RE DWI INDRA SARI

CACV 256/2023, [2024] HKCA 432

On Appeal From [2024] HKCA 7

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 256 OF 2023

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1014 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the court):

1.  By a judgment dated 12 January 2024 ([2024] HKCA 7)  (“the Judgment”), this court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Deputy Judge”)  dated 3 August 2023 ([2023] HKCFI 1964), whereby the Deputy Judge refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  On 22 January 2024, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Judgment.

3.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

4.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

5.  In her Notice of Motion, the applicant merely stated:

“I would like to reject and review the decision made by the court. They disregard my dangerous situation.” (sic)

6.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged her written submissions on 7 February 2024.  In those submissions, she again claimed that she would be harmed or killed by the loan shark and that she would face grave danger.  She also claimed that the Deputy Judge and the Director failed to take her case in context as the loan sharks had been harassing and threatening people.  She further asserted that internal relocation would be impossible as Indonesia is a very communal society and that to live in another place would mean that she would have to live like a fugitive.

7.  In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  Her assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of her fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Her allegations are essentially a mere regurgitation of those submissions she had previously made before this court in her appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [8] - [16] of the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  More importantly, she fails to identify any specific error in the Judgment. Clearly, her assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

8.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, her allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

9.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

10.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.