HKSAR v. CHAN KWOK CHING

CACC 97 /2020

[2021] HKCA 488

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 97 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO 248 OF 2020)

________________________

________________________

__________________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

__________________________________

1.  The applicant sought leave to appeal against his sentence, following his plea of guilty, entered on 12 June 2020 before HH Judge Woodcock (“the judge”) in the District Court, to a charge of possession of things with intent to destroy or damage property, contrary to sections 62(a) and 63(2) of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200 (Charge 1). A further charge of possession of apparatus for radio-communications without a licence, contrary to sections 8(1)(b) and 20 of the Telecommunications Ordinance, Cap 106 (Charge 2), to which the applicant pleaded not guilty, was marked not to be proceeded with, without leave of the court or the Court of Appeal.

2.  The particulars of Charge 1 were that on 10 November 2019, at Siu Lun Court, Tuen Mun, in the New Territories, the applicant had in his custody or under his control, 3 petrol bombs stoppered with white fabric strip, 2 spanners, 3 bottles containing cyclohexane and methyl‑cyclohexane, 1 container containing light petroleum distillate, 1 bag of white powdery solids containing calcium hypochlorite, 14 pieces of white fabric, 1 funnel, 4 lighters and 1 pair of scissors, intending without lawful excuse to use, or cause or permit another to use, those things to destroy or damage any property belonging to some other person.

3.  The judge adjourned the original sentencing hearing pending the preparation of a Detention Centre/Training Centre suitability report, as well as a psychologist’s report.  At the resumed hearing on 29 June 2020, having read the reports and heard further submissions, the judge sentenced the applicant to 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.

The facts

4.  In the afternoon of 10 November 2019, a team of police officers were patrolling in Tuen Mun in a police vehicle.  At 3:09 pm, they were driving past Siu Lun Court near the junction of Heung Sze Wui Road and Hoi Wing Road, where they saw a group of persons clad in black making their way through Siu Lun Court.  The applicant, who was among the group, was holding a radio transceiver set (commonly known as a “walkie-talkie”). The officers gave chase and eventually stopped the group, including the applicant, in Siu Lun Court.

5.  At the time, the applicant was dressed in black, with a black facial covering and a pair of black gloves.  He was also carrying a black rucksack and a black waist bag, onto which were strapped three black bottle pouches.  In each of the pouches was what is commonly known as a “petrol bomb”.  The three petrol bombs comprised glass bottles respectively containing 122 millilitres (“ml”), 175 ml and 260 ml of a colourless liquid containing an organic mixture of mainly cyclohexane and methyl-cyclohexane, which are both highly flammable organic solvents and common ingredients in paint-thinning mixtures.  Two of the petrol bombs were stoppered with a fabric strip, while the third had no stopper, although a fabric strip was found inside the bottle.  One of the petrol bombs fell to the ground, when the applicant was being subdued.  In the applicant’s black waist bag, amongst other things, were 4 lighters, 2 spanners and 3 Octopus cards.

6.  In the applicant’s rucksack, further related items were found, namely:

(a)     1 plastic bag with approximately 409 grammes of a white powdery solid containing calcium hypochorite, which is commonly found in bleaching powder;

(b)     3 plastic bottles containing a total of about 1.88 litres of a colourless liquid containing an organic mixture of mainly cyclohexane and methyl-cyclohexane;

(c)     1 canister containing about 95 ml of a colourless liquid containing an organic mixture of mainly light petroleum distillate, which is a highly flammable organic solvent and a common constituent in lighter fluid;

(d)     a funnel;

(e)     14 pieces of white fabric;

(f)     a pair of scissors;

(g)     a respirator, a filter canister, goggles, gloves and what was described as a “kerchief”; and

(h)     5 packets and 1 bottle of saline.

7.  Officers of the Communications Authority later confirmed that the walkie-talkie, which had been held by the applicant, was a radio‑transmitting apparatus requiring a licence.  However, the applicant did not have such a licence at the relevant time.

