LUAN GANG v. SIMPSON MARINE LTD

HCA 107/2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
ACTON NO 107 OF 2011
________________
BETWEEN
LUAN GANG
Plaintiff
and
SIMPSON MARINE LIMITED
Defendant
________________
(By Original Action)
AND BETWEEN
SIMPSON MARINE LIMITED
Plaintiff
and
LUAN GANG
1st Defendant
OFFTECH INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
2nd Defendant
________________
(By Counterclaim)
AND
HCAJ 171/2011
ADMIRALTY ACTON NO 171 OF 2011
________________
BETWEEN
SIMPSON MARINE LIMITED
Plaintiff
and
THE OWNERS OF THE SHIP OR VESSEL M/V “MAGGIE”
Defendants
(an “AZIMUT 43 PLUS” HULL NO. 568 HIN:IT‑AZI 43568E010 CERTIFICATE OF OWNERSHIP NO. 139475 ENGINE NO. 46953382 / 46951949)
________________
(Consolidated by Order of Reyes J on 1 June 2012)
Before: Hon Ng J in Court
Dates of Hearing:18 – 20 August and 9 October 2015
Date of Judgment: 20 May 2016
________________________
J U D G M E N T
________________________
Introduction
1.
This is a dispute concerning the sale by Simpson Marine Limited (“
Simpson Marine
”) to Mr Luan Gang (“
Luan
”) of a brand‑new pleasure craft “MAGGIE” (“
Yacht
”), an Italian‑built “Azimut 43 Plus" and the supply and installation by Simpson Marine of certain extra items, mainly cable and satellite TV system, on the Yacht (“
extras
”).
2.
The contract between Simpson Marine and Luan was evidenced by and/or contained in a written “ORDER CONTRACT” no. SML (HK) 086‑10 dated 21 December 2009 (“
Principal Agreement”
) between Mr Luan as buyer and Simpson Marine as seller at the total price of €664,104 (“
Price”
).
3.
Appendix 1 to the Principal Agreement (“
Appendix 1
”) contained a list of optional items.  One of the optional items which featured prominently in this case was the joystick control for engines and thrusters.  Appendix 1 provided for the installation of two joysticks, one at the main helm, the other at the flybridge, at the cost of HK$11,500.
4.
The Price of €664,104 was expressly stated to include not just the Yacht and the optional items, but also the following:
(1)  Delivery to Savonna, commissioning, sea trials.
(2)  Shipping documents & custom clearance from Europe.
(3)  Sea delivery to La Spezia.
(4)  Shipping Cradle.
(5)  Shipping Insurance.
(6)  Ocean freight to Hong Kong.
(7)  Offloading and commissioning.
5.
In addition, after the Yacht had arrived in Hong Kong in July 2010, Luan requested and Simpson Marine agreed to supply and install the extras (“
Supplemental Agreement
”
) for an additional price of HK$182,431.  The description of the extras and their prices were set out in a Simpson Marine invoice dated 12 August 2010 (“
Invoice
”) issued to Luan.
6.
It was an express term of the Principal Agreement that:
“Delivery date (best estimate only — actual delivery depends upon ship availability): May 2010 ex factory Italy.”
7.
The Yacht was ready for delivery ex factory in Italy in May 2010, as evidenced by a report after inspection of the Yacht at the port of Genoa on 25 and 26 May 2010.
8.
Other express terms of the Principal Agreement, including the so‑called “Second Special Term”, relied upon by Luan will be referred to below.  Suffice it to say that while Clause 2 of the “Second Special Term” gave Luan an option to inspect the Yacht by his own inspector before shipment from Italy, the option had not been exercised by him.  There was no complaint by Luan about events in Italy.
9.
The Yacht arrived at a container terminal in Hong Kong on about 3 July 2010 and was sent to Simpson Marine’s facilities at Aberdeen for commissioning.  Shortly afterwards, the Yacht was registered, as instructed by Luan, in the name of Offtech International Ltd (“
OIL
”).  There was, however, no suggestion by Luan of a novation of the Principal Agreement or an assignment of his contractual right to OIL.
10.
As evidenced by the payment of the deposit of HK$120,000 (“
deposit
”) on 19 July 2010, Luan requested and Simpson Marine agreed to supply and install the extras under the Supplemental Agreement around that day.  Performance of the Supplemental Agreement, as far as Simpson Marine was concerned, was completed by 12 August 2010, as evidenced by the Invoice dated 12 August 2010.  There was no complaint by Luan about work done under the Supplemental Agreement as such.
11.
