RESORTS WORLD AT SENTOSA PTE LTD v. TSANG YUEK KWAN

HCRE 93/2025

[2026] HKCFI 4928

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS NO 93 OF 2025

________________________

________________________

________________________

________________________

DECISION

________________________

A. Introduction

1.  This is the Defendant’s application by summons dated 6 February 2026 seeking to set aside the registration of the  Singaporean judgment (the “Singaporean Judgment”) under Case No HC/OC 38/2025 (the “Singaporean Proceedings”)

2.  As will be elaborated below, the foremost issue to be determined is whether a foreign judgment in respect of an indebtedness in connection with a gaming transaction is not registrable under section 6(1)(a) of the Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap 319) (the “FJREO”) on the ground that it would be contrary to public policy to do so.

B.   Material Background

3.  The Plaintiff is a licensed casino operator in Singapore.

4.  The Defendant is a patron of the Plaintiff.

5.  According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant is a heavy gambler with immense experience in gambling.  He has been gambling heavily at the casino operated by the Plaintiff since at least 2013.  At one stage, his gaming credit reached S$15 million.

6.  In August 2024, the Defendant gambled at the Plaintiff’s casino.  There, the Defendant entered into a credit agreement (the “Credit Agreement”) with the Plaintiff.

7.  Pursuant to the said Credit Agreement:-

(1)  On 9 August 2024, the Defendant drew down S$10 million.

(2)  On 13 August 2024, the Defendant further drew down S$2 million.

8.  Accordingly, the Defendant has been indebted to the Plaintiff in the amount of S$12 million.

9.  Between September and November 2024, the Defendant made some partial repayments to the Plaintiff.  The total indebtedness was, thus, reduced to S$10,383,400.

10.  On 14 January 2025, the Plaintiff commenced proceedings against the Defendant under the Singaporean Proceedings.

11.  The Defendant, via legal representatives, defended the Plaintiff’s claims in the Singaporean Proceedings.

12.  To this end, a substantive defence dated 14 May 2025 was filed.  Whilst the Defendant averred that he was intoxicated when he drew down the sum of S$10 million on 9 August 2024, his case regarding the drawdown of S$2 million on 13 August 2024 was based on bare non‑admissions.

13.  On 9 July 2025, the Plaintiff applied for summary judgment against the Defendant in the Singaporean Proceedings.

14.  Having considered the evidence, the parties’ conduct as well as submissions advanced by the parties’ legal representatives, the Singaporean court took the view that the Defendant’s defence was “dubious”.

15.  Upon further considering the evidence on the Defendant’s financial means, the Singapore court granted the Defendant conditional leave to defend.  It was ordered that the Defendant should pay a sum of S$2 million into court on or before 3 October 2025, failing which judgment would be entered against him (the “Condition”).

16.  It is not in dispute that the Defendant had failed to comply with the Condition imposed by the Singaporean court.

17.  As a result, on 6 October 2025, the Singaporean court entered the Singaporean Judgment against the Defendant.

18.  On 11 December 2025, Master Hui ordered that the Singaporean Judgment be registered pursuant to the FJREO.

19.  By summons dated 6 February 2025, the Defendant applied to set aside the registration of the Singaporean Judgment on the ground that it would be “contrary to public policy” to give effect to the Singaporean Judgment in Hong Kong.

C.   Summary of the Defendant’s Contentions

20.  The contentions that were advanced on behalf of the Defendant can be summarized as follows:-

(1)  First of all, Mr Owen Kun (for the Defendant) suggested that an agreement involving gaming is null and void under Hong Kong laws.  On this basis, Mr Kun contended that a foreign judgment that is founded upon a gaming transaction must be repugnant to the moral standards of Hong Kong society (the “Legality of Gaming Activities Ground”).

(2)  Second, Mr Kun contended as the Defendant was intoxicated, he did not have the mental capacity to contract, and the Plaintiff’s claim is not even permissible under Singaporean law (the “Alleged Intoxication Ground”).

(3)  Third, Mr Kun contended that the Defendant did not have financial means to satisfy the Condition imposed by the Singaporean Court (the “Alleged Lack of Financial Means Ground”).

21.  For the reasons elaborated below, I am of the view there is no merits in the Defendant’s contentions, and none of his grounds for setting aside the registration of the Singaporean Judgment is made out.

D.   Deliberation

D1  The Legality of Gaming Activities Ground

22.  Section 6(1)(a)(v) of the FJREO provides that:-

“On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced the registration of the judgment- (a) shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied- ….(v) that the enforcement of the judgment shall be contrary to public policy in the country of the registering court”

23.  The question before the court is whether it would be contrary to public policy to enforce a foreign judgment that is premised on a loan advanced to a borrower for the purpose of gambling in a foreign country.