8.  The applicant lived in a housing estate in Tuen Mun about 14 minutes’ drive from Siu Lun Court.

Reasons for sentence

9.  After reciting the facts in the case, the judge noted that the applicant was 17 years of age at the time of offence, and almost 18 by the time of sentencing.  He had a clear record and was the youngest of four children from a good family.  Whilst on bail, he had sat the Hong Kong Diploma secondary education exams and was awaiting his results.  The applicant, who was aspiring to be an engineer, was hoping to study an engineering programme at a College in Santa Barbara, California, in the United States, which had offered him a place for March 2020; an offer, which I am told, has now lapsed.  Several mitigation letters written by social workers testified to the applicant’s continuous voluntary work and his charitable nature^[1]. The applicant had also written a letter to the court himself to express his remorse and apologise for disappointing his family^[2].

10.  The judge referred to the Detention Centre/Training Centre suitability report prepared on the applicant.  The report concluded that the applicant was mentally, psychologically and physically fit for detention in either a Detention Centre or a Training Centre, although the recommendation was that the applicant would be more suitable for rehabilitation in a Detention Centre^[3].

11.  The judge also considered the report of the psychologist, who found that the applicant had the ability to differentiate between right and wrong, as well as understand the consequences of his own behaviour.  However, the psychologist had also found that the applicant exhibited “some risk factors for re-offending”[4]. The applicant was said to be relatively weak in his respect for the law and the criminal justice system, and exhibited certain negative attitudes towards law enforcement.  The psychologist detailed in her report how the applicant had learnt to make petrol bombs online, yet he also claimed to be unaware of the consequences of making and throwing petrol bombs.  She considered that the applicant had been highly influenced by social media and, if he continued to identify with social events and their participants, and maintain his current views towards law enforcement authorities, his risk of re-offending would increase.  The psychologist concluded her report by saying that the applicant would benefit from psychological intervention, so as to challenge his thinking and decision-making for the purpose of re-integrating into society^[5].

12.  The judge observed that the charge carried a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, which was an indication of how seriously the offence was viewed by the legislature.  She also made it clear that such offences should never become confused with legitimate and peaceful protests.  What the judge found particularly disturbing was the paraphernalia discovered in the applicant’s rucksack: judging by the fact that he had 3 ready-made petrol bombs in his possession, the items in his rucksack could be used to make between 7 and 15 further similar incendiary devices.  Since petrol bombs were notoriously unstable weapons once ignited and thrown, she said it would be difficult to foresee the possible or likely consequences, as well as the scale of harm, which might be caused by their throwing^[6].

13.  The judge viewed the wearing of black from head to toe, including a face mask and gloves, as well as his possession of three Octopus cards, as aggravating features, since they were designed to avoid detection and tracing.  The items he was wearing, and which were in his possession, showed that the applicant was well-prepared to cause damage and chaos.  On the other hand, the judge expressly took account of the applicant’s young age, his previous clear record, the mitigation advanced and the contents of the various letters and the reports before her, whilst commending him for his voluntary work in various community projects^[7].

14.  However, the judge was not convinced by the applicant’s claim that he had acted impulsively, since considerable planning had obviously gone into his offence; moreover, according to the psychologist’s report, the applicant was motivated by his dissatisfaction with how the police had been dealing with protesters.  The judge was sure the applicant knew what he had made, what he was carrying and that he intended to use the petrol bombs as acts of reprisal^[8].

15.  The judge considered that a young person who committed a serious crime could not turn youth to his/her advantage.  Notwithstanding an offender’s youth, a court must keep in mind the classic principles of sentencing; namely, rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence and prevention.  She held that youth weighed little against the interest of the community as a whole, which lay in the preservation of public order.  Furthermore, a custodial sentence was required in order to deter others, particularly in light of the then prevalence and indiscriminate use of petrol bombs on the streets of Hong Kong.  In such circumstances, general deterrence took precedence over personal circumstances and rehabilitation.  The judge concluded that a term of imprisonment was inevitable^[9].

16.  Accordingly, she adopted a starting point of 4 years’ imprisonment, having expressly taken into consideration the applicant’s age when identifying the starting point.  Giving the applicant the full one-third discount for his timely plea of guilty, she passed a sentence of 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.  The judge also ordered that the applicant should be seen by a psychologist during the term of his incarceration^[10].