It is common ground that (1) the Price was paid by Luan in full after signing the Principal Agreement, and (2) after deducting the deposit, HK$62,431 remains outstanding under the Supplemental Agreement.
12.
It is also common ground that despite Simpson Marine’s requests, Luan did not accept delivery of the Yacht.
13.
By letter dated 23 August 2010, Luan’s solicitors wrote to Simpson Marine rejecting the Yacht and seeking a refund of the Price.  For reasons which will become apparent later in this judgment, the ground of rejection given in the letter is telling.  The only ground given by Luan’s solicitors was that it was a term of the Principal Agreement that the Yacht should be installed with the joysticks.  The letter alleged that upon inspection (without specifying when), the joysticks had not been installed.  This amounted to breaches of various implied conditions of contract viz correspondence with description, merchantable quality and fitness for purpose, as well as misrepresentations by Simpson Marine.  There was no mention of delayed delivery at all.
14.
The allegations of Luan’s solicitors were denied by Simpson Marine’s solicitors in a written reply dated 6 September 2010.  They said that the joysticks had in fact been installed in the Yacht and the Yacht had been ready for collection since 18 August 2010.  They demanded Luan to collect the Yacht and pay the outstanding balance of HK$62,431 under the Supplemental Agreement and threatened legal proceedings.
15.
A few correspondence was exchanged between the parties’ solicitors, principally regarding the arrangement of an inspection of the Yacht and sea trial by Luan’s surveyor which was scheduled to take place on 17 September 2010.
16.
By letter dated 27 October 2010, Luan’s solicitors wrote to Simpson Marine’s solicitors complaining
inter alia
about malfunctioning of the joystick control during the inspection and sea trial conducted by Luan’s surveyor on 17 September 2010.  They alleged that the malfunctioning constituted misrepresentations and breaches of implied conditions of contract and claimed to rescind and/or repudiate the Principal Agreement.  They also rejected the Yacht and asked for a refund of the Price. It was in this letter that Luan’s solicitors first referred to the date of 12 July 2010 as the agreed delivery date and complained of delayed delivery.
17.
As a result of the impasse between the two, Simpson Marine was left with the Yacht and incurred costs in berthing and maintaining it.  Luan on the other hand left Hong Kong in November 2010 for reasons unrelated to the present dispute, at least on the face of it.  At the time of the trial, Luan was in custody.
18.
On 19 January 2011, Luan issued the writ of summons in HCA 107/2011 against Simpson Marine.  Simpson Marine counterclaimed against Luan and OIL in HCA 107/2011 seeking a declaration that Luan had repudiated the Principal Agreement and recovery of the balance due under the Supplemental Agreement and its costs of berthing and maintaining the Yacht as damages.
19.
Subsequently on 12 December 2011, Simpson Marine issued the
in rem
Action HCAJ 171/2011.  On 3 February 2012, Simpson Marine obtained from Reyes J an order for the appraisement and sale of the Yacht pendente lite.  On 3 April 2012, the Yacht was sold by the Bailiff and the sale proceeds paid into court.
The parties’ case
20.
As pleaded in the amended Consolidated Statement of Claim, Luan claims against Simpson Marine for misrepresentations, rescission of the Principal Agreement, refund of the Price and the deposit, damages for breaches of contract and reimbursement of inspection fees of HK$16,000.  The pleaded bases of Luan’s claims are highly convoluted and would have involved an investigation into
inter alia
whether certain terms should be implied into the Principal Agreement, whether and when the joystick control was installed, whether and when the joystick began to function satisfactorily and whether certain pre‑contractual representations made by Simpson Marine regarding the joystick control were false and entitled Luan to rescind the Principal Agreement and obtain a total refund of the Price.
21.
In his Supplemental Opening Submissions, Mr Cheung confirmed to this court that, after taking further instructions, Luan would only pursue the following relief against Simpson Marine:
(1)  damages for late delivery of the Yacht from 12 July 2010 to 17 November 2010 (a total of 128 days) at the rate of 0.5% of the Price per day ie a total sum of €425,025 pursuant to the “Second Special Term” of the Principal Agreement; and
(2)  inspection fees of HK$16,000.
22.
As Mr Alder put it in his Closing Submissions, the near total collapse of Luan’s pleaded case and the withdrawal of his main claims on the eve of the trial speak volume as to his credibility.  There is considerable force in the submission.
23.
