RE AS

CACV 93/2018

[2018] HKCA 446

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 93 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 274 of 2017)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Chu JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge M Ng (“the Judge”) given on 22 March 2018 refusing him leave to apply for judicial review.  The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office/ Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 2 June 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against two decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 8 January 2016 and 22 November 2016 rejecting his non-refoulement claim.  The Director’s first decision covered the BOR 3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2] and the torture risk[3] while the second decision related to the BOR 2 risk ground[4].

The applicant’s claim

2.  The applicant is a Pakistani national.  He claimed to have departed Pakistan for Guangzhou on 9 November 2012, and entered Hong Kong illegally on 13 November 2012.  He was arrested by the police on the same day.  He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 15 November 2012.  He attended three screening interviews at the Immigration Department between September and November 2015.  The applicant’s non-refoulement claim was based on his fear that, if he were to be refouled to Pakistan, he would be subjected to ill-treatment or even life danger posed by a person called Baha-Ul-Haq (“Baba”) because he had reported his illegal drug dealing activities to the police and to the Pakistan People Party (“PPP”). 

3.  The applicant was born and raised in a village in Sargodia District, Punjab and had received 12 years of formal education.  He has a younger brother who suffers from mental illness.  The applicant and his family are Sunni Muslims, but some of his maternal relatives had converted to Ahmadi Muslims.  The applicant’s family were supporters of PPP, which is an opposition party in Pakistan.  Baba was the district head of the Muslim Students Federation (“MSF”) supported by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (“PMLN”), which was the ruling party in Pakistan at the time of the screening interviews.  His elder brother, also a member of PMLN, was a Minister of the National Assembly in the applicant’s locality.  Baba recruited students in the applicant’s college to run a drug syndicate.  Among the recruits was a person called Ameer, who carried out drug dealings and other illegal activities for Baba. After the applicant and some of the Ahmadi students reported their illegal activities to the college principal and the police, Baba, Ameer and their associates were hostile to them and often threatened to harm them.

4.  The applicant relied on nine incidents of threat and attack, which were set out in details in the Director’s first decision and in [12] of CALL-1 Form.  In summary, the first incident was a verbal threat made by Ameer and his associates when the applicant was still at college.  On that occasion, Ameer was armed with a gun and they threatened to kill the applicant if he did not stop acting against them.  The second incident happened in November 1999. After a heated argument followed by a fight between the applicant and his friends and Ameer, Ameer and his brother fired two shots at the applicant from the rooftop of the applicant’s house, but missed.  The matter was reported to the police.  Ameer was arrested and imprisoned.  After that, the applicant received threats delivered through his family members by Altaf, who was promoted by Baba to replace Ameer, and his subordinates.  After Ameer’s release from prison in 2000, the applicant moved to stay with his maternal grandmother, after moving around seven to eight relatives’ houses in the village.

5.  The third incident happened on 2 December 2000 after Altaf’s daughter went missing.  A group of men went to the applicant’s home, accused the applicant of kidnapping Altaf’s daughter, assaulted his parents and demanded them to hand over the applicant.  Altaf’s people also looked for the applicant at his grandmother’s house.  No report was made to the police about this incident but the applicant’s family members had written complaint letters to the police.  The applicant went to stay in Bhakkar City for three to four months.  In about March or April 2001, he joined the army.       

6.  The fourth incident happened in December 2001 in which Altaf’s subordinates fired a gunshot at the applicant’s maternal uncle, but missed and injured a teacher instead.  Although a report was made to the police, no legal action was taken after the victim received compensation and withdrew the complaint, and a bribe was made to the police.  The applicant believed his uncle was attacked because he had stayed with him, and he had helped the applicant to flee from the village.  Meanwhile the applicant had completed his military training and was stationed in Bahawalpur from where he was later transferred to Karachi.  Through his maternal uncle’s arrangement, the applicant spoke to a PPP member called Nadeem about the threats and attacks from Baba and his associates and sought his assistance.  Nadeem, however, made use of the information to make political attacks on Baba’s brother and the PMLN.     