24.  Mr Kun heavily relied on Las Vegas Hilton Corporation v Lo Yuk Leung (HCA 8739/1997, 19 January 1998).

25.  With no disrespect, Mr Kun’s reliance on Las Vegas Hilton Corporation is completely misplaced. Indeed, this authority is flatly against the Defendant’s case.

26.  In Las Vegas Hilton Corporation, the plaintiff, which operated a casino in Nevada, sought to enter summary judgment against the defendant in regard to a gambling debt.  One of the defences raised by the defendant was that it was contrary to public policy to allow the plaintiff to recover the indebtedness[1].

27.  On page 11 of the judgment, Findlay J dealt with the question of whether it was “offensive to the public policy or morality of Hong Kong to allow the recovery of this debt in the circumstances in this case”.  Findlay J answered the question in the negative.  The learned Judge held that:-

“I have no hesitation in saying that it is not. That conclusion has ample support in the views expressed in Saxby v. Fulton [1909] 2 KB 208. The headnote of that case, which correctly reflects the ratio of the decision, is ‘Money lent in a foreign country for the purpose of being used by the borrower for gaming, the game not being illegal by the law of that country, may be recovered in the English Courts.’ That case is a Court of Appeal decision, and has stood for nearly ninety years without being questioned. In fact, the law, as the Court of Appeal saw it, had been so for a lot longer than that. I say that because the Court of Appeal followed a decision of Lord Lyndhurst given in 1842. I do not think that the case of Sayed Raji v. Bank Sepah Iran (Unrep) QBD 23 May 1988, before a single judge, relied on so heavily by Mr Huggins, does, or could, detract from authority of Saxby. That case was concerned with those cases where the English courts will refuse to enforce foreign judicial awards where they conclude that a substantial injustice has been committed according to English notions. Mr Huggins, as one might expect, seeks to distinguish Saxby. He points out that the facts are different, as indeed they are. In that case, the money was lent by a friend, not a casino owner, and there was no suggestion that the gambler was under any "disability". I do not consider that these factors to be material in the light of my earlier findings, and do not make any difference to the application of the case to the one before me. There is, however, another factor that Mr Huggins argues is important. The Saxby decision was given by Vaughan Williams, LJ, Buckley, LJ and Kennedy LJ. . Buckley, LJ said, at 227 -

‘Two propositions lie at the root of this case. The first is that the contract of loan was made at Monte Carlo and that the money was advanced for purpose which at that place is legal. The second, which is of cardinal importance, is that by the common law of England gaming and wagering are not per se illegal. There are many statutes . . . which make certain gaming contracts and securities given in connection with gaming void and render the consideration for the contract illegal, but there is no principle of common law and no statute which makes betting and wagering in itself illegal. Coming to the question of public policy, I cannot see that it is contrary to public policy for the English Courts to recognize a debt contracted for the purpose of wagering abroad in a place where such wagering was legal.’

Vaughan Williams, LJ and Kennedy, LJ did not, apparently, see the second proposition as of "cardinal importance". It is so, of course, that the common law of Hong Kong also does not make gambling illegal. In England, the approach was, in 1909, to allow the common law to stand, and to make exceptions by statute. We have a statute that makes gambling generally illegal, but provides for broad exceptions. In practice, gambling in Hong Kong is widespread, heavy and legal, so long as it is conducted through the Hong Kong Jockey Club. I do not think this difference of approach leads rationally to the conclusion that gambling in England was not contrary to public policy, but gambling in Hong Kong is so contrary. Given the attitude of public policy in Hong Kong to gambling that I have already outlined, in my view, it would be the height of arrogance and hypocrisy to tell the State of Nevada that the courts of Hong Kong regard it as offensive to the public policy and morality of Hong Kong to enforce this debt legally incurred in Nevada in the circumstances of this case.”

(emphasis added)

28.  In the premises, Las Vegas Hilton Corporation clearly supports the proposition that money lent in a foreign country for the purpose of being used by the borrower for gaming lawfully in the foreign country is recoverable, and enforcing such a lending transaction would not be contrary to any public policy in Hong Kong.

29.  In the present case, it is common ground that under Singaporean law, it was lawful for the Defendant to gamble at the casino operated by the Plaintiff.  As such, there was no reason why the Plaintiff might not enter into the Credit Agreement with the Defendant.  There was nothing repugnant or outrageous in respect thereof.  In this connection, in Las Vegas Hilton Corporation[2], Findlay J made these observations:-

“We have, in Hong Kong, plenty of addictive gamblers, drinkers and shoppers, and those that supply the facilities to gamble, drink and shop provide plenty of encouragement and assistance to these people to indulge their addictions. It is not conceivable that any court in Hong Kong would find it contrary to public policy or morality to allow the recovery of debts incurred by such persons in the pursuit of their addictions. That may be desirable in a Utopia, but we do not live in such a society. If a person is incapable of making rational decisions regarding his financial affairs, that is something that he, his family, his friends or the public authorities should do something about; it is not a situation in which the Hong Kong Jockey Club, or any other supplier of goods or services, should be expected to protect that person against his own inclinations that may be detrimental to his welfare and that of his family.”