The “Second Special Term” of the Principal Agreement was handwritten in the Principal Agreement as follows:
(1)  “卖方需出具第三方驗船合格報告” / “seller have to issue inspection certificate”.  (“
Clause 1
”)
(2)  “买方可选择委派驗船师前往意大利船厂验船” / “buyer can assign inspector to check boat before shipping”.  (“
Clause 2
”)
(3)  “2010年7月12日在香港到貨，晚到貨 0.5% 每天罰款.  (香港仔深湾游艇会)” / “boat deliver
(sic)
to HK before 12
th
July 2010.  如迟0.5% penalty per day.  Force majore
(sic),
weather, shipping company cancelled or client delays payment”.  (“
Clause 3
”)
24.
Mr Cheung first submits that upon the true construction of Clause 1, delivery could only take place
[1]
upon the issuance of the requisite certificate by a third party after inspecting the Yacht in Hong Kong.  On the evidence, Marine Surveys and Engineering Services Ltd (“
MSES
”), on behalf of Simpson Marine, only issued a surveyor’s report on 17 November 2010 after inspecting the Yacht in Hong Kong.  Hence, the Yacht should only be deemed to have been ready for delivery to Luan on 17 November 2010.  The period of late delivery was thus from 12 July to 17 November 2010.
25.
Second, Mr Cheung submits, on the true construction of Clause 3, the Yacht must be ready in all respects for delivery to Luan in Hong Kong on or before 12 July 2010.  He submits the rationale of Clause 3 is that Luan had named the Yacht “Maggie” after his fiancée as it was meant to be a wedding gift to her at their wedding ceremony, scheduled to take place in August 2010.  The rather exact delivery date of 12 July 2010 and the penalty of 0.5% per day showed that time was of the essence — Luan was very eager to take delivery of the Yacht sometime in July 2010.
26.
As outlined by Mr Alder in his Closing Submissions, Simpson Marine’s answers to the two submissions are as follows.
27.
First, Luan’s construction of Clause 1 is misconceived.  The ordinary and natural reading of the three clauses is that they were arranged in chronological sequence.  Read in this sequence, Simpson Marine’s obligation under Clause 1 to procure an inspection certificate means
pre‑shipment
inspection in Italy and the issuance of a certificate by a third party afterwards.  Clause 2 also refers to
pre‑shipment
inspection, which gives Luan an option of arranging his own inspector to carry out the inspection.  Lastly, Clause 3 specifies the delivery date of the Yacht in Hong Kong.  On the facts, the certificate under Clause 1 was issued after inspection had taken place in Genoa on 25 and 26 May 2010 by STB Italia SRL.
28.
Second, Luan’s construction of Clause 3 is also misconceived. The date 12 July 2010 is only the date specified for the arrival of the Yacht in Hong Kong at Simpson Marine facilities in Aberdeen, not the date for the delivery of the Yacht to Luan.
29.
Once the Yacht had arrived in Hong Kong, it had to be moved to Aberdeen for “commissioning”.  Commissioning involves things like unpacking and fitting loose items, cleaning, fuelling, charging, testing fitted equipment and optional extras, holding initial customer and joint inspections, internal sea trial, checking for seaworthiness, remedying cosmetic and other defects and ‘snags’ such as loose fittings, ordering missing parts, registering etc.  As there was no express time for commissioning in the Principal Agreement, it would only have to be completed within a reasonable time.
30.
Further, on 19 July 2010, Luan ordered the extras to be supplied and fitted onto the Yacht under the Supplemental Agreement.  This necessarily pushed back the time required for commissioning and delivery of the Yacht to him.
31.
On Simpson Marine’s case, the commissioning and the installation of the extras were completed sometime around 12 August 2010.  The sea trial and the handover meeting took place successfully on 18 August 2010 and the Yacht was contractually compliant, seaworthy and in a state fit for delivery.  There was thus no delay on the part of Simpson Marine.
Main Issues
32.
In light of the above, the principal issues in this case are:
(1)  the proper interpretation of Clauses 1 and 3, in light of the relevant factual matrix;  (“
1
st
Issue
”)
(2)  what was the agreed time of delivery under the Principal Agreement;  (“
2
nd
Issue
”)
(3)  whether Simpson Marine delivered the Yacht to Luan on 18 August 2010, as claimed by Simpson Marine, or only on 17 November 2010, as claimed by Luan;  (“
3
rd
Issue
”)
(4)  whether there was late delivery, and hence breach of the Principal Agreement, on the part of Simpson Marine;  (“
4
th
Issue
”)
(5)  if there was late delivery, the quantum of Luan’s loss and damage;  (“
5
th
Issue
”)
(6)  if there was no late delivery, the quantum of Simpson Marine’s loss and damage as a result of Luan’s failure to accept the Yacht.  (“
6
th
Issue
”)
The factual and expert witnesses — general observations
33.
