicial
process and not the Director’s Decision. There are established
statutory procedures of appeal from the Director to the Board and the
2nd applicant had invoked those procedures. The Director’s Decision
was superseded by the Board’s Decision and is no longer susceptible to
judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549).
7. Thus, this court will deal with the 2nd applicant’s application for
leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision
only.
Legal representation of the 2nd applicant
8. The 2nd applicant is a minor and the 1st applicant appeared on behalf
of the 2nd applicant at the hearing before the Board. The 2nd
applicant was also legally represented when her case was dealt with by
the Board.
9. As the 2nd applicant was legally represented before both the Director
and the Board, and no new evidence would be advanced in the Leave
Application, this court considered that the lack of legal
representation for the 2nd applicant in the Leave Application was a
mere irregularity and it would not prejudice the 2nd applicant.
Hence, this court waived the irregularity and will proceed to deal
with the Leave Application in respect of the 2nd applicant as
discussed below.
Late application
10. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the 2nd applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3
months when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when
the Board’s Decision was made.
11. However, the applicants filed Form 86 on 26 March 2026, which was
almost 2 years and 9 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 27
June 2023). The 2nd applicant was hence late for almost 2 years and 6
months in making the Leave Application, and this court has to consider
whether there is any good reason to extend the time for the 2nd
applicant to make the Leave Application.
12. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
13. The applicants did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when they filed the Leave
Application.
14. A delay of almost 2 years and 6 months is very substantial, and there
is simply no reason for this court to grant an extension of time for
the 2nd applicant to file the Leave Application when no explanation
was given at all. More importantly, there is no merit in the Leave
Application whatsoever as discussed below.
15. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the 2nd applicant to file the Leave
Application. The Leave Application in respect of the 2nd applicant
can therefore be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time
alone.
16. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with
the Leave Application as discussed below.
The 2nd applicant’s case
17. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the 2nd
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
18. In sum, the 2nd applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection
because her life would be in danger if she was sent back to Vietnam as
her parents could not repay a loan to the creditor of her father, and
the creditor or his men would harm and kill the 2nd applicant.
Oral hearing
19. As aforementioned, this court ordered that an oral hearing be fixed to
hear the 2nd applicant’s case pending her application for legal aid.
However, the 2nd applicant and the 1st applicant acting as the 2nd
applicant’s next friend were both absent at the hearing on 15 October
2026.
20. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave
to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of
prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral
hearing of the leave application. The correct approach is to treat
the applicant as having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason
of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave
application on its merits.
21. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the 2nd
applicant’s case based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
22. The 2nd applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
23. The applicants annexed a document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” to their Form 86. This court will treat those
grounds as the 2nd applicant’s grounds for her application. However,
the contents of the said document were all very general and were in
fact used by many applicants in similar applications as their grounds
for applying leave to judicially review the Board’s decisions. It is
like a template for such applicants and they just used the grounds
stated therein without any regard to their own situations.
Nevertheless, this court will still deal with the grounds as discussed
below.
Discussion
24. As mentioned, all the grounds contained in the document with the title
“Grounds on which relief is sought” are very general. Some of the
grounds therein were directed at the Director. As the Director’s
Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is no longer
susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali, supra). This
court will therefore consider only those grounds directed at the Board
in respect of the Board’s Decision.
25. There are a total of 6 paragraphs under the heading “Grounds” in the
applicants’ said document. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the grounds were
directed at the Director. Hence, they could not be used to challenge
the Board’s Decision and can be simply ignored. Thus, only paragraphs
1, 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds are relevant to the Leave Application.
26. In paragraph 1 of the grounds, the 2nd applicant alleged that the
adjudicator of the Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it
was not reasonable and fair as required by the Wednesbury test.
However, the 2nd applicant did not state how or why the Board’s
Decision was wrong, unfair and unreasonable. It does not help the 2nd
applicant to establish any ground by just mentioning the right to life
in paragraph 1 either.
27. In any event, the Board did assess the 2nd applicant’s risk of right
to life, and after careful consideration of the 2nd applicant’s case,
found that there was nothing in the 2nd applicant’s case that
supported her claim under BOR 2[1] if she was refouled to Vietnam.
28. In paragraph 3 of the grounds, the 2nd applicant alleged that the
adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing
too much reliance on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed
to take her personal background and experience into account. However,
the 2nd applicant did not state which aspects of her personal
background and experience had not been taken into account by the
Board.
29. In paragraph 4 of the grounds, the 2nd applicant alleged that the
adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing
whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by her, and
unreasonably required her to respond to questions. This accusation
lacks any particulars in support. The 2nd applicant did not state
which explanations she provided (acted by the 1st applicant) were not
accepted by the Board and which questions she (acted by the 1st
applicant) was unreasonably required to answer.
