LUCK MOST LTD AND OTHERS v. GOOD MOVEMENT LTD

LDCS 11000/2020

[2023] HKLdT 52

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

LAND COMPULSORY SALE MAIN APPLICATION NO 11000 OF 2020

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DECISION

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The Applications

1.  There are 3 applications before me, which all turns on one issue in dispute, the interpretation of paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance (“the Ordinance”).

Background

2.  By a summons taken out by the applicants filed on 29 September 2021, the applicants apply for an order that 3 of the expert reports filed by the respondent be expunged from Court file and be not admitted as evidence in the trial. I refer to my decision given herein on 2 September 2022 (“the September Decision”), and these reports are referred to as Reports 2, 3 and 4. It is the contention of Mr Chain, counsel for the respondent that these reports are relevant to the argument that “merged site factor” or “special interest factor” should be taken into account for setting the reserve price if an order for sale is granted. Mr Chain also applies to adduce a new Report 5 which he contends would explain or supplement Reports 2, 3 and 4.

3.  Mr Mok, counsel for the applicants submits that this Tribunal shall not take into account such factors in setting the reserve price, referring to the interpretation of paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Ordinance (“the on its own formula”). He also argues that these reports are not covered by the earlier order of this Tribunal on expert evidence and they are not admissible without leave. I do not repeat the submission of Mr Mok which has been set out in the September Decision.

4.  But I agree with Mr Chain that the on its own formula should not be considered in isolation without a corresponding application to strike out the part of the Amended Notice of Opposition of the respondent on the merged site issue raised, if I have to rule whether the on its own formula is arguable at all. And Mr Mok agrees to proceed with the striking out application on the other grounds. And at the end, I rule in favour of Mr Mok and expunged the 3 reports and rule that they are not admissible for reason set out in my September Decision, which I do not repeat. I do not allow the Report 5 be admitted.

5.  Mr Chain took out a summons on 16 September 2022 for leave to review/appeal against my September Decision. The grounds for review and appeal are the same.

6.  Around the same time, Mr Mok confirms that the applicants would apply to strike out part of the Amended Notice of Opposition on merged site issue. A summons to strike out part of the Amended Notice of Opposition on the merged site issue was taken out by the applicants on 7 October 2022.

7.  And by my ruling on 30 September 2022, I refuse to review my September Decision. And for leave to appeal, I suggest the application for leave to appeal be stayed and be restored after my determination of the striking out application for part of the Amended Notice of Opposition. Following some discussion with parties on paper, and by agreement, the part of the summons for leave to appeal is stayed pending my determination of the striking out application.

8.  By my decision given on 24 February 2023 (“February Decision”), I have allowed the application of the applicants and strike out paragraph 1(b) together with the plan marked A and the Schedule annexed to the Amended Notice of Opposition. I also give an order nisi that the applicants shall be entitled to costs.

9.  By another summons filed on 1 March 2023, the respondent applies for leave to appeal against my February Decision. By another summons filed on 10 March 2023, the respondent applies to vary my costs order nisi. The respondent has also restored the application for leave to appeal against my September Decision.

10.  I have directed all 3 applications be dealt with together, and by paper disposal. Submissions have been lodged by parties and this is my ruling.

Legal Principle on Leave to Appeal

11.  The legal principle on application for leave to appeal is trite and I only set out, firstly, section 11(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance (“LTO”) which provides that:

“Subject to section 11AA and the provisions of any Ordinance relating to appeals from the Tribunal, any party to proceedings before the Tribunal may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a judgment, order or decision of the Tribunal on the ground that such judgment, order or decision is erroneous in point of law.”

12.  Section 11AA further states that:

“(6) Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the Tribunal, the Court of Appeal or the registrar hearing the application for leave is satisfied that –

(a) the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.”

13.  And it is well established that “a reasonable prospect of success” means an appeal with prospect that are more than fanciful without having to be probable: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 at paragraph 17.

14.  Mr Chain invites this Tribunal to consider both applications for leave to appeal together. And in particular, he relies on section 11AA(6)(b), that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that leave to appeal should be granted.

