RE HO HO WA

[English Translation – 英譯本]
HCB 2348/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO. 2348 OF 2007

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JUDGMENT

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1. The Creditor herein is the Incorporated Owners of Hoi Fu Court, situated at Hoi Ting Road, Kowloon.  The Debtor is one of the owners at Hoi Fu Court.

Debt underlying the petition

2. By way of a bankruptcy petition presented on 15 March 2007 and amended on 16 August 2007, the Creditor applies for a bankruptcy order against the Debtor.

3. The debt underlying the petition arises out of two costs orders in a case before the Lands Tribunal (“LDBM 3/2006”).  The case was initiated by the Debtor and one Ng Shui Wa, another owner at Hoi Fu Court, against 11 Respondents including the Creditor, 9 members of the management committee of the Incorporated Owners, and the Hong Kong Housing Authority.  The issue under dispute in that case was whether the agenda of and resolutions passed at the later stage of the owners’ general meeting on 10 December 2005 were valid.

4. On 13 March 2006, the Lands Tribunal made the two costs orders which formed the basis of the present bankruptcy petition.  The first order required the Debtor and Ng Shui Wa to jointly and severally pay costs of and occasioned by the Creditor and the other 9 Respondents up to 19 January 2006 in respect of the summons of 12 January 2006.  The second order, which was made against the Debtor alone, required him to pay costs of and occasioned by the Creditor and the other 9 Respondents as from 20 January 2006 in respect of the abovementioned summons.

5. The Debtor applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the above two costs orders out of time (HCMP 759/2006).  Tang JA (as he then was) dismissed the application on 17 May 2006.

6. Pursuant to the above two costs orders, the Creditor submitted two bills of costs to the court.  On 3 August 2006, the court conducted a provisional taxation.  Dissatisfied with the outcome thereof, the Debtor requested a hearing to tax the bills of costs.  At the first call-over hearing on 17 October 2006, the Debtor did not submit a list of objections and the Master adjourned the hearing.  The Debtor subsequently submitted a list of objections but did not attend the second call-over hearing.  In his absence, the Master allowed the amounts provisionally taxed for the two bills of costs.  The respective taxed costs were:

(a)      For the first costs order:

          $23,353.33 with interest at judgment rate until full payment.

(b)     For the second costs order:

          $33,428.66 with interest at judgment rate until full payment.

7. The relevant allocatur was issued on 6 December 2006.

8. On 4 January 2007 the Debtor applied for leave to appeal out of time against the Master’s orders for taxed costs.  On 24 January 2007, Deputy High Court Judge Chan dismissed the application with costs.

9. As the Debtor failed to satisfy the abovementioned two orders for taxed costs, the Creditor issued a “statutory demand” against the Debtor on 15 January 2007 and handed the same to the Debtor in person on 24 January 2007.

10. On 15 March 2007, the Creditor took out the bankruptcy petition herein.

11. As Ng Shui Wa had subsequently paid to the Creditor the sum of $23,353.33 under the first order for taxed costs, at the hearing of this bankruptcy petition the Creditor only pursued against the Debtor the sum of $33,428.66 and relevant interest under the second order for taxed costs.

Application to adjourn the petition sine die

12. At the commencement of the hearing, the Debtor applied, on the following grounds, for the hearing of the petition to be adjourned sine die:

(1)     He was pursuing an appeal against the judgment made on 15 January 2007 in LDBM 3/2006;

(2)     The Debtor [sic] took out the bankruptcy petition with an ill intent, namely to hinder him in pursuing the appeal;

(3)     He was willing to pay the underlying debt into the court; and

(4)     The bankruptcy petition had caused him great distress and he had family matters to deal with.

13. Prior to that, on 30 October 2007, the Debtor had also filed an affirmation seeking to adjourn the petition sine die on the ground that he was applying for legal aid and lodging an appeal.  The application was dismissed by Poon J on 5 November 2007.

14. For the following reasons, I dismissed the Debtor’s renewed application to adjourn the bankruptcy petition sine die:

(1)     In LDBM 3/2006, after trial the Lands Tribunal handed down judgment on 15 January 2007, ruling that the agenda of the owners’ general meeting on 10 December 2005 and the resolutions passed thereat, including the resolution for the re-election of the management committee of the Incorporated Owners, were valid.

