CHAN WING HO v. NANJING LTD

HCSA14/2008

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL APPEAL NO. 14 OF 2008

(ON APPEAL FROM SCTC 20706 OF 2007)

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REASONS  FOR  JUDGMENT

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1. At the hearing of the appeal I have dismissed the appellant’s appeal with costs to the claimant/respondent.  The following is my reasons therefor.

2. The claimant entered into the monthly parking licence agreement with the defendant at his carpark.  The monthly licence agreement was actually entered through the claimant’s father one Mr Chan Lam.  On 19 October 2006, Mr Chan Lam as a driver of his son’s vehicle parked his car at the carpark.  At about 5 p.m. that day he was informed that his car was burnt by a fire.

3. The fire, as found by the learned presiding officer Mr Anthony Chow, was broken out from a generator next to the claimant’s car.  There was no evidence that the generator had ever been maintained and the presiding officer found that the defendant is negligent in not maintaining the generator which had caused the fire.  He gave judgment for the claimant in the sum of $40,400 being $40,000 for the market value of the car before it was destroyed, plus $900 for towing fee but less $500 for the credit given to the owner for dissembling the car (劏車費).

4. The presiding officer further found that the parking of the car was not a kind of bailment but a licence granted by the defendant to the claimant’s representative i.e. his father.  Those issues listed by the presiding officer and his decision thereon and are as follows :

「9.   被告人是否需要為申索人損失負上法律責任，取决在被告人第二項答辯理由：雙方合約內的免費條款。

10．  在免責條款的答辯上，本席須判定：（一）有關免責條款是否雙方合約的一部分？（二）有關免責條款是否適合被告人現尋求免責的責任？（三）有關免責條款是否符合香港法例第 71條《管制免責條款條例》內的合理標準測試？

11．  有關免責條款在申索人申請使用被告人停車場簽署的申請表格《使用車位許可權申請表》上清楚地列出。相同的免責條款亦在有關停車場入口僱員更亭外，分開放在兩處不同的地方。在填寫申請表格時申索人明顯已知道這個免責條款的存在。而申索人每次出入停車場時亦應該清楚看到這一個免責條款。因此，申索人在知道免責條款的存在下，繼續使用停車場設施，明顯申索人已同意免責條款是與訟雙方合約的一部分。

12. 有關免責條款寫：

「如有車輛或其內之財物失竊、被盜、交失、損毀、失火或申請人遭受任何損失，即使證實乃因本停車場、本停車場僱員或代理人疏忽、失職或懈怠或由本停車場僱員或代理人行為不當，本停車場、本停車場僱員及代理人亦毋須負任何責任，或向申請人作任何賠償」。

13．  免責條款內容極為廣濶，包括失火。明顯被告人現尋求免責的責任已包括在有關免責條款內。

14．  香港法例第 71條《管制免責條款條例》第 7條禁止任何人藉免責條款，卸除疏忽而引致的法律責任，除非該免責條款符合《管制免責條款條例》第 3條內的合理標準。而證明該免責條款符合合理標準的責任在被告人身上。

15. 《管制免責條款條例》第7條寫 ：

  ‘逃避因疏忽、違約等而引致的法律責任

(1)   [任何人不得藉合約條款、一般告示或特別向某些人發出的告示，而卸除或局限自己因疏忽引致他人死亡或人身傷害的法律責任。][1]

(2)   至於其他損失或損害方面，任何人亦不得藉上述各項而卸除或局限自己因疏忽而引致的法律責任，但在該條款或告示符合合理標準的範圍內，則不在此限。

(3)   如合約條款或告示看來是用以卸除或局限因疏忽而引致的法律責任，則雖然某人同意或知道該條款或告示的存在，亦不得單憑這點認為該人表示自願承擔任何風險。’

[《管制免責條款條例》第7條 ：

  違約對“合理標準”驗證的影響

  關於合約的其他條文

(1)   如合約條款須符合合理標準才可作為依據，則縱使有關合約已經因違約而終止，或已由決定將該合約當作已廢除的一方予以終止，該合約條款仍可斷定為符合合理標準，並因此具有效力。

(2)   遇有違約事件時，如有權將該合約當作已廢除的一方仍肯定承認合約存在，則單憑這點並不使合約內任何條款無須符合合理標準。]

16. 《管制免責條款條例》第3條寫 ：

‘合理標準的驗證

(1)   在合約條款方面，只有在法庭或仲裁人在考慮及立約各方在立約時所知悉、預料或理應知悉或理應預料到的情況後，斷定加入該條款是公平合理的，則就本條例及《失實陳述條例》(第284章)第4條來說，該合約條款才符合合理標準。

(2)   [為執行第11或12條而斷定一項合約條款是否符合合理標準時，法庭或仲裁人須特別考慮附表2所列事項；但本款並不阻止法庭或仲裁人按照法律規則，判定一項看來是卸除或局限有關的法律責任的條款，實際並非合約條款。]

(3)   [在告示方面(指沒有合約效力的告示)，只有在法庭或仲裁人在考慮及法律責任產生時或可能產生時(只因有該告示才沒有產生)各方面的情況後，斷定准予以該告示作為依據是屬公平合理的做法，則就本條例來說，該告示才符合合理標準。]

(4)   [在根據本條例或《失實陳述條例》(第284章)斷定一項合約條款或告示是否符合合理標準時，在不影響第 (2)款的情況下，法庭或仲裁人須特別考慮：試圖以該條款或告示作為依據者的對方，是否明白該條款或告示所採用的語文，以及其明白的程度。]