Interest of Justice Point

15.  I shall come to the substantive argument of Mr Chain on the interest of justice point first. The February Decision turns on my ruling in favour of the on its own formula. And if I am correct, there is no reason in any event to admit the 3 reports expunged (and the non-admitted Report 5) by my September Decision as they turn on the RDV of the subject lot taking into account the redevelopment potential of developing the lot with adjacent lots.

16.  Mr Chain in his submission said the 2 leave applications turn very much on the arguability of the merged sites point, i.e. whether either the value of the subject lot (or in setting the reserve price) the Tribunal can have regard to its potential to be redeveloped together with neighbouring lot or lots. He submits that in valuation terms this is sometimes referred to as hope/marriage value, or Clay factor.

17.  Mr Chain refers to the intended grounds of appeal in both applications for leave. But I believe he is mainly relying on the grounds set out in the Summons for leave to appeal against my February Decision. While he submits that the grounds are arguable and hence I should grant leave, he has not elaborated on these grounds at his first written submission.

18.  Mr Chain submits that irrespective of whether the merged sites point is arguable as a pure point of law/interpretation, the point even if considered on the more limited basis of hope value/intrinsic value would be facts sensitive, and therefore neither the pleadings nor the evidence should be struck out, in that those facts are, at the very least, potentially relevant to hope/intrinsic value, and the Tribunal would not know whether they are in fact relevant/probative until the evidence are given.

19.  Mr Chain has sensibly made a broad bush submission on the 13 paragraphs of the proposed grounds of appeal. I shall deal with his argument on the grounds later in this decision with the submission from Mr Mok, who indeed goes through each paragraph.

20.  At this juncture, I shall consider the argument on interest of justice first, as he relies on a newly added 14^th ground of appeal in his submission: -

“14. The learned Presiding Officer further erred in striking out, inter alia, paragraph 1(b) of the Notice of Opposition, which pleaded facts pertaining to the potential value of the subject lot, on the sole basis that on a true and proper interpretation of the “on its own” formula in paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 (“Formula”), the Tribunal when setting the reserve price (which the learned Presiding Officer accepted is only a (minimal [I presume he meant minimum]) protection (paragraph 39 of Decision), cannot as a matter of law even consider those facts pleaded in paragraph 1(b); in so ruling the learned Presiding Officer either erred in conflating the value (and/or redevelopment potential) of the subject lot with the reserve price, alternatively, if the learned Presiding Officer did agree with R’s submission that the reserve price inevitably means the value (and/or the full redevelopment potential) of the subject lot, then erred in failing to hold that the Formula is unconstitutional in that it would not be “no more than is necessary”, the Respondent repeats ground 11 above.”

21.  In support of his argument, Mr Chain refers to 2 judgments of this Tribunal by different panels.

22.  Mr Chain first refers to Double Top Development Ltd and others v Kentone Ltd and others [2023] HKLdT 28, a judgment by Member Alex Ng sitting alone, that it was held that “hope value should not be excluded in the setting of reserve price”, and that “hope value can sometimes be reflected in market value”.

23.  Mr Chain also refers to Asia Bright Enterprises Ltd and others v Liu Cheuk Man and others [2023] HKLdT 30, a judgment by a panel of HH Judge M. Wong and Member Alex Ng. He refers to paragraph 52 that “the Tribunal in fixing the reserve price has a discretion to consider other matters on top of the redevelopment potential of the lot”, and he further suggests at paragraph 57 to 59, the Tribunal has held to the effect that “that in appropriate cases hope value and even marriage value may be included/considered.” It is necessary to read paragraphs 57 to 59 of the judgment (which I have set out hereinafter) in greater details for my consideration of his argument.

24.  On the basis of these authorities, Mr Chain submits that grounds 2 and 4 of the proposed grounds of appeal are arguable, and also the new ground 14. I believe he is also arguing that because of the ruling by other panel of this Tribunal which appear to be in conflict with my ruling on the on its own formula, it is in the interest of justice for leave to appeal be granted.