On the facts, Luan testified for himself and OIL at trial.  Further, a Ms Xiao Han (“
Xiao
”) also testified for him and OIL.  Simpson Marine, on the other hand, called only one factual witness ie Mark Woodmansey (“
Mark
”).
[2]
34.
I have carefully considered the testimony, as well as the demeanour, of all three witnesses, and assessed it against the documentary evidence and the known and undisputed surrounding circumstances of this case. I have in particular considered the inherent probabilities or otherwise of the parties’ respective contentions, and assessed the witnesses’ credibility accordingly.
35.
This court has considerable reservation about Luan’s testimony. He is a recalcitrant witness who is unwilling to acknowledge even the perfectly obvious fact, as long as it seems to him to be against his case.  I will give one or two examples of his answers in cross‑examination.
36.
First, he refused to accept that the Yacht had to go through the process of commissioning after it had arrived in Hong Kong.  This is so notwithstanding the fact that the Principal Agreement expressly provided for “commissioning” and his own Counsel’s express recognition, in his Supplemental Opening Submissions, of the need for “necessary commissioning”.  Second, Luan denied it would take time for Simpson Marine to supply and install the extras under the Supplemental Agreement and that would inevitably push back the date when the Yacht was ready for delivery to him.
37.
Luan was admittedly a first-time buyer of a yacht and, was according to Xiao “very inexperienced”.  It is difficult to see how he could honestly and justifiably insist that no commissioning to the Yacht was necessary.  No explanation was provided by him in cross‑examination — he simply said he was not told about it when he signed the Principal Agreement.  His insistence is all the more untenable given the express term of the Principal Agreement which provided for commissioning and for which Simpson Marine charged €5,950.  Similar observation can be made of his denial that extra time would be required to get the Yacht ready for delivery, by reason of the supply and installation of the extras under the Supplemental Agreement.  As Luan was a first time buyer, it is reasonable to conclude that he also had no prior experience of or knowledge as to how long it might take for that kind of work. Common sense dictates that it would push back the time for handover of the Yacht to him.
38.
As for Xiao, her testimony is of marginal relevance to the resolution of the present dispute.  This is partly because her principal, if not only, role in the case was to accompany Luan to the yacht exhibition in Marina Cove, Sai Kung, in December 2009 where they met Simpson Marine’s representatives viz Mark and Angel Zhou.  She was also present at Simpson Marine’s office when the Principal Agreement was entered into.  Further, while testifying in court, Xiao showed very little memory of the events at which she was present.  This is entirely understandable since she did not know Luan well. While working in a yacht club, Xiao had only met Luan previously in a yacht exhibition in Shenzhen, PRC — she had no interest whatsoever in the dispute between Luan and Simpson Marine.  She had since moved on from the job at the yacht club to a totally different field in about 2011.
39.
On the part of Simpson Marine, this court finds Mark a truthful witness.  He gave his evidence clearly and calmly and his response to questions was mostly direct.  His credibility had withstood the test of cross‑examination. Importantly, his testimony is corroborated by contemporaneous documents, as shall be explained below.
40.
Concerning expert evidence, Luan and OIL called Mr Raymond Yeung who prepared the Delta Report.  Simpson Marine called Mr Richard Lamble who signed off the MSES report.  There was no dispute as to their expertise.
41.
Both experts confirmed in court the contents of their respective reports.  Their testimony was largely, though not completely, unchallenged.  This court finds both experts to be truthful on the whole.  For reasons which will become apparent, this court need only refer to and/or rely on their testimony with regard to one or two issues in this case.
1
st
Issue
42.
On the proper construction of Clause 1, having considered the parties’ respective submissions, which have already been outlined above, this court accepts Mr Alder’s submission that under it, Simpson Marine’s obligation was to procure a third party inspection certificate prior to shipment of the Yacht from Italy, and not after it had arrived in Hong Kong.
43.
First, as Mr Alder submits, it is more natural to read Clauses 1, 2 and 3 as referring to events which were intended to take place one after another chronologically.
44.
Second, there is no reference in the entire Second Special Term to inspection of the Yacht in Hong Kong as such.  On the other hand, Clause 2 expressly refers to Luan’s option to arrange his own inspector to carry out an inspection in Italy.  It can therefore confidently be concluded that the parties did contemplate a
pre
‑shipment inspection in Italy.  The same cannot be said of a
post
‑shipment inspection in Hong Kong.  This makes perfect sense since if any problem should be found with the Yacht, it would be much better for it to be found sooner rather than later, closer to the Yacht’s factory in Italy, rather than thousands of kilometres away from it in Hong Kong.  Hence, if Clause 1 were to impose an obligation on Simpson Marine to procure an inspection certificate, it is entirely logical that the inspection was to take place in Italy.
