RE PAKPONGSIRI THIDARUT

CACV 216/2025 [2026] HKCA 314

On appeal from [2025] HKCFI 1050

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 216 OF 2025

(ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 2579 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  At the hearing on 23 October 2025, this court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung given on 15 April 2025 dismissing her application for leave to apply for judicial review. The Reasons for Judgment ([2025] HKCA 985)  was handed down on 13 November 2025.

2.  On 17 November 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal this court’s judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant also lodged a written submission to support the application.

3.  Having considered the Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.  The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our Reasons for Judgment. We will not repeat them.

5.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  The grounds for the application as appeared by the Notice of Motion state that: (1)  the Court were wrong as a matter of law for not applying the principle of irrationality to the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”); (2)  there is some error of law in that the decision maker just relied on country-of-origin information (“COI”)  and facts that favour the rejection of the applicant’s claim; (3)  actual life is different from the COI, and the officers and the courts chose to ignore the overwhelming evidence of violence towards minorities; and (4)  the Judge did not apply the law properly.  

7.  In her affirmation, the applicant stated that there is a good ground of appeal that was not necessarily considered by Court of Appeal and the merits of this ground was sufficient reason for the Court to allow her appeal.  The written submission is identical to the submission lodged by the applicant in support of her appeal: see [12] of our Reasons for Judgment. 

8.  All the matters put forward by the applicant do not provide any viable grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  First, and critically, no question of great general and public importance has been identified, as required by section 22(1)  (b)  of the Ordinance.  Second, the matters raised in the Notice of Motion were new grounds that had not been raised in the application made to the Judge or in the appeal to this Court.  It is not open to the applicant to rely on new grounds in an application for leave to appeal, especially when the new grounds are fact-sensitive.  Third, there is no substance in the affirmation filed together with the Notice of Motion.  Fourth, for the reasons given in [14(4)  and (5)] of our Reasons for Judgment, the written submission is unarguable.  

9.  We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)  (b). 

10.  As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.