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HCAL 1650/2023
[2026] HKCFI 1698
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1650 OF 2023
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BETWEEN
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Sumarni Siti |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
1. The Applicant is a 42-year-old national of Indonesia who arrived in Hong Kong on 16 December 2017 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract on 16 December 2019 or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her employment was prematurely terminated on 20 November 2018, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and more than 2 years later on 19 January 2021 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia she would be harmed or killed by her creditor for failing to repay her debts. She was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of her claim.
2. The Applicant was born and raised in Pati Telogo Wungu, Indonesia. After leaving school she married her husband, and took care of her mother due to her kidney problem, and to meet her mother’s medical expenses she in 2012 borrowed a loan from a local money-lender to be repaid by monthly instalments with interests, which she initially managed to make with the household money provided by her husband.
3. Upon the passing of her mother in 2017 and her subsequent separation with her husband, the Applicant in December 2017 came to Hong Kong to work as a foreign domestic helper to make her living and to keep up with her monthly loan repayments.
4. However, when her employment was prematurely terminated in November 2018, she was without income to repay her loan, and for which her creditor threatened to kill her, and so the Applicant was afraid to return to Indonesia and therefore overstayed in Hong Kong, and subsequently raised her non-refoulement claim for protection, for which she completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 19 October 2021 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).
5. By a Notice of Decision dated 16 November 2021 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
6. In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from her creditor and followers upon her return to Indonesia as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of her creditor to seriously harm or kill her other than to press her to repay her debts, that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between her and her creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 270 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 1.9 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from her home district in large cities such as Jakarta where it would be difficult if not impossible for her creditor to locate her.
7. On 25 November 2021 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which she attended an oral hearing on 14 December 2022 before the Board during which she gave evidence and answered questions raised of her claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 31 January 2023 her appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.
8. In its decision[1] the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from her creditor over her unpaid debts but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of her creditor to seriously harm or kill her other than to press her to repay her debts, and that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between her and her creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon her return to Indonesia as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for her to move safely to other parts of the country away from her home district without any risk of being located by her creditor that her claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.
9. On 15 September 2023 the Applicant filed her Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in her Form or her supporting affirmation of the same date in which she just repeated her claim as before but without putting forth any proper ground for her intended challenge.
10. By then the Applicant was also out of time with her application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason to extend the period within which the application shall be made.
11. As the last day of the three-month period for her to file her Form 86 fell on 30 April 2023, the Applicant was therefore some 4 ½ months late with her application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.
12. In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 4 ½ months must be considered as very substantial and inordinate, for which she did not provide any explanation or reasons in her Form or affirmation, and as the record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 31 January 2023 to her then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for her such serious delay.
13. As for the merits, if any, of her intended application, as noted above that the Applicant has also failed to put forward any proper ground for her intended challenge. As such, and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in her process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any merits in her intended application either.
14. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
15. In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in her claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for her to relocate to other part of Indonesia, there is simply no justification to afford her with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.
16. In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.
17. Moreover, the Applicant has recently on 24 January 2026 in writing requested to withdraw her application as her issue in her home country has been resolved that she now wants to return to Indonesia as soon as possible.
18. As I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in view of her latest confirmation of no more issue for her to return to her home country, I accordingly dismiss her leave application.
Dated the 24th day of March 2026
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(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant on 24 March 2026
Sumarni Siti
Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 24 March 2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 19312
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 1751/21 (formerly RBCZ 344/21)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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