45.
On the evidence, Simpson Marine did procure such a certificate after inspection had taken place in Genoa on 25 and 26 May 2010 by STB Italia SRL.  There is no other credible explanation for the existence of such a certificate, save and except that it was procured by Simpson Marine pursuant to its obligation under Clause 1.  Luan had not provided an alternative explanation for it.
46.
Third, Luan’s argument that Simpson Marine had procured the MSES report dated 17 November 2010 in performance of Clause 1 is disingenuous.  On the evidence, Luan purported to reject the Yacht and threatened legal action as early as 23 August 2010.  His solicitors commissioned a survey by Delta on 17 and 20 September 2010.  According to a letter dated 22 October 2010 from Simpson Marine’s solicitors, Luan attended the Yacht on 16 and 17 September 2010 together with his solicitors and surveyor.  By letter dated 27 October 2010, Luan’s solicitors referred to Delta’s survey result that the Yacht failed the Side shift trial and the Diagonal trial and purported to reject the Yacht on that ground.  It is therefore clear and obvious that by the time of the inspection by Mr Lamble of MSES on 11 and 12 November 2010 leading to the MSES report, the parties were at loggerheads and were contemplating legal proceedings.
47.
In these circumstances, this court has no difficulty rejecting Luan’s argument and finds as a fact that the MSES report was not procured by Simpson Marine pursuant to Clause 1 — instead, it was procured because and only because a dispute had broken out between Simpson Marine and Luan.
48.
As for the proper construction of Clause 3, this court also accepts Mr Alder’s submission that 12 July 2010 is only the date specified for the arrival of the Yacht in Hong Kong, rather than the date of delivery of the Yacht to Luan.
49.
First, Clause 3 uses the words “boat deliver to
HK
before 12 July 2010”.  In this court’s view, the ordinary and natural meaning of these words must be as what Mr Alder submitted.  If the parties had intended 12 July 2010 to be the date of delivery to Luan, Clause 3 would instead have read “boat deliver to
Mr Luan
before 12 July 2010”.
50.
Second, the Principal Agreement already contained an express term as to delivery date ie “Delivery date (best estimate only — actual delivery depends upon ship availability)”: May 2010 ex factory Italy.” While it is permissible to give greater effect to written clauses than printed ones:
Chitty on Contracts
32
nd
Ed Vol 1, para 13‑072 should there be reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the contract as a whole, it does not appear to this court that there is any reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the Principal Agreement as a whole.  The express term as to delivery date means what it says: best estimate date of delivery would be May 2010 in Italy.  On the other hand, Clause 3 specified the date by which the Yacht should be physically in Hong Kong.  There is no inconsistency between the two.  Nor is there any ambiguity when the two are read together.  Again, as this court emphasizes above, the parties they could have specified, whether in Clause 3 or in the next clause, a date of delivery to Luan after the Yacht had arrived in Hong Kong, had that been their intention.  But they had not.  Luan’s unilateral intention that the Yacht should be ready for delivery to him in Hong Kong does not mean that Simpson Marine shared that intention or agreed to it as part of the contract.
2
nd
, 3
rd
and 4
th
Issues
51.
These three issues can conveniently be dealt with together.
52.
It is well established that a seller’s duty is to deliver the goods to the buyer and the buyer’s duty is to accept the goods in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale: section 29 of the Sale of Goods Ordinance (“
SOGO
”).
53.
With respect to the seller’s duty to deliver the goods, it is normally sufficient for the seller to place the goods specified by the contract at the disposition of the buyer in a deliverable state without any reciprocal act on the part of the buyer — the performance of the seller’s duty to deliver does not mean that delivery has in fact taken place if the buyer has not in fact taken possession of the goods:
Benjamin’s Sale of Goods
(9
th
Ed) paras 8‑001 – 8‑002.
54.
Under section 31(2) of the SOGO, where under the contract of sale, the seller is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but no time for sending them is fixed, the seller is bound to send them within a reasonable time.
55.
In the present case, while the printed term of the Principal Agreement appears to suggest that delivery should be ex factory in Italy, it is not disputed that Simpson Marine was bound to send the Yacht to Luan in Hong Kong.  Indeed, it is Simpson Marine’s case that it had to carry out certain commissioning work after the Yacht had arrived in Hong Kong to make it deliverable to Luan.  The commissioning work was outlined in Mark’s supplemental witness statement at paragraph 17(7) (“
Mark 2
”).  This court sees no reason to doubt his evidence in this respect.