The Debtor lodged an appeal (CACV 44/2007) against the said judgment. Upon application of the 11^th Respondent (the Hong Kong Housing Authority), Tang VP made an order on 20 June 2007 requiring the Debtor to pay $160,000 into the court within 21 days as security for costs.  The Debtor applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the order out of time, and the application was dismissed on 5 October 2007.  The Debtor indicated that he was applying for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision, but the result of the application is not yet known.

In my judgment, CACV 44/2007 concerned the outcome of the trial in LDBM 3/2006, whereas this petition stemmed from two interlocutory costs orders.  Even if in CACV 44/2007 the Creditor [sic] successfully reversed the Lands Tribunal’s judgment of 15 January 2007, this would not affect the validity of the interlocutory costs orders of 11 March 2006.  Therefore, the appeal in CACV 44/2007 would not hinder the Creditor in enforcing the orders for taxed costs with which this bankruptcy petition was concerned.

(2)     The Debtor pointed out that, following the application for security of costs by the 11^th Respondent (the Hong Kong Housing Authority) in LDBM 3/2006, the Creditor took out this petition. The Debtor contended that they were both deliberately obstructing him from appealing against the judgment in LDBM 3/2006.

It was, however, beyond dispute that the Debtor had not satisfied the costs orders underlying this bankruptcy petition, which did not involve significant sums of money.  The Debtor claimed that he did not repay the debt because he had spent his money on seeking legal advice.  In my judgment, if this was the case, the Debtor was not in a position to accuse the Creditor of having an ill intent in taking out the bankruptcy petition.

Furthermore, if there were good arguable grounds for the appeal that the Debtor was pursuing, then even if a bankruptcy order had been made, the Official Receiver could still exercise his discretion and consent to the Debtor proceeding with the appeal.

(3)     The Debtor suggested paying the debt into the court by instalments, but the Creditor did not accept the offer.

More than one year had elapsed since this bankruptcy petition was filed on 15 March 2007.  Four call-over hearings had been held during the period. What the Debtor suggested would only cause further delay to the legal proceedings, which would be undesirable. Bankruptcy proceedings should not be delayed for too long.

Furthermore, it was inappropriate to paying the outstanding sum into court. For the Debtor, there was simply no room for contesting the debt that arose from the interlocutory costs orders.

(4)     Regarding the Debtor’s complaint about the bankruptcy petition causing him distress, this in my view was the very reason why this bankruptcy petition should not be adjourned sine die.  Adjourning the hearing sine die would only delay the legal proceedings further and cause even greater distress.

The Debtor submitted a divorce decree granted by the Family Court, in an attempt to show that he had family matters to deal with.  I did not consider this a good reason for adjourning the hearing sine die.

Grounds for opposing the petition

15. The Debtor does not dispute that he has not paid the costs and interest under the relevant orders for taxed costs.  He opposes the bankruptcy petition solely on the following grounds:

(1)     The Creditor had not complied with sections 36 and 44 and paragraphs 8(2) and 10 of Schedule 2 to the Building Management Ordinance.

(2)     The bankruptcy petition was therefore presented without due authorization.

(3)     Similarly, the solicitor acting for the Creditor has not been duly authorized and hence is not entitled to conduct this action and attend the relevant hearings on behalf of the Creditor.

Authority to present the bankruptcy petition

16. The bankruptcy petition herein was presented on 15 March 2007 and signed by Madam Wong Wai Ling, Chairperson of the Creditor’s 2^nd management committee, on behalf of the Creditor.  The petition was amended on 16 August 2007 and the amended petition was also signed by Madam Wong Wai Ling on behalf of the Creditor.  Madam Wong made affirmations confirming the truth of the contents of the bankruptcy petition and the amended petition.

