黃嘉謀 v. 油塘工業大廈第三座業主立案法團

DCCJ 4931/2021

[2026] HKDC 44

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 4931 OF 2021

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BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  This case concerns water seepage in an industrial building.

2.  The Plaintiff is the registered owner of Flat D on the 8^th Floor of Yau Tong Industrial Building Block 3 (“the Building”), located at 2 Sze Shan Street, Yau Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“the Premises”). The Premises lies immediately beneath a water tank (“the Tank”) situated on the rooftop (“the Roof”) of the Building.

3.  The 1^st Defendant is the incorporated owners (“IO”) of the Building.

4.  In essence, the Plaintiff alleges that water has been seeping into the Premises since around 2015. The Plaintiff contends that such seepage resulted from the IO’s failure and/or neglect to maintain and keep the Tank, the Roof and/or the water-proof layer of the Building in good repair and condition. He seeks damages and injunctive relief against the IO.

5.  The IO denies liability, and counterclaims against the Plaintiff for damages allegedly caused to a lift in the Building.

6.  At the conclusion of the trial, I reserved my judgment to be handed down, which I now do.

7.  Before I give my judgment on the main issues, I will first deal with some interlocutory applications heard on the first day of trial.

B. THE APPLICATIONS

8.  On the first day of trial, Mr Kenneth Lee (with Mr Tommy Chung), counsel for the IO, made an oral application for leave to discontinue the counterclaim. Mr Simon So (with Mr Herman Ho), counsel for the Plaintiff, did not oppose the application. By consent, I granted leave for the IO to discontinue the counterclaim, with costs of the counterclaim to the Plaintiff, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for one counsel.

9.  Also on the first day of trial, I heard two summonses taken out by the IO. By the first, filed on 21 May 2025, the IO sought leave to file a 2^nd supplemental witness statement of Yip Chun To Adrian in the form of the attached draft. By the second, filed on 26 May 2025, the IO sought leave to amend the first summons by attaching a revised draft of said supplemental witness statement. The revised draft supplemental witness statement included seven photographs and a work quotation.

10.  Mr Simon So opposed the applications, but confirmed that the Plaintiff did not object to the seven photographs and the work quotation being adduced as evidence at trial.

11.  Mr Lee made submissions as to why this Court should allow the applications. He submitted that the supplemental witness statement demonstrated that the condition of the Tank and the substitute tank remained unchanged between October 2023 (when the expert conducted the inspection) and May 2025. That was the main purpose the IO sought to achieve by filing the supplemental witness statement.

12.  I indicated my preliminary view to Mr Lee that the supplemental witness statement carried little probative value. As Mr So confirmed, there was never any dispute that the condition of the Tank and the substitute tank remained unchanged. After further discussion, Mr Lee sought leave to withdraw both summonses, which I granted.

13.  The parties however disagreed on the issue of costs of the summonses. I heard submissions and reserved my decision on costs to be delivered with this judgment. I now do so.

14.  Given that the IO took out the two summonses but subsequently withdrew them, it is unsurprising that Mr So sought costs of both summonses.

15.  Mr Lee, however, argued that the IO should only bear the costs of the second summons, while the costs of the first summons should be borne by the Plaintiff instead. He submitted that the IO was “compelled” to make the application because the Plaintiff was uncooperative in allowing the expert to conduct a further inspection.

16.  I am not persuaded by Mr Lee’s submissions. If Mr Lee was so convinced of the necessity of filing a supplemental witness statement, he could have proceeded with the application. However, if he proceeded with the application, I would have dismissed it with costs anyway as the supplemental witness statement was in my view unnecessary.

17.  Mr Lee further argued that the Plaintiff all along objected to the first summons until the last moment when he agreed to admit the photographs and the work quotation. However, the application before this Court was for leave to file a supplemental witness statement, not to adduce documentary evidence. I fail to see how Mr So’s agreement to admit documents could have any direct bearing on the IO’s application and my ruling on costs.

18.  I see no reason why the IO should not pay the costs of the first summons. I therefore order that the costs of the two summonses be paid by the IO to the Plaintiff in any event, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for one counsel.

C. THE PARTIES’ CASES AND ISSUES IN DISPUTE

C1. The Plaintiff’s case

19.  As stated, the Plaintiff’s case is that water seepage into the Premises has occurred since around 2015.

20.  Immediately above the Premises is the Tank, which comprises of a Fresh Water Tank, a Fire Service Supply Tank (“FSS Tank”) and a Flushing Water Tank.

21.  In paragraph 10 of the Statement of Claim (“SOC”), the Plaintiff pleads:

“In breach of the DMC and the Defendant’s common law and/or statutory duties, the Defendant and/or its/their servants, agents, or occupiers have caused and/or permitted water to seep, discharge, escape, percolate, and/or leak from the Tank into the [Premises] since in or around 2015 on a day unknown to the Plaintiff (“the Water Seepage”).”

22.  Paragraph 11 of the SOC further pleads that:

“The Water Seepage was due to the Defendant’s failure and/or neglect to maintain and keep the Tank, the Roof, and/or the water-proof layer of the building in good repair and condition (“the Negligence”). The Negligence is in breach of the DMC and the Defendant’s common law and/or statutory duties.”

23.  The Plaintiff then sets out the particulars of the alleged negligence.

24.  The Plaintiff contends that he had repeatedly informed the IO of the water seepage since about 2015. Despite these notifications, the IO failed, neglected and/or refused to carry out repair works to remedy the problem.

25.  In May 2020, the Plaintiff instructed Hong Kong Building Inspection & Structural Diagnostic Limited (“the Plaintiff’s Expert”) to investigate the source and cause of the seepage. The report dated 11 July 2020 concluded that the seepage stemmed from the Tank.

26.  In July 2021, the IO engaged CME Solutions Limited (“the IO’s Expert”) to conduct its own investigation. The report dated 30 July 2021 concluded that the seepage stemmed from the FSS Tank and/or the Fresh Water Tank.

27.  In September 2021, the Water Supplies Department informed the Plaintiff that the FSS Tank was seeping and issued a repair notice to the IO on 1 September 2021 requiring remedial action.

28.  As submitted by Mr So in his opening, the Plaintiff’s causes of action are based on (i) breach of the Deed of Mutual Covenant (“DMC”); (ii) breach of common law and statutory duties; and (iii) nuisance and/or undue interference with the Plaintiff’s right of quiet enjoyment of the Premises. The Plaintiff also pleads reliance, where necessary, on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.