56.
The question is: was a time (or rather, date) fixed for sending the Yacht to Luan in the Principal Agreement?
57.
As this court has ruled earlier on the 1
st
Issue, the time (or rather date) put forward by Luan was 12 July 2010, pursuant to Clause 3.  This court has already ruled against Luan on this.  No other date has been put forward by the parties.  This court can find none after considering the terms of the Principal Agreement.  In these circumstances, this court rules that, as a matter of construction, the Principal Agreement has not fixed any time for Simpson Marine to send the Yacht to Luan.  In accordance with section 31(2) of the SOGO, Simpson Marine was only bound to do so within a reasonable time, after 3 July 2010, alternatively after 12 July 2010.
58.
The next question is: as a matter of fact, when was the Yacht “placed at the disposition of the buyer in a deliverable state”?  In this regard, Mark’s evidence, as stated in Mark 2, can be summarised as follows.
59.
It is accepted by Simpson Marine that one of Luan’s requirements for the Yacht under the Principal Agreement was that it could revolve 360 degree and move laterally and diagonally.  For this purpose, Appendix 1 provided for the installation of the so‑called Xenta Systems “Vessel Manoeuvring Assistant” (“
VMA
”) consisting of a “black box” with circuitry and one or more joysticks.  A VMA is a set of controls in the shape of joysticks for the engines and thrusters of a yacht which overlay the main control for the two.  The VMA is not a necessity or requirement for safe navigation.  Nor is it a necessity in order for the Yacht to revolve 360 degree or move laterally and diagonally, which could be done by a competent skipper with or without the VMA.  It is simply a luxury item.
60.
When the Yacht first arrived in Hong Kong on 3 July 2010, it came with two “old” model joysticks, one already fitted on the flybridge control panel, the other one in a cardboard box ready for fitting at the main helm control panel.  On 14 July 2010, two “new” model joysticks arrived in Hong Kong and Simpson Marine was prepared to install the “new” model joysticks in the Yacht as part of “commissioning”, at no extra costs to Luan.  That was done by 12 August 2010.
61.
At the material time, Mark was very used to operating the VMA.  In fact, he was a professional delivery skipper and one of his jobs at Simpson Marine was to demonstrate the operation of the yachts to clients.  From Simpson Marine’s records, the VMA, including the two joysticks, had been installed and working properly by 12 August 2010.  He personally took Luan out on the Yacht at the sea trial/ handover meeting on 18 August 2010 and demonstrated the use of the VMA to Luan.  The VMA worked fine.
62.
As to what happened in August 2010, Luan simply said this at paragraphs 26 and 27 of his first witness statement:
“26. On 2
nd
August 2010, I engaged a surveyor to inspect the Yacht. The surveyor’s fees in the sum of HK$12,000.00 were paid by me. The delivery date was postponed to 12
th
August 2010 as SML could not deliver the Yacht and I refused to accept the Yacht.
27.  On 12
th
August 2010, I engaged a surveyor to inspect the Yacht.  The surveyor’s fees in the sum of HK$4,000.00 were paid by me.  SML could not deliver the Yacht and I refused to accept the Yacht.”
63.
There was no mention of what happened at the sea trial/ handover meeting on 18 August 2010 in Luan’s first or supplemental witness statement.  To be fair to him, Luan did accept in cross‑examination that there was a sea trial with Mark on that day.  However, the most Luan did say in his first witness statement was that the joystick had not been installed at the helm on 28 July 2010:
“25. Another inspection was conducted by me on 28
th
July 2010. The Defects [ie only the flybridge, but not the helm, was installed with the joystick] and the problem with the air‑conditioning system remained …”
64.
This court has no difficulty accepting Mark’s evidence.
65.
Not only does this court find Mark a credible and truthful witness and prefer his evidence to that of Luan, Mark’s evidence is corroborated by contemporaneous documents whereas Luan’s is not.  In this regard, an internal email message from Simpson Marine’s service department to Mark (and Angel Zhou) dated 9 August 2010 pointed out that certain missing parts for the joystick arrived in Hong Kong in the late afternoon of that day and that a staff of the department “will do it tomorrow”, which this court takes to mean the remaining installation work would be done the next day. In another internal email message from a technical personnel of Simpson Marine to Angel Zhou dated 25 August 2010, it was stated that the air‑con and joysticks issues had been resolved.  What was left was a new insert for the flybridge hatch, which had been removed for air‑con modification.
