歐陽長良 對 中建國際發展有限公司及另四人

HCA 1173/2014

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件2014年第1173號

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判案書

A. 引言

1.  本案原告人歐陽長良先生於2014年6月24日入稟提出訴訟，要求法庭頒令宣布，基於逆權管有的原則，原告人擁有新界元朗丈量約份第118約地段第45號A分段，地段第68號，地段第70號，地段第72號，地段第73號及地段第74號（“涉案地段”）的管有業權，而各被告不得提出收回涉案地段，他們對涉案地段的所有權亦繼之而終絕。

2.  各被告是涉案地段現有的登記業主。他們各自擁有的土地如下：

第一被告人	地段第45號A分段、第68號、第 70 號、第72號及第74號
第二被告人	地段第73號A分段
第三被告人	地段第73號B分段
第四被告人	地段第73號C分段
第五被告人	地段第73號餘段

3.  在本案中，各被告否認原告人的說法，並向原告人作出反申索，要求法庭裁定原告人非法佔有涉案地段，容許他們取回涉案地段，並向原告人申索租值補償金。

4.  涉案地段的地界圖可見於本判案書附件A。

B.   原告人之案情

5.  根據原告人的案情，涉案地段位於新界元朗，各被告在2011年分別購入。

6.  約於1950 年代，原告人父親在原告人的姊姊及姑媽協助下開始佔用了涉案地段。原告人父親在原告人的姑媽協助下在涉案地段上建造了五間屋，並且以涉案地段作為他們的居所，直至他們身故。

7.  原告人父親及姑媽在涉案地段上養鴨及豬。而原告人則在約1980年開始與他父親及姑媽在涉案地段上居住及協助他們飼養禽畜，直至他在約1986年結婚搬離涉案地段。原告人的父親則繼續排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段。

8.  及後，飼養禽畜的作業則由種植蔬果取代。在大約1990年代頭，原告人開始在涉案地段養淡水魚及後來養龜。而在大約1990年代中，原告人亦開始收買廢金屬及/或家居用品生意，及把有關物品存放在涉案地段上。

9.  約於1995年，原告人父親把在涉案地段上的五間屋其中一間以私人特許（personal licence）的形式批准他的同村兄弟歐陽才德先生及他的家人居住。當原告人父親在2002年9月27日過身後，有關的私人特許在法律上亦自動取消。但原告人之前不知道有關的私人特許在法律上會因爲其父親過身自動取消，故此他容許歐陽才德先生繼續在涉案地段上居住。而原告人只於2012年才截斷供應自來水的管道，藉以要求歐陽才德將管有權交回予原告人，但前者拒絕。

10.  原告人及其父親及姑媽又或附近鄰居先後在涉案地段興建圍欄把涉案地段圍封。

11.  原告人的案情指，自1960年代起原告人父親有意圖逆權佔用涉案地段。而原告人父親死後，原告人繼承了排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段，並且繼續有意圖管有涉案地段。

12.  原告人亦指從沒有人要求原告人或原告人父親繳交涉案地段的租金。

13.  基於原告人父親及由原告人繼承了的排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段，以及有關的意圖，故此，根據香港法例第347章《時效條例》第7(2) 條和第17條，被告喪失收回土地的權利，對涉案地段的所有權，於本案開展前已告終絕。

14.  原告人亦指由於被告圍封了在地段第45號A分段上的一些屋及在涉案地段上傾倒建築物料及/或泥土，導致原告人蒙受損失，故此追討損害賠償。

C.   被告之案情

15.  各被告為涉案地段的登記業主。第一被告人中建國際發展有限公司（“中建”）於2010年4月1日買入新界元朗丈量約份第118 約地段第45號A分段，地段第68號，地段第70號，地段第72號及地段第74號（“該5個地段”）之2/3業權，其後於2011年11月4 日買入該5個地段餘下之1/3業權。而第二至第五被告人則是於2011 年8月20日分別購買地段第73號A分段、B分段、C分段及餘段。

16.  被告指原告人的父親是向地段第73號的前業主鄧同輝（或煇）先生承租涉案地段的其中地段第73號。

17.  被告同意原告人的父親曾經在2002年9月27日逝世前居住於地段第45號A分段西面的一間屋，但他在約2001年把位於地段第45號A分段的另一間屋售予歐陽才德及歐陽鳳霞夫婦作為他們的居所。原告人的父親在相關時間並沒有排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段及/或相關意圖。

18.  於地段第70號北面，由始至終，有一條路徑連接著地段第70號和涉案地段東面的公眾行人路徑。

19.  而原告人僅自2007或2008年起才有用小部份之涉案地段。故此，原告人在相關時間並未有排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段及/或相關意圖。

20.  被告指出下列事實顯示原告人並沒有相關意圖管有涉案地段及並未有排除外人及控制涉案地段：

(1) 原告人曾於2010年12月左右向當時的其中一位業主承認原告人父親是從鄧同輝先生處租用地段第73號，並口頭承諾會在收到通知後將地段第73號交還予當時的業主

(2) 原告人曾於2012年2月左右容許中建指派的土地測量師在中建的地段進行測量工作

(3) 原告人曾於2013年6月左右容許一位張先生及另一位差餉物業估價署的女職員與中建的代表人進入地段第45號A分段及地段第73號對位於該地段的構築物進行量度，作估價之用

(4)   原告人曾於2011年5月4日左右，容許當時地段業主指派的土地測量師於地段第73號進行測量，測量旨在為把地段第73號分割為第73號A分段、B分段、C分段及餘段，以在該地段發展興建3所丁屋