Grounds of appeal

17.  Ms Queenie Ng, on behalf of the applicant, has submitted that the judge was in error simply to adopt a starting point of 4 years’ imprisonment, without identifying the original starting point, the aggravating factors and the corresponding enhancement of sentence, and the mitigating factors and the corresponding reduction in sentence; thus resulting in the appellate court not being able properly to assess whether the starting point, the extent of any enhancement and the extent of any reduction were correct in all the circumstances of the case (Ground 1).

18.  In making these submissions, Ms Ng relied on the Court’s decision in HKSAR v Islam Azharul[11], where the necessary steps in sentencing for a criminal offence were set out.  Firstly, the court should adopt a starting point based on the blameworthiness of the offender and the harm caused by the offence.  Secondly, the sentencing court should list the aggravating features, explaining which factors have or have not been taken into account and specifying the extent of enhancement given for those factors.  Thirdly, the court should set out the mitigating features, explaining which factors have or have not been taken into consideration and specifying the amount of reduction given for those adopted.  Having specified the enhancements given for the aggravating features, the court should, by the application of the totality principle, ensure that the aggregation of the enhancements did not result in an oppressive and overloaded sentence^[12].

19.  The applicant’s complaint is that the judge was silent as to the weight she gave to the aggravating and mitigating features and, although the judge did say that she had borne the applicant’s young age in mind when assessing the starting point at 4 years’ imprisonment, she did not say what the sentence might have been if the applicant had been an adult and thus, the extent of any reduction for this factor.

20.  Ms Ng also took issue with the judge’s finding that the paraphernalia found in the applicant’s rucksack could be made into more petrol bombs^[13]. She argued that according to the Amended Summary of Facts, the applicant was not carrying with him any bottles with which to make additional devices, apart from the three already made; hence, the judge did not have a sufficient factual basis to make the determination she did.

21.  Ms Ng further sought to compare the present case with recent cases of arson or attempted arson^[14], which demonstrate that judges in the District Court have generally adopted starting points ranging from 4 years’ to 6 years’ imprisonment^[15] (Ground 2).  The thrust of Ms Ng’s submission was that arson (or attempted arson) was more serious than the offence with which the applicant had been charged.  She relied, in particular, on the first instance decision in HKSAR v Chan Chun Fai Kelvin, where the defendant had been convicted on his own pleas before the same judge of one charge of attempted arson and one charge of possession of things with intent to destroy or damage property (the “possession charge”).  Taking the view that the defendant’s personal circumstances did not amount to effective mitigation because of the gravity of the case, the judge had imposed starting points of 5 years’ imprisonment for the attempted arson; and 3½ years’ imprisonment for the possession charge^[16].  Ms Ng submitted that there was no apparent difference in the circumstances between Chan Chun Fai Kelvin and the present case to justify the disparity in starting points on the possession charges.

22.  Furthermore, Ms Ng submitted that in cases involving possession of petrol bombs coming before the magistrates’ courts, the starting points adopted generally ranged between 12 and 21 months’ imprisonment^[17].

23.  Accordingly, counsel submitted that the starting point of 4 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive and/or wrong in principle.

The respondent’s stance

24.  Mr Ira Lui, on behalf of the respondent, conceded that the judge did not follow the orthodox sentencing approach set out in Islam Azharul.  However, it was well-established that an otherwise proper sentence would not be upset simply because of a failure to indicate the starting point adopted: see R v Wong Cho Chop[18]; HKSAR v Gurung Laxman[19].

25.  Mr Lui further submitted that there was little utility in comparing first instance decisions with the present case because the former did not establish any sentencing guidelines, nor were they binding on the Court of Appeal.  He also pointed out that no meaningful comparison could be made with cases from the magistracies, when there were no reasons for sentence given by the sentencing magistrates before this Court.

26.  He argued that the present case was clearly distinguishable from, and more serious than, the circumstances of the possession charge in Chan Chun Fai Kelvin.  In that case, the defendant was arrested on his own some days after the arson case had occurred.  Inside a room of an industrial building, which he was renting at the time, there were also found 11 petrol bombs.  He was not carrying them on the street, in contemplation of a confrontation, nor was there the aggravating feature of his disguise.  By way of contrast, in the present case, the applicant was carrying the petrol bombs as well as the ingredients capable of making further incendiary devices, and he was clearly acting in concert with others and on his way somewhere; indeed, he was holding a walkie-talkie when intercepted.  Consequently, the facts in the present case were more serious than those of the possession charge in Chan Chun Fai Kelvin, and amply justified a starting point of 4 years’ imprisonment.