30.  I respectfully agree with and adopt Findlay J’s observations.

31.  For completeness, it should be mentioned that Mr Kun also referred me to the following passage in Findlay J’s judgment in Las Vegas Hilton Corporation.

“But a reading of the Gambling Ordinance paints a false picture of public policy and morality in Hong Kong in relation to gambling. It is a matter of common knowledge to everyone living in Hong Kong that very large amounts of money are lawfully bet and won on the totalizator at every race meeting organised by the Hong Kong Jockey Club, and many people take part in frequent lawful lotteries known as the Mark Six. The public purse benefits from this widespread gambling in Hong Kong. A duty of 18% is payable on so called exotic bets, and 12% on other bets. As is also well known in Hong Kong, the Jockey Club ploughs back much of the profit it makes from this lawful gambling into community projects that benefit the Hong Kong people. So, we may understand from this that the public policy of Hong Kong as reflected in our law and morality is not against gambling per se; it is not regarded as immoral, sinful, improper or worthy of public condemnation. The public policy is that gambling should be controlled and directed so that, to some extent, it benefits the community, both through the activities of the Jockey Club and by the collection of duty, and not the private purse of casino owners and bookmakers…” (emphasis added)

32.  The aforesaid passage would not avail the Defendant at all.  As Findlay J pointed out, our law and morality do not regard gambling as “immoral, sinful, improper, or worthy of public condemnation” per se. Instead, “[t]he public policy is that gambling should be controlled and directed”.

33.  In the present case, there is no dispute that the Plaintiff was a licensed operator that was authorized by Singaporean authorities to operate a casino.  There is plainly no room for the Defendant to suggest that he was encouraged to engage in gambling activities with operators that were unlicensed or unregulated.  This was not the case.

34.  For all the above reasons, the Legality of Gaming Activities Ground fails.

D2  The Alleged Intoxication Ground

35.  Under the Alleged Intoxication Ground, the Defendant implicitly suggested that the Singaporean court was wrong in not accepting his defence that he was intoxicated when he drew down the sum of S$10 million pursuant to the Credit Agreement.

36.  This is an impermissible attempt.

37.  As pointed out by Mr Martin Lau (for the Plaintiff), in WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Maydwell [1996] 1 HKC 444 at 449C-D, Ching JA (as Ching PJ then was) held in determining whether a foreign judgment should be registered:-

“…the court is not retrying the case. The question is not whether the decision of the foreign court is correct.”

38.  In the premises, I cannot see how the Defendant may seek to “reopen” questions relating to substantive merits.

39.  In any event, I do understand why the Singaporean court was skeptical about the Defendant’s case.  Whilst there was a complete absence of complaint for a long period of time, the Defendant even made partial repayments to the Plaintiff.  The Defendant’s conduct was simply inconsistent with his defence.

40.  For all the above reasons, I reject the Alleged Intoxication Ground.

D3  The Alleged Lack of Financial Means Ground

41.  Under the Alleged Lack of Financial Means Ground, the Defendant implicitly suggested that the Singaporean court was wrong in imposing the Condition, with which he failed to comply.

42.  As pointed out, it is not this court’s function to review whether the Singaporean court was wrong to impose the Condition or to grant conditional leave to defend: see WFM Motors Pty Ltd (supra) at 449C-D.

43.  In any event, there is no question that the Singaporean Judgment was given after due process.  Whilst the Defendant had, via legal representatives, fully participated in the Singaporean Proceedings, he also had opportunities to file evidence on both the merits and his financial means.  These were matters that the Singaporean court had duly considered.  There is no room for the Defendant to complain that he had suffered any injustice or unfairness.

44.  Accordingly, the Alleged Lack of Financial Means Ground fails.

E.   Disposition

45.  None of the Defendant’s grounds for setting aside the registration of the Singaporean Judgment is made out.

46.  I accordingly dismiss the Defendant’s summons dated 6 February 2026.

47.  Costs should follow the event.

48.  Bearing in mind that clause (h) of the Credit Agreement provides that the Defendant shall indemnify the Plaintiff in regard to all legal costs and disbursement on a full indemnity basis and that the Defendant’s contentions are wholly without merits, I am of the view that the costs to which the Plaintiff is entitled shall be assessed on an indemnity basis.

49.  I order the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff’s costs in respect of the summons dated 6 February 2026 forthwith, summarily assessed at HK$150,000.

50.  Lastly, I thank Mr Owen Kun and Mr Martin Lau for their helpful assistance.