7.  In the fifth, sixth and seventh incidents that happened on 25 May, 20 July 2002 and 25 May 2003, Altaf’s subordinates fired gunshots at the applicant’s parents and relatives.  In the fifth and seventh incident, the applicant’s father was injured and was treated in hospital, and the incidents were reported to the police.  In the sixth incident, the applicant’s parents and relatives were not hurt, but there was heavy firing at the grandmother’s house in the morning after.

8.  The eighth incident was an abduction of the applicant in May or June 2004 when he was on holiday in Hub area, Karachi.  During the seven to eight months’ detention, the applicant was questioned about what information he had given to Nadeem, and was assaulted several times with punches, kicks, wooden sticks and electrical cables.  On one occasion a lit cigarette was also applied to his upper left arm while on another occasion a gunshot was fired at him causing bleeding in his right calf.  There was also one occasion when the applicant was given electric shocks and repeatedly burnt with lit cigarettes to extract information on what he had told Nadeem and to force him to sign some documents.  Eventually, the applicant managed to escape.  He stayed with a doctor, who was his uncle’s friend in Clifton area, Karachi.  The applicant did not report his abduction to the police as he did not think they would help. Nor did he tell the army because his family members had been threatened.  The applicant learnt later that Altaf died of a heart attack, and he was replaced by one of his subordinates.  

9.  In 2006, the applicant obtained a visa to go to Malaysia.  After staying in Kuala Lumpur for about six months, he went to Taiwan where he stayed until March or April 2010.  The applicant returned to Pakistan because he was caught overstaying and also because he wanted to resolve the dispute with Baba.  By then, Ameer had married one of his cousins and he agreed to help the applicant to settle the dispute with Baba.  In January 2011, the applicant went to the Philippines.  He returned to Pakistan in August 2011.

10.  The ninth incident happened in September 2011.  Through Ameer’s arrangement, the applicant met with Baba, during which Baba asked him to retrieve the information he gave to Nadeem and offered in return to kill Ameer and let the applicant take his place.  The applicant asked for time to consider it.  That afternoon, he told Ameer of Baba’s plot.  A week later, when Ameer and the applicant were travelling in a car, they discovered they were followed by two motorbikes ridden by Baba’s people.  When they tried to escape, the motorcyclists fired several shots at their car.  The applicant fled to Karachi where he stayed until 2012.  He learned later that Ameer was killed by Baba’s people.  In November 2012, the applicant obtained a Chinese visa and flew to Guangzhou, from where he went to Shenzhen and eventually entered Hong Kong on 13 November 2012.        

11.  In his non-refoulement claim form, the applicant produced several exhibits and photographs showing the scars on his head and calf.  In his interviews with the immigration officer, he added that he could not return to Pakistan because people thought he was an Ahmadi Muslim, so they took and tortured him.  He claimed also that Baba would falsely accuse him of murdering Ameer and kill him.  He said the police would not help or protect him because they were corrupt and would disclose his whereabouts to Baba.  

The Director’s decisions

12.  In the Notice of Decision dated 8 January 2016, for reasons set out in [14], the Director considered there were no substantial grounds for believing that the perceived risk of harm from Baba and his associates upon the applicant’s return to Pakistan was likely to materialise.  On the analysis given in [15] and [16], the Director assessed that state protection and internal relocation alternatives was reasonably available, and they would further lower or negate the level of risk.  The Director did not accept the applicant faced a genuine and substantial risk of being subjected to ill-treatment under BOR 3.  The Director found the dispute with Baba was a private dispute outside the definition of “persecution”, and further did not accept the applicant’s fear of ill-treatment to be well-founded.  The Director further noted there was no evidence of the threats, attacks on him or the harm that his enemies may inflict on him were committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of the national government of Pakistan.  The Director accordingly rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim under the BOR 3, persecution and torture ground.  

13.  By letter dated 4 November 2016, the Director invited the applicant to provide additional information relevant to an assessment of the BOR 2 risk.  Not having received a response from the applicant, the Director proceeded to consider the applicant’s claim on the ground of the BOR 2 risk based on the primary materials prepared for the other applicable grounds for his non-refoulement claim.  By a Notice of Further Decision dated 22 November 2016, the Director decided against the applicant.