17. Before Madam Wong signed the bankruptcy petition, the Creditor’s management committee prepared a written resolution dated 28 February 2007 (“28-2-2007 written resolution”).  The written resolution, which was signed by 9 of the 11 members of the management committee, reads as follows:

Hoi Fu Court Owners Incorporation

(“The Corporation”)

Written Resolution of the 2^nd Management Committee

The Corporation hereby authorizes Wong Wai Ling and Yau Mei Choi to use the common seal of the Corporation and sign an ‘authorization’ authorizing Wong Wai Ling to act on behalf of the Corporation in respect of the issuance of bankruptcy petitions against Ho Ho Wa and Ng Shui Wa, namely to sign the bankruptcy petitions, all affirmations and documents, to attend and vote at creditors’ meetings, and to deal with all matters relating to the bankruptcy petitions.  See the annex hereto for the two relevant ‘authorization’ documents.

18. On 9 March 2007 the Chairperson and the Secretary of the management committee issued the authorization on behalf of the Creditor, authorizing Madam Wong Wai Ling to sign and present a bankruptcy petition against the Debtor, make relevant affirmations, and deal with matters in relation to bankruptcy proceedings against the Debtor.

19. On 30 May 2007, the 2^nd management committee of the Creditor convened its 13^th meeting, at which 8 committee members were present.  They unanimously passed the following resolution (“30-5-2007 resolution”):

On 28 February 2007, the Corporation’s 2^nd management committee made a written resolution consenting to the taking out of a bankruptcy petition against Ho Ho Wa and Ng Shui Wa (see copy of the resolution). For the avoidance of doubt, this committee hereby re-confirms the contents of the said resolution and confirms that all authorizations stated in the said resolution took effect from that day.

20. The Debtor does not dispute that the Creditor posted in public the minutes of the 30 May 2007 meeting.

21. Regarding the 28-2-2007 written resolution and the 30-5-2007 resolution, the Debtor’s arguments are:

(1)     The Creditor did not post in public or disclose to the owners the 28-2-2007 written resolution, contrary to the requirements of paragraphs 8 and 10 of Schedule 2 to the Building Management Ordinance;

(2)     The Debtor asked for copies of the resolutions passed at the meeting but the Creditor, in contravention of section 36 of the Building Management Ordinance, only provided the 28-2-2007 written resolution;

(3)     The Debtor also challenges the authenticity of the 28-2-2007 resolution; and

(4)     Although the 30-5-2007 resolution had been posted in public in accordance with the relevant requirements in the Building Management Ordinance, it was ratified after the bankruptcy petition was taken out and it was made without the Debtor’s consent, and therefore it was invalid and also unfair to the Debtor.

22. I now deal with these arguments in turn.

23. Schedule 2 to the Building Management Ordinance governs the composition and procedure of management committee.  Paragraph 8(1) and (2) of Schedule 2 states that the chairman of a management committee has the right to convene a committee meeting and that the secretary shall at least 7 days before the date of the meeting display a notice of the meeting in a prominent place in the building.  Paragraph 8(2A) and (2AA) provides for the contents of the notice of the meeting and the ways the notice may be given.  Paragraph 10 governs the procedures of a meeting of the management committee.  Paragraph 10(4) provides that the secretary shall keep minutes of the proceedings of a management committee, and paragraph 10(4A) provides that the minutes shall be certified by the person presiding over the meeting as containing a true record of the proceedings of the meeting.  Paragraph 10(4B) further provides that the secretary shall display the certified minutes in a prominent place in the building within 28 days of the date of the meeting of the management committee and cause the minutes to remain so displayed for at least 7 consecutive days.

24. The 28-2-2007 resolution is a written resolution, not a resolution made by the management committee in the course of a meeting.  This being the case, the requirements relating to notice of meeting and minutes in paragraphs 8 and 10 of Schedule 2 do not apply.  The Debtor’s argument that the 28-2-2007 written resolution had not been publicly displayed and had therefore contravened the aforesaid statutory requirements cannot be sustained.

25. The Debtor also contends that, by reason of paragraph 10(2) of Schedule 2, the management committee was debarred from adopting a written resolution.  The provision provides that:

(2)        All acts, matters or things authorized or required to be done by the management committee may be decided by a resolution passed by a majority of the votes of members of the management committee present at a meeting of the management committee.