21.  基於上述理由，原告人並未對涉案地段完成逆權管有，各被告至今依然擁有涉案地段的所有權。

D.   爭議點

22.  由此可見，本案的主要爭議點是原告人是否有足夠時間的排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段及相關意圖。

E.   法律原則

23.  根據香港法例第347章《時效條例》第7(2) 條：–

「自有關訴訟權在任何其他人方面產生的日期起計滿12年後,他不得提出回收土地的訴訟……」

24.  根據《時效條例》第13條，收回土地的訴訟權在土地開始處於逆權管有的當天產生。

25.  要證明逆權管有，管有人（即本案中的原告人）必須證明他實質管有一地，並意圖管有該地。見香港終審法院在Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai & Another (No.2) (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 55一案中跟隨了Powell v McFarlane and Another (1979) 38 P & CR 452及其他英國案例所定立的原則。

26.  實質管有的意思是，管有人須按照實際情況，對一地行使一定程度的、實質的、具獨有性的控制，正如Slade J在上述Powell v McFarlane and Another一案中第470‑471頁所言：–

“Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and conclusive possession, though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot both be in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree ofexclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed.”

27.  香港上訴法庭在Gotland Enterprises Limited v Kwok Chi Yau & Others，CACV 260/2014（Judgment dated 19.01.16）一案中亦說：

“36. One must not lose sight of the exclusive character of the occupation in order to establish factual possession. Not every use or occupation of land can satisfy this requirement. The Judge gave the example of growing of fruits on a piece of open land. If a person only plants fruit trees without excluding others from entering the land, he is only using the land instead of occupying the same exclusively…

37.  Though it is not absolutely essential to have the land fenced off in order to establish exclusive occupation, this is the classic way of doing so.  In the absence of any physical barriers set up to exclude others from entering the land, one must examine what steps were taken by the person claiming exclusive occupation to exclude others.”

28.  至於管有意圖，指的是管有者必須有意圖，以自己的名義，在合理切實可行以及法律容許的範圍內，將原業主在內的其他人排除於該地之外，正如Slade J在Powell v McFarlane and Another一案中第471、472及480頁所言：

“the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow”

“An owner or other person with the right to possession of land will be readily assumed to have the requisite intention to possess, unless the contrary is clearly proved. This, in my judgment is why the slightest acts done by or on behalf of an owner in possession will be found to negative discontinuance of possession. The position, however, is quite different from a case where the question is whether a trespasser has acquired possession. In such a situation the courts will, in my judgment require clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser, claiming that he has acquired possession, not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world. If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.”

“In view of the drastic results of a change of possession, however, a person seeking to dispossess an owner must, in my judgment, at least make his intentions sufficiently clear so that the owner, if present at the land, would clearly appreciate that the claimant is not merely a persistent trespasser, but is actually seeking to dispossess him.”

29.  在Wu Yee Pak v Un Fong Leung & Others (2004) 7 HKCFAR 498（中譯本在505頁）一案中，陳兆愷終審法院常任法官亦在判詞第5段說：

“5. Since possession by the appellant of the land through occupation is accepted, the key issue is whether his possession was adverse in that he was neither a tenant nor a licensee of the respondents. The burden of proof admittedly lies with the appellant and the evidence he has to adduce must be compelling. Powell v McFarlane & Another (1979) 38 P & CR 452; and Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai & Another (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 55.”

“5. 由於案中雙方接受上訴人是通過佔用該土地而管有該土地，故關鍵的爭議是其管有是否因他既非租客，亦沒有得到兩名答辯人的特許，而屬逆權管有。上訴人無疑須負起舉證的責任，而他援引的證據必須能夠令人信服。見Powell v. McFarlane & another一案 (1977) [sic] 38 P & CR 452一案及Wong Tak Yue v. Kung Kwok Wai David & Another (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 55一案。”

30.  香港終審法院在Wong Tak Yue一案中述明，管有意圖的問題，和任何「意圖」的問題一樣，是關於事實的問題。

31.  將一地圍封，是意圖管有該地的最有力證據，當然圍封並非意圖管有該地的唯一證明。

E.1  據用原則

32.  此外，由於被告的案情是原告人的父親是向第73號地段的前業主鄧同輝（或煇）先生承租涉案地段的其中第73號地段，「據用」（encroachment）原則在本案中亦適用。

33.  在Secretary for Justice v Chau Ka Chik Tso (2011) 14 HKCFAR 889一案中，香港終審法院非常任法官施廣智勳爵認為，「據用」原則是指假如租客開始並然後持續佔用屬於其業主的土地，則特別是在被據用土地毗鄰已租出土地的情況下，須推定租客的意圖是把其據用的土地附加於已租出土地，使租客能佔用和使用被據用土地，猶如該土地是已租出土地的一部份。該推定可予推翻，方法是提出證據證明租客意圖以擁有人身份而非僅以租客身份佔用被據用土地。而常任法官李義亦說假如租客據用毗鄰其已租入土地的另一幅土地，則根據「據用」法則，將產生一項可予推翻的推定，即租客佔用被據用土地作為已租入土地的附屬土地，而租客不得宣稱自己逆權管有被據用土地。該推定及「不容反悔」原則既適用於涉及據用屬於業主的土地的個案，亦適用於涉及據用屬於第三者的土地的個案。

E.2  據用原則: 不一定要相連地 (Presumption of Encroachment: not necessarily adjoining land)

