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DCCC 752/2016
香港特別行政區
區域法院
刑事案件2016年第752號
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| 出席人士: |
Mr Lui Kit Ling，為外聘大律師，代表香港特別行政區
Mr Lo Chi Hung，由法律援助署委派的麥家榮律師行延聘，代表第四被告人
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| 控罪: |
[1] 至 [2] 搶劫罪（Robbery） |
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判刑理由書
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控罪
1. 在本席前，被告人承認兩項「搶劫」罪，違反香港法例第210章《盜竊罪條例》第10條。
事發經過
2. 控方案情指，被告人帶同其他兩或三名年青人，在一個月內，共兩次，在夜間，在九龍灣區內的癖靜地點裡，對單獨路人拳打腳踢，劫去路人的手提電話共／或錢包。事件中，路人雖沒有骨折或永久傷殘，但最終仍遍體鱗傷，需要休養數天，特別在第二次裡，被告人使用武器，他拿起地上一支木棍襲擊路人，最終除滿身傷痕，該路人脫掉了兩顆門牙。
被告人的背景
3. 被告人現年21歲、單身，他與母親同住一「公屋」單位，他中三後輟學，至今已嘗試多份工作。他有一個刑事定罪紀錄：於2014年，因「襲擊致身體傷害」罪名，他被判往「更生中心」。
參考案例
4. 區志恆（CAAR 2/2005）亦是一宗糾黨行劫的案件，上訴庭對案中的第三答辯人採用了7年的判監起點，該人在短短數小時內，糾黨進行了三宗街頭劫案：先追逐及包圍兩名學生，口頭（但沒有出手）逼使他們交出八達通卡（控罪一）；繼而手持木棍作勢（只作勢）襲擊一途人，逼使他交出手提電話（控罪二）；三小時後，黨員更執起木棍和鐵通追打另一途人，幸好最終途人只受皮外之傷，傷勢並不嚴重，但其手提電話卻給拿走了（控罪三）。
5. 考慮後，本席對現在兩項控罪採用6年監禁的總刑期起點，給予被告人三分之一的認罪扣減，本席將判處他4年監禁。
6. 就控罪一和二，本席分別採用54和60個月的判監起點，扣減三分之一後，則各變為36個月和40個月。本席頒令，第二項控罪的40個月刑期中只有12個月與第一控罪的36個月刑期分期執行，故今天共判處被告人48個月（4年）監禁。
判刑平等
7. 在本案中，其他被告人獲判感化，D4則判監4年，這樣D4當然心有不甘，因此本席解釋個中原因。
8. 原審共有五名被告人（D1至D5），D2最早認罪，並遭另一法庭判以感化，其餘四名被告人（D1、D3、D4、D5）則安排在本席前審訊，惟首日D4認罪，其餘三名被告人則進行了數天審訊，結果D1和D3獲判無罪釋放，而D5亦只判處「普通襲擊」罪罪成並予以感化。
9. 換言之，五名被告人中只有D4判監，其餘四人一是脫罪，不然感化而已。D5的「普通襲擊」罪與D4的「搶劫」罪有天淵之別，判刑不同理所當然，D4的主要投訴集中在與同犯「搶劫」罪之D2的判刑（感化）分別之上。
10. 眾所周知，除非罪疚深淺或個人背景差異，否則同告應予以類同處分[1]。
11. 不過，D4干犯兩項控罪，D2只干犯一項控罪（控罪二）。而且，在控罪二的情節裡，D4才是主腦，他更使用木棍襲擊傷者，最終又獨吞贓物（手提電話）；相反，D2只是追隨者，並沒有使用武器，始終不獲得益。從此可見，D4之罪疚深，D2的較淺。
12. 個人背景方面，D4事發（判刑）時20（21歲），D2則15（16歲），D4有一前科，曾予以更生機會，判往「更生中心」，D2則沒有任何刑事定罪紀錄。從此可見，兩者背景差別甚大，D2應盡量給予第一次的更生改過機會。
13. 更何況處理年少罪犯時（D2 16歲），法庭一向注重其更生[2]。
14. 表面上同告之間判刑不公之案件在英國亦時有發生，其中在Bowles[3]一案裡，因為其明顯痛改前非，洗心革面，立心改過，一個罪疚更深和前科更多的被告人獲判感化，同告就此投訴（上訴）後仍判處18個月即時監禁。
[1] Cheng Ka Wing [2001] 2 HKLRD 206 at page 264: “We accept that there may be an objectionable disparity of sentences where one of two, or more, defendants receives, from the same judge and at the same time, a more severe sentence than the other, or others and the difference is not justified by any relevant distinction in their culpability or personal circumstances.＂
[2] Cheng Ka Wing (above also at page 264): “However the judge was not dealing with adult offenders, the defendants before her were young offenders and it was incumbent upon her to ensure, so far as she could, that each received a sentence that was appropriate for his needs and would best give him a chance to reform.”
[3] [1996] 2 Cr App R(S) S248, at page 249 to 250: “This brings us to the question of disparity. On the face of it, the appellant could have expected to receive a sentence somewhat less severe than that imposed on King whose culpability was greater, whose record of offending was significantly worse and who had pleaded guilty to other serious charges. One can see from the sentencing remarks that in King’s case, the learned judge was originally thinking in terms of a lengthy term of imprisonment presumably significantly in excess of that which he passed on the appellant. In the event, he was persuaded by what he had read and heard about him that King had reached the point at which he had sufficient motivation to change his ways. For that reason, the judge was persuaded to take what he himself described as the exceptional course of putting King on probation with condition that he participate in a residential project. It has been recognised on a number of previous occasions that it may be appropriate to take this course with a persistent offender who otherwise faces a significant term of imprisonment if there is sufficient reason to think that it may be possible to break the cycle of offending once and for all. Clearly, the learned judge took that view in this case and took the view that there were sufficient grounds for thinking that King may be able to change his ways if given the chance, and we would not wish to criticise him for doing so. Unfortunately, however, the appellant was not in the same position. There were not the same reasons in this case for believing that he was highly motivated to change his ways. Moreover, having been sentenced by the magistrate to a term of imprisonment for his driving while disqualified, he was not at liberty. In the circumstances, the judge cannot be criticised for taking the course he did, having regard to the differences between these two men’s personal circumstances which satisfactorily account in our view for the different treatment accorded to them in this case.”
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