29.  The Plaintiff claims the following reliefs:

(1) Injunctions, including a prohibitory injunction to stop further seepage and a mandatory injunction requiring repairs; and

(2) Damages, including general damages for nuisance and inconvenience, investigative costs, repairs and reinstatement costs, and loss of rental income and/or mesne profit.

30.  During his opening, Mr So submitted that the Plaintiff’s case on the sources of the seepage is what was concluded by Mr Simon Cheung Wai Sum, the single joint expert in this action (“SJE”), namely (a) the defective illegal small fresh water tank (inside the Tank); and (b) defective common facilities of the waterproofing system beneath the Plaintiff’s private main roof. I will address the SJE report later. For now, I pause to consider a dispute between the parties on whether the Plaintiff is allowed to advance such a case.

31.  Mr Lee submitted that the second source as identified by the SJE was never part of the Plaintiff’s pleaded case and the Court should not allow the Plaintiff to run such a case.

32.  He argued that a plain reading of the SOC shows a clear and deliberate limitation of the Plaintiff’s claim to seepage solely from the Tank. He referred to paragraph 10 of the SOC, which defines “Water Seepage” as “water to seep, discharge, escape, percolate, and/or leak from the Tank into [the Premises] since in or around 2015”.

33.  I do not accept Mr Lee’s arguments. With respect, in my view, Mr Lee’s reading of the SOC is too narrow.

34.  The primary objective of pleadings is to inform the opposing party the case they have to meet so that proper preparation is possible. In my view, the SOC, reading as a whole, sufficiently informs the IO that the Plaintiff’s case concerns seepage into the Premises from the common parts of the Building for which the IO is responsible.

35.  To begin with, paragraph 9 of the SOC pleads the IO’s duties to “maintain the Tank, the Roof, and external wall of the Building or any part thereof in good repair and condition”.

36.  Then, while paragraph 10 pleads breach relating to seepage from the Tank, paragraph 11 alleges, inter alia, failure to maintain the Tank, the Roof and/or the water-proof layer of the Building.

37.  Paragraph 18 sets out particulars of breach and/or negligence. These include complaints that the IO failed to take sufficient steps to ensure that water would not seep from the common parts of the Building. Some examples of these particulars are:

“18.1 Failing to keep the common parts, including but not limited to the Tank, of the Building in good repair and condition.

18.2 Causing, or permitting, the water and/or other liquid to escape, leak, drip, percolate, or seep (or suffering the same to escape, leak, drip, percolate, or seep) from the common parts, including but not limited to the Tank, of the Building to the [Premises].”

38.  The phrase “common parts, including but not limited to the Tank” appears repeatedly in paragraph 18. In my view, this demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s case is not confined to the Tank.

39.  Finally, the SOC seeks injunctive relief, inter alia, restraining seepage “from the Tank and/or the Roof”, and requiring rectification to stop the seepage “from the Tank and/or the Roof”.

40.  I am therefore not persuaded by Mr Lee that the IO did not know that the Plaintiff’s case also concerns the seepage from the Roof. The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to run a case that seepage originated from both the Tank and the Roof, as found by the SJE.

C2. The IO’s case

41.  The IO’s case has not been entirely consistent.

42.  In the Amended Defence and Counterclaim (not settled by Mr Lee), the IO pleads as follows:

(1) The IO denies any water seepage into the Premises from the Tank since 2015 (§7).

(2) The IO denies that the water seepage was caused by its default (§7).

(3) In October 2020, the Plaintiff installed a solar panel system and placed numerous goods on the Roof (§7(a)).

(4) The IO took proactive steps to follow up and investigate the Plaintiff’s complaints. Its findings show that the seepage originated from the Plaintiff’s air conditioning structures on the Roof. The Plaintiff also drilled holes on the Roof to fix certain structures, damaging the waterproofing system and causing rainwater to seep into the Premises (§7(b)).

43.  From these factual averments, the IO’s case appears to be that the seepage was caused by the Plaintiff’s own acts and had nothing to do with the IO. Consistent with this stance, the IO denies or disagrees with the findings of the reports of both the Plaintiff’s Expert (§8) and the IO’s Expert (§11).

44.  However, the IO also pleads in the same pleading that it has always been cooperative (§7(c)). Between 2019 and 2024, the IO engaged competent contractors to repair the Roof and the FSS Tank, and even constructed a temporary substitute water tank (§7(d)). It specifically pleads that upon receiving the Plaintiff’s complaint, it proactively followed up and engaged competent contractors to investigate and remedied the problem (§7(e)).

45.  It is therefore unclear from the IO’s pleading whether its case is that the seepage did not originate from the Tank at all, or that it did but the IO promptly investigated and remedied the problem.

46.  The ambiguity was initially clarified by Mr Lee in his opening submissions. Mr Lee accepted that there was seepage into the Premises and that the sources were both the Tank and the Roof, as found by the SJE. His objection was limited to the pleading point discussed earlier. From this clarification, the IO’s defence appears to be that it took reasonable steps to address the Plaintiff’s complaints and rectify the seepage.

47.  However, during closing submissions, the IO’s position shifted. Mr Lee maintained that the IO admitted seepage into the Premises, but argued that the SJE identified the Tank and defective waterproofing system beneath the private roof only in December 2023, that is the date of the expert report. Prior to that, other sources allegedly contributed to the seepage.

48.  The “other sources” identified by Mr Lee were:

(1) the “pre-existing condition” of the Premises before the Plaintiff purchased it, including unauthorised building works on the Roof and their dilapidated state; and

(2) the installation of air-conditioning units on the Roof and the affixing of radiator pipes to the outer walls between 2015 and 2018.

C3. Issues in dispute

49.  The parties lodged an Agreed List of Issues for Trial. In light of the submissions, I have slightly modified the list as follows:

(1) Whether there has been water seepage into the Premises since 2015; and if so, what was its cause (“Issue 1”).

(2) Whether the IO is liable for such water seepage (“Issue 2”).

(3) What is the appropriate amount of damages (“Issue 3”).

(4) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief (“Issue 4”).

D. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

50.  Section 18(1) of the Building Management Ordinance (Cap 344) (“BMO”) provides that it is the duty of the Incorporated Owners to maintain the common parts and the property of the corporation in a state of good and serviceable repair and clean condition; and do all things reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the obligations contained in the DMC for the control, management and administration of the building.

51.  However, this subsection does not make the incorporated owners an insurer such that, if some part of the building falls into disrepair, the incorporated owners automatically becomes liable.

52.  The incorporated owners will be liable if there is fault. It will also be liable if, having been made aware of a defect requiring remedy, it fails to take appropriate steps. See Lau Chun Wing Rod v The Incorporated Owners of Po On Building (CACV 20/2007, unreported, 01/11/2007) at §12. The Incorporated Owners will also be liable if it continues or adopts a nuisance, or does not, without undue delay, remedy it once when it becomes aware of it: Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callagan & Ors [1940] AC 880 at 904-905 and Loke Yuen Jean Tak Alice v Wong Kit Ying & Ors [2016] HKCFI 179, at §55.

53.  Hence, the test is one of reasonableness.

54.  The waterproofing membrane in the Roof is common part by virtue of paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to BMO: Wing Ming Garment Factory Ltd v Wing Ming Industrial Centre (IO) [2014] 4 HKLRD 52, at §§96-99. So are the external walls, roofs and water tanks: paragraphs 1, 3 and 6 of Schedule 1 to BMO.

E. WITNESSES’ EVIDENCE

E1. The expert evidence

55.  Mr Simon Cheung Wai Sum, a chartered building surveyor, registered professional surveyor (building surveying) and registered inspector (List of Surveyors) was appointed as the SJE in this case. He prepared a single joint expert report dated 12 December 2023 (“the Report”). The Report is adduced as evidence at trial without calling the SJE pursuant to the Order of Master Maurice Lam dated 27 April 2023.

56.  Inspection and examination on the Premises and the Roof took place on 22 August, 13, 20, 27, 30 September, 4 and 17 October 2023.

57.  On 22 August 2023:

(1) The SJE observed that the internal condition of the Premises was badly deteriorated on the structural elements, and large areas of spalled concrete with exposure of the seriously rusted reinforcement bar, delamination/debonded render, crack and efflorescence were generally observed and recorded due to prolonged water seepage attack. The locations of water seepage problem were widespread. He identified the locations and marked them as Locations A to I. He specifically noted that water drippings could be seen at Location F.

(2) The SJE observed that the Premises is situated below the private main roof, the fire service pump house and common facilities of the reinforced concrete water tanks. According to the latest approve drainage plan (the Appendix V to the Report), three water tanks were recorded, namely Fire Services Supply Tank, Flushing Tank and Fresh Water Tank.

(3) He observed that the Fire Services Supply Tank and Flushing Water Tank were still being used and operating normally. However, the originally approved Fresh Water Tank had been divided into two separate water tanks by a partition wall formed with light-weighted sand bricks. A structural reinforced concrete slab access opening above it had been cut, formed and plastered at upper roof level. The small tank inside the Fresh Water Tank is referred to as the “Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank” in the Report, and I will adopt this definition in this judgment.

(4) He also noted that there was liquid-applied waterproofing coating on the floor and the partition wall of the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank.

(5) He observed that the concrete surface of the access opening and the liquid-applied waterproofing coating inside the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank appeared quite new, and therefore the works were likely carried out within a year. I will return to this observation later.

58.  On 13 September 2023, the SJE conducted colour dye test. Pyranine dye was put into the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank, while Standard Blue dye was diluted and put inside the Flushing Water Tank. The dye was left to pond for 168 hours.

59.  On 20 September 2023:

(1) It was observed that non-salty clear water droplets were found at Location F, and no corresponding colour dye was detected.

(2) However, the moisture contents readings increased as compared with those taken on 13 September 2023. I have compared the moisture contents readings taken on 13 and 20 September 2023, and found that in general moisture contents readings increased not only at Location F, but at Locations A to E and G too.

(3) He conducted further colour dye tests. Orange II dye was put inside the Fresh Water Tank, while Rhodamine B dye was diluted and put inside the Fire Services Supply Tank. The dye was left to pond for 168 hours.

60.  On 27 September 2023:

(1) The SJE found fluorescent effect or stain at Location F which made the SJE to conclude that the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank was a source of water seepage to the Premises.

(2) He however noticed no water droplet, nor any correspondence colour dye used at the Fresh Water Tank or the FSS Tank.

(3) He conducted the last colour dye test. Sulforhodamine B dye was ponded on the entire private main roof of the Premises for 168 hours.

61.  On 30 September 2023, the SJE conducted a 1-hour colour dye (Sulforhodamine B) water spraying test against reinforced concrete water tanks.

62.  On 4 October 2023, the SJE noticed the corresponding dye of Sulforhodamine B at several locations of common staircase.

63.  On 17 October 2023, the SJE found the corresponding dye of Sulforhodamine B at Location F. The SJE therefore concluded that the private main roof above the Premises was also a source of water seepage to Location F.

64.  The SJE further opined that the solar panel system on the Roof would not affect or jeopardise the existing water integrity of the common facilities of waterproofing system below the private main roof.

65.  In conclusion, the SJE opined that the water seepage to the Premises was sourced and caused by:

(1) defective Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank at upper roof; and

(2) defective common facilities of the waterproofing system beneath the Plaintiff’s private main roof.

66.  On the issue of quantum, the SJE opined that:

(1) the reasonable amount of costs of reinstatement is HK$387,500;

(2) the reasonable amount of costs to appoint an expert to carry out water seepage investigation and compilation of single expert report is HK$29,800; and

(3) the reasonable amount of costs to carry out structural concrete repair for removal of potential hazard on the concrete ceiling and maintain structural safety inside the Premises is HK$29,800.

67.  There is no challenge to the contents of the Report. I also find it comprehensive and the conclusion logical. I accept the Report in full.

E2. Factual witnesses – their overall credibility and reliability

68.  In assessing the evidence of any witness, I am guided by the legal principles summarised in the authorities cited by the parties, including Lee Fu Wing & Anor v Yan Paul Po Ting [2009] 5 HKLRD 513 at §53; The Joint and Several Trustees of the Property of Yeung Wing Sing v Yeung Wing Sing (a bankrupt) & Anor [2021] HKCFI 2018 at §26; Star Glory Investment Ltd v Kai Tuo (HK) Technology Co Ltd (HCA 3523/2002, unreported, 13/08/2005) at §12, and Cheung Yuk Ying Engracia v Macgregor Isabella [2022] HKCFI 376 at §§58-60.