34.  Jourdan and Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession (2^nd ed.)的作者於 §§25-33–25-37討論了“據用原則”的基本原理和相關的案例，指出“據用原則”可以適用於出租地和據用地鄰近但不相連的情況。只要出租地和據用地鄰近，而租客可以說是因此得到了從出租地佔用據用地的能力或機會，“據用原則”便可以適用：

“…Accordingly, for the presumption to apply, the tenant must derive the ability or opportunity to encroach from his possession of the demised premises. It should follow that the presumption does not apply to land sufficiently distant from the demised premises that no connection between the two can properly be made…”

(Adverse Possession, §25-33)

“…It is not necessary that the land inclosed should be adjacent to the demised premises; the same rule prevails when the encroachment is at a distance…” (emphasis added)

(Adverse Possession, §25-33, 引用Kingsmill v Millard (1855) 11 Exch 313 at 318, per Parke B (obiter))

“…I think the distance here is not great enough to found a distinction. In some of the cases, the intervention of a stream like the Rhine or the Rhone would probably rebut the prima facie presumption, when a small insignificant stream would not” (emphasis added)

(Adverse Possession, §25-34, 引用Earl of Lisburne v Davies (1866) LR 1 CP 259, 264-265 per Erle CJ)

“[The presumption] would apply or not according as it might appear that the land was so near the holding that by reason of that proximity the tenant gained the opportunity of annexing it, and the fact that the circumstances of the enjoyment might induce the landlord to wink at the incroachment….” (emphasis added)

(Adverse Possession, §25-34, 引用Earl of Lisburne, 266)

“As Erle CJ stated in that case, the fact that a road separates the demised premises from the land encroached on does not prevent the presumption from applying.” (emphasis added)

(Adverse Possession, §25-35, 引用Doe d Lloyd v Jones (1846) 15 M&W 580)

“In Smirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd, Pennycuick V-C said that Lord Hastings v Saddler ‘…might well have been decided on the simple ground that the plots on the mainland were too far away [about half a mile] from the demised land for the presumption to apply” (emphasis added)

(Adverse Possession, §25-36, 引用Smirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd [1975] Ch 317 at 328E)

“In Tower Hamlets LBC v Barrett, Neuberger LJ said:

“[31] … I would be sceptical about the application of the doctrine (especially in relation to land owned by a third party), unless the land to which possessory title is acquired is very close to the demised land and occupied by the tenant together with that demised land. That appears to accord with principle, in that Willes J in Whitmore's case at 5 referred to the "opportunity afforded to the tenant to take in adjoining land". He went on to explain, on the same page, that the doctrine was not only "in accordance with the rights of property", but was also based on the fact that it was "convenient". It is hard to see how convenience could be invoked in a case where the two pieces of land are not very close and are used and occupied together.” (emphasis added)

(Adverse Possession, §25-37, 引用Tower Hamlets LBC v Barrett [2006] 1 P & CR 9 at §31)

E.3 舉證責任 (Burden of Proof)

35.   高等法院原訟法庭杜溎峰法官在 Birkinhead Properties and Investments Limited v Lam Kai-man and Person(s) in Occupation of the Land，HCMP 1588/2012（Judgment dated 12.1.2016）指出，逆權管有案件中，聲稱佔有者須要對於逆權管有的所有元素，滿足一個重（“heavy”）的舉證準則（但還是民事的準則，即相對可能性的衡量）：

“13.  The burden of proof of these three requirements [i.e. (i) factual possession; (ii) intention to possess or animus possidendi; and (iii) possession is adverse] is on the squatter. The standard of proof is the civil standard.  However, the burden is a heavy one.  The squatter has to adduce objective and compelling evidence: Powell v McFarlane.  Self serving evidence is hardly likely to be of assistance.  The court will scrutinize such evidence with great care.  The squatter’s evidence of his subjective intention will invariably be given no weight as being self serving evidence, but his statements against his interest will usually be accorded considerable weight. Objective evidence will be given such weight as they deserve.” (emphasis added)

36.   原告須要提出必須能夠令人信服的證據（“compelling evidence”），此點亦在上述Wu Yee Pak v Un Fong Leung & Others (2004) 7 HKCFAR 498一案中，陳兆愷終審法院常任法官在判詞第 5 段說明了這要求。

37.   杜法官強調，法庭必須以客觀的證據（例如空中圖片、政府測量圖）來測試原告人對自己有利的證據：

“22.  Lam’s own evidence on these factual issues has to be cautiously scrutinised as being self-serving. He has no other factual witnesses.  The only sources of objective evidence are the aerial photographs, survey sheets and the experts’ interpretation of those photographs and survey sheets.  Great caution has to be exercised in examining and interpreting these exhibits.  The aerial photographs were taken from a far distance.  Objects placed underneath the umbrellas formed by trees and shrubs cannot be revealed on the photographs.  Likewise, fences may be concealed by vegetation overgrowing on them.  Though the survey sheets are produced annually, the experts agree that they only contain partial updates.  That an item shown in the survey sheet in the previous years which is not shown in a later year does not necessarily mean it ceased to exist in that later year.  It could have ceased to exist earlier but the change was not updated on the survey sheet.  Likewise, an item shown to exist for the first time in a survey sheet might have existed earlier.  These photographs and survey sheets have to be examined together and considered as a whole.  Lam’s evidence would have to be tested against these aerial photographs and survey sheets.” (emphasis added)

38.   以上所述，原告人對他自己不利的聲明（declaration against interest）比起自說自話的聲明（self serving declaration）更為重要，亦見香港終審法院在Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai & Another (No.2) (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 55，at 69，一案中跟隨了Powell v McFarlane and Another (1979) 38 P & CR 452所定立的原則。

E.4  佔有意圖 (Animus Possidendi)

39.   聲稱佔有人（即本案中的原告人）就着他是否有意圖管有該地必須清楚明確毫不含糊（unequivocal）。見Tsang Foo (also known as Fu) Keung & another v Chu Jim Mi Jimmy & 2 others，CACV 178/2015（Judgment dated 28.10.16）一案。並且需要提出必須能夠令人信服的證據（compelling evidence）。高等法院上訴法庭法官張澤祐指出：

“2.6. The situation is, however, different where there is evidence pointing to a contrary conclusion or the acts of the person who claimed possession are equivocal and capable of more than one interpretation, in such a case the intention to possess is not established.  As Slade J in Powell stated at page 472 :

“If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.”