Paragraph 10(2) only states that all matters authorized to be done by the management committee may be decided by a resolution passed by the committee members at the meeting.  It does not state that the resolution must be passed at a meeting of the management committee.  I do not agree that paragraph 10(2) debarred the Creditor’s management committee from using a written resolution to authorize the Chairperson to present the bankruptcy petition herein.

26. As for section 36 of the Building Management Ordinance, it provides as follows:

Any person who ―

(a)        in any form required by this Ordinance, or in any notice or document given, issued or made for the purposes of this Ordinance, makes any statement or furnishes any information; or

(b)        furnishes any information required to be furnished under this Ordinance,

which he knows, or reasonably ought to know, to be false in a material particular, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for 6 months.

27. The Debtor submits that the 28-2-2007 written resolution was false in a material particular, namely that the management committee had never convened any meeting to discuss and pass the said resolution.  However, the heading of the 28-2-2007 written resolution clearly showed that it was a written resolution; furthermore, the resolution neither mentioned any meeting of the committee nor stated that it had been discussed and passed by the committee at a meeting.  The Debtor is incorrect in saying that the resolution was false in a material particular; and section 36 is entirely irrelevant to the present case.

28. The Debtor also challenges the authenticity of the 28-2-2007 written resolution.  He harbours doubts about paragraph 1.2 of the minutes of the management committee meeting on 30 May 2007, which recorded that the committee resolved that the representative from the property management office should not attend the meeting because the contents of the meeting of the committee were divulged soon after the meeting.  The Debtor submits that, as the 28-2-2007 written resolution was not posted in public and its contents had not been divulged, there are doubts about the authenticity of the resolution.

29. The 28-2-2007 written resolution is a written resolution.  It has never been the Debtor’s case that this resolution was passed at a meeting of the management committee.  This resolution, therefore, has nothing to do with the question raised at the meeting of 30 May 2007 regarding the contents of the management committee meeting having been divulged.  The Debtor has also failed to put forward any factual basis on which the authenticity of the 28-2-2007 written resolution can be open to challenge.

30. Upon the above analysis, I disagree with the Debtor’s allegation that the 28-2-2007 written resolution was so unsafe that it could not legally and validly authorize the Chairperson of the management committee to represent the Incorporated Owners in presenting the bankruptcy petition herein and conducting the relevant legal proceedings.

31. Even if, as alleged by the Debtor, the bankruptcy petition herein had been presented without due authorization, the Creditor had by way of the 30-5-2007 resolution ratified its decision to authorize Madam Wong Wai Ling to present and proceed with the bankruptcy petition.  The Creditor, as a corporation, has the power to confirm and ratify decisions and acts that have been made and done, including matters of authority to commence legal proceedings.  The position is no different from a registered limited company and its board of directors: see Kammy Town Limited v. Super Glory Corporation Limited, HCA 3524/2003 (paragraph 9 of judgment dated 14 January 2005) and羅仁訴金源洋樓業主立案法團, HCMP 2262/2006 (paragraph 13 of judgment dated 21 December 2006).

32. That the meeting of 30 May 2007 was convened after the presentation of the bankruptcy petition would not bar the management committee from ratifying the decision as contained in the 28-2-2007 written resolution.  Furthermore, as this was a matter of authorization and representation between the Debtor [sic] and Madam Wong Wai Ling, the Creditor did not have to obtain the Debtor’s consent before passing a resolution ratifying the decision.  The management committee is entitled to decide for itself whether to ratify the decisions to present the bankruptcy petition and authorize Madam Wong to conduct the relevant proceedings.

33. For these reasons, whether by way of the 28-2-2007 written resolution or the 30-5-2007 resolution, the bankruptcy petition herein have been presented, and the relevant legal proceedings conducted, with due authorization.  The Debtor’s argument that the Creditor has illegally taken out the bankruptcy petition against him is misconceived.

Authority of the Creditor’s legal representatives

34. Relying on section 44 of the Building Management Ordinance, the Debtor submits that the solicitors for the Creditor have not been legally authorized and hence are unlawfully acting for the Creditor in the present case.

35. Section 44(1)(a) of the Building Management Ordinance authorizes the Secretary for Home Affairs to issue Codes of Practice regarding the procurement of supplies, goods and services required by an owners’ incorporation.  The parties hereto agree that, according to the Codes of Practice prepared by the Home Affairs Bureau, where the services or goods required by the corporation have a value of $100,000 or above, the corporation shall invite tenders in respect thereof.