69.  Generally speaking, although the demeanour of a witness is one factor I may consider, the more reliable approach is to test a witness’ evidence against its inherent plausibility, and any undisputed or indisputable evidence, particularly contemporaneous documents.

70.  The Plaintiff gave oral evidence. Notwithstanding Mr Lee’s criticisms of him, I formed a strong impression that the Plaintiff was a credible and reliable witness. His testimony was generally consistent and remained unshaken under cross-examination. The events in question span almost a decade, and it is understandable that he could not recall every detail – for example, the name of the contractor he engaged or the reasons for choosing the contractor. In my view, such gaps do not affect his overall credibility or reliability.

71.  I am particularly impressed by the Plaintiff’s honest and forthcoming answers concerning his claim for loss of rental income. He testified that he had been using the Premises as his office and that he retired in 2022. He stated directly and without hesitation that it was only upon his retirement that he considered he no longer required the Premises. Although this evidence was plainly against his own interests and likely to reduce the quantum of his claim for loss of rental income, the Plaintiff did not attempt to evade the point. His candour in this regard reinforced my assessment of his general credibility.

72.  The defence first called Mr Yip Chun Kwok Danny (“Danny”), the former chairman of the IO from June 2016 to July 2021. His evidence was not challenged by Mr So, and I accept it in full.

73.  The defence also called Mr Yip Chun To Adrian (“Adrian”). Having heard his oral testimony, I am unable to accept that he told me the whole truth. He appeared inclined to provide evidence which he believed would favour the defence. Several examples illustrate this:

(1) As noted above, the SJE observed that the waterproofing coating inside the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank appeared to have been applied within a year prior to inspection. Under cross-examination, Adrian stated that the IO did not carry out any such work, and suggested that someone might have entered the Tank and applied the coating without the IO’s knowledge. This evidence is, in my view, inherently implausible. It is difficult to imagine who, apart from the IO, would have the motive to engage workers to perform such work without any apparent benefit. It is equally difficult to believe that the work could have been carried out without notice by either the IO or the management company (who would naturally report it to the IO). On the evidence, it is far more likely that the IO itself undertook the work prior to the SJE’s inspection in an attempt to obtain a favourable finding that the Tank was not the source of the seepage. However, probably not as the IO wished, the newly-applied coating still failed to stop the seepage entirely.

(2) When questioned about the substitute water tank (described in the Defence and Counterclaim as “temporary tank” (臨時食水水缸)), Adrian stated, for the first time, that the tank was no longer temporary and that the IO had no intention of using, or restoring water supply to, the original tank. However, he was unable to identify when this alleged decision was made. Under further questioning, he accepted that there was no resolution to this effect, and said instead that it was merely a consensus between the IO members. He could not, however, explain how such a “consensus” was reached. In my judgment, this was an attempt to give evidence aimed at avoiding the grant of injunctive relief in respect of the Tank. The complete absence of meeting minutes, documentary records, or even email or text messages concerning any decision of not using the original tank anymore strongly suggests that no such decision or consensus ever existed.

(3) Adrian was also questioned on the Plaintiff’s case, as set out in the Answer to Request for Further and Better Particulars of Statement of Claim dated 10 July 2023, that the Plaintiff’s water seepage complaint was raised as an agenda item at the 2016 annual general meeting and 2019 management committee meeting, which the IO denies in the Defence and Counterclaim. His answers were inconsistent. At one point, he said he had asked the management company to look into the matter but found no record of the complaints. He later added that he could not find any record of the 2016 annual meeting at all. As for the 2019 meeting, he first said that he could not recall whether he had conducted any investigation or attempted to locate the meeting records; moments later–after I pointed out that the production of the minutes would readily rebut the Plaintiff’s allegation–he changed his evidence and claimed that he had attempted to retrieve the record from the management company. When pressed on whether he had actually retrieved the minutes, he again changed position and said he had only asked for the complaint letters. In any event, this latest answer is highly improbable. As the complaint was allegedly raised as an agenda item, the natural way to rebut the allegation would have been to produce the agenda and minutes, not complaint letters.

74.  I allow myself to be guided by the impressions formed above as to the credibility and reliability of each witness in my assessment of the disputed issues in this case.

F. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

F1. Issue 1 – Whether there has been water seepage into the Premises since 2015; and if so, what was its cause

75.  For the reasons set out below, I find that there has been water seepage into the Premises since 2015. I further find that the water seepage was caused by the defective waterproofing system beneath the FSS Tank (until the waterproofing works were carried out), the defective Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank at upper roof, and the defective waterproofing system beneath the Plaintiff’s private main roof.

76.  The Plaintiff’s evidence is that water seepage began appearing on the ceiling of the Premises in about 2015. Concrete began to peel off, cracks developed, and the steel reinforcement bars became exposed and rusted.

77.  This evidence is corroborated by a quotation from Wai Wha Engineering Co dated 7 June 2015 (“Wai Wha Quotation”). The document records that there were cracks on the ceiling of the Premises leading to water seepage. It supports the Plaintiff’s case that water seepage existed as early as 2015.

78.  The Plaintiff testified that he and his wife had made repeated complaints, both orally and in writing, to the IO and/or the management company from 2015 onwards. He produced complaint letters addressed to the IO from 2015 to 2020, the earliest dated 12 June 2015. Their contents are broadly consistent with his allegations. I find that these letters support the Plaintiff’s case.

79.  The IO has never alleged that these letters were forged. During cross-examination, Mr Lee did not put to the Plaintiff that the letters were fabricated or that he did not send them. Adrian’s evidence was simply that the IO had never received any complaints from the Plaintiff (see paragraph 4 of his witness statement).

80.  On the balance of probabilities, I find that the IO did receive the Plaintiff’s complaints from 2015 onwards and was aware of the alleged water seepage since that time. My reasons are as follows.

(1) In paragraph 7(a) of the Defence and Counterclaim, the IO pleaded that despite the Plaintiff having made allegations since 2015 that the ceiling of the Premises was severely damaged, he still installed a solar panel system on the Roof in 2020. This is a positive averment acknowledging that allegations of ceiling damage had been made since 2015.