2.7. This is reaffirmed by Lord Hutton at paragraph 76 :

‘It is in cases where the acts in relation to the land of a person claiming title by adverse possession are equivocal and are open to more than one interpretation that those acts will be insufficient to establish the intention to possess.’” (emphasis added)

40.   法庭一般會從聲稱佔有者的行為推斷出其主觀意圖。但是，如果證據清楚顯示，他實際上並沒有管有爭議物業的意圖，法庭是不會視他為管有該物業（見Jourdan and Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession (2^nd ed.)，at §§9-04–9-05）：

“9-04  In Site Developments (Ferndown) Ltd v Cuthbury Ltd, Vos J said, without referring to authority: ‘The intention required must be objectively manifested, and need not be shown to have been a subjective belief.’ As phrased, this is incorrect. As explained below, the court will ordinarily infer the subjective intention from the squatter’s conduct, but, if it is apparent from the evidence that, despite the squatter’s conduct, he did not actually have the intention to possess, he will not be treated as having been in possession.

9-05  In J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham, it was argued that there should be no need to demonstrate an intention to possess in order to establish actual possession. That argument was roundly rejected. [Referring to §40, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson]…” (emphasis added)

E.5  向業主租用或獲業主以特許形式批准使用土地的問題

41.   高等法院首席法官馬道立（當時官階）在Cheung Chung Yan v Chan Man Kwong & Ors，CACV 268/2003（Judgment dated 12.02.2004），at §17指出，一名人士如果獲得批准而使用該土地，這不會是逆權侵佔：

“17. As a matter of law, where a person occupies land as a licensee or otherwise with the permission of the true owner, he is not in adverse possession, for he enjoys his occupation under lawful title:‑ see Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623, at 636.” (emphasis added)

E.6  租用、承認及意圖的關係 (Tenancy: Acknowledgment / No animus)

42.   Jourdan and Radley-Gardner，Adverse Possession（§16-32）指出：

“However, in some circumstances, an oral acknowledgment of title may show that the squatter did not have the necessary animus possidendi, and was not in possession at all.”

所以，雖然本案的承認（“acknowledgment of title”）並不是書面，不符合第347章《時效條例》的規定，但是也可證明原告人等沒有佔用意圖（no animus possidendi）。

43.   在上述Cheung Chung Yan一案，高等法院首席法官馬道立（當時官階）及羅傑志副庭長說：

“In subsequent visits, the position was made clear to the defendants by the plaintiff that although he did not have any plans to develop the Land at the time, should the Land be so required, the defendants had to return it.  In her evidence-in-chief, D2 said this:-

“if I [the plaintiff] want to use this piece of land you [D2] have to return it to me.'  And every time she mentioned that, 'If you [the plaintiff] really want to use it, this piece of land, I [D2] will return it.'  Every time she told her younger brother, Cheung Chung-yan [the plaintiff], about this.”

(§7(6), per Ma CJHC)

“(2) More important, nothing in the evidence demonstrates that as from 1964, the defendants had the intention to exclude the true owner (the plaintiff) from the Land.  The evidence and the judge's acceptance of those facts set out in paragraph 7 above, demonstrate quite the contrary.”

(§16(2), per Ma CJHC)

“22.  Although Mr Hui argued that the death of the father would have terminated any licence to occupy the land, that it seems to me, is not the point.  The defendants seek to establish that they have been in adverse possession. Clearly on the judge's finding the possession cannot have been adverse during the father's lifetime.  It is not a question of a licence, it is a question of the relevant defendants not having any intention to occupy the land adversely to anyone. …”

(§22, per Rogers VP)

“24….Implicit in that finding seems to me be the finding that the defendants never did have the intention occupying the land if it were contrary to the plaintiff's wishes.”

(§24, per Rogers VP)

(emphasis added)

E.7  有關圍欄的問題 Enclosure to Exclude (in addition to Gotland)

44.   於 Wai Wah Traders Ltd v Wong Yim，HCMP 965/2000（Judgment dated 8.12.2011）一案中，高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官陳美蘭（當時官階）在判詞的第51，62及64段說，她不認為在土地沒有被圍起的情況下，聲稱佔有者定期從樹上採摘荔枝、砍樹枝以在其他地方嫁接和栽種等，能構成其持續及排外管有和控制該土地。陳法官認為，聲稱的佔有者須要有其他行為排除業權人及其他人，以對土地行使排外管有和控制：

“51.  I do not accept that the mere picking of lychee fruit from trees on the Land, or the cutting of branches from the trees for grafting and growth elsewhere, even if done on a regular basis, can constitute continuous and exclusive possession or control of the Land.  It is mere trespass, at most persistent trespass, and unauthorised destruction and appropriation of property…

62.  The burden is on San Fat to prove that he and his family had made it perfectly plain to the world at large by their actions or words that they had intended to exclude the owner as best they can.  If their actions are equivocal, the courts will treat them as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the registered owner.