66.
Luan’s case, on the other hand, is full of gaps.
67.
His lawyers alleged in their 23 August 2010 letter that upon inspection, Luan noticed that the joystick had not been installed.  It did not specify which inspection (as Luan made a number of inspections in July and August 2010) or whether only one or both joysticks had not been installed. Further, in his first statement, Luan referred to two inspections on 2 and 12 August 2010 by his surveyor but did not explain, even in the briefest term, what had been observed during the inspections or what had been found to be defective or missing from the Yacht, whether the joysticks or otherwise, if any.  By the time of the sea trial survey conducted by Luan’s expert Mr Raymond Yeung on 17 September 2010, as evidenced by the survey report of Delta Marine Services Limited (“
Delta
”), there was no dispute that both joysticks had been installed on the Yacht.  The then complaint was that the joysticks did not function satisfactorily in all respects: it was alleged that the Side shift trial and the Diagonal trial failed, albeit it was accepted by the expert that the Rotation trial, the Rotoshift trial and the Approach trial were satisfactory.
68.
Unsurprisingly, Simpson Marine disputes Delta’s findings.  For one, nothing untoward about the VMA was identified by Mr Lamble in the MSES report.  In fact, he described the Yacht in his report as “the usual high quality Azimut product”.  Importantly, Mark said Simpson Marine’s technical personnel found the bow thrusters fuse to be blown the day following Delta’s sea trial on 17 September 2010, rendering the bow thruster inactive and hence the failed result described in Delta’s report.  He said the fuse was easily rectified the next day.  He frankly admitted that he could not say whether the fuse was blown during the Delta inspection or before it.
69.
In this court’s view, in the scheme of things, it matters little whether the fuse was blown during the Delta inspection or before it.  This is because Luan’s claim at the trial was confined to delayed delivery of the Yacht, not that the VMA was so “non‑functional” or the Yacht was so defective that Simpson Marine was in breach of the usual implied conditions of merchantable quality or fitness for purpose.  Nor can Luan establish that the express term of the Principal Agreement as to the provision of a VMA, including the two joysticks, was a “condition” of the contract in the legal sense, the breach of which entitled him to treat the contract as repudiated.  The reasons are these.
70.
First, the supply of the VMA was only 1 out of 40 to 50 items of extras, all of which were optional, and it cost Luan merely HK$11,500 out of the Price of €664,104.  On any view of the terms of the Principal Agreement, this court is not satisfied it is a crucial part of the agreement or that it was a critical element of the Yacht.  Second, Mark’s evidence is that the VMA is a luxury item not necessary or required for safe navigation of the Yacht or for it to revolve 360 degree, move laterally or diagonally.  In this regard, Mark’s evidence is corroborated by Mr Lamble’s testimony in court. This court accepts the testimony of both.  After all, by definition, an optional item is neither necessary nor required for the operation of the Yacht.
71.
The next question is: was the Yacht delivered by Simpson Marine to Luan on 18 August 2010?  Putting it in another way: was the Yacht in a deliverable state and placed at the disposition of Luan on that day?
72.
Mark’s evidence as to what happened on 18 August 2010, which this court accepts, has been outlined above.  Luan seeks to contradict his evidence with the findings of Delta at the sea trial on 17 September 2010. However, it seems to this court the fact that the VMA failed 2 out of 5 trials during one inspection by Luan’s expert on 17 September 2010 is insufficient to establish the Yacht was not in a deliverable state.  While the VMA
failed
2 out of 5 trials, it is accepted in the Delta report that the VMA
passed
3 out of 5 trials during the survey. Importantly, Mark’s evidence was that the cause of the failed trial was likely to be a blown fuse which could easily be and was in fact rectified.  In this court’s view, the fact that one optional item of the Yacht encountered a minor and rectifiable problem is not evidence that the Yacht as a whole was not deliverable any more than the fact that, for instance, the sunroof of a car encountered a minor and rectifiable problem is evidence that the car as a whole is not deliverable.  The burden is on Luan to establish on balance of probabilities that the Yacht was not in a deliverable state on 18 August 2010.  This court finds Luan has failed to discharge the burden.
73.
To conclude, this court finds that the Yacht was in a deliverable state as at 18 August 2010 and was placed at the disposition of Luan.  The alternative date put forward by Luan that delivery only took place on 17 November 2010, being the date of the MSES report, is rejected.  Further, given this court’s construction of Clause 1 above, the date of the MSES report has no relevance to the question of delivery and this court so finds.
74.
