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DCCC 1336/2024
[2025] HKDC 1406
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1336 OF 2024
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| Before: |
H.H. Judge G. Lam |
| Present: |
Mr. Fergus Chau, SPP, of the Department of Justice, for HKSAR. |
| |
Mr. David Cheung instructed by M/s NGANS Lawyers LLP, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the defendant. |
| Offences: |
(1) & (2) Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence(處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產) |
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REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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The defendant pleaded guilty to 2 charges of "Money laundering". In short, he lent his bank accounts to someone.
Summary of Facts
Charge 1
2. On 21 December 2015, the defendant opened a bank account (No.012-831-1-054369-0) with Bank of China ("the BoC Account"). He claimed to be a delivery man earning less than HK$10,000 per month. The bank statements were sent to a Tin Shui Wai address provided by him. The defendant was the sole signatory of the BoC Account.
3. In November 2020, Madam Chow (PW1) met someone surnamed Cheung through social media. Cheung introduced an online cryptocurrency platform named "LMAX" to PW1. Between 3 and 8 December 2020, as instructed by the staff of LMAX, PW1 deposited a total sum of HK$240,000 into different bank accounts, including 3 deposits made to the BoC Account on 8 December 2020, which aggregated to a total sum of HK$110,000. When PW1 later wanted to convert her cryptocurrency into HK Dollars for withdrawal, LMAX claimed system malfunction and subsequently became out of reach. The Police was alerted.
4. Between 5 and 9 December 2020, the BoC Account received 23 deposits, which aggregated to a sum of HK$999,934 (including PW1's HK$110,000). A total sum of HK$999,952 was withdrawn by 22 transactions. Bank records showed that from 5 December 2020 onwards, the amounts of deposits had increased significantly. Patterns such as large sum deposits, "mirror" transactions, quick speed of withdrawals (same day) and low balance were found. "Test" deposits and withdrawals in the sum of $1 were often made during the offence period.
Charge 2
5. On 2 September 2020, the defendant opened a corporate bank account (No.149-606618-838) held in the name of Blackjad Limited with HSBC ("the HSBC Account"). He claimed to be the director, ultimate beneficial owner (with 100% shareholding), key-controller and contact person of Blackjad. He was the sole signatory of the HSBC Account.
6. Between 10 October 2020 and 2 February 2021, the HSBC Account received 2 cash deposits which aggregated to a sum of HK$21,000 and a transfer deposit in the sum of US$468,389.60. These funds were withdrawn very soon (from same day to one week) in cash (which aggregated to a sum of HK$808,600) and by transfers (which aggregated to sums of US$107.11 and HK$2,830,000).
Arrest
7. The defendant was arrested on 14 September 2021 in relation to the HSBC Account. In his video recorded interview, the defendant admitted, inter alia, that he was a part-time warehouse worker, and was the sole person-in-charge of Blackjad. He claimed that he had forgotten when he set up Blackjad. A friend had asked him to do so. He did not use Blackjad to do any business. The HSBC Account was operated by a friend (named unknown) of another friend (named "Ah Man"). The defendant claimed not knowing the parties which deposited funds into the HSBC Account.
8. The defendant was arrested on 19 January 2023 in relation to the BoC Account. In his video recorded interview, the defendant claimed that he did not know PW1 or the LMAX app.
Mitigation & Sentence
9. The defendant is 43 and single. He has 2 conviction records, both are unrelated to "money laundering". Defence counsel Mr. Cheung informed me that the defendant was a part-time warehouse worker. In mitigation, Mr. Cheung submitted that the defendant had no knowledge of any predicate offence related to either charge. He lent his 2 bank accounts to different friends and did not bother to check the bank statements afterwards. Mr. Cheung stressed that the defendant received no remuneration for lending out his 2 bank accounts; he was merely helping his friends.
10. The prosecution has applied for an enhanced sentence pursuant to section 27(2)(c) and (d) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap.455) on the basis of prevalence as well as the nature and extent of harm caused to the community. Mr. Cheung did not object.
11. I bear in mind the Court of Appeal's decision in HKSAR v Xu Mai Qing CACC 464/2005, whereas Yeung JA (as he then was) held "Under section 27(11) of OSCO, what the prosecution has to prove is the prevalence of the offence, not the increase in the number of such offences[1]."
12. I have read the witness statement of CIP Li dated 23 July 2025. I am satisfied that in 2020, deception-related money laundering cases were prevalent in Hong Kong in terms of the number of cases as well as the total value of monetary loss.