…

64.  On the available evidence, I do not regard the Leung children playing on the Land in the early 1960s, the Leung family's picking of fruit, clearing of trees and working on parts of the Land, and their periodic cutting of branches or shoots from the trees on the Land in and after 1981 as sufficient manifestation of a clear and unequivocal intention that they intended to exclude the owner from the Land.  This is particularly so when the Ching family were able to enter the Land between 1973 and 1985, and access into and through the Land was also possible from Lots 1307 and 1181 at least.  Mr. Ching, Mrs. Ching, or any stranger entering the Land after 1973 would not have encountered any fence or other enclosure at the border of the Land to indicate to them, objectively and clearly, that entry was forbidden by someone else.  Even if Mr. and Mrs. Ching were to have noticed any lychee fruit missing, or any tree having been tampered with (which they deny), they would have regarded it as annoying acts of trespass only.” (emphasis added)

E.8  後來加上的圍欄 (Subsequent Fencing)

45.   如果聲稱的佔有者後來能夠把爭議地段圍起，法庭應當考慮及質疑（“it is a legitimate enquiry to doubt”）聲稱佔有者在爭議地段被圍起之前的佔用是否足夠構成“排外管有”：見Ngan Cheung Wah v Kwong Shook Ling，DCCJ 578/2011（Judgment dated 10.01.14）區域法院暫委法官葉樹培在判詞第41段所述，及高等法院上訴法庭關淑馨法官於CACV 92/2014（Date of Judgment 20.08.14）在判詞第39，42及43段所說及維持了該判決。

46.   區域法院暫委法官葉樹培於Ngan Cheung Wah的判詞第41段說：

“41. As P has been able to enclose the Property by fence in 2008/2009, there are no reasons why P could not enclose it by fence earlier.  Obviously erecting wire mesh fence on two sides as alleged by P is insufficient to secure exclusive possession of the Property, having taken into account of the location and nature of the land.  One side of the Property facing the pavement of Cha Kwo Ling Road has never been fenced.  Before the erection of the present wire mesh fence, members of the public can easily enter the Property from Cha Kwo Ling Road pavement without any barriers.  Therefore, there is lack of evidence of sufficient control of access by the public to the Property before 2008/2009.” (emphasis added)

47.   高等法院上訴法庭維持了區域法院暫委法官葉樹培的判決，關淑馨法官並在判詞第39，42及43段說：

“39. The judge in §41 of the Judgment was examining the 1984 wire mesh fence which was erected on two sides only to determine whether the physical control thus exercised over the Property was sufficient to establish factual possession, along with other activities of the plaintiff, having regard to the location and nature of the land. The judge did not suggest as a matter of law that the plaintiff must establish complete enclosure of the Property to take adverse possession, nor was he looking for a situation that no one could gain access except with the plaintiff’s permission. Given that the plaintiff was able to enclose the Property by wire mesh in 2008/2009, it was a legitimate enquiry whether the wire mesh erected on two sides only in 1984 was sufficient to establish exclusive physical control.

…

42. The plaintiff’s submission here is similar to ground 2.  The complaint was that the judge wrongly asked in §41 of the Judgment why the plaintiff could not have enclosed the Property before 2008/2009.  Ms Leung submitted it was wrong to ask what else could have been done on the Property, citing Cobham v Frett at 1785 and Purbrick v Hackney London Borough at §§20 to 21.  The right question was whether what the plaintiff did, cumulatively and as a whole, was sufficient to exclude the paper title owner.

43. For the reasons already given, we do not think the judge had applied the wrong test or asked the wrong question in his evaluation and analysis of the evidence.  He was entitled to regard the plaintiff’s activities as found as insufficient to establish sole physical possession. There is no basis for us to interfere on this ground.” (emphasis added)

E.9  沒有持續逆權管有的假設 (No Presumption of Continuous Adverse Possession)

48.   而聲稱佔用人負有舉證責任證明他在有關時段持續及沒有間斷地逆權管有了有關土地。於On Yip Property Development Co Ltd v Kwok Tai Kuen Alan ，HCMP 3192/2013（Judgment dated 15.04.15）（at §8）高等法院首席法官張舉能法官指出：

“8. In our view, the judge was correct in rejecting the contention of a presumption of continued possession in favour of the defendant’s family after the commencement of adverse possession back in the 1950s.  Whether, at any material time, there was adverse possession, and whether any such adverse possession once begun continued unbroken for 20 years, are questions of fact to be established by evidence, the burden being on the squatter.  He has to discharge the burden of proof by cogent and sufficient evidence.  Whilst such evidence can take many forms, including direct oral evidence, documentary evidence and inferential evidence, and the parties’ cases must be considered in light of inherent probabilities and commonsense, there is no place for any presumption, whether legal or evidential, in favour of the squatter.  Everything must naturally depend on the facts of each case.  The situation of a squatter who has enclosed the land in question and that of one who seeks to establish a case of continuous adverse possession of open land must, by the nature of things, be rather different.” (emphasis added)

E.10  原告人並不擁有任何遺產的實益權益 (Plaintiff has no accrued rights in deceased Father’s asset (if any))

49.   當一個無遺囑者的遺產在遺產管理程序中，遺產受益人並不擁有任何遺產的實益權益。遺產受益人只有要求遺產管理人妥為管理遺產的權利：Lord Sudeley v Attorney General [1897] AC 11, 21-22, per Lord Davy：