(2) Adrian accepted in cross-examination that the IO did receive the Plaintiff’s complaint letter dated 16 October 2019. In that letter, the Plaintiff expressly stated that he had repeatedly lodged complaints with the IO since 2015. This supports the Plaintiff’s case, and the IO has never denied it.

(3) The correspondence exchanged between the parties’ former solicitors also supports my finding:

(a) In a letter dated 20 April 2020, the Plaintiff’s former solicitors, L&L Lawyers (“L&L”) stated that the Plaintiff had repeatedly raised the issue of water seepage with the IO and the management company since 2015.

(b) In their reply of 29 April 2020, the IO’s former solicitors, Huen & Partners (“H&P”) did not deny that the Plaintiff had made such complaints or that the IO had received them.

(c) L&L’s further letter dated 1 June 2021 again referred to the year of 2015.

(d) H&P’s reply of 10 June 2021 again did not deny receipt of complaints since 2015.

(4) The Plaintiff’s evidence was that he raised the complaint at the 2016 annual general meeting, and that it was listed as an agenda item. Mr Lee did not challenge this evidence during cross-examination. On the other hand, the IO, without satisfactory explanation, failed to produce the relevant agenda or minutes – documents which would have easily rebutted the Plaintiff’s case had it been untrue. I draw an adverse inference against the IO.

(5) I have found the Plaintiff to be a credible and reliable witness, and I accept his evidence on this matter.

81.  As to the cause of the water seepage, Mr Lee argued that the SJE report was only relevant to the condition of the Premises at the time of inspection in 2023, but not earlier. He submitted that earlier water seepage may have been caused by (i) the “pre-existing condition” of the Premises, including unauthorised building works on the Roof and their dilapidated state; and (ii) the installation of air-conditioning units on the Roof and the affixing of radiator pipes to the outer walls between 2015 and 2018.

82.  Mr So objected to the IO running these arguments, on the ground that these alleged alternative causes were not pleaded.

83.  I see force in the objection. While paragraph 7(b) of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim pleads an allegation relating to the installation of the air-conditioning unit, it concerns only the drilling of holes to fix the unit on the rooftop. It does not include the allegation regarding radiator pipes on the external walls. The “pre-existing condition” is not pleaded at all. In his closing, Mr Lee made extensive submissions regarding dilapidated rooftop conditions, protruding pipes, and alleged failure by the Plaintiff to adequately carry out repairs. However, the Plaintiff had not been informed to meet such a case in the first place.

84.  It is unfair for the IO to raise unpleaded points at trial. I agree with Mr So that the IO should not be permitted to advance this unpleaded case.

85.  Even if I were to allow the IO to run this “other causes” case, I find on the evidence, and on balance of probabilities, that the sources of water seepage did not include those advanced by Mr Lee. I say this for the following reasons.

86.  In arguing that the “pre-existing condition” and the unauthorised building works caused the seepage, Mr Lee relied on the Wai Wha Quotation and argued that at that time the rooftops were burdened with unauthorised building works and the condition was dilapidated.

87.  In my view, the Wai Wha Quotation is wholly insufficient to indicate that the water seepage was caused by the pre-existing condition, any unauthorised building works or the state of the rooftop.

88.  Indeed, the quotation supports a contrary finding: it records water seepage into the ceiling of the Premises, which more likely than not suggests defects in the waterproofing membrane of the Roof.

89.  As to the installation of air-conditioning units on the Roof and the affixing of radiator pipes to the external walls, Mr Lee relied on both the Wai Wha Quotation and an alleged investigation carried out by the IO in 2018.

90.  The relevant part of the Wai Wha Quotation records that in Units 8A and 8B (not the Premises), air-conditioning pipes remained in the ceiling and were exposed above the rooftop, and that water seepage occurred whenever it rained. This does not sufficiently support the allegation that the air-conditioning pipes on the Roof caused water seepage into the Plaintiff’s Premises.

91.  Regarding the alleged 2018 investigation, the IO contends that Danny sent a WhatsApp message to the Plaintiff’s wife on 23 June 2018 stating that technicians had found seepage caused by the air-conditioning radiator’s pipes.

92.  I find that this purported investigation lacked particulars and substance. Several photographs of the radiator and pipes were sent to the Plaintiff’s wife, but no technician’s report was produced. Danny’s evidence was that he himself took the photographs. He did not identify the “technicians”, nor explain how they reached their alleged conclusion. There is also no evidence that the IO engaged any such “technicians”.

93.  Further, the relevant location is right next to the external wall of the Building, and is distant from the area beneath the Tank, which is the area where the Plaintiff had complained of seepage.

94.  Neither the Plaintiff’s Expert nor the IO’s Expert identified the alleged alternative causes advanced by the IO.

95.  Finally, I give full weight to the SJE report. The SJE expressly ruled out other possible sources and causes of the water seepage, including from the external walls or other private main roofs.

96.  The SJE agreed with the reports prepared by the Plaintiff’s Expert and the IO’s Expert that there was water seepage from the FSS Tank to the Premises, but stated that the FSS Tank was watertight at the time of his inspection showing some remedial works on the FSS Tank had been carried out. He further concluded that the water seepage was caused by the defective Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank at upper roof and defective common facilities of the waterproofing system beneath the Plaintiff’s private main roof.

97.  The evidence shows that some remedial works have been carried out inside the FSS Tank in March 2020.

98.  I find that prior to such works, the FSS Tank was one of the sources of the water seepage since 2015. I further find that the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank and the defective waterproofing system beneath the Plaintiff’s private main roof have, throughout, been sources of the water seepage since 2015.

99.  I am mindful that the burden of proof rests on the Plaintiff. I am satisfied that he has proved, on the balance of probabilities, the findings I have reached above.

F2. Issue 2 – Whether the IO is liable for such water seepage

100.  I find that the IO is liable for the water seepage into the Premises.

101.  In determining this issue, I must assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of the IO’s actions in response to the Plaintiff’s complaints after it became aware of the seepage.

102.  I am distinctly unimpressed by the IO’s conduct in addressing the Plaintiff’s complaints since 2015. To borrow Mr So’s words, the IO has consistently adopted a “laid-back and could-not-care-less” attitude.

103.  Of particular significance is the period between mid-2015 and mid-2018, during which the IO took no action whatsoever in response to the Plaintiff’s repeated complaints, made orally, in writing and even raised at a formal meeting.