Applicants’ Reply on Interest of Justice Point

25.  I shall consider the applicants’ argument on Asia Bright first.

26.  Mr Mok submits that these paragraphs have to be read in the whole context. As for paragraph 52, the Tribunal mentioned that in fixing the reserve price has a discretion to consider other matters on top of the redevelopment potential of the Lot. It gives an example immediately after that statement, that the adjacent lots are made subject matter of the statutory auction together with the subject lot. And it was stated in paragraph 53 to 56 of the judgment that “…as Site A, Site B and Site C [the adjacent lots owned by the majority owner] are not the subject matters of this application and have not been included in the intended auction, we do not consider that the marriage value and/or the so called “Clay Factor” of the merged site should be included in our determination of the reserved price.”

Discussion and Ruling

27.  And before I move on, I set out paragraphs 52 to 59 of the judgment –

“52. First of all, we accept R2’s submission that the words “takes into account” and “approved by the Tribunal” in paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Ordinance shows that the Tribunal in fixing the reserve price has a discretion to consider other matters on top of the redevelopment potential of the Lot. In other words, the reserve price may not be just equivalent to the RDV of the Lot, but can be fixed at a figure that includes other considerations on top of the RDV of the Lot. For example, if there are other adjoining lots that would be sold together with the Lot in a single auction, the reserve price could be based on the RDV of the merged site of all the lots.

53. However, as Site A, Site B and Site C are not the subject matters of this application and have not been included in the intended auction, we do not consider that the marriage value and/or the so called “Clay Factor” of the merged site should be included in our determination of the reserve price.

54. R2 seeks to argue that “redevelopment potential of the lot on its own” cannot be wrongly equivocated to mean “redevelopment potential of the lot when redeveloped individually on its own”. However, in our view, what the Ordinance stipulates is clear – it is the redevelopment potential of “the Lot on its own”.

55. If the Lot could be redeveloped together with other lots, the redevelopment potential of “the Lot on its own” would be higher. Although it is not disputed that the applicants do have the plan to redevelop Site A, Site B and Site C together with the Lot, it does not mean that the applicants will certainly be able to acquire the Lot through the auction and hence redevelop all the lots together. After all, there will be a public auction and other developers may outbid the applicants. The other developers would not be able to redevelop Site A, Site B and Site C together with the Lot, and it is unrealistic to assume that they would pay a price that reflects the marriage value of all the lots. One cannot just assume that the redevelopment potential of “the Lot on its own” must be higher because the applicants want to redevelop the Lot together with the adjoining lots, as it does not represent the market value as such. It is just a special interest to the applicants to acquire the Lot so that it could be redeveloped with the other lots.

56. Thus, we consider that the reserve price for the auction under Schedule 2 of the Ordinance, which takes into account “the redevelopment potential of the lot on its own”, should be the RDV of the Lot only, the market value of the Lot on the basis of redevelopment of the Lot alone.

57. From valuation perspective and in accordance with HKIS Valuation Standards 2020, hope value can be included in the market value, which should reflect the highest and best use of an asset that maximises its potential and that is possible, legally permissible and financially feasible, but the amount of hope value must be limited to the extent that it would be reflected in offers made by prospective purchasers in a general market under a rational environment which means with market-evidence.

58. We agree that if the Lot is redeveloped together with its adjacent 3 sites, there will have a marriage value released from the site merger. Both Mr Chan and Mr Cheung opine that the market value of the merged site is greater than the aggregate of the individual market value of the 4 sites, though they have different opinion on the amplitude of the difference. However, we are not persuaded by Mr Cheung that the market value of the Lot would include the proportional marriage value or part of the proportional marriage value. On the conditions that size of the Lot is about 1,000 square meters, large enough for an efficient development, and the market value of the Lot is a large lump sum over $1,000 million, we are of the view that except for the applicants and/or related parties of the applicants, which are the special purchaser(s), there would not have any rational purchaser which would pay a price for the Lot higher than the RDV of the Lot in the hope of sharing the marriage value with the applicants.

59. Hope value may sometimes be reflected in the market value but usually in exceptional cases only, such as the cases that (i) there would have competition from at least 2 purchasers (i.e. in the scenario that the relevant lot can be merged with the other lots on the right or the lots on the left and the lots on the right and left are owned by different parties); and (ii) the marriage value is substantial when it is compared with value of the relevant asset, so that a rational purchaser would take the risk to put in a higher bid in the circumstances.”