“My Lords, I am of opinion, on the facts of this case, that Mrs. Tollemache at the time of her death had no right of property in or right to claim any part of the mortgages in specie, and that the appellants, her executors, acquired only a right to have the estate duly administered and to enforce that right by an action for the purpose, but had no right virtute officii to have any part of the New Zealand mortgages appropriated to the estate of their testatrix in specie.” (emphasis added)

E.11  新界土地業權承傳不適用中國習慣法

50.   雖然涉案地段位於新界，遺產分發事宜可能適用中國習慣法（Chinese Customary Law），但是根據Wu Koon Tai v Wu Yau Loi [1997] AC 179 (PC)，at 187H-188A per Lord Browne-Wilkinson，新界土地業權的轉予適用香港法律：

“In their Lordships’ view, the devolution of title to land in the New Territories, whether by inter vivos transaction or on death, is regulated by the registration system and the general law of Hong Kong…”

51.   因此，原告人在沒有獲授予遺產管理權的情況下，不能代表父親的遺產進行訴訟。原告人並沒有擁有任何遺產的實益權益。再者，原告人仍然有哥哥在世（即歐陽長財）。

F.   雙方證供

52.   本案經過了七天的審訊，原告人歐陽長良先生有在審訊中出庭作供，並且傳召了原告人聲稱為其父親的乾兒子梁浩然先生(“PW2”)，而他的朋友鄧林標先生則沒有出庭作供。原告人亦沒有傳召他的專家證人陳漢錕先生在審訊中出庭作供。

53.   被告方面則傳召了共9名事實證人作供，他們分別為：

(1) 社工丘錦蓮女士

(2) 歐陽鳳霞女士

(3) 鄰居黃健偉先生

(4) 第五被告人的朋友陳玉榮先生

(5) 第一被告人的董事張志寬先生

(6) 社工馬玉霞女士

(7) 已故鄧同輝先生的兒子鄧海橋先生

(8) 第五被告人程振明先生

(9) 毗鄰地段第71號的前業主陳金花女士

54.   而原告人兄長歐陽長財先生的一份非宗教式誓詞及其附件則以傳聞證供形式呈堂。

55.   此外，第一至第五被告人聘用的土地測量師梁志欣先生以專家證人的身份出庭作供。而雙方按照法庭指示所撰寫的一份聯合專家陳述書亦有呈堂（“聯合陳述書”）。雙方的專家意見並沒有太大分歧。

G.   本席作出的考慮

G.1 爭議地段被完全圍起？

56.   原告人堅稱他於1980年代到達涉案地段時，涉案地段已經被完全圍起。本席同意，這與客觀證據不符。

     第70地段

57.   空中圖片、政府測量圖和聯合陳述書顯示，第70地段東面的沿著公眾行人路的圍欄（F5），是自2013年後才存在。所以原告人說所有圍欄一直存在，他只是修理損壞了的部分的說法，明顯與事實不符。

     第68地段

58.   被告人的專家報告和聯合陳述書顯示，第68地段在1997年前完全看不見任何沿著公眾行人路的圍欄。考慮了有關的空中圖片和測量圖後，專家認為於1997年第一次能夠看見該地段沿著公眾行人路的南半部分的圍欄。

59.   被告人的專家報告、1997年的空中圖片（修訂版本）（證物D2）、和陳達榮測量師行有限公司1998年2月的測量記錄圖均顯示東面沿著公眾行人路的圍欄（F4）並未有延伸到地段東北的部分。所以，第68地段在有關時段只是部分被圍起，並不是如原告人聲稱的從1980年他到該地時已經見到全部圍起。根據陳達榮測量師行有限公司2012年2月的土地測量圖，該地段於2012年是有被圍起的。

     第72地段、第74地段

60.   第74地段、第72地段東面的沿著公眾行人路的邊界，由始至終也沒有任何圍欄。

     第73地段、第45A地段

61.   雖然第73地段東面有圍欄，但該地段與第72地段相接的邊界沒有任何圍欄。由於第74地段、第72地段東面沒有圍欄，任何人也可以從第74地段、第72地段東面自由進出涉案地段，然後往北進入第73地段和第45A地段。所以第73地段及第45A地段在相關時段根本沒有被圍封。

62.   如果第68地段和第70地段分別於2012和2013才被圍起，加上其他地段遲些才被圍起，這便顯示出在被圍起前，原告人並沒有排除所有人。

G.2 土地用途的變化

63.   根據原告人及PW2所述，涉案地段的用途隨著原告人父母健康轉差，都漸漸由耕地變成種蕉樹。因此，如果原告人的版本是真確的，空中圖片、聯合陳述書等客觀的證據都應該顯示涉案地段的全部土地續漸由耕地變成樹。

64.   上述兩位社工對（90年代後期）探訪原告人父母時所見的描述，也證明他們應該沒有能力耕種。

65.   可是，客觀證據卻顯示在第70地段和第72地段曾出現土地由樹變回耕地的情況。在盤問下，原告人顯然對該情況懵然不知，他也不得不承認耕作活動很可能不是原告人或他的父母進行的。他只是推測，地段上所有的活動必然經過他的父親或母親同意。

     第70地段

66.   至於第70地段，空中圖片、聯合陳述書均顯示，從1987年至2015年間，除了2004年外，地段上看不見任何耕作活動，只有雜草和蕉樹。

67.   原告人面對盤問的回答，清楚表現出他根本不知道該地段上的任何情況。

68.   空中圖片和聯合陳述書均顯示，於2004年，第70地段的西北部分有耕作活動，耕作活動部分在第71地段的構建物之門口對開進行。

69.   原告人在證人台上首先供稱2004年的耕作活動是其母親進行的。原告人承認他不能夠解釋為何其母親沒有選擇在第45號A分段耕種，而要去離開她住的地方較遠的第70地段的西北部分耕作。