27.  Mr Lui submitted that since the applicant had admitted, as an element of the charge, that he intended to damage property with the petrol bombs in his possession, he would have committed arson had he not been intercepted.  As such, the general sentencing principles relating to arson and public order offences should come into play, which he summarised as follows:

(a)     Arson is viewed as an extremely serious offence because of the inherent danger of an uncontrollable fire, and of the reckless disregard exhibited by an arsonist for life and property.  The potentially grave consequences of arson called for heavy and deterrent sentences^[20].  The maximum sentence of life imprisonment for this offence underscored the seriousness of deliberately starting fires;

(b)     In the context of unlawful assemblies involving violence, it has been held by the Court in Secretary for Justice v Wong Chi Fung^[21] that the sentencing court’s main consideration is the punishment of the offender, as well as deterring others from violating the law in a similar manner.  These factors will be given great weight and the offender’s personal circumstances will not be regarded as a strong mitigating factor.  These observations were endorsed by the Court of Final Appeal^[22];

(c)     Although the young age and rehabilitation of the applicant were relevant factors, they were not the sole objectives of the court’s sentence^[23]. Deterrent sentences were necessary to dissuade young people from joining illegal enterprises^[24];

(d)     Public order offences have been established as an exception to the general principle that a deterrent sentence should not be passed on a person with a clear record^[25];

(e)     Having regard to the seriousness of the offence, although the rehabilitation of a young offender is relevant, it pales into insignificance against the more important purposes of deterring others and ensuring public order is maintained^[26].

28.  In short, Mr Lui contended that the judge was correct in placing greater emphasis on retribution, deterrence and prevention than on the rehabilitation of the applicant: thus, the judge’s conclusion accorded with well-established principles.

29.  Mr Lui contended that there were 14 aggravating features in the present case:

(i)     the applicant was carrying multiple types of fire accelerants, which had been viewed by the courts as matters of considerable aggravation^[27];

(ii)     if the intended arson was to be committed by throwing petrol bombs, the danger would escalate;

(iii)     the applicant was clearly determined to use the petrol bombs, since he had strapped three of them to his waist bag, and had four lighters easily accessible in his waist bag;

(iv)     the applicant was in possession of a considerable quantity of inflammable solvents sufficient to make between 7 and 15 further petrol bombs, as well as 14 pieces of white fabric to be used as stoppers for the devices;

(v)     the applicant carried other implements for committing criminal damage, such as lighters, spanners and a pair of scissors;

(vi)     the location where the applicant and his group were arrested was a residential area, posing significant risks to residents in the vicinity;

(vii)     the applicant took well-planned and effective measures to conceal his identify, facilitate his escape and avoid detection;

(viii)     the applicant acted in concert with a group of persons, for which he was equipped with a walkie-talkie;

(ix)     the offence was premeditated;

(x)     the offence took place “during the height of recent disturbances when many petrol bombs were thrown indiscriminately all over Hong Kong”[28];

(xi)     the applicant admitted that he had specifically learnt how to make petrol bombs and believed it was “a way to fight against the law enforcer”^[29];

(xii)     the offence took place in broad daylight, in blatant disregard of the law;

(xiii)     the applicant clearly set out with the intention of perpetrating violent and destructive acts;

(xiv)     according to the psychologist’s report, there was a risk that the applicant would re-offend^[30].

30.  Mr Lui defended the judge’s finding that the items found in the applicant’s rucksack could have been used to make between 7 and 15 further petrol bombs.  There was no ostensible reason for carrying such a quantity of inflammable solvents on his person, if his only intention was to use 3 petrol bombs.  The inflammable solvents were in three plastic bottles, and were clearly not leftover from making the 3 petrol bombs.  The presence of the funnel, in particular, as well as the 14 extra pieces of white fabric, strongly supported the correctness of the inference the judge drew.  The applicant did not explain why he was carrying these items.