The Board’s decision

14.  On the applicant’s appeal, an oral hearing was held on 25 November 2016.  The Board considered the applicant’s case on all applicable grounds.  By its decision dated 2 June 2017, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal.  In [58] to [61] of the decision, the Board set out the applicant’s oral evidence given to the Board.  It noted that the applicant’s oral evidence was inconsistent with his answers given in the non-refoulement claim form in a number of respects (see [78]), and concluded that the applicant’s evidence was unreliable and doubtful.  Credibility aside, the Board was of the view that the applicant failed on all the applicable grounds.  It considered that a torture claim was not made out because the ill-treatments inflicted during the abduction (even if true) was an isolated incident and were not meted out by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, public official or public authority.  As to the BOR 3 claim, the Board did not accept the applicant would face a real risk of being tortured or ill-treated if he were refouled to Pakistan, noting that, on the applicant’s case, he had been able to escape the notice of Baba and his associates for a long period of time when he was in Pakistan before, between and after his many trips abroad.  The Board also found the applicant’s claim, even if true, did not amount to persecution under the Convention.  On the issue of state protection, the Board acknowledged that the police force in Pakistan was not effective in the past, but pointed out that the Country of Origin Information set out in the decision showed there had been reform and improvement, and it would be up to the applicant to access the available protection offered by the state and the alternative avenues if the police failed to offer help.  The Board further noted that internal relocation was available to the applicant when he returns to Pakistan.  Finally on BOR 2, the Board found that the applicant failed to establish a case that he faced a real risk of danger against his life if he were to return to Pakistan.           

The Judge’s reasons for refusing leave

15.  The applicant filed his Form 86 on 7 June 2017 seeking leave to judicially review the Board’s decision.  The grounds he relied on to support his application were set out in [3(a)] to [3(i)] of the CALL-1 Form. They were considered and dealt with by the Judge in [32] to [44] of the CALL-1 Form dated 22 March 2018 as follows:

“32.  In the present application for leave to apply for judicial review, the court is to consider whether the Adjudicator had made any error of law or conducted procedures that failed to comply with the high standard of fairness as explained by the Court of Final Appeal in Secretary for Security v Saktheval Prabakar. In addition, the court would also rigorously examine and anxiously scrutinise the decision-making process and the reasons by which the Adjudicator reached the Adjudicator Decision, and consider whether they satisfied the Wednesbury test.

33.  AS did not ask for oral hearing of his application for leave to apply for judicial review. I have considered with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny the papers for the present application by AS. I consider it appropriate to deal with AS’ application on paper. Upon careful consideration, I am unable to fault the [Board’s] Decision. She had analysed the materials, claims and evidence with care and caution. She had also applied the correct standard of proof. AS’ complaints against the Adjudicator were not made out. I found no substance in AS’ grounds for the present application.

34.  In respect of the grounds of review in paragraph 3(a) above (insufficient research and inquiry into COI materials), paragraph 3(b)(i) above (failure to take relevant or relevant parts of the COI materials into account and placing weight on COI materials of little or no relevance) and paragraph 3(e) above (failure to consider and assess whether state protection existed under BOR3), I note the Adjudicator made particular references to the COI materials she examined/assessed. I have perused the Adjudicator Decision that referred to the COI materials the Adjudicator had taken into consideration. They were relevant, objective and balanced, and there was nothing to show they were something beyond the reasonable scope of materials which an adjudicator was expected to take into account. In fact, the Adjudicator specifically addressed AS’ allegations about police corruption and need for bribery for the police to act in the NCF/Interviews and in his evidence (see paragraph 27 above). But there was also COI that after passing the National Accountability Ordinance in 1999 state protection was available with the setting up of NAB with 4 regional offices including one in Rawalpindi, and that a large number of police officers had been disciplined for misconduct and inefficiency. There was further COI that showed avenues of recourse when a Pakistani police officer did not fulfil his/her duties or engaged in active wrongdoing (see paragraphs 95-96 of the Adjudicator Decision). Thus, the COI materials that the Adjudicator considered in the Adjudicator Decision covered materials that supported AS’ concerns and that showed ongoing efforts to put in place strategies and programmes to bring out improvement in the delivery of justice. AS had not shown what other COI materials he had provided to the [Director] and/or Adjudicator that the latter had failed to consider. AS’ criticism was but a bare assertion, and he did not point to any particular COI material that was more pertinent. After all, the claim was that of AS being the applicant, and he bore the ultimate responsibility for it throughout the processing of it with the burden always remaining on him being the person claiming protection from refoulement. In any event, the Adjudicator had found AS’ evidence to be inconsistent and flawed such as to render his claim implausible and unreliable. In my view, these grounds were not arguable.