104.  In June 2018, the IO purported to follow up on the Plaintiff’s complaint, and allegedly conducted an investigation through some unidentified “technicians”. The IO concluded that the water seepage was caused by the Plaintiff’s own fault. I have already found above that this finding is unsustainable.

105.  There was then no further action by the IO until March 2019. According to the minutes of the IO’s Management Committee meeting dated 8 April 2019, one Mr Yu, a member of the IO, complained on 28 March 2019 that water was seeping from the Roof into the Premises, and subsequently from the Premises to his unit (Unit 7D). As a result of Mr Yu’s complaint, the IO engaged KF Engineering Co (“KF”) to carry out certain waterproofing works.

106.  I pause here to note that the IO maintained its position that the water seepage was caused by the Plaintiff’s own fault until Mr Yu’s complaint. I further note that if water was seeping from the Roof to the Premises, and then further to Unit 7D, the water ingress must by then have been serious. This supports the Plaintiff’s case.

107.  It is unclear when KF actually carried out the works, but based on the dates of the invoices, the works appear to have been performed in or around April and September 2019.

108.  On 28 August 2019, the Plaintiff lodged a complaint with the Joint Office of Food and Environmental Hygiene Department and Buildings Department (“Joint Office”). On 14 October 2019, the Joint Office replied that following an inspection on 3 September 2019, it was suspected that the FSS facilities were the cause of the water seepage. The Joint Office informed the IO accordingly.

109.  On 16 October 2019, the Plaintiff wrote to the IO stating that the water seepage had worsened because the remedial works carried out around the outer sides of the FSS Tank had caused the seepage to concentrate at the ceiling of the Premises.

110.  On 11 December 2019, 13 January 2020, 16 January 2020, 10 February 2020, 12 February 2020 and 12 March 2020, the Plaintiff sent further complaint letters to the IO reporting persistent water seepage and demanding actions.

111.  According to Adrian, and as recorded in the minutes dated 21 July 2021, Universal Fire Eng Co (“Universal”) was engaged to empty the FSS Tank between January and April 2020, and KF was engaged to carry out waterproofing works inside the FSS Tank in March 2020.

112.  According to the demand letter from L&L to the IO dated 20 April 2020, the Plaintiff had also provided a quotation from Silver Consultants (銀晉顧問) for conducting a water seepage test. The IO did not respond and did not conduct any test.

113.  In its reply, H&P contended that the water seepage did not originate from the FSS Tank because seepage continued even after the tank was emptied, and instead alleged that the Plaintiff’s air-conditioning radiators and pipes on the Roof and external walls were the sources.

114.  These conclusions were illogical and lacked evidential foundation. The fact that seepage persisted after the FSS Tank was emptied does not exclude the FSS Tank as a source; it may simply indicate multiple sources. Whether the radiators or pipes contributed to the seepage was a matter that required proper testing.

115.  The Plaintiff thereafter instructed the Plaintiff’s Expert to conduct a water seepage test. Inspection took place on 6 May 2020, and a report was issued on 11 July 2020. The expert opined that the affected area in the Premises was not near the external wall, and thus the external wall was unlikely to be the source. He also observed that seepage continued despite the absence of rainfall on the days of inspection, with no evidence of rainwater ingress from the Roof. He concluded that the seepage originated from the Tank on the Roof, but excluding the Flush Water Tank, because the seeped water was not salt water.

116.  The IO appears to have been dissatisfied with this report. However, it took no steps to instruct its own expert to conduct any test.

117.  The next development was the IO’s invitation for quotations in January 2021, some six months later, for waterproofing works on the Fresh Water Tank and the construction of a temporary fresh water tank. According to the minutes of an annual general meeting on 8 July 2021, the IO engaged Grease Project Company (“Grease”) on 1 March 2021 for these works.

118.  Unexpectedly, and through no fault of the IO, Grease resigned before commencing work in May 2021.

119.  According to the IO meeting minutes dated 21 July 2021, the IO was advised by the Water Supplies Department on 6 June 2021 to conduct investigations before undertaking further works. The IO then engaged the IO’s Expert, who prepared a report dated 30 July 2021. The IO’s Expert concluded that the seepage originated from the FSS Tank and/or the Fresh Water Tank.

120.  Despite this, the IO took no remedial action. Neither Danny nor Adrian provided any explanation for this inaction.

121.  Mr Lee submitted that the report of the IO’s Expert was unhelpful, as it failed to definitely identify whether the FSS Tank or the Fresh Water Tank was the actual source of the seepage. He argued that as there had been remedial works on the FSS Tank, it was reasonable for the IO to question the necessity of any further FSS Tank repairs.

122.  There is no evidence that these were in fact the IO’s reasons. In any event, if the IO believed that the FSS Tank was not the source, it should logically have repaired the Fresh Water Tank – the only remaining identified source. Yet it did nothing.

123.  Some four months later, in November 2021, the IO engaged Glory Sky Consulting Engineers Ltd (“Glory Sky”) to conduct another inspection. A report was issued on 22 November 2021. Notably, according to the report, Glory Sky was engaged only to conduct a visual inspection. Its recommendation was for repair works to all three tanks: the FSS Tank, Flush Water Tank and the Fresh Water Tank.

124.  Again, no remedial action followed. Neither Danny nor Adrian provided any explanation.

125.  Mr Lee again submitted that the FSS Tank and the Flush Water Tank had been ruled out as sources, and that the report lacked any direct link to the Fresh Water Tank, rendering the IO’s scepticism reasonable. However, there is (i) no evidence that this was the IO’s actual consideration; and (ii) even if the IO believed that the FSS Tank and the Flush Water Tank were not the sources, it would have proceeded with repairs to the Fresh Water Tank – the only remaining candidate. It did not.

126.  Finally, in December 2021, the IO engaged Cheung On Engineering Construction Ltd to construct a substitute fresh water tank, and the works were completed in March 2022. However, there is no evidence that any repair works were carried out to the original Fresh Water Tank.

127.  Five months later, in August 2022, the IO engaged Universal to conduct drainage works on the FSS Tank. No further steps were taken thereafter.