31.  It was contended that the only mitigating factors that could reasonably be advanced on the applicant’s behalf were his youth and his timely plea, both of which were properly reflected in the sentence passed.

32.  Mr Lui then sought to compare the sentence in the present case with other cases of similar facts:

(a)     In HKSAR v Ngai Man Yin and another^[31], the two applicants were found in possession of three petrol bombs and were sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment after trial for conspiracy to cause explosions likely to endanger life or damage property and possession of explosive substances.  (It should be noted, however, that conspiracy to cause explosions likely to endanger life carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment under section 53 of the Crimes Ordinance; whilst possession of explosive substances carries a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment under section 55 of the Crimes Ordinance.)

(b)     In HKSAR v Lui Fui^[32], the accused pleaded guilty to possession of a plastic hand grenade without a licence and the starting point of 4½ years’ imprisonment was upheld on appeal.  (Again, it should be noted that possession of ammunition without a licence carries a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment under section 13 of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, Cap 238.)

33.  Mr Lui suggested that, on the basis of these authorities, the judge would have been justified in adopting a starting point of 5 years’ imprisonment, given all the aggravating features in the present case, reducing it by 1 year for the applicant’s youth and clear record, and arriving at a notional sentence after trial of 4 years’ imprisonment before discounting it for plea.

34.  Finally, Mr Lui observed that the remarks made by the Court of Final Appeal in Kwok Wing Hang v Chief Executive in Council on the exceptional and sustained outbreak of violent public lawlessness between June and October 2019^[33] applied in equal measure to the present case, which had been committed in November 2019.  Indeed, he referred to the Court’s comment that the situation had deteriorated during October and November 2019, despite the making of the Prohibition on Face Covering Regulation[34], which had come into force on 5 October 2019.  Accordingly, the ultimate sentence of 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment imposed on the applicant, whilst robust, was entirely proper.

Consideration

35.  I have rehearsed the respective submissions of the parties, which have been presented very ably and persuasively by counsel for both sides, in some detail so that the applicant will understand the relative force of the competing arguments.  I am particularly conscious that he was sentenced as young person of 17 years of age to an adult sentence of imprisonment.  That must obviously be a concern to any court, and it is clear that it was a factor which weighed heavily with the sentencing judge.

36.  Ms Ng sensibly accepted on the applicant’s behalf that it could no longer be contended that the judge gave insufficient consideration to the rehabilitative sentence of a Detention Centre order; and the original ground of appeal to that effect was no longer being pursued.  In my view, she was right to adopt this position.  However, it follows that once one accepts, given the seriousness of the offence and the public interest engaged, that a sentence of imprisonment was inevitable, then the only real question is whether the judge adopted the correct starting point.

37.  I did not consider the comparison with the sentence for the possession charge in Chan Chun Fai Kelvin apposite. Firstly, the circumstances of the possession charge were very different: the petrol bombs were found in a room in an industrial estate; the defendant was on his own when apprehended; and there were no circumstances indicating that he was on a mission anywhere to throw them.  In the present case, the applicant clearly was on a mission somewhere when intercepted, armed with ready-made petrol bombs and a walkie-talkie, and clearly acting together with a group of confederates, all suitably clad in black.  Moreover, he had the means to make further petrol bombs.  Mr Lui made the point that, although there were no other bottles found, the wherewithal for making between 7 and 15 further incendiary devices was in his rucksack, including a funnel, which is normally used to channel liquid from one bottle or container to another.  It is inconceivable why he should have had these items on his person, if he was not on an imminent mission somewhere to use them.  Whilst there are similarities, particularly as to the ages of the defendant and applicant, I agree that the facts of this case were more serious than those in Chan Chun Fai Kelvin.  In any event, Chan Chun Fai Kelvin, as a first instance decision, cannot be binding on the Court of Appeal.  The same must be said of the other first instance decisions in both the District Court and magistracies.

38.  As for any criticism of the judge’s approach to the starting point, the judge did say that had the applicant been older, the starting point would have been higher[35]. Although it is true that she did not indicate what that starting point might have been had he been older, that does not provide a reasonably arguable ground of appeal against sentence.  Ultimately, the Court will be looking at the resulting sentence to see whether it was wrong in principle and/or manifestly excessive, regardless of the way the judge has gone about the process of reasoning her sentence.