35.  In respect the ground of review in paragraphs 3(b)(i) and 3(d) above (failure to evaluate and make finding of fact as to whether there existed in Pakistan a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violation of human rights, and ignoring evidence towards minorities), Au J in ST v Betty Kwan & anor [2013] 3 HKC 87, 99 said as follows:

“(1) The aim of the determination is to establish, among others, whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture (as understood under the CAT) in the country to which he or she would return. The exercise is a risk assessment. The risk must be ‘foreseeable, real and personal’. The risk needs not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present.

(2) The existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not by itself constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country. Additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of such a pattern does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in risk of being subjected to torture.”

36.  In my view, the Adjudicator had made due and adequate assessment of the evidence before finding that there were no substantial grounds for believing that AS would be in danger of being subjected to torture. As seen in paragraph 23 above, the Adjudicator noted discrepancies in AS’ case such that the negative pull of such inconsistencies rendered his evidence unreliable and his claim implausible. In my view, there was sufficient evidence and adequate analysis to support such finding/conclusion by the Adjudicator. In the circumstances, there was no basis to suggest AS had any personal and present risk of being subjected to torture.

37.  Further, the Adjudicator found that the ill-treatment AS received during his kidnap (even if true) was an isolated incident, and not meted out by a public official or with the consent/acquiescence of a public official or public authority (see paragraph 24 above). This was supported by the Adjudicator’s findings as to AS’ credibility, and the fact AS was able to escape the notice of Baha and his gang for a long time in Pakistan before, between and after his various trips abroad (see paragraph 25 above). In my view, there was no duty on the Adjudicator to proceed further to consider the pattern of violation of human rights and/or general evidence of violence against minorities. This ground had no merits.

38.  In respect of the ground of review in paragraphs 3(b)(ii) and 3(c) above (putting weight on COI materials of little or no relevance, cherry-picking COI materials, and selectively relying on COI materials that favoured rejection of AS’ claim), and paragraph 3(i) above (Adjudicator displaying a biased and formula approach), these grounds contained no particulars and had no merits.

39.  In respect of the ground of review in paragraph 3(g) above (officers being rude and having pre-judged AS’ case, and officers speculating it was merely out of anger/ spite that AS was assaulted/tortured/threatened), there was no merit to this ground. I note the present application for leave to apply for judicial review was only directed at the Adjudicator Decision and not against the [Director’s] Decision and/or [the Director’s] Further Decision. Since the hearing before the Adjudicator was by way of rehearing, such complaints against the immigration officers were irrelevant.

40.  In respect of the ground of review in paragraph 3(h)(ii) above (AS was not given the opportunity to submit additional facts for his non-refoulement claim in respect of the BOR2 risk as he did not receive the letter from [the Director] that invited him to submit additional facts), there was an oral hearing before the Adjudicator. AS’ failure to provide additional materials or facts on any other absolute and non-derogable rights under BOR, particularly BOR2 risk, was noted by the [Director] in coming to the [Director’s] Further Decision. But the present application for leave to apply for judicial review was only against the [Board’s] Decision. In AS’ appeal to the Board he gave evidence at the oral hearing before the Adjudicator on 25 November 2016, so he must have known he could supplement, amend or add information in relation to his petition. But no additional materials or facts were given by AS at the oral hearing before the Adjudicator. Still further, even for the purpose of the present application for leave to apply for judicial review, AS did not state in the [affirmation] any additional materials or facts on any other absolute and non-derogable rights under BOR, particularly BOR2 risk, that he wished to rely on. I also note the Adjudicator carefully considered AS’ account in coming to her conclusion. It must be remembered that even though the Adjudicator had to assess AS’ non-refoulement claim with a high standard of fairness and as a joint endeavor, it was AS’ duty to establish his non-refoulement claim.