28.  I have no problem with paragraph 52. It is a discretion to grant an order for sale. And every discretion has to be exercised judicially. And in the context of the Ordinance, it has to be exercised in light of the express provision of the Ordinance, and that is the reason why all cases turn on the interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Ordinance.

29.  It is clear that by paragraphs 53 to 56, the panel in Asia Bright set out clearly that if the adjacent sites are not included in the intended auction, or the subject matters of the application, the merged site and Clay Factor should not be taken into account in assessing the reserve price, have regards to Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Ordinance. Paragraphs 57 to 59 must be read with these paragraphs. And paragraphs 57 to 59 in the correct reading is a discussion on market value if the subject lot is developed with adjacent lot(s). I believe there is no conflict between Asia Bright and my ruling or that for justice or special reason shall be clarified by the Court of Appeal.

30.  It is the argument of Mr Chain that I should not exclude the introduction of expert evidence or to prevent the respondent from arguing the merged site issue. This should be left to the determination of the Tribunal after hearing all the evidence. But the introduction of expert evidence is subject to leave of this Tribunal. It is an interlocutory matter, and a case management decision. When leave is considered, it has to be considered in light of the law. And hence the argument is not a matter for trial, but at case management stage whether this Tribunal should allow the evidence be introduced. It is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide if the expert evidence shall be adduced at the interlocutory stage.

31.  Mr Mok also refers to another recent judgment of this Tribunal given in China Orchid International Limited and others v Fujitec (HK) Company Limited and others [2023] HKLdT 38. He refers in particular to paragraphs 315 and 316 of the judgment: -

“315. We accept that the words “takes into account” and “approved by the Tribunal” in paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Ordinance show that the Tribunal in fixing the reserve price has discretion to consider other matters on top of “the redevelopment potential of the lot on its own”. In other words, the reserve price may not be just equivalent to the RDV of the lot, but can be fixed at a figure that includes other considerations on top of the RDV of the lot.

316. However, including Swire’s “special interest” as part of the considerations for establishing “the redevelopment potential of the lot on its own” is a completely different matter. This is trying to include potential that is not due to the lot on its own. In our view, what the Ordinance stipulates is clear – it is the redevelopment potential of “the lot on its own”. Hence, this alleged “special interest” cannot be taken into account in establishing the RDV of the subject lot.”

32.  Again, this is a judgment against the consideration of merged site factor when the adjacent sites are not matter of the application or to be included in the auction. And again, the Tribunal adopts the on its own formula. There is no special reason why I should grant leave to appeal.

33.  As for Double Top, this is a judgment by a Member sitting alone. This means that no legal issue is raised and the dispute between parties are on valuation. Hence, with no disrespect, the comments by the learned Member would be his opinion on valuation. Having read the submission of Mr Mok, in his reply submission, Mr Chain agrees to ignore this judgment for this application for leave to appeal. He reiterates that both Asia Bright and China Orchid are at the very least arguably authorities which show that the merged sites issues should not be struck out, and which I disagree for reasons set out above. I reject the argument of Mr Chain.

The Grounds of Appeal on the February Decision

34.  For completeness, I shall come to the proposed grounds of appeal for leave to appeal against my February Decision. In the summons, 13 paragraphs of proposed grounds of appeal have been set out.

35.  I believe paragraph 1 has to be read with paragraph 2. It is claimed that this Tribunal erred in holding that the “on its own” formula is exhaustive and not inclusionary only. Paragraph 2 further said in so holding, this Tribunal has placed no or no sufficient weight to the words “redevelopment potential” in the same paragraph, i.e. paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Ordinance.

36.  Mr Chain has not elaborated on the reason, and I believe he is relying on the submission at the hearing, and I do not repeat what I have stated in my Decision. Mr Chain is relying further on the new cases and which I considered above. There is no merit.

37.  Mr Mok in fact has given a very detailed submission on the on its own formula which I agree. I do not see any prospect that Mr Chain’s submission that my interpretation of the on its own formula is wrong.

38.  Paragraph 3 complains that my February Decision is unclear as to whether I accepted the respondent’s submission that as a matter of fact in the great majority of applications under the Ordinance, the applicant is a developer and where there is an order for sale, there is usually no competition at the public auction and the reserve price is almost the sale price.