39.  I should make clear that it is not my function to determine the correctness of the sentence appealed against: that is the function of the Court of Appeal.  My only function is to determine whether there are reasonably arguable grounds of appeal against sentence worthy of the consideration of the Court of Appeal.  I have concluded, notwithstanding the matter of the applicant’s age, that there are no such grounds, and I accordingly refuse leave to appeal against sentence.

40.  I should advise the applicant that he has the right to renew his application for leave to appeal against sentence to the Court of Appeal.  However, he should also be warned that the Court has the power to make an order for the loss of any time which the applicant has spent in custody pending his appeal, if it were to come to the view that there was no justification for the renewal of the application.

[1] Reasons for Sentence, Appeal Bundle (“AB”), pp 12-14, paras 7-14.

[2] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 16, para 23.

[3] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 14, paras 16-18, the Detention Centre/Training Centre suitability report at AB, p 38.

[4]  Psychologist’s report, AB, p 41, para 10.

[5] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 15-16, paras 19-22; the psychologist’s report at AB, p 40-42, paras 6‑10,12.

[6] Reasons for Sentence, AB, pp 16-17, paras 25-28.

[7] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 18, paras 29-30.

[8] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 18, paras 30-31.

[9] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 19, paras 32-34.

[10] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 20, paras 36-38.

[11] HKSAR v Islam Azharul [2020] 1 HKLRD 644.

[12] Ibid., at para20.

[13] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 17, para 8.

[14] Annex 1 to the applicant’s supplemental written submissions.

[15] HKSAR v Yiu Siu Hong [2020] HKCA 1087; HKSAR v Chong Yam Miu Lucas [2020] HKDC 216; HKSAR v Chan Chun Fai Kelvin [2020] HKDC 856; HKSAR v Lam Siu Hung [2020] HKDC 984; HKSAR v Kwong Man Tsun [2020] HKDC 1118; HKSAR v Lai Chun Hung [2020] HKDC 1190.

[16] Chan Chun Fai Kelvin, at paras 34-50.

[17] Annex 2 to the applicant’s supplemental written submissions.

[18] R v Wong Cho Chop (Unrep., Crim App No 517 of 1990, 12 July 1991), at p 2.

[19] HKSAR v Gurung Laxman (Unrep., CACC 254/2011), at paras 28-32.

[20] R v Li Mun Tong (Unrep., Crim App No 309 of 1994, 16 May 1995), at p 2; HKSAR v Li Lin Shum also known as Li Sum (Unrep., CACC 82/2015, 26 August 2015) at para 9; HKSAR v Kung Pak Fu [2008] 2 HKCLRT 240, at paras 15-16.

[21] Secretary for Justice v Wong Chi Fung [2018] 2 HKLRD 699, at paras 127-134.

[22] Secretary for Justice v Wong Chi Fung (2018) 21 HKCFAR 35, at paras 116-121, 123.

[23] Attorney General v Law Ying Cheung [1981] HKC 161, at 163B-C.

[24] HKSAR v Cheung Chi Him and Others [2000] 2 HKLRD 657, at 661E-F.

[25] R v Nguyen Quang Thong & Ors [1992] 2 HKCLR 10, at p 13 lines 4-9.

[26] Secretary for Justice v SWS [2020] HKCA 788, at paras 45-55.

[27] HKSAR v Loku Galappaththige Pramuka Salinda (Unrep., CACC 46/2016, 11 November 2016), at para 17.

[28] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 17, para 27.

[29] AB, p 40, para 6.

[30] AB, p 41, para 10.

[31] HKSAR v Ngai Man Yin and Anor (Unrep., CACC 70/1997, 27 August 1998).

[32] HKSAR v Lui Fui (Unrep., CACC 237/2007, 14 March 2008).

[33] Kwok Wing Hang v Chief Executive in Council (2020) 23 HKCFAR 518, at paras 87-97.

[34] Ibid., at para 95.

[35] Reasons for Sentence, AB, p 20, para 36.