41.  In respect of the ground of review in paragraph 3(h)(i) above (failure by decision-maker to rely on AS’ additional facts/grounds in relation to BOR2 risk without any interview or consideration of his further facts and grounds), I find this to be wholly without merit. Since it was AS’ case that AS had not been given the opportunity to provide additional materials or facts on any other absolute and non-derogable rights under the BOR, particularly BOR2 risk, I am quite unable to see how AS could complain that the DOI/Adjudicator failed to properly consider and rely on the further/additional facts and grounds that he had submitted. I repeat the discussion in paragraph 40 above.

42.  In respect of the ground of review in paragraph 3(f) above (paragraph 43 of the [Board’s] Decision), the Adjudicator stated as follows in paragraph 43 of the [Board’s] Decision:

“[AS] said he was told his mother had been receiving calls from anonymous callers asking for his whereabouts in spite of frequent changes of her mobile phone number, it seems the changes of her telephone numbers were known to these people.”

I am wholly unable to see from paragraph 43 (or indeed other paragraphs) of the [Board’s] Decision any mention by the Adjudicator that “he do not think that [AS] heard (or would have been allowed to hear) in detail the telephone conversation of Niraj”. Even more perplexing was the suggestion in the ground of review in paragraph 3(f) above that AS was Niraj’s wife and they lived in the same home such that “she” would overhear telephone conversations. In fact, AS was an unmarried man, and not Niraj’s wife. There is no merit to this ground.

43.  I am unable to find any grounds that showed there was an error of law by the Adjudicator. I see no evidence of procedural unfairness or failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness. The Adjudicator Decision was not Wednesbury unreasonable.

44.  In my view, AS’ claim was not reasonably arguable. There was no realistic prospect of success, and I refuse leave for judicial review with no order as to costs.”

The applicant’s grounds of appeal

16.  In his Notice of Appeal, the applicant sought to rely on the following grounds of appeal:

(1)  He was not aware he had to request for an oral hearing. The Judge wrongly exercised her case management power in deciding not to allow him a chance to explain himself.

(2)  He was challenged for not providing any medical certificate or report in respect of his injuries prior to the hearing before the Board, but he did not have any legal assistance and did not know how to obtain a medical report in Hong Kong.  The Duty Lawyer told him a medical examination was not necessary and did not make arrangement for it.

(3)  There is no reasonable basis for finding against him on credibility.  The Judge blindly agreed with the Director and the Board, and did not conduct any analysis.  He did not raise any torture claim in Bangladesh, Kenya and The UAE because he was not aware such claim was implemented.  The Board assumed he had the resources and information to learn about the availability of such claim in other countries.

(4)  The Director rejected his claim based on assumptions, such as in [14.3] and [14.7] of the first decision.  There is no reasonable basis for the Director concluding that the documents he provided were unable to show that he would be subjected to a real risk of torture/ill-treatment of he were to return to Pakistan.  The Director did not explain why his injuries and scars could not support the existence of such risk.

(5)  The Board had placed too much weight on his credibility.     

(6)  The Director did not give him the opportunity of submitting additional facts.  Although there was an oral hearing before the Board, he was not given legal representation and language assistance in the BOR 2 assessment.

Our decision on the appeal

17.  By letter dated 6 April 2018, the applicant agreed to this appeal being heard by a two-judge court.  We heard the appeal on 19 July 2018.

18.  In respect of ground (1), Order 53 rule 3(3) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A provides that the Court may determine an application for leave to bring judicial review without a hearing, unless this is requested for in the Form 86.  The determination of the applicant’s leave application on paper without a hearing is not the result of the Judge’s case management decision.  Form 86 states that “this form must be read together with notes for guidance obtainable from the Registry”.  Section A5 of the notes for guidance has reproduced the content of Order 53 rule 3(3).  Further and importantly, given the detailed grounds made by the applicant in his application and that they had been fully and carefully considered by the Judge, we do not accept the determination of his application for leave on paper has resulted in any prejudice or unfairness.  There is no merit in this ground.