39.  I am not making any fact finding in the February Decision. The reason I reject the respondent’s argument is on law. There is no merit in this paragraph.

40.  Paragraph 4 said I erred in the true and correct interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Ordinance. I only repeat my Decision and I also adopt the submission of Mr Mok herein on the interpretation of the on its own formula. There is no prospect of success in this paragraph.

41.  Paragraph 5 said I should not entertain the argument of a point of law, as the same point may be relevant to other application after trial. Yet there is an application before me and there is no reason why I should not determine a point of law to resolve the striking out application. There is no merit in this point.

42.  Paragraph 6 is not a point for this Tribunal. What Mr Chain complains of is that, the public auction does not provide a level playing field. Not that there is no evidence in support, and that I was not asked to rule thereon. And if minority owners are not satisfied with the sale arrangement provided by the Ordinance, this is a matter for consideration by the Legislature for amendment of the Ordinance, not suggesting that I agree with the contention of Mr Chain. That is the same argument raised in paragraph 7. There is no merit in these paragraphs.

43.  Paragraph 8 argues that Fully HK Investments Ltd and others v Poon Val Ching and others HCMP591/2007 is not a ruling of the Court of Appeal. No authority has been adduced at this hearing to support this argument. And I have no reason to doubt the correctness of the judgment. There is no merit in this ground.

44.  Paragraph 9 does not appear to be a ground. The fact that it might be difficult is not a reason for the Tribunal not to do so. But what I said in my decision is the Legislature has considered the difficulty when approving the amendment to add the on its own formula. The paragraph has no merit.

45.  Paragraph 10 said I erred in relying too much on the minutes of the meeting of the Bills Committee on 28 February 1998 when there was no or no sufficient evidence on what discussion/suggestions led to the Law Society’s suggested difficulties. I do not believe one has to consider the difficulties suggested by the Law Society. It is a point taken by the Legislature before passing the Bill. If there is any doubt on the clear meaning of the on its own formula as set out in the Ordinance, the minutes clearly assist this Tribunal on the interpretation. And I also rely on the judgment of Day Bright on interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the Ordinance. There is no merit on this ground.

46.  Paragraphs 11 and 12 should be considered together. It is Mr Chain’s argument on constitutionality. As I stress in my February Decision, I am to determine the reserve price, and not the final sale price. There is no reason to believe that the reserve price would affect the final sale price. I believe Mr Chain is trying to merge the 2 issues as one, as he believes that the reserve price is usually the final sale price. And I have followed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Fully that the sale price, with any other factors, even the merged site factor, could be reflected in the final sale price set by the market.

47.  There are no merits in these 2 grounds.

48.  Paragraph 13 argues that the true value of the potentialities of the subject lot ought only to be decided after hearing all relevant evidence. I have no disagreement as long as the on its own formula provided in the Ordinance is followed. This paragraph adds nothing to the proposed ground and has no merit.

49.  And I have fully considered the argument of Mr Chain on the new Ground 14 which I found there is no merit.

50.  In summing up, there is no merit in the proposed grounds of appeal for the February Decision. Having considered all submission and matters raised before me, I see no other reason to grant leave to appeal and I therefore dismiss the application and I shall come to costs at the end of this decision.

Grounds of Appeal on the September Decision

51.  I shall now come to the Grounds of Appeal on the September Decision.

52.  Mr Chain submits that there are 2 arguable points of law. First, as a matter of law, whether the Tribunal can without any further order, in effect, limit the way how expert evidence can be presented when the original order granting leave has not so provided. And secondly, as a matter of fact whether an expert report under the Ordinance must without exception set out (i) a basis of valuation or methodology” and (ii) the so called RDV when such term is not even a term provided for in the Ordinance.

53.  Mr Mok identified the relevant paragraphs in my September Decision in paragraph 45 of his written submission which I do not repeat. He submits that there is no merits in the respondent’s grounds of appeal in that “they do not contain any challenge against the finding [of this Tribunal] that Reports 2-5 failed to inform the applicants (and the Tribunal) (1) any proposed method to assess the alleged enhanced RDV of the Lot (owing to Hysan’s ownership of the adjacent lots, not forming subject matter of [this Application under the Ordinance]); (2) any justification for the proposed method, and (3) any idea on the quantum of the enhance RDV of the Lot.