13. There is clear and cogent evidence before me that money laundering using bank accounts opened by "ML Stooges" is still widespread and commonly being practised in Hong Kong today. What true criminals need are gullible scapegoats like the defendant in the present case who would take the blame for them when the law enforcement takes action. The court must send a clear message to the general public that people who play the role of "ML Stooge" will receive severe punishment, so that there is a deterrent effect. When there are fewer or no willing "ML Stooges", the criminal activities which rely on their bank accounts would fail.
14. This is a typical case of money laundering by way of stooge bank accounts. The defendant claimed complete ignorance of the investment scam against PW1; however, such a scam would have been meaningless without his bank account. Assuming what the defendant said is true, given his role, the total sums which went through his 2 accounts and the overall circumstances, I grant the prosecution's application and will enhance the sentence by 25%.
15. The Court of Appeal in SJ v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201 held :-
Generally, the sentence for "money laundering" offences should mainly reflect the amount of "black money" laundered and not the benefit obtained by the defendant or others. The reason being that it is very difficult to prove the benefit concerned, and in most "money laundering" cases, there may not be evidence to show from what indictable offence the "black money" are in fact derived. Of course, if there is information to prove that the "black money" is originated from serious crimes, including drug trafficking, kidnap and blackmail, illegal human trafficking, other organized crimes, etc. or the defendant's benefit is huge, then the sentence should be adjusted upward.[2]
16. In determining the proper starting point, I have reminded myself of the sentencing principles laid down in HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 545 and HKSAR v Boma Amaso [2012] 2 HKLRD 33. I have also borne in mind the amounts of money involved, the duration of the offences, the defendant's role in relation to the movements of funds as well as his personal circumstances.
17. In SJ v Ngai Fung Sin Apple [2013] 5 HKLRD 104, Yeung V-P held :-
Neither the fact that the "illicit/black money" was actually not derived from an indictable offence nor the defendant's ignorance of the actual source of the "illicit/black money" is necessarily a valid mitigating factor…[3]
Charge 1
18. I accept there is no evidence showing that: (i) except the HK$110,000 from PW1, the funds received by the BoC Account were related to any predicate offence; and (ii) the defendant was involved in or had any knowledge of any predicate offence. As the sole owner of the BoC Account, the defendant should have retained its ultimate control and paid attention to its transactions on a regular basis.
19. On the other hand, I cannot overlook the fact that a total sum of HK$999,934 went through the BoC Account within a period of 4 days. By lending his bank account to someone and thus allowing funds of unknown origins to pass through the BoC Account, the defendant played a pivotal role in helping the mastermind(s) of criminal activities to access their illegal funds without revealing their identities.
20. In the circumstances, I adopt a starting point of 3 years' imprisonment[4]. With the timely guilty plea, the sentence becomes 24 months. With the 25% enhancement, I sentence the defendant to 30 months' imprisonment for this charge.
Charge 2
21. There is no evidence showing that the funds received by the HSBC Account were related to any predicate offence. A total sum of HK$21,000 and US$468,389.60 (i.e. approximately HK$3.67 million[5] in total) went through the HSBC Account within a period of 5 months. Hence, I adopt a starting point of 4 years' imprisonment[6]. With the timely guilty plea, the sentence becomes 32 months. With the 25% enhancement, I sentence the defendant to 40 months' imprisonment for this charge.
Overall sentence
22. The total sum received by the 2 bank accounts was HK$4.67 million odd. Bearing in mind the totality principle, I consider a global starting point of 4 years' imprisonment appropriate and just. With the timely guilty pleas, the overall sentence is reduced to 32 months. Apart from this, I see no other mitigating factors which warrant any further reduction. With the 25% enhancement, the final overall sentence becomes 40 months. To achieve this, I order the sentences for both charges to run concurrently.
[1] Paragraph 16 on p.4 of the judgment.
[2] Paragraphs 12 and 13, pp 204-205.
[3] Paragraph 44, p 114.
[4] According to Wan Kwok Keung (supra), the starting point is 3 years or so where the "black money" involved is between $1 million and $2 million. (See paragraph 15 of the judgment)
[5] Adopting HK$7.80 to US$1 as the exchange rate.
[6] According to Wan Kwok Keung (supra), the starting point is 4 years or so where the "black money" involved is between $3 million and $6 million. (See paragraph 15 of the judgment)
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