RE DHILLON SUKHWANT SINGH

CACV 359/2018

[2019] HKCA 630

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 359 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 676/2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 18 January 2019, this court (Yeung VP, Barma and McWalters JJA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the judge”) on 27 July 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decisions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion dated 8 February 2019, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant stated in the Notice of Motion that:

“There is some error in law in my decision. Decision maker just relied on COI information and my previous facts which were favor on reject my claim. Actual life occur different situation then mentioned COI information. Officer and courts prefers to ignore the overwhelming of the evidence of the violence towards minorities searching for unrealistic silver lining. The decision is betray a bias and formula approached unlikely access the danger of my life and clearly calculate to rejected my claims”

4.  The applicant lodged a written submission in support of the application on 26 February 2019 four days after the date by which he was directed to do so.  As the delay was relatively short we shall have regard to it notwithstanding it being lodged late.  In it, he identified a number of errors allegedly committed by the Director of Immigration and the Board.  He also submitted that it is unsafe for him to return.

5.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the Notice of Motion and written submission.

6.  The matters stated by the applicant in the Notice of Motion and written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in the Notice of Motion and written submission.  

7.  The applicant only identified the alleged errors by the Director and the Board.  As we have stated in [12] and [13] of our judgment, these are not viable grounds of appeal. 

8.  The applicant submitted that the courts ignored the overwhelming evidence without giving any particulars for this ground.  Also, the ground based on the alleged danger upon his return is not a proper ground of appeal at all.  In our view, these grounds are plainly not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

9.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 8 February 2019 is dismissed.