54.  Mr Mok further submits that the reports do not contain any hint on how the applicants can prepare their response to the reports, nor any hints on how these reports could assist the Tribunal to assess the reserve price of the Lot.

55.  My short answer to the submission of Mr Chain is that I do not limit the original order on leave to adduce expert evidence. I did interpret the order on expert evidence. I believe it must be correct that the original order is to allow expert evidence to assist the Tribunal on the issues as pleaded. And if there is any doubt, it must be correct that the other parties may raise objection to the expert evidence adduced, and when determining if the expert evidence should be adduced at the trial, issue of relevance, and probative value must be a consideration. And this is a matter for case management and I see no reason why it has to be left to the Trial Presiding Officer.

56.  With that consideration, there is no merits in Mr Chain’s argument, or the proposed grounds of appeal. I also adopt the submission of Mr Mok to rule that there is no merit in the proposed grounds of appeal and the respondent’s application should be dismissed.

Costs

57.  The respondent applies by summons to vary the costs order nisi I gave in favour of the applicants with the February Decision. I refer to the Affidavit of Lung Siu Wing filed herein on 10 March 2023. He refers this Tribunal to the following facts, which are not in dispute –

“(a) Paragraph 1(b) of the Notice of Opposition was added by amendments which was allowed by consent;

(b) After the amendments and the Respondent’s filing of Reports 2 to 4 (“the 3 Expert Reports”), there were prolonged correspondences between the parties over the 3 Expert Reports; and

(c) Even then, when the Applicants issued their summons on 29 September 2021 (“1^st Summons”), the Applicants have not applied to strike out paragraph 1(b), and it was only after the learned Presiding Officer pointed that out at the hearing of the 1^st Summons that the Applicants issued the 2^nd summons dated 7 October 2022.

As a result, unnecessary costs were incurred (and wasted).”

58.  The respondent applies to vary the costs order nisi to the effect that “the respondent do pay the applicants 75%, or such other % as this Honourable Tribunal determines to be just, costs of the summons dated 7 October 2022 and costs of and occasioned by the 3 expert reports filed by the respondent on 30 July 2021, with certificate for counsel to be taxed at High Court Scale if not agreed”.

59.  Mr Mok submits that there is no duplication of work between the 2 summonses taken out by the applicants. There should not be any reduction of the costs. And Mr Mok asks for costs on behalf of the applicants for all 3 summonses to be summarily assessed.

Ruling on Costs Order Nisi

60.  This application is tricky. On the hearing in July 2022 (resulting with my September Decision), I have invited Mr Mok to orally apply for striking out and Mr Chain has no objection. But he asked for an adjournment and Mr Mok refused, and abandoned the argument on striking out. I have to say that both parties must be aware of the argument on the on its own formula and whether this Tribunal should strike out the paragraphs in the Amended Notice of Opposition turns on this issues. And I am convinced that if Mr Chain proceed with the application, his client would not have any prejudice.

61.  It is Mr Chain who asks for an adjournment but I cannot say that he is acting unreasonable. Mr Mok decided to proceed on other grounds, again I cannot say that he is acting unreasonable. It is unfortunate that we have to split the hearing into 2. I cannot say that the applicants have been acting unreasonably or leading to additional costs. If they agree to the adjournment, there would still be additional costs.

62.  Balancing all, I am not convinced that there should be reduction of costs against the applicants and I dismiss the application. And I retain my costs order given with the February Decision.

Conclusion

63.  Summing up, I dismiss all 3 summonses of the respondent, for leave to appeal/review my September Decision, for leave to appeal against my February Decision, and to vary my costs order nisi with my February Decision. And for costs, I see no reason why the respondent shall not bear the costs of the applicants. And I give an order nisi in favour of the applicants for costs of the 3 summonses to be taxed at High Court Scale with certificate for counsel. The order nisi shall become absolute within 14 days unless parties apply to vary.

64.  I am not prepared to direct the costs to be paid forthwith and I would leave the costs to be taxed in due course.