30. In fact, this allegation could not be true. The 2nd applicant was
legally represented before the Board at the Board’s hearing. If
indeed the Board had unreasonably required her (acted by the 1st
applicant) to respond to questions, her legal representative should
have raised the matter at the Board’s hearing.
31. There was actually nothing wrong for the Board to question the 2nd
applicant (acted by the 1st applicant) extensively to try to
understand her claims better and to assess her accounts of the events
leading to her claim for non-refoulement protection. The questions
were necessary for the Board to fulfil its duty of finding of facts in
relation to the 2nd applicant’s claim. This court finds no fault or
unfairness in the Board’s questioning of the 2nd applicant (acted by
the 1st applicant) at all.
32. In paragraph 6 of the grounds, the 2nd applicant simply alleged that
the adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition and the Board’s
Decision was irrational. There was no particulars or reasons given to
say how or why the Board’s Decision was irrational.
33. The Board had in fact provided a detailed analysis of the 2nd
applicant’s claim and the reasons why the Board concluded that the 2nd
applicant failed on all applicable grounds under the USM to claim non-
refoulement protection. The Board’s rejection of her non-refoulement
claim was a decision made after due consideration of the law and the
evidence placed before it.
34. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
35. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in the 2nd applicant’s
said document could establish any valid ground to challenge the
Board’s Decision when they are so vague and general without any
requisite particulars related to the 2nd applicant’s case.
36. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
37. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the 2nd applicant for
the intended judicial review.
38. In assessing the appeal/petition by the 2nd applicant, the Board held
an oral hearing on 19 May 2023. As said, the 2nd applicant was
legally represented and the 1st applicant appeared on her behalf.
Thus, the 2nd applicant was given the opportunity to present her case
to the Board through her legal representative.
39. In its assessment of the 2nd applicant’s claim, the Board was
cognizant of the principles set down by Fabio[2] (see paragraph 38 of
the Board’s Decision).
40. The Board laid out its assessment of the 2nd applicant’s case on all
the applicable grounds under the USM in paragraphs 37 to 56 of the
Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
41. In gist, the Board found that the 2nd applicant’s case was clearly a
loan dispute between the 2nd applicant’s father and his creditor. The
loan did not involve the 1st applicant, let alone the 2nd applicant.
The Board noted that the 1st applicant entrusted the 2nd applicant’s
paternal grandparents to look after the 2nd applicant’s eldest sister,
who was born in Vietnam, before the 1st applicant left Vietnam. The
2nd applicant’s eldest sister remained living in Vietnam, which
suggested that even if the creditor chased after the 2nd applicant’s
father for repayment of the loan, the creditor did not target the
children. The Board found that it also explained why there was no
fear of the safety of the 2nd applicant’s eldest sister when the 1st
applicant decided to leave her behind in Vietnam under the care of the
2nd applicant’s paternal grandparents.
42. The Board had also considered the 2nd applicant’s counsel’s submission
that if the 2nd applicant was to be returned to Vietnam without her
parents, it would be hard for her to live in Vietnam. However, in
view of the fact that the 2nd applicant’s eldest sister was still
living in Vietnam together with her paternal grandparents, the Board
found that it was not the case that if the 2nd applicant were returned
to Vietnam without her parents, there was no one to look after her.
43. In considering the 1st applicant’s concern that the police in Vietnam
would not help them even if she reported her fear of being harmed by
the creditor to the police because they were corrupt, the Board found
that although COI did suggest that corruption and inefficiency were
common in all levels of the police force, COI also revealed that the
Vietnamese government had recently undergone reforms in order to
combat corruption amongst the police and to improve their efficiency.
44. The Board therefore found that the 2nd applicant was not at risk of
being harmed, ill-treated, tortured or persecuted if she was to return
to Vietnam.
45. On top of its findings as summarised above, the Board also considered
that, if the 2nd applicant was to return to Vietnam with the 1st
applicant, the 1st applicant should have no difficulty to live a
normal life in a province or city other than her own in order to avoid
the creditor of the 2nd applicant’s father. In its consideration of
the viability of internal relocation of the 2nd applicant with the 1st
applicant, the Board had also taken into account the difficulties they
might face, and the availability of assistance, including education
and medical services, that could be rendered to them.
46. Thus, the Board concluded that the 2nd applicant’s claim failed on all
the applicable grounds under the USM.
47. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was
entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
48. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
49. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the 2nd applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
50. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application in respect of the 2nd
applicant is dismissed for being made out of time and also for lack of
merits.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicants/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicants’ solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 21/10/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave|Applicants’ ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Nil |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |21/10/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance | |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |Putative respondent’s |
|and | |ref. no.: |
| | |USM 17216 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the Applicant proposes | |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing, | |QA T/C 374/20 (Formerly |
|including the affidavit| |RBCZ 10306/20) |
|in support of the | | |
|application for leave | |Department of Justice, |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.
[2] Fabio Arlyn Timogan and Ors v Evan Ruth and Anor [2020] HKCA 971