LIMBU MEENU v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 560/2026

[2026] HKCFI 1588

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 560 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  This is the second of the Applicant’s recent applications for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  On 16 September 2025, the Applicant sought to challenge the decision made on 5 September 2025 by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) not to grant her an extension of stay. The Applicant’s essential complaint was that the Director failed to consider certain materials provided by her, that the application for extension of stay should have been granted, and that because it was not granted that makes the rejection unfair.

3.  By my reasoned Decision dated 6 October 2025, [2025] HKCFI 4531, I dismissed that application.

4.  On 14 October 2025, the Applicant sought to appeal my Decision in CACV 879/2025 (“Appeal”). In the Appeal, Kwan VP directed that unless the Applicant filed an application to fix a date for hearing the appeal by 4pm on 12 February 2026, the Notice of Appeal filed on 14 October 2025 would be dismissed immediately thereafter without further notice.

5.  The Applicant failed to comply with that direction, and the Appeal was dismissed on 12 Februarys 2026.

6.  On 6 March 2026, the Applicant wrote to the Registrar of the Court of Appeal, amongst other things seeking until 13 March 2026 to file the appeal bundles and for her Appeal to be reinstated.

7.  The day before that, on 5 March 2026, the Director wrote to the Applicant, noting that both the application for leave to apply for judicial review and the subsequent Appeal were dismissed, that the Applicant’s limit of stay in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”) had expired since 9 April 2025, and requiring the Applicant to leave the HKSAR on or before 12 March 2026.

8.  On 12 March 2026, the Applicant wrote to the Director requesting for a deferral of departure. On the same day, the Director wrote to state that, having carefully considered all the grounds raised in the letter requesting deferral of departure, the Applicant was still required to leave the HKSAR on or before 12 March 2026 (“Refusal of Deferral Decision”).

9.  Now, by Form 86 dated 12 March 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge (and to seek an order to quash) the Refusal of Deferral Decision.

10.  Having considered the materials, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with the application on paper. This is my Decision.

B.  Basis of Application

11.  The Form 86 states that the Applicant’s supporting affirmation contains the grounds on which the relief is sought.

12.  The affirmation identifies that, having been informed of the dismissal of the Appeal, the Applicant made enquiries with the Court of Appeal Registry and obtained the Court’s directions (which she claims not to have received, notwithstanding that she accepts that they were sent by post to the correct address). She then wrote to the Court on 6 March 2026, explaining the reasons for non-compliance with the Court’s order, and seeking reinstatement of the Appeal. As at the date of the affirmation, she was still awaiting a response from the Court.

13.  The Applicant asserts that the Director’s Refusal of Deferral Decision is unreasonable and unfair, when her request for deferral was not unreasonable and she had valid grounds. She says she notified the Director in her own letter of 12 March 2026 of the difficulties her daughter would face if the Applicant were required to depart within such a short period of time, and the Director’s response is totally unreasonable and unacceptable.

14.  In summary, the Applicant seeks leave to be granted for judicial review because her case “is based on unfair rejection” of the request for deferral of departure.

C.  Consideration of Merits

15.  In my previous Decision [2025] HKCFI 4531, I pointed out various principles which are equally applicable to the present circumstances. As appropriate, they can be repeated.

16.  It is a mandatory requirement of the rules governing applications for leave to apply for judicial review that the applicant sets out on the application form the relief claimed and the grounds put forward in support of that relief. Any relevant grounds would, of course, be the usual public law grounds such as illegality, procedural impropriety, or irrationality. It is not for the Court to seek to divine potential public law grounds of review from the materials provided by an applicant.

17.  The Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction does not sit as some form of appellate body. The Court is concerned with the integrity of the decision-making process, not the underlying merits of the decision. Whether or not to grant a visa – or to defer a requirement for leaving the HKSAR where the applicant has no visa – is a matter for the Director (to whom the relevant statutory powers have been given). The weight to be given to the various matters in the consideration of that decision is also a matter for the Director, subject only to possible judicial interference on traditional public law grounds.

18.  The Applicant has failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of the rules, in that the complaints made in her affirmation do not amount to public law grounds of review. A general claim that a decision is “unfair” or “unreasonable” – even when qualified by the word “totally” – does not, with respect, identify a public law ground of review.

19.  Here, there is no allegation of illegality, and there is no proper basis identified to support an allegation of any procedural impropriety. The Applicant has not put forward anything arguably capable of clearing the high hurdle of establishing an arguable case on irrationality (or Wednesbury unreasonableness).

20.  Further, making a compassionate or humanitarian submission does not assist the Applicant. As I also said in my previous Decision, it is well settled that there is no legal requirement for the Director to take into account such humanitarian or compassionate factors in making his immigration decisions. Further, if the Director chooses to take such factors into consideration, the weight to be accorded to them is a matter for him, subject only to interference on irrationality grounds. The materials provided by the Applicant do not identify any such reasonably arguable ground.

21.  Further still, in the context of merely a request for deferral of the requirement to leave the HKSAR following the refusal of permission to stay, the weight to be accorded to compassionate or humanitarian factors is unlikely to differ from that already given in the original decision to refuse the extension of stay.

22.  Lastly, there is obviously nothing unreasonable in the public law sense in the Director proceeding on the basis that he has refused permission to stay, and the Applicant’s intended judicial review challenge to that decision has been rejected by orders of the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeal.

23.  Indeed, it might be thought that the Director has made no further ‘decision’ – of the sort that might be amenable to review – where he has simply stated and refused to change the period within which he expects or requires the Applicant to leave the HKSAR because she has been here without permission for almost a year, and her legal challenges have failed.

D.  Result

24.  The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of appeal with any realistic prospect of success.

25.  Therefore, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

26.  I make no order as to costs.