19.  Concerning the challenges to the decisions of the Director and the Board in grounds (2) to (5), it should be borne in mind that evaluation of evidence, and assessment of credibility and merits of an applicant’s claim are matters for the Director and the Board, and the Court should not usurp their role as the primary decision maker: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160, and Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163.  Judicial review is not an avenue to revisit the assessment made by the Director or the Board in the hope that the Court may consider the matter afresh in the absence of any error of law: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; and Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328.  Accordingly, the criticism that the Judge did not conduct an analysis of the case and assessment of credibility is misplaced.

20.  In the present case, both the Director and the Board had given reasons for their adverse finding on the applicant’s credibility.  They were entitled to have regard to the inherent probabilities in assessing the applicant’s account of the events, such as what the Director did in [14.3] and [14.7] of the first decision.  They were also entitled to look at the totality of the evidence and to decide on the weight to be put on the nine items of documents and photographs referred to in [7] of the Director’s first decision. In light of the Director’s assessment and rejection of the applicant’s account for the reasons given in [14] of the first decision, it was open to him to find that the four photographs showing scars on the applicant’s body “can at the most support your claim that you had sustained some injuries and some scars were left on your body but on the basis of available evidence, all of them cannot support any real risk of torture/ill-treatment upon your return to Pakistan” ([8.8] of the Director’s first decision).  There is no proper basis for the applicant’s challenges to the Director’s and the Board’s finding of credibility.  Further, the criticism of the Board finding against the applicant because he had not raised any torture claim in Bangladesh, Kenya and the UAE is clearly unwarranted since this did not form part of the Board’s reasoning and it is not the applicant’s case that he had been to these countries.      

21.  As for ground (6) which relates to the assessment under the BOR 2 ground, this court has held that neither the high standard of fairness laid down in Sakthevel Prabakar v. Secretary for Security (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187 nor the judgment of FB v. Director of Immigration HCAL 51 of 2007 prescribes that a claimant has an absolute right to free legal representation at all stages of the proceedings: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15, Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17, and Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37.  The applicant had the benefit of legal representation in presenting his case to the Director and at the screening interviews. The applicant has not indicated what relevant additional information he could have submitted, but did not submit to the Director or the Board because he did not have further legal or language assistance.  The non-availability of medical report is not material since he had already put forward photographs of the scars and wounds on his body. 

22.  Given that he did not respond to the invitation, the Director was entitled to proceed with the assessment based on the primary materials available, which were obtained through the screening interview and also the information provided by the applicant with the assistance of lawyer.  Further as the Judge pointed out, the applicant could have, but did not, put in additional information relevant to the BOR 2 assessment at the oral hearing before the Board.   On the facts of this case, we cannot see any additional basis for advancing a claim on the BOR 2 risk independent of the BOR 3 risk, the persecution risk, and the torture risk.  We do not accept there is any arguable basis to challenge the determination on the BOR 2 ground.

23.  At the hearing of the appeal, the applicant submitted a copy of a registration certificate to show that he has two elderly parents and a brother who is mentally ill, and said that there would be no one to look after them if anything should happen to him.  We note that this point had been made to, and considered by the Director in his first decision. 

24.  The applicant also reiterated that the scars on his body as shown on the photographs produced to the Director proved that he had been tortured.  He further disputed the findings on availability of state protection and internal relocation, arguing that the real situation differed from what was depicted in the information on the Internet, and that every time he returned to Pakistan from another country he was attacked again.  For the reasons explained above, none of these points afford a basis for quashing the decision of the Board, or the decisions of the Director.

25.  Having considered the applicant’s arguments as well as the materials before us, we can see no error of law or impropriety in the procedure in the process before the Director and the Board.  Nor is there any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the fairness of the process.  We agree with the Judge that the intended judicial review is not reasonably arguable and has no prospect of success, and leave to apply for judicial review should be refused.

26.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.