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HCAL 142/2026
[2026] HKCFI 569
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 142 OF 2026
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BETWEEN
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CHIANG LI WEI (蔣立維) |
Applicant |
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and |
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THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF ALHAMBRA BUILDING |
Putative |
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(平安大樓業主立案法團) |
Respondent |
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| Before: |
Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public) |
| Date of Decision: |
20 February 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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A. Introduction
1. By Form 86 dated 13 January 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to “review” a judgment dated 16 December 2022 and request for photocopying the judgment received by him.
2. The Form 86 names the Incorporated Owners of the Alhambra Building (“IO”) as the Putative Respondent.
3. The relief sought by the Applicant is as follows (in English translation):
The judgment of Mr Justice Au and Mr Justice Chow was comprehensive and reasonable, [but] the opposing party failed to comply with. Hence I request to review, reproduce and copy the judgment dated 16 December I received for a clear decision that I would not be required to pay money to the Alhambra Building.
4. Having considered the materials provided with the application, it seems to me that it can appropriately be dealt with on paper.
5. This is my Decision.
B. No Merit
6. The application has no merit.
7. First, it is trite that an applicant for leave to apply for judicial review must identify on the Form 86 the public law grounds which the applicant says are of sufficient merit for the grant of leave. Merely identifying that there is an alleged non-compliance of the IO with the judgment, and requesting for a “review” of the judgment, do not identify any public law error. This is a breach of the mandatory requirements in Order 53 rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court. It is not for the Court to try to identify grounds for an applicant. This alone is fatal to the application.
8. Secondly, where the application has been made (as is usual) on an ex parte basis, there was an improper failure of the Applicant to have made full and frank disclosure of details of the judgment that he seeks to “review”, except that he merely made the following points in a letter dated 16 January 2026 (in English translation):
(1) The judges (Mr Justice Thomas Au and Mr Justice Anderson Chow) ordered that no payment should be made to the Alhambra Building. A bankruptcy order is made.
(2) Regarding the adverse possession, the two judges’ decision is clear that it is a successful case of adverse possession of the property of the Buildings Department of the Government. At present, the opposing party made a demolition order. I am in agony that I specifically ask for this judicial review. Please approve. Thank you.
9. The Applicant did not state the case number of the judgment as referred to by him in the Form 86 and supporting affirmation.
10. However, by search on the Judiciary website’s Legal Reference System, it seems that the judgment is the decision of the Court of Appeal (“CA”) dated 16 December 2022 in Chiang Li Wei (蔣立維) v The Incorporated Owners of Alhambra Building (平安大樓業主立案法團), [2022] HKCA 1830 (“CA Judgment”), in which the CA dismissed the Plaintiff’s (i.e. the Applicant’s) application for leave to appeal against decisions of HHJ Herbert Au-yeung (as Herbert Au-yeung J then was) (1) dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim, allowing the Defendant (i.e. the IO)’s counterclaim and ordering the Plaintiff to deliver vacant possession of a property to the Defendant and pay the costs and profits of occupying that property (30 September 2021, [2021] HKDC 1251), and (2) refusing grant of leave to appeal (16 December 2021, [2021] HKDC 1584) (together, “DC Judgments”).
11. In an application for leave to apply for judicial review, it is the duty of an applicant to make full and frank disclosure in support of his application. The Applicant has failed to do so. It is not for the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction to guess or try to ascertain the impugned decision. This is also fatal to the application.
12. Thirdly, the target of the Applicant’s proposed challenge is clearly a private law matter between himself and the IO. It is not amenable to judicial review because the dispute between them is the Applicant’s claim for adverse possession and the IO’s counterclaim.
13. As set out in “Relief Sought” part of his Form 86, the Applicant stated that the CA Judgment was comprehensive and reasonable but the opposing party [i.e. IO] failed to comply with it. Therefore, the application by no means identifies any public law error in the CA Judgment. In any event, this Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction does not act as either an appellate court from another court, or to enforce orders made by other courts.
14. Fourthly, it is trite that an application for leave to apply for judicial review must be made promptly and in any event within 3 months of the date when the grounds for the application first arose, usually by reference to the date of the impugned decision. If the leave application is not made promptly or within that long stop period, there needs to be an application for an extension of time within which the leave application can be made, identifying the circumstances as might justify the grant of an extension.
15. The Applicant filed his application for leave to apply for judicial review on 13 January 2026, which is more than 3 years after the CA Judgment was handed down, and did not provide any reasons for the delay. There are no materials which persuade me that the circumstances of this case justify an extension of time for bringing the intended challenge. That, of itself, is also fatal to the application.
16. In passing, I note that the Applicant also sent a letter dated 31 January 2026 by post (received by the Court on 2 February 2026), attaching copies of a Writ of Possession dated 30 September 2021 and a Notice to Occupier to Quit dated 12 January 2023. The contents of the letter and the attachments are immaterial to the determination on whether leave to apply for judicial review should be granted.
C. Result
17. In addition to the other procedural defects and difficulties, the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds for review with any realistic prospect of success.
18. In those circumstances, the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.
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(Russell Coleman)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court
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The applicant, acting in person
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