RE INSIGHT STUDIOS (HK) LTD

HCCW 668/2025

[2026] HKCFI 458

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) PROCEEDINGS NO 668 OF 2025

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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  This is my reasons for the usual winding up order I made against Insight Studios (HK) Limited (the “Company”) on 19 January 2026.   

II.  THE COMPANY’S APPLICATION FOR ADJOURNMENT

2.  The debt in question (the “Debt”), in the sum of HK$272,835.45, was based on an award made by the Labour Tribunal in LBTC 3307/2024 on 8 April 2025. There was no dispute over the Debt. Nor was there any appeal against the award. The Company had filed an affirmation to explain that there would be imminent revenue-generating projects that would enable the Company to settle the award. Based on the affirmation evidence, the Company sought an adjournment of 12 weeks or alternatively 6 weeks.

3.  It is trite that before the Court would adjourn a petition on the ground that there would be funds for the company to settle the debt in question, there should be credible and precise evidence with sufficient particulars to show how the company would be able to obtain funds to pay the debt in question within a reasonable time. In the present case, the Company’s evidence can be summarised as follows:-

(1)  First, the Company expected to receive approximately RMB1,200,000 within 33 working days after the release of the Company’s production of a travel documentary, scheduled to be released on 13 February 2026. The Company said that the “revenue, after deducting the cost of productions that need to be paid to the vendors, would be able to improve the Company’s cash position”. The Company’s counsel, Mr Sik Chee Ching, relied on this as the primary ground in support of an adjournment. I noted, however, there was no evidence to explain how much would be used to pay the vendors, and how much would be left to improve the Company’s cash position.

(2)  Second, on 5 January 2026, the Company entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with a Shenzhen company for production of documentary. The Company alleged that this project would generate cash. I noted, however, that Clause 7.1 of the MOU expressly states that the MOU is a non-binding document, and further and in any event, no figures about the revenue and costs have been provided.

(3)  Third, the Company alleged that it has been entrusted by the family foundation of a Hong Kong celebrity client to produce a highly confidential documentary, and expected that a service agreement for this purpose would be provided and executed in the new few weeks. The Company expected that this would “trigger fee payments tied to deliverables, subject to client approvals”. The Company took the view “based on experiences” that “the production cost of this type of documentary is much lower, and the project margin is expected to be approximately 50% of the production budget”. I noted, however, that no figures had been provided about the expected revenue, the budgets, and the costs.

(4)  Fourth, the Company alleged that because of the confidentiality obligation, the Company was unable to disclose further details of the two projects mentioned just now. However, in my view, in the light of the present Petition presented on 24 October 2025 (the “Petition”), if the Company would like to rely on any new projects to say that it would have sufficient funds, it lied upon the Company to make sure that it could really do so by explaining the matter to the counterparties in such new projects. If the counterparties refused, it was the risk of a winding-up order which the Company and the counterparties had to take.

(5)  Fifth, in any event, the Company gave some general figures despite the alleged confidentiality obligation. It alleged that “Based on the experience, from the second quarter of 2026 once the production kicks off, there will be approximately fund of not less than HK$100,000 (after deducting the costs that will need to be advanced for completing the production and the overheads) available on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. These inflows were expected to be sufficient to materially address the Company’s short-term liabilities, including the Petition Debt, by structured settlement”. Putting aside the lack of basis for such expectation, as said, the amount of the Debt was HK$272,835.45. By this expected HK$100,000 on a monthly or bi-monthly basis, even if I assume that the Debt was the only liability the Company had, it would take come to at earliest 4-5 months assuming that the “second quarter of 2026” would start in March 2026. I noted that the Company was careful to say that it has “short-term liabilities”, and did not even say what long term liabilities it had. What one could work out from such carefully drafted evidence was that the Company certainly had other short-term liabilities it had to settle.

(6)  Sixth, the Company had sufficient assets, and it could realise the assets if the Company still cannot pay after the adjournment. However, this in itself was not a good ground for adjournment, and in any event, there is no valuation report of the assets to make good the Company’s allegation.

(7)  It remains for me to say that the evidence about the Company’s ability to pay after adjournment was couched in vague and uncertain terms like “expected”, “materially address… short-term liabilities”, “second quarter of 2026”, “near term”. Such evidence was not or not sufficiently precise at all.

4.  In the circumstances, I refused any adjournment for 12 weeks or 6 weeks.

5.  During the hearing, Mr Sik sought a shorter adjournment. However, on such evidence as analysed above, I saw no point for a shorter adjournment given that on such evidence, the earliest the Company could pay would start in early March 2026. Upon a shorter adjournment, the Company may well just come back to say to have another adjournment to wait for the income. This would essentially be a 6 weeks’ or 12 weeks’ adjournment the Company was seeking. I should not allow this approach to buy time.

III.  OTHER EVIDENCE

6.  The remaining parts of the Company’s affirmation can be easily dealt with:-

(1)  First, there was on-going negotiation with the Petitioner. However, this was not a ground for opposing the Petition: see Re Lau Kam Sing Dickie [2019] HKCFI 1855 at §7(4).

(2)  Second, a winding-up order will prejudice the interests of the Company and the creditors. However, a creditor is entitled ex debito justitiae to a winding up order: see Re Esquire (Electronics) Limited, CACV 31/1996, 12 June 1996 at §4. I add that given the Company’s inability to pay and the lack of sufficient evidence to explain why an adjournment should be granted, a winding-up order would be in in the interest of the creditors.

(3)  Third, the Company had sufficient assets to settle the Debt. However, first, there was no valuation report to substantiate the value of the assets; and second, balance-sheet solvency was not the test, and the test was whether the Company is able to pay under section 177(1)(d) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous) Ordinance (Cap. 32).

IV.  CONCLUSION

7.  Having considered the above, I make a usual winding up order.