This court has earlier ruled that in accordance with section 31(2) of the SOGO, Simpson Marine was only bound to send the Yacht to Luan within a reasonable time after 3 July 2010, alternatively, 12 July 2010.  This court has also earlier ruled the Yacht was in a deliverable state as at 18 August 2010 and was placed at the disposition of Luan.  The question is: was Simpson Marine in breach of the Principal Agreement for delayed delivery?  In order to answer this question, this court must decide: (1) what amounts to a reasonable period for the commissioning of the Yacht after its arrival in Hong Kong; and (2) whether further allowance should be made for the time required to carry out the work under the Supplemental Agreement?
75.
Regarding (1), the testimony of Simpson Marine’s expert, Mr Lamble, is highly pertinent.  First, in the MSES report, he stated that it was usual for new yachts, even high quality yachts, to contain some defects which required a local broker’s attention.  Second, in cross‑examination, he explained that, from his experience, it was common for the commissioning of a yacht in Hong Kong to take less than two months but certainly more than one month.  One of the reasons was that Hong Kong did not have a huge reserve of experts who were able to carry out the work required.  During commissioning, the local broker ie Simpson Marine in this case, would pick up all minor defects and correct them, dealing with important matters first.  He also said some minor outstanding defects would be rectified during the warranty period.  All these were unchallenged by Luan’s counsel.  Mr Lamble’s testimony was supported by Mark’s testimony.
76.
This court has no difficulty accepting Mr Lamble’s and Mark’s evidence.  This court finds as a fact that a reasonable time for commissioning the Yacht was one to two months after its arrival in Hong Kong ie 3 July 2010.
77.
Regarding (2) above, it is self‑evident that time was required to carry out the works under the Supplemental Agreement, despite Luan’s denial in court.  Luan’s counsel did not really seek to argue otherwise.  If so, some further allowance should be given to Simpson Marine for such works.
78.
In these circumstances, this court’s conclusion is: there was no delay, and hence no breach of the Principal Agreement, on the part of Simpson Marine for delivering the Yacht to Luan on 18 August 2010.
5
th
Issue
79.
Given this court’s conclusion on the 2
nd
to 4
th
Issues, the 5
th
Issue does not arise for consideration.  In any event, given this court’s construction of Clause 3, the 0.5% per day clause is not applicable since the Yacht arrived in Hong Kong on 3 July 2010, well before the 12 July 2010 deadline.
6
th
Issue
80.
Under section 39 of the SOGO, when the seller is ready and willing to deliver the goods and requests the buyer to take delivery, the buyer who fails to do so within a reasonable time is liable to the seller for any loss occasioned by his neglect or refusal to take delivery, and also for a reasonable charge for the care and custody of the goods.
81.
The parties have helpfully agreed on the quantum of Simpson Marine’s claim in the event this court dismisses Luan’s delay claim in full.  They are set out in Appendix 4 to Mr Alder’s Closing Submissions.
Disposition
82.
Mr Luan’s claim is hereby dismissed.
83.
There shall be judgment in favour of Simpson Marine on its counterclaim against Mr Luan in the sum of HK$542,089, together with accrued interest in the sum of HK$124,663 up to 18 August 2015
[3]
, and daily interest thereafter at the rate of HK$89.10 to judgment.  Interest thereafter shall continue to accrue at the judgment rate until payment.  Simpson Marine’s counterclaim against OIL is dismissed.
84.
In the absence of agreement on costs (including all costs reserved) within 14 days, the parties are at liberty to restore the hearing for substantive argument, ½ hour reserved, or such other time as the parties agreed.  As far as the sale proceeds of the Yacht are concerned which are presently in court, again, in the absence of agreement within 14 days, Mr Luan/OIL should, if so advised, make a formal application to this court under Order 75 of the Rules of the High Court, indicating clearly the amount they seek to be paid out, to be heard at the same time as the restored hearing on costs, if any.  Liberty to apply for all consequential matters, to be heard at the same time as the restored hearing on costs, if any.
85.
Lastly, I thank counsel for their helpful submissions.
(Peter Ng)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court
Mr Y L Cheung and Mr H C Chan, instructed by Ho Tse Wai, Philip Li & Partners, for the plaintiff in HCA 107/2011 (by original action), OIL and the defendants in HCAJ 171/2011
Mr Edward Alder, instructed by Laracy & Co, for the defendant in HCA 107/2011 (by original action) and the plaintiff in HCAJ 171/2011
[1]
In other words, Luan would not be obliged to accept delivery unless the certificate is available.
[2]
Ms Angel Zhou’s witness statements were admitted as hearsay.
[3]
First day of resumed trial.