128.  A further five more months passed before, in January 2023, the IO again engaged Glory Sky to conduct another inspection. A report dated 10 January 2023 was produced. As with the earlier engagement, according to its report, Glory Sky was instructed to conduct only a visual inspection. The report once again recommended remedial works to all three tanks.

129.  Adrian gave evidence that Miss Lam of the management company informed him that, during this inspection, Glory Sky told her that they had discovered a confined space within the Fresh Water Tank and recommended that the IO open the space to check whether any water was inside (see paragraph 16 of his witness statement).

130.  In March 2023, the IO instructed Kam Fun Engineering Co to construct an opening and cap on the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank and to drain the water inside it.

131.  Between August and October 2023, the SJE conducted inspection of the Premises and the Roof. A report was issued on 12 December 2023.

132.  In March 2024, the IO finally engaged Wai Wha Engineering Co to carry out works inside both the original Fresh Water Tank and the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank, including demolition of the partition wall and waterproofing works. It is common ground that the water seepage at least improved thereafter.

133.  It is clear from the above chronology that:

(1) The IO took no actions, and showed no intention of engaging professionals or conducting any form of testing, from 2015 until April 2019.

(2) From April 2019 to December 2023, the IO’s actions were slow and sporadic. There were lengthy gaps with no activity. Despite clear conclusions reached by various experts, the IO consistently failed to carry out any repair works to the Fresh Water Tank.

(3) The Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank was separated by a partition wall formed with light-weighted sand bricks. As shown in the photographs, the original Fresh Water Tank was tiled, whereas the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank including the partition wall was not. Once the water inside the Fresh Water Tank was drained, the presence of the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank would not have been difficult for any professional to detect. Yet, it was only in December 2021 that the IO decided to construct a substitute tank and empty the Fresh Water Tank, with drainage completed in March 2022. The Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank was allegedly discovered by Glory Sky only in January 2023.

(4) The IO contends that it had no knowledge of the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank until January 2023, and that its actions thereafter were prompt and responsive. I accept that the IO’s conduct after January 2023 was more proactive and reasonable. However, in my judgment, had the IO acted promptly and adequately from 2015 onwards, the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank would have been discovered much earlier. It does not lie well in the IO’s mouth to argue that it was unaware of its existence until a later stage.

134.  I therefore find that the IO’s actions were far from reasonable or appropriate. Accordingly, the IO was in breach of its duties under section 18(1) of the BMO. The IO was also in breach of its common law duty not to create or cause nuisance.

F3. Issue 3 – What is the appropriate amount of damages

135.  According to the Statement of Claim, as clarified in Mr So’s opening submissions, the Plaintiff claims the following heads of damages:

(1) General damages for trespass, deprivation of quiet enjoyment, nuisance, annoyance, inconvenience and mental distress;

(2) Costs of reinstatement of the Premises;

(3) Costs of engaging the Plaintiff’s Expert to carry out investigation; and

(4) Loss of rental income.

F3.1 General damages

136.  I have considered the authorities cited by Mr So, including John So & Anor v Lau Hon Man & Ors [1993] 2 HKC 356, Wong Hon Hung & Anor v Jolly Birds Ltd (unreported, DCCJ 5341/2006, 24/06/2008), Cosmos Legal Consultant Ltd v Skycherry Development Ltd (unreported, DCCJ 2548/2009, 14/05/2013), Choi Man Wing & Anor v Wong Tang Hoi Alice (unreported, DCCJ 4825/2016, 31/07/2018), Wu Tung Chai & Anor v Chan Kwong Ming & Anor [2023] HKDC 198, Top Victory (Asia) Ltd v Kong Shui Sun & Anor [2023] HKDC 1697, Wu Hucheng v Tian Jiong & Anor [2024] HKDC 1902, Fong Yuen Tung Nicole v Pong Yuen Kong [2024] HKCFI 1061.

137.  Mr Lee did not cite any authorities in reply.

138.  A special feature of this case is that the water seepage persisted for many years, from 2015 onwards, and, as observed in multiple expert reports as well as by the SJE, the Premises suffered significant damage. Taking all circumstances into account, I assess an appropriate award of general damages at $90,000.

F3.2 Costs of reinstatement of the Premises

139.  The SJE assessed the costs of reinstatement at $387,500. He further assessed the reasonable costs for carrying out structural concrete repairs necessary to remove potential hazards on the concrete ceiling and to ensure structural safety inside the Premises at $29,800.

140.  I find both assessments reasonable and justified. I therefore assess the total costs of reinstatement at $417,300.

F3.3 Costs of engaging the Plaintiff’s Expert to carry out investigation

141.  There is no evidence that the Plaintiff actually incurred any costs in engaging his expert. I therefore disallow this head of claim.

F3.4 Loss of rental income

142.  The Plaintiff claims that he intended to rent out the Premises but for the water seepage condition. In Mr So’s opening, the Plaintiff sought loss of rental income from 12 June 2015 to the date of trial at an annual rent of $334,125.

143.  The Plaintiff testified that he used the Premises as his office, a place to read and write, to repair antiques, and to store personal belongings.

144.  He stated that he began planning his retirement in 2012, when he was 63 years old. His plan was to complete his work by 2020, and he fully retired in 2022. Upon retirement, he considered that he no longer required the Premises for personal use and intended to rent it out to generate additional income to support his living expenses. I accept his evidence.

145.  Given the deteriorated state of the Premises caused by the water seepage, I find that it could not have been rented out until the necessary repairs are completed.

146.  I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Plaintiff intended to rent out the Premises after his retirement, but not earlier. As no exact retirement date was provided, I adopt 1 January 2023 as the date from which he would have rented out the Premises but for the water seepage.

147.  Mr Lee submitted that only a portion of the Premises could have been rented out because part of it was still used for storage. This argument was not pursued in the pleadings, in witness statements, nor in cross-examination. It is possible that such items could have been moved to the Plaintiff’s other properties, but there is no evidence either way, as the matter was not put to the Plaintiff. In my view, it is unfair for the IO to advance such submissions for the first time in closing, when the Plaintiff had no opportunity to address them.

148.  Mr Lee further submitted that the IO cannot be liable for loss of rental income because it did not know, nor could reasonably foresee, that the Plaintiff intended to rent out the Premises. I reject this submission. There is nothing unforeseeable about an owner renting out an industrial premises.

