RE HOSSAIN RASEL

CACV 178/2025, [2026] HKCA 1340

On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 43

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 178 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2820 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 2 February 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 19 January 2026 (“the Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 43).[1] In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Levy (“the Judge”) dated 31 March 2025, by which the Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1096).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“With due respect and humbly submissions I beg to you that I do not agree with the decision of the Court and the Torture Claims Appeal Board. I have severe problem in my home country. If I return there I will be killed by my enemies. The learned Judge did not scrutinize my application for the Judicial Review. The Torture Claims Appeal Board considered my claim lightly and made a simply decision.” (sic)

5.  Contrary to Practice Direction 2.1 and the directions of the Registrar of Civil Appeal dated 2 February 2026, the applicant did not lodge any written submissions in support of his present application by 16 February 2026.

6.  In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [5] ‑ [10] of the Judgment.  He has not identified any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3].  His assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

9.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.