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HCAL 1181/2024
[2025] HKCFI 274
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1181 OF 2024
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BETWEEN
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Dewi Yulianti |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
1. Extension of time for the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 28 December 2023 be refused; and
2. The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
1. The Applicant is a 33-year-old national of Indonesia who last arrived in Hong Kong on 28 November 2019 with permission to continue to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her last employment was prematurely terminated on 26 March 2022, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and was arrested by police more than 1 year later on 12 May 2023. After she was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, she raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia she would be harmed or killed by her former husband over their personal disputes. She was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of her claim.
2. The Applicant was born and raised in Bima, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Indonesia. After leaving school she married her husband and raised a family with a child in her home district.
3. Shortly after their marriage her husband became unemployed, and instead of looking for other employments her husband demanded that the Applicant should go work as a prostitute to support their family, and when she refused, he beat her severely that eventually she succumbed to his demand and worked as a prostitute to support their family.
4. As she did not wish to continue to do so but fearing of being harmed by her husband, the Applicant subsequently and secretly made arrangements to leave the country by applying to work as a foreign domestic helper in Hong Kong, which she eventually did on 3 July 2019 when she departed Indonesia for Hong Kong to start her first employment, during which she ceased all further contact with her husband.
5. In 2021 she hired a lawyer in Indonesia to divorce her husband, but after her last employment was prematurely terminated in March 2022, she was afraid to return to Indonesia and therefore overstayed in Hong Kong, and upon her subsequent arrest by the police she then raised her non-refoulement claim for protection, for which she completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 14 July 2023 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation.
6. By a Notice of Decision dated 24 August 2023 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
7. In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and found no substantial grounds for believing that there will be any real and substantial risk of her being harmed or killed by her former husband upon her return to Indonesia due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from him, that there is no evidence of any real intention of her former husband to seriously harm or kill her in the absence of any further contact between them since she left the country in 2019 and their subsequent divorce in 2021 that it is not accepted that her former husband would still have any adverse interest in her, that in any event it was a private dispute between the 2 of them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 279 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 1.9 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from her home district in large cities such as Jakarta where it would be difficult if not impossible for her former husband to locate her.
8. On 30 August 2023 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which she attended an oral hearing on 17 November 2023 before the Board during which she gave evidence and answered questions raised of her claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 28 December 2023 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.
9. In its decision the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from her former husband over their disputes but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of him to seriously harm or kill her since their divorce in 2021, and that in any event it was a private and personal dispute between the 2 of them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon her return to Indonesia if resorted to as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for her to move safely to other areas of the country away from her home district without any risk of being located by her former husband that her claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.
10. On 23 July 2024 the Applicant filed her Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in her Form or her supporting affirmation of the same date in which she just repeated her claim as before but without putting forth any proper ground for her intended challenge.
11. By then the Applicant was also out of time with her application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason to extend the period within which the application shall be made.
12. As the last day of the three-month period for her to file her Form 86 fell on 28 March 2024, the Applicant was therefore more than 3 months and 3 weeks late with her application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.
13. In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 3 months and 3 weeks must be considered as very substantial and inordinate, for which she did not provide any explanation or reasons in her Form or affirmation, and as the record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 28 December 2023 to her last reported address without being returned through undelivered post, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for her such serious delay.
14. As for the merits, if any, of her intended application, as noted above that the Applicant has also failed to put forward any proper ground for her intended challenge. As such, and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in her process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any merits in her intended application either.
15. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
16. In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in her claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for her to relocate to other part of Indonesia, there is simply no justification to afford her with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.
17. Having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.
18. Moreover, the Applicant recently on 29 October 2024 filed an affirmation requesting to “cancel” her application but without putting forth any reason or explanation for her such request.
19. In the premises, as I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for her serious delay, I refuse to extend time and accordingly dismiss her leave application.
Dated the 24th day of January 2025
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(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant on 24 January 2025
Dewi Yulianti
Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 24 January 2025
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 22106
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 657/23 (Formerly RBCZ 5000603/23)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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