36. The Debtor’s argument is: by failing to call for tenders before engaging the solicitors now on record to conduct the proceedings herein on its behalf, the Creditor contravened the provisions of the Codes of Practice and section 44 of the Ordinance.

37. Section 44(2) provides for the consequences of failing to comply with the Codes of Practice, as follows:

(2)        A failure on the part of any person to observe any Code of Practice issued under subsection (1) shall not of itself render that person liable to criminal proceedings of any kind but any such failure may, in any proceedings whether civil or criminal including proceedings for an offence under this Ordinance, be relied upon as tending to establish or to negative any liability which is in question in those proceedings.

38. In Chan Chee Shum & Chiu Lai Wah v. The Incorporated Owners of Gold Mine Building, LDBM 226/1998 (date of judgment: 1 March 2003), the Lands Tribunal pointed out that the Codes of Practice were not law and therefore, even if the corporation in that case had not strictly complied with the Codes of Practice, its decision to appoint a contractor would not be rendered invalid: see paragraph 106.

39. In Law Yan v. The Incorporated Owners of Gold Mine Building (羅仁訴金源洋樓業主立案法團), HCMP 2262/2006, the applicant pointed out that the corporation did not call for tenders before engaging a lawyer and therefore the lawyer had no authority to act for the corporation in that case.  Yuen JA pointed out in paragraph 106 of her judgment that the absence of a tendering process was not essential.

40. In my judgment, the Codes of Practice set up in accordance with section 44(1) are not rules of law.  That an owners’ incorporation did not strictly observe the requirements of the Codes in engaging service providers does not necessarily mean that the engagement or authority of the service provider is invalid.

41. In the present case, it is beyond dispute that Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow was retained by the Creditor as its annual legal adviser in 2006 and 2007.  It was both logical and reasonable for the Creditor to engage the same law firm to defend on its behalf against the Debtor in LDBM 3/2006 and present on its behalf the bankruptcy petition in execution of the interlocutory costs orders made in the said case.

42. The Debtor claims that he had no knowledge of the contents of the retainer agreement between the Creditor and Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow.  This, however, cannot constitute a ground for challenging the authority of Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow to act for the Creditor in the present action.  Nor does it show that the Creditor was obliged to call for tenders before appointing Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow to act for it in LDBM 3/2006 or the present case.

43. Relying on the case of Shanghai Land Holdings Limited (In Receivership) v. Chau Ching Ngai & Mo Yuk Ping, HCA 2704/2003 (date of judgment: 8 January 2004), the Debtor contends that Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow bears the burden of proving that it has been duly authorized to act for the Creditor in the present case.  In the case cited above, D1 applied through his solicitors to strike out a default judgment.  The plaintiff at the same time took out a summons seeking an order that D1’s solicitors had not been duly authorized to act for D1 and that D1’s application was to be set aside accordingly.  In his judgment, Deputy High Court Judge To considered a number of authorities (see paragraphs 11 to 17) which indicated that a party who wished to challenge the authority of the solicitors for the opposite party should apply separately to the court for a determination thereon.  Unless and until such challenge was raised and such an application made, the court would presume that the solicitors acting for a party had been duly authorized to do so.  Where the authority of the solicitors to act for a party came under challenged, the burden rested upon those solicitors to prove that they had been duly authorized.

44. The Debtor in the present case has not by summons applied for a determination on the question of whether Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow was duly authorized.  As a matter of fact, bankruptcy petition was presented long ago and the Debtor has filed three affirmations, but only at this hearing did the Debtor allege for the first time that Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow lacked authority to act for the Creditor.  In his affirmation of 12 December 2007, the Debtor made mention of section 44 of the Building Management Ordinance but did not seek to challenge the authority of Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow.  As Mr Tang has submitted, it was improper for the Debtor not to raise the issue of authority until this hearing, as this rendered it impossible for the Creditor and its solicitors to adduce any evidence in rebuttal.  The Debtor explains that he is ignorant of law and not well-educated, but I do not find the explanation reasonable.  It can be seen from the Debtor’s affirmation and submissions in court that he has made thorough and detailed preparations in contesting the case.  The Debtor claims that this is because he has spent money on legal advice.  If this is the case, the Debtor’s claim of being ignorant in law and not well-educated will not serve to explain why he did not raise any challenge to the authority of the Creditor’s solicitors at an earlier stage.  In any event, litigants in person have to abide by procedural rules as much as legally represented litigants do.