70.   當代表被告資深大律師提醒原告人陳金花將會作供說她曾於約2003年在第70地段的西北部分進行了數個月的耕作，原告人及後才解釋說陳金花可能已經徵求原告人母親的同意才能於該地進行耕作，只是原告人母親沒有告訴原告人。

71.   本席同意，這只是原告人在證人台上作出的毫無根據的推測。

72.   原告人在盤問陳金花（“DW9”）時更說他聽過母親提及DW9有問過他母親可否種菜，並得到他母親批准才種。DW9回答說她並沒有問過原告人母親。原告人更說當他的母親向他提及這事時，他便即時跟DW9說不可以種菜。這些說法原告人在他的證人陳述書或誓章甚至他自己作供時都沒有提及，明顯是事後才杜撰出來的。

     第72地段

73.   至於第72地段，空中圖片和聯合陳述書均顯示，在1988年至1996年期間，該地段並沒有進行耕作活動。於1996年，該地段東部曾再次出現耕作活動，但只有一年的時間。

74.   原告人說他不記得第72地段在1996年有進行過耕作活動 。原告人在盤問下說他根本沒有注意該地段用途的改變。

75.   代表被告資深大律師向原告人指出第72地段上的活動根本與原告人和他的家人無關。原告人同樣堅持說該地段一定跟他有關。地段上如果有其他人進行任何活動，一定是他的父親或母親出租或是授權的。

76.   本席同意，這亦只是原告人在證人台上作出的毫無根據的推測。

77.   以上地段的土地使用模式出現了原告人不能解釋的改變，顯示很可能不同地段於不同時段涉及不同的使用者或佔用人，而不是由原告人的父母無間斷的使用。

G.3 原告人及PW2證供不可信，無必須能夠令人信服的證據 (No compelling evidence)

78.   再者，原告人的證供經常出現矛盾，在法庭的證供，在申索陳述書，在證人陳述書，在誓章中經常出現多個不同版本，與PW2的證供亦出現矛盾。本席同意，明顯地他不是一個誠實可靠的證人。

79.   例如原告人在2014年準備的誓章更完全沒有提及過他結婚後搬離開涉案地段的事實，甚至說他父親過身後他一個人繼續在涉案地段居住。直至後來歐陽鳳霞在她的誓章駁斥了原告人的講法，原告人才在後來準備的申索陳述書及證人陳述書承認他於1986年結婚後搬離開了涉案地段。

80.   又例如就着S1至S8的建築物在何時建造的問題，原告人在庭上、在證人陳述書、在誓章及在傳訊令狀總共出現了四個不同版本。而雙方專家在聯合陳述書中均同意S1至S4的建築物在1972年已存在，而S5至S8的建築物亦於1973年已存在。很可能原告人之前不知道有這些客觀證據，以為可以瞞天過海，所以在2014年準備誓章及傳訊令狀時杜撰了那些版本，但及後他見過這些客觀證據，知道與他先前所述的版本有矛盾，故此在書面證人供詞中隻字不提。

81.   此外，本席同意，原告人的證供在很多地方都顯得不合情理。例如根據原告人姑媽的死亡證顯示，她是在1981年5月2日過身的。如果原告人真的在1980至1986年與父親及姑媽一同居住在涉案地段的話，那又為何他會把他姑媽逝世的日期弄錯為1986年？又為何他需要問他的堂兄呢？

82.   又例如原告人連他聲稱已撥打了數百次父親的電話號碼也記錯，而電話費單亦顯示有關的電話號碼曾經被停用，需要重新繳交再接駁費用，但原告人卻稱他完全不知道有這樣的一回事，他的父母亦沒有向他提及過。原告人父母當時已很大年紀，身體狀況欠佳，如果原告人真的是有定期回到涉案地段探望父母的話，為何他的父母不跟他說電話被停用這件事，又沒有要求他代為繳款呢？另一個例子是在1988年，原告人的父親曾經聘用律師代他寫信向內地公安局申請原告人的母親黃銀葉來香港照顧他。信中內容提及原告人父親獨居，乏人照料，無法繼續耕作，無法找到其他親人協助。可是原告人卻說他的父親從來沒有跟他提及過這件事，亦沒有提及過發出了律師信後的效果如何。如果原告人真的有定期到爭議地段探望他的父母，為何會出現這樣的情況呢？

83.   由此可見，在有關時段原告人根本不是如他所聲稱和他的父母有緊密聯繫。

84.   而原告人在庭上亦表現得迴避閃縮，例如他最初看到證物P1的地段索引圖時只推說他不懂看圖。後來他在看到已經把公眾行人路徑塗上黃色及把有關地段的南北界線塗上粉紅色的證物P2地段索引圖時仍然推說看不懂。但當被問到為何在他的誓章裏有提及附圖，他才承認他看得懂附圖上的有關地段，只是不明白圖上的屋。當法庭再問他誓章宣誓的時候是否明白，原告人即能夠說出大那間屋是歐陽財德住，細的那間標示出來就是原告人的父親所居住。法庭再問他是否看得明白，原告人更即時表示收回他看不明白的那一句說話。

