HKSAR v. WONG KAM HO AND ANOTHER

HCCC 203/2021

HCCC 141/2023

(Consolidated)

[2026] HKCFI 1252

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CRIMINAL CASE NOS 203 OF 2021 AND 141 OF 2023

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  HCCC 203/2021 and HCCC 141/2023 concern two defendants, namely, Mr Wong Kam-ho (“D1”)  and Madam Chin Yin-ling Elaine (“D2”). The defendants have been found guilty after trial on the 2^nd count of conspiracy to traffic in a dangerous drug.

2.  The Particulars of Offence relating to Count 2 provide that between 17 March 2019 and 23 March 2019, both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, D1 and D2 conspired together and with Wong Ka-wo (“PW1”), to unlawfully traffic in a dangerous drug, namely, 5,959 grammes of a powder containing 4,751 grammes of cocaine.  

3.  Dealing firstly with the personal background of the defendants.  D1 was born in Hong Kong in August 1981 and is now 44 years old.  He received education up to Secondary 3 level in Hong Kong and he worked as a steel binder in construction sites earning approximately HK$50,000 a month before his arrest. 

4.  D1 is single but he and his former girlfriend had a son born out of wedlock in May 2010.  His former girlfriend then left him and their son in 2014.  Since then, D1 moved to live with his mother and his elder brother at the Tin Shui Estate. D1 was the sole breadwinner of the family and he financially supported his mother and his son.  His elder brother is financially independent but he did not give any maintenance money to the mother.  D1 used to give his mother HK$20,000 per month. 

5.  After his arrest in April 2020, his mother exhausted the savings and eventually applied for public assistance.  She also passed D1’s son to the care of the maternal grandmother of the child as she was unable of caring for the grandchild on her own.  After becoming acquainted with D2, D1 would sometimes also live with D2 (who was living with her daughter)  in Yuen Long since around mid-2018.  During the relationship, D1 also financially supported D2 and her daughter.  

6.  D1 has no previous record relating to drugs.  

7.  D2 had a clear record in Hong Kong at the time when the offence was committed.  She is aged 48 and she was only 43 years old at the time when the offence was committed.  D2 was born and raised in Hong Kong.  She migrated to the United States with her family at the age of 13.  She received education up to Grade 12 level in the United States.  After leaving school and coming back to Hong Kong, D2 had been working as a sales lady in an optical shop, duty-free shop and various boutiques.  

8.  D2 is single with a daughter, aged 18, born out of wedlock with D2’s former boyfriend.  The daughter, who is a Year 1 university student, is now living with D2’s mother in the United States.  At the time when the offence was committed, due to the fact that D2 had to take care of her daughter, who was only 13 years old at the time and being a primary school student in Hong Kong, D2 could only work on a part-time basis as, for example, a cashier.  At the material time, D2 was cohabiting with D1, who was also providing financial support to D2. 

9.  The sentencing approach for the offence of trafficking in a dangerous drug is laid down in HKSAR v Herry Jane Yusuph [2021] 1 HKLRD 290, which is further clarified in HKSAR v Lee Ming Ho [2024] 1 HKLRD 1186.  The first step is to identify the relevant sentencing band or bracket applicable to the quantity of drugs concerned.  The second step is an assessment of the role and culpability of the defendant based on the evidence before the court.  The third step is to identify where in the relevant band of the guidelines the defendant comes.  It may be necessary to go outside the band to reflect the particular circumstances of the offence and the role of the

defendant. The fourth step is to consider aggravating factors which bear on the “notional sentence after trial”. The fifth step is to have regard to any matters of mitigation, bearing in mind that “personal circumstances will count for little, unless they are exceptional”. The sixth and final step is for the judge to stand back and look at the overall sentence passed in order to ensure that it is a “fair, just and balanced sentence”.

10.  I shall adopt the same six-step approach in sentencing the defendants.  I shall deal first with the sentence of D1.  The drug agreed to being trafficked has been particularised under Count 2 as 4,751 grammes of cocaine.  

11.  Regarding the first step, for 4,751 grammes of cocaine, the applicable guideline tariff band is that of 20 to 24 years’ imprisonment: see HKSAR v Huang Ruifang (No. 3) [2025] 2 HKLRD 138 at paragraph 62.  

12.  Second, concerning the defendant’s role and culpability, this case clearly involved an international element.  This is an important factor when assessing the role and culpability of the defendants in order to identify the appropriate starting point for sentence.  I have to bear in mind the quantity of narcotic being introduced into Hong Kong, which not only increases the supply of the particular dangerous drug, but causes great harm to the community: see HKSAR v Lee Ming Ho, supra, at paragraph 74. 

13.  I see little to distinguish the roles between D1 and D2.  On the evidence, D1 has accompanied PW1 throughout the trip to Ethiopia and the journey back to Hong Kong.  On the other hand, D2 has arranged for the air tickets for the entire trip, including the funding thereof. 

14.  Third, for 4,751 grammes of cocaine, an arithmetical approach towards the guidelines would lead to a sentence after trial of 23 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.  For the international element of this case as held above, I would increase the notional sentence after trial by 2 years, taking it to 25 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.  

15.  Fourth, I consider that there is no aggravating factors which would enhance the sentence after trial for D1. 

16.  Fifth, I consider that there is no mitigating factor which may reduce D1’s sentence.  

17.  Accordingly, D1 is sentenced to 25 years and 8 months’ imprisonment on Count 2.  

18.  I consider that 25 years and 8 months’ imprisonment is a fair, just and balanced sentence in all the circumstances of this case and the circumstances of D1.  

19.  I turn now to the sentence of D2.  The analysis at Step 1 to Step 4 of Herry Jane Yusuph, supra, regarding D1 applies equally to D2.  This leads to a notional sentence after trial of 25 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.  

20.  Regarding Step 5, like D1, D2 was convicted after trial.  However, in my view, D2 should receive a discount for the assistance rendered by her to the authorities in HCCC 5/2024.  Such assistance has been set out in the Reasons for Sentence in that case, which I gave earlier today, where I came to the conclusion that D2 (D3 in that case)  fell into the category

of someone who had offered to testify for the prosecution but whose offer had not been taken up because of some supervening event beyond her control, namely, the other defendants pleading guilty.

21.  In my view, a discount should also be given to D2 in the present case for such assistance.  D2 should receive a discount on her overall sentence to be served, rather than just the sentence in HCCC 5/2024.  The policy of accepting useful assistance to the authorities as mitigation does not draw a distinction between assistance about the crime for which the defendant is before the court and other crimes.  

22.  I hold that the discount that ought to be given in the present case should be 8 per cent.  Accordingly, D2’s sentence on Count 2 is reduced to 23 years and 7 months’ imprisonment.  

23.  As the final step, I have to stand back and consider the total sentence which D2 has to serve in order to ensure that it is a “fair, just, and balanced sentence”.  Having regard to the fact that the offence in HCCC 5/2024 and the offence in the present case were entirely separate offences, but at the same time taking firmly into account the totality principle, and being as merciful as I can, I order that 4 years of the sentence imposed in HCCC 5/2024 are to run consecutively (and the rest to run concurrently)  to the 23 years and 7 months sentence imposed in the present case. 

24.  In other words, the total sentence which D2 has to serve is therefore 27 years and 7 months’ imprisonment.