(5)   [凡任何人試圖藉合約條款或告示，將其法律責任局限於指明的款額內，而根據本條例或《失實陳述條例》(第284章)，需要斷定該條款或告示是否符合合理標準時，在不影響第(2)或(4)款的情況下，法庭或仲裁人須特別考慮以下事項——

(a)   該人可預計能動用的資源，以承擔可能產生的法律責任；及

(b)   在保險方面該人能夠受保的程度。]

(6)   任何人如聲稱合約條款或告示符合合理標準，須負責證明如是。”

17．  何為“立約各方在立約時所知悉、預料或理應知悉或理應預料到的情況”？在Bewise Motors Co. Ltd. v. Hoi Kong Container Services Co. Ltd. CACV178/1996一案中，Mortimer J.A.引用Taylor L.J.在Circle Freight International v. Medeast Golf Exports [1988] 2 LR 427一案中的測試：

  “Would the parties have agreed that a particular term formed part of the contract if they were reasonable men looking at the matter objectively in the knowledge that no adverse consequences would float from the answer.  The term would only be contractual if the party’s answer would had been a definite ‘yes’.  ‘Possibly’ will not do.”

18. Bewise Motors Co. Ltd.中的條款只是局限法律責任條款而非免責條款，因此法庭應較優惠地釋義。（見Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees & Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164。）但本案的有關免責條款是絶對性的，被告人無論發生任何事情，無論任何原因令申索人的汽車受損，被告人亦無需負上任何責任。如被告人有意毀壞申索人汽車也好，被告人亦無需負上任何責任。這麼一個免責條款完全不合理，沒有任何有理智的人會承認及同意有關免責條款是雙方合約的一部分。

19. 在本席在少心地考慮有關的事宜後,在事實上判定有關免責條款不能滿足《管制免責條款條例》第 3條合理標準。被告人不能得到有關免責條款的保護。因此被告人需要對申索人的損失負上法律責任。」

The aforesaid decision is a very comprehensive and appropriate decision of the presiding officer.

5. Ms Maggie Wong, counsel for the appellant submitted that the claimant or his driver could, according to the warning notice put up at the carpark which the presiding officer found as a fact that the owner and his driver were aware of such an exemption clause, have driven away the car when he disagreed with the provisions therein.  However this, as submitted by the claimant’s counsel with which I entirely agree, is not applicable to a monthly licence fee but is only applicable to an hourly user of the carpark.  In other words the claimant could not have driven away his car on the last day of the monthly licence and claimed back all the money he paid for that month.

6. The appellant submitted that the wording of the exemption clause is not very extensive as found by the presiding officer“極為廣闊”as in paragraph 13 thereof.  It was submitted that the exemption clause does not cover flooding or vandalism.  I do not agree.

7. The exemption clause said“或申請人遭受任何損失”.  This must also cover flooding and vandalism caused by the defendant.  (If they were not caused by the deliberate act or negligence of the defendant or its employees, they would not be liable in tort in any event.) 

8. Since the exemption clause is very extensive I find that it is limited by Cap. 71 which came into effect on 1 December 1990.  The intension of the Ordinance as appeared in its recital is : “to limit the extent to which the civil liability for breach of contract, or for negligence or other breach of duty, can be avoided by means of contract terms and otherwise; and to restrict the enforceability arbitration of other agreements.”

9. Schedule 2 of the Ordinance provided as follows :

“GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION OF REASONBLENESS TEST

  The matters to which the court or arbitrator shall have regard in particular for the purposes of sections 11(3) and 12(3) and 4 are any of the following which appear to be relevant-

(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties relative to each other, taking into account (among other things) alternative means by which the customer's requirements could have been met;

(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, or in accepting it had an opportunity of entering into a similar contract with other persons, but without having to accept a similar term;

(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of the term (having regard, among other things, to any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing between the parties);

(d)    where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some condition is not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect that compliance with that condition would be practicable;

(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the customer.”

10. The claimant is an ordinary consumer for the purpose of this Ordinance and the contract is not between two commercial entities.  Accordingly those cases decided and cited in this case which involved dispute between two commercial entities would not apply. 

11. Further, cases cited to me which have no consideration of the Ordinance or in England the Control of Exemption Clauses Act 1977c.  50 in UK would not assist me either.

12. Schedule 2 only provided certain guidelines.  In this case regards should be given in particular to paragraphs (a) to (e) thereof.  But this list is not exhaustive.  The presiding officer could not be criticized by not citing the Schedule 2.  

13. It is a finding of fact that the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence extent of the term i.e. the exemption clause.  This has been taken into consideration by the presiding officer.  The only issue is whether the effect of the exemption clause should be limited by the Ordinance.

14. The strength of the bargaining position for the parties should be taken into account.  The claimant was only a consumer.  The fact that there were two other car parks nearby does not mean that the exemption clause is reasonable when the customer knew of the exemption clause in the licence and in the warning notice.  This is only one of the factors.  The presiding officer could have investigated into the terms provided by the other two car parks nearby and why the claimant had chosen this very car park apart from the claimant’s contention that it was near to his home.  How far the other two car parks are from his home in comparison has not been investigated.  All in all this is only one of the factors for or against the claimant. 

15. The main consideration of the presiding officer with which I entirely agree, is that the exemption clause is very extensive and it would cover anything or any damage caused by the negligence or deliberate act of the officer or employees of the defendant.  This must be limited by the effect of the Ordinance and is void or ineffective under sections 7 and 13 of the Ordinance.

16. Accordingly, the appeal has been dismissed with costs to the claimant/respondent to be taxed on gross sum assessment basis by a Master, if not agreed.

[1]   [   ]為審裁官在其判決理由書沒有引述之部分。