85.   原告人更經常把他的證供出現矛盾的地方推說是因為他的律師混淆了。

86.   原告人說他的母親上午搬走他下午便搬回去涉案地段的說法更是不可信。首先在他的證人陳述書第27段,原告人說他母親是2007年初離開涉案地段返回內地居住，而他是在2007年才搬回涉案地段的。可是在庭上原告人卻把日期推前一年改口說成是2006年。明顯地他是因為後來見到他的兄長歐陽長財的誓章知道原來他的兄長是在2006年12月接他的母親回內地居住，所以在庭上才改口說成是2006年，並且再一次推說是他的律師在草擬證人陳述書時弄錯了。當被問及有什麼特別事情令他記起是2006年而並非2007年，原告人便說他搬入去的那天正是農曆新年年初九或年初十。但當法庭問他一方面同意他的母親在2006年12月返回內地，但另一方面又說是農曆新年年初九或年初十，為何會有這樣的矛盾，他便推說農曆年初九或年初十這個說法可能記錯，並且收回這句說話。這顯示原告人的證供並不可信。

87.   而原告人這方面的說法更被歐陽鳳霞（“DW2”）的證供直接駁斥了。DW2清楚說原告人是在他父親那間屋丟空了一至兩年，即在2007或2008年才搬到爭議地段。

88.   此外，除了一張在2014年11月份發出的電費單外，原告人沒有披露任何其他文件包括信件、銀行月結單、水費單、電話費單等可證明原告人在有關時段居住在涉案地段上。顯然，原告人並不能提出必須能夠令人信服的證據（compelling evidence）。

89.   至於PW2，雖然他堅決否認在訴訟中有任何利益，但為何他會在沒有跟原告人及他的兄姊商討過的情況下代原告人出價$50,000,000出售5間屋呢？

90.   再者，PW2在庭上的證供亦與他的證人陳述書的內容不符。明顯地他的證供不盡不實，他也不是一個誠實可靠的證人。

91.   相反，被告方的證人大多數都是獨立證人，他們在訴訟中沒有任何利益。本席同意，所有被告方的證人作供時均清晰直接，他們的證供均合情合理，盤問下也沒有被動搖。本席接納他們的證供為事實。

H.   總結

92.   本席接納原告人的父親是向鄧海橋的先父租用地段第73號，再加上「據用」原則（presumption of encroachment），原告人便不可能是逆權侵佔。就算，原告人母親或原告人在父親去世後，2002年9月，開始逆權侵佔，本案入稟前亦只有11年9個月多點，不夠法定時限，法庭應判原告人敗訴。

93.   再者，本席接納原告人有向鄧海橋承認需要交還土地，因此亦沒有佔用意圖（no animus possidendi）。亦因為原告人如此心態，各被告人或第73地段前業主之測量員或政府人員可以派人進入相關地段測量。

94.   即使假設原告人的父親並不是租用第73地段而是非法佔用爭議地段，亦沒有必須能夠令人信服的證據舉證他母親緊接他父親佔有該地。他母親必須返回內地申請單程證，於2003年2月才抵達香港（他父親2002年去世）。

95.   原告人亦欠缺必須能夠令人信服的證據舉證他無間斷即時繼續（successive squatter）他母親的佔用。原告人在盤問下承認他母親在2006年12月回鄉。但原告人聲稱他是母親返回內地後，在農曆正月搬入涉案地段，即一定是2007年1、2月間的事。而據歐陽鳳霞證供所說，原告人是他母親回鄉後一段時間才搬入。再者，原告人母親亦在父親2002年死後某時間回內地，成功申請單程證於2003年2月到達香港，而並不是無間斷佔有。

96.   再者，除第45A及73地段外，原告人父親佔用的證據完全不足。就此兩地段，證據亦主要是居住S2木屋。根據被告證人（尤其社工）的證供，原告人父母親不可能大範圍耕種或種蕉樹，亦不足以佔用廣大範圍於此兩地段，更遑論及於其他地段。

97.   至於S1 700呎木屋，不論是申索陳述書所聲稱的准許（licence）或被告方說的賣斷給歐陽才德夫婦，在原告父親死後均不可能是原告母親或原告的佔據。因此，S1周圍的45A及73 號地段亦未必是原告或母親佔據，而是歐陽財德夫婦佔據的，或與他們共用的。

98.   被告方獨立證人之證供及環境證供所見，原告人並沒有常常於2007年以前探望或幫助其父母使用或佔據廣大土地。

99.   最後，原告人在本案中並不是以他父親的遺產管理人身份提出訴訟，原告人必須證明他本人持續及不間斷地有排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段及有相關的意圖。

100.   無論如何，本案客觀證據顯示原告人並沒有排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段及有相關的意圖。

101.   原告人肩負有舉證責任。綜合案中所有證供證據，本席同意原告人未能以強而有力的證據證明他有持續及不間斷地排外管有、佔用及控制涉案地段以及有相關的意圖。

I.    命令

102.   基於上述理由，本席頒令撤銷原告人的申索。

103.   就第一至第五被告人之反申索，本席作出下列命令：

(1) 命令原告人交還涉案地段的空置管有。

(2) 禁制令禁止原告人，不論他本人、他的代理人或任何其他人以任何形式進入涉案地段或放置任何物品、構築物或貨物在涉案地段或其任何部份上又或入侵涉案地段或其任何部份。

(3) 象徵式損害賠償HK$100。

(4) 陳健強法官於2014年6月27日及2014年7月18日所作出的兩個命令被解除。

104.   本席作出暫准命令，本訴訟的訟費（包括所有獲保留之訟費）由原告人支付被告（包括兩位大律師證書）。若各方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則數額留待法庭評定。倘若在本判案書頒下後14天內並沒有任何更改訟費命令的請求，此暫准命令將成為絕對命令。