ALI MUHAMMAD v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 3716/2019

[2026] HKCFI 3629

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 3716 OF 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By summons (“the Summons”) filed on 22 January 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to appeal, out of time, against this Court’s order dated 16 May 2025, whereby his application for leave to apply for judicial review of (i) the Record of Screening Interview by the Immigration Department dated 14 March 2018; (ii) the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 28 November 2019; and (iii) the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 May 2018, which rejected his claim for non-refoulement on all applicable grounds other than risk of torture, was dismissed.

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. The Applicant is therefore late in taking out the Summons by 237 days.

3.  In determining whether to extend time for appealing a refusal of leave, the court will consider: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office CAMP 64/2020 [2020] HKCA 844 at §10).

4.  Given that the statutory period for lodging an appeal is 14 days, the present delay is plainly considerable. However, other than asserting that he has not received the Court order, the Applicant has provided no useful particulars for consideration at all; it is unclear which address is said by him to be “wrong”, which address should be the correct one, since when the former address is alleged to have become “wrong” and the reasons for such a claim, etc. This is not to mention that the paramount duty rests squarely upon him to ensure that the Court is kept updated with his current address for correspondence.   

5.  In any event, the most important consideration is the merits of the intended appeal. I am not remotely satisfied that the Applicant, by alleging that his life is still in danger in his home country and the conditions there are not “good”, has sufficiently demonstrated any arguable ground upon which the appeal could reasonably succeed. The Court will not exercise its discretion to extend time where the proposed appeal is, on its face, devoid of merit (see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017).

6.  The absence of merit in an intended appeal weighs decisively against the grant of an extension of time. To allow the Applicant to proceed with a challenge that is without merit would serve only to prolong the proceedings unnecessarily, prejudice the proper administration of the refoulement process, and undermine the interests of the proposed respondent.

7.  Accordingly, the Summons for extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal is dismissed.