149.  I therefore allow the claim for loss of rental income from 1 January 2023 to the date of judgment, a period of 24.22 months. Credit must be given for actual rental income received by the Plaintiff from 1 April 2025 to the date of judgment at $2,000 per month, totalling $18,440. The Plaintiff does not seek any post-trial loss of rental income.

150.  As for the assessment of market rent, there is no expert evidence before the Court. The only available evidence is the rateable value assessed by the Rating and Valuation Department.

151.  Mr Lee submitted that the rateable value is unreliable and should not be used as the basis for assessing rental loss.

152.  With respect, I do not accept that submission. Expert evidence is not the only basis upon which market rent may be assessed. The rateable value also provides a useful reference of the market rental of a property: see 皇河實業有限公司 v Wan Chiu Yuen and Anor (unreported, DCCJ 4448/2011, 20/04/2015) at §204.

153.  The Plaintiff has made it clear in pleadings and witness statements about his intention to rely on the rateable value of the Premises. The relevant documents were also disclosed. However, the Defendant chose not to adduce any evidence, expert or factual, to challenge that the rateable value was different from the market value, or to offer an alternative basis of assessment. In these circumstances, I am entitled to consider the rateable value to make my assessment: see 嚴近 訴 曾俊運 (unreported, CACV 461/2000, 30/01/2001) at §§9-11.

154.  Taking the relevant factors into account, I assess the average monthly rental value of the Premises for the period from 1 January 2023 to the date of judgment at $28,000.

155.  I therefore assess the loss of rental income as follows:

($28,000 x 24.22 months) – $18,440 = $659,720

F3.5 Summary of damages

156.  I assess the total damages as follows:

	HK$
General damages	90,000
Costs of reinstatement	417,300
Loss of rental income	659,720
	________
TOTAL	1,167,020

F4. Issue 4 – Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief

157.  The Plaintiff seeks both a mandatory injunction requiring the IO to carry out repairs, and a prohibitory injunction restraining the IO from causing further nuisance.

158.  The water seepage has persisted for a very substantial period since 2015. The IO’s responses throughout have been slow, inadequate and reactive. This action itself only prompted the IO to take marginal steps. It was ultimately the SJE report that spurred the IO into adopting a more proactive stance. The IO’s overall conduct gives me little confidence that it will take sufficient and timely action unless compelled by an order of the Court.

159.  The SJE identified two sources of the water seepage: the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank, and defective waterproofing on the Roof.

160.  As discussed above, Adrian testified that although there was a supposed “consensus” among IO members that the Fresh Water Tank (now also including the Illegal Small Fresh Water Tank as the partition wall was demolished) would no longer be used, no resolution to that effect had ever been passed. In other words, even assuming there were such a “consensus”, the IO cannot be said to have ruled out the possibility of using the Fresh Water Tank in the future. No undertaking has been given by the IO not to do so.

161.  Although waterproofing works were carried out to the Fresh Water Tank in March 2024, there is no evidence before this Court that such works have stopped the water seepage.

162.  No evidence has been presented that any repair works have been carried out to the Roof, nor whether any such works, if done, have been effective in stopping the seepage.

163.  In these circumstances, I consider it just and necessary to grant a mandatory injunction requiring the IO, at its own costs, to carry out all necessary rectification, repair and/or remedial works to stop or prevent water seepage from the Fresh Water Tank and the Roof into the Premises within 70 days from the date of this judgment.

164.  In making this order, I have considered Mr Lee’s submissions that the Plaintiff did not come to Court with clean hands. Having reviewed the parties’ correspondence, I do not accept that the Plaintiff refused to cooperate with inspections or repairs.

165.  On the contrary, it was the Plaintiff through his solicitors, Messrs Mike So, Joseph Lau & Co (“M&J”) who promptly proposed on 9 January 2025 that the SJE conduct an inspection and test, barely a week after receiving Adrian’s supplemental witness statement dated 2 January 2025 alleging that the IO had engaged contractors to resolve residual seepage issues. Yet, the IO’s solicitors, Messrs Lau & Chan (“L&C”), only issued a holding reply on 22 January 2025 and provided no substantive response.

166.  On 17 March 2025, more than two months after the Plaintiff’s proposal, L&C informed M&J that the IO had “recently engaged another contractor to inspect and repair” the Roof. This suggests that no proper repair had been undertaken previously.

167.  On 18 March 2025, M&J promptly, and reasonably in my view, requested that repair works be carried out before the SJE conducted any testing.

168.  Thereafter, the solicitors exchanged correspondence regarding the IO’s request that the Plaintiff remove the solar panels and concrete blocks from the Roof before repairs commenced. The IO asserted that repairs could not begin without such removal. The Plaintiff disagreed and sought further explanation. He also pointed out that storing the solar panels and concrete blocks would require considerable space, and their removal, storage, and reinstallation would incur significant costs.

169.  Ultimately, on 25 April 2025, L&C confirmed that the IO would proceed with the repair works notwithstanding the presence of the solar panels and concrete blocks, though it claimed this would substantially increase the difficulty, duration, and cost of the works.

170.  I find nothing unreasonable in the Plaintiff’s conduct. On the contrary, I find the IO’s conduct unhelpful. The IO waited more than two months to respond to the Plaintiff’s proposal to engage the SJE; it failed to commence timely repair works to the Roof; and it unnecessarily pressed for the removal of the solar panels and concrete blocks. Had repairs been undertaken promptly, the SJE would likely have had sufficient time to conduct testing before trial.

171.  I therefore reject Mr Lee’s arguments that the Plaintiff came to the Court with unclean hands.

172.  As for the prohibitory injunction sought, I do not consider it necessary or appropriate in the circumstances, and I therefore refuse to grant such relief.

G. DISPOSITION

173.  I enter judgment for the Plaintiff against the IO in the sum of HK$1,167,020.

174.  I order the IO to pay interest:

(1) on the general damages, at 2% per annum from the date of the service of the Writ of Summons to the date of this judgment; and

(2) on the loss of rental income, at half of 1% above the HSBC Best Lending Rate per annum from 1 January 2023 to the date of this judgment.

175.  I further grant a mandatory injunction against the IO in the terms set out in paragraph 163 of this judgment. In this regard, the parties have liberty to apply.

176.  Costs should follow the event. I make an order nisi that the IO do pay the Plaintiff’s costs of this action, including any costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for one counsel.

177.  I thank all counsel for their assistance.