BINTI MUSA ADAH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2670/2025

[2026] HKCFI 2815

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2670 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons dated 13 February 2026 and filed on 20 February 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 28 January 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 5 November 2025.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 28 January 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 11 February 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In her supporting affirmation dated 13 February 2026, the applicant stated that her appeal was filed out of time because she was unaware of the 14-days’ time limit, as she was unrepresented at the relevant time, and in addition, she was being detained by the immigration authorities at Nei Kwu Correctional Institution and hence it had been difficult for her to prepare and file the necessary documents. She further stated that she required assistance to draft an appeal.

8.  However, at the hearing of the Summons on 7 May 2026, the applicant explained her delay in filing the appeal by saying that her lawyer met her while she was detained in Hei Ling Chau and she got the documents from her lawyer. She then sent back the documents to her lawyer within the 14 days’ time limit, but her lawyer delayed the process in filing the appeal.

9.  Her explanation at the hearing was contradictory to what she stated in her affirmation. When I asked the applicant why it was so, she replied that she did not know the contents of the affirmation as she could not read English, the affirmation was prepared by her lawyer and her lawyer was doing everything for her.

10.  It is clear that her explanations for the delay are unsatisfactory as the two versions are contradictory. However, the Summons and the applicant’s affirmation do appear to have been prepared by a lawyer or someone with legal knowledge. If what the applicant said at the hearing were true, it was the fault of her lawyer in delaying the lodging of her appeal. The applicant cannot claim that she was unaware of the time limit or had no legal assistance as asserted in her affirmation.

11.  The applicant did not give any ground for her intended appeal in the Summons, nor in her affirmation, but she stated in the Summons that she wanted to have leave to advance a new sole ground of appeal.

12.  Nevertheless, at the hearing of the Summons, when I asked the applicant for her grounds of appeal, she merely said that she still wanted to stay in Hong Kong and nothing else. Thus, the applicant did not provide any valid ground of appeal at the hearing of the Summons either.

13.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

14.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

15.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.