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HCAL 95/2020
[2025] HKCFI 1863
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 95 OF 2020
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BETWEEN
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Hoque, Md Ziaul |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, “Director of Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 9 January 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board ("the Board") dated 24 December 2019 (“the Board's Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL000095_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board decided that the applicant’s claims for non-refoulement protection were not made out on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”), and confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 14 September 2018.
Amendment
3. In Form 86, the applicant did not name any proposed interested party, when the Director should be the putative interested party. Thus, on this court’s own motion, “Director of Immigration” is added as the putative interested party.
The applicant’s case
4. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
5. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because he feared being killed or harmed by 2 engineers against whom he made a report of corruption to the Anti-Corruption Commission in Chittagong, Bangladesh, as both of them wanted him to stop being a witness in the corruption case against them.
Oral hearing
6. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. However, he was absent at the hearing on 1 April 2025.
7. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral hearing of the leave application. The correct approach is to treat the applicant as having withdrawn his request for a hearing by reason of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the Leave Application on its merits.
8. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for his intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. However, the applicant did not advance any ground for his intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 9 January 2020. He merely stated in his affirmation that he was applying for leave for judicial review against the Director as well as the Board’s Decision.
Discussion
11. First of all, only the Board’s Decision is reviewable by judicial process and not the Director’s decision. There are established statutory procedures of appeal from the Director to the Board and the applicant has invoked those procedures. The Director’s decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision and is no longer susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali, HCAL 2048 of 2018, dated 28.09.2022).
12. Thus, this court will only consider the Leave Application in respect of the Board’s Decision as discussed below.
13. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s Decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).
14. In assessing the appeal by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 7 May 2019. The applicant was present and was given the chance to present his case and grounds of appeal to the Board in person. After due consideration of the law and the evidence as presented by the applicant, the Board concluded that the applicant did not face any real risk from his alleged threats in his home country.
15. Further, the Board found internal relocation viable for the applicant, who had owned his own company for over a decade and appeared to be resourceful. It would not be unreasonable to expect the applicant to relocate to a different city such as Dhaka if he did not wish to return to his home area.
16. The finding of facts was solely within the ambit of the Board. This court finds nothing wrong in the way the Board reached its conclusion based on the evidence available to the Board.
17. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.
18. In Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, the Court of Final Appeal held that for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim had to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoyed realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.
Conclusion
19. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of May 2025
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( Thomas Chan )
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
Notes for the applicant:
If leave has been granted, the applicant or his solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on: 16/5/2025
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 16/5/2025
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 13580/18/9/341/B1561
Director of Immigration
Putative interested party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 2976/18 (T2S9) (Formerly RBCZ 13144/16)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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