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ISLAM NUR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
ISLAM NUR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6215 · HCAL 1753/2025
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1753/2025
[2026] HKCFI 6215
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1753 of 2025
BETWEEN
| |Islam Nur |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. No extension of time be granted to the applicant to file the
application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
By a “Notice of application to apply for leave for judicial review” in the
prescribed Form 86 filed on 7 August 2025, the applicant applied for leave
to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial
review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 4 October 2024
(“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the Director
of Immigration (“Director”) dated 12 June 2024 rejecting the applicant's
non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision
can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL001753_
2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
In the Form 86, the applicant named the Director and “TCAB/NCPO” as the
proposed respondents and did not name any interested party. As the Board
should have been the proper putative respondent and the Director, the
proper putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended accordingly
on the court’s own motion.
The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Bangladesh, he
would be harmed or killed by the people of the Awami League as the
applicant, a supporter of the opposite party, the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party, refused to join the former. The Board’s reasoning and findings were
set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to
repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s
abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
As no request for a hearing was made in the Leave Application, this court
will determine the Leave Application without a hearing: O.53, r.3 (3) of
the Rules of the High Court.
Discussion
A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision. It
is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the
Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of
judicial review clearly and succinctly, and further to make full and frank
disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form
86 provided none at all. In the supporting affirmation, the applicant only
repeated the facts of his claims without putting forth any grounds.
As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not
interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural
unfairness or irrationality. In the present case, even though the Board
had not expressly rejected the applicant’s account of past events, it found
that the applicant would not be subjected to any risks of harm if refouled
as the past two attacks indicated that the Enemies did not have any genuine
desire to seriously harm or kill the applicant. It also found that the
injuries the applicant suffered in the past were not serious, thus not
meeting the requisite requirement of severity. It further found that state
protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available. The
Board therefore dismissed the applicant’s appeal. These are findings of
fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject
to there being any public law errors.
Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board
correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high
standard of fairness. The assertions the applicant made in his supporting
affirmation were only a repetition of the facts of his claims, and cannot
constitute any valid grounds. The applicant has not shown any errors of
law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably
arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this
court to grant leave.
Whether to grant extension of time
Another matter I need to consider is the delay in the Leave Application.
Pursuant to O 53 r 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, an application
to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within
3 months from the date of the Board’s Decision. In the present case, the
Leave Application was late for more than 7 months, which is lengthy.
The applicant provided no reason at all for the delay. Having regard to
the conclusion above that the intended challenge does not have any prospect
of success, this court declines to exercise its discretion to grant an
extension of time for the late filing of the Leave Application.
Order
The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
No extension of time be granted to the applicant to file the application
for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 13th day of November 2026
| |( Alfred CHAN ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 13/11/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Islam Nur |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |13/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 23973 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |456/24 (formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |5000311/24) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.