45. Quite apart from the point that the Debtor should not have left the above issue until this hearing, there is no basis upon which the Debtor can dispute the authority of the Creditor’s lawyer.  Madam Wong Wai Ling has expressly stated in her affirmation filed on 31 December 2007 that Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow was retained by the Creditor as its annual legal advisor for 2006 and 2007.  In the absence of other evidence to prove that Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow was not appointed by the Creditor to act for it in the present case, the court has no factual or legal basis for not accepting Madam Wong’s deposition that the Creditor has engaged Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow to act for it in the present case.

46. More importantly, the questions of whether the Creditor has complied with the Codes of Practice or whether Messrs. Tang, Wong & Chow has been duly authorized will neither invalidate this bankruptcy petition and the relevant legal proceedings nor assist the Debtor in contesting the petition.

Section 6D(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap.6)

47. The Debtor in his affirmation also suggested charging the debt underlying this petition to his property.  Section 6D(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap.6) was cited in that respect.  Although the Debtor did not make any submission on this point at the hearing, I shall also deal with this defence for the sake of completeness.

48. Section 6D(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance provides as follows:

(3)        The court may dismiss the petition if it is satisfied that the debtor is able to pay all his debts or is satisfied ―

(a)        that the debtor has made an offer to secure or compound for a debt in respect of which the petition is presented;

(b)        that the acceptance of that offer would have required the dismissal of the petition; and

(c)        that the offer has been unreasonably refused,

and, in determining for the purposes of this subsection whether the debtor is able to pay all his debts, the court shall take into account his contingent and prospective liabilities.

49. The security proposed by the Debtor is the property at Room 17, 30/F, Block A, Hoi Fu Court.  According to the record of the Land Registry as at 27 December 2007, the property was held by the Debtor and one Madam Tse Suet Ha as joint tenants.  According to a decree of divorce submitted by the Debtor at this hearing, the Debtor has divorced Madam Tse Suet Ha.

50. For the following reasons, the Creditor does not accept the Debtor’s proposal to charge the debt in question to the property:

(1)     The Debtor has never indicated any willingness to pay the debt in question.

(2)     There are already three charges over the property, with the Hong Kong Housing Authority as chargee and involving debts exceeding $370,000.  The property is also subject to a mortgage dated 8 March 2000 to secure a sum of $850,000.  The value of the property is insufficient to cover the debts.

(3)     As the property is jointly owned by the Debtor and Madam Tse Suet Ha, the Creditor cannot compel the co-owner to sell the property and then apply the proceeds to repay the debts: Chan Ching Kit Katherine v. Lam Sik Shui & Lam Sik Ying, HCMP 2239/2000 (date of judgment: 24 June 2002).

51. In the present case, as the Debtor has not adduced evidence of the current market value of the property and its net value after deducting the debts under the mortgage and the three charges, I cannot possibly assess whether the Debtor’s interest in the property constitutes sufficient security for the debt underlying this petition.  On the basis of the Creditor’s concerns as set out above, it is in my view not unreasonable for the Creditor to decline the Debtor’s proposal.

52. Furthermore, the information available in the present case shows that, apart from failing to repay the debt with which the present case is concerned, the Debtor also fails to satisfy a number of other costs orders which involve considerable sums of money: see CACV 44/2007 (paragraphs 1 to 7 of the judgment dated 20 June 2007).  I am not satisfied that the Debtor is able to repay all his debts.

53. In my judgment, therefore, the Debtor cannot rely on section 6D(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance to contest this bankruptcy petition.

Conclusion

54. On the above analysis and reasoning, there is no merit in the Debtor’s defence.  I make the usual bankruptcy order and also an order nisi that the Creditor’s and the Official Receiver’s costs be paid out of the Debtor’s assets.