HKSAR v. HUEN HO CHUEN

HCMA 733/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 733 OF 2014

(ON APPEAL FROM KCCC 2170 OF 2014)

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  The appellant, HUEN Ho-chuen was originally charged with the following offences:

(a) Charge 1 – Living on Earnings of Prostitution of Others (“LEPO”), contrary to section 137(1) of the Crimes Ordinance (“the Ordinance”), Cap 200;  

(b) Charge 2 – Conspiracy to LEPO, contrary to sections 159A and 137(1) of the Ordinance and Common Law;

(c) Charge 3 – Conspiracy to Exercise Control Direction or Influence over females for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to sections 159A and 130(1)(b) of the Ordinance and Common Law; and

(d) Charge 4 – Controlling Another Person for the Purpose of Prostitution (“CAPPP”), contrary to section 130(1)(b) of the Ordinance.

2.  The appellant pleaded not guilty to all four charges and was convicted after trial of Charges 1 and 4 by Madam Veronica Heung (“the magistrate”).  He was acquitted of Charges 2 and 3.  He was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment for Charge 1 and 9 months’ imprisonment for Charge 4, both sentences to run concurrently, making a total of 9 months’ imprisonment.  

3.  The appellant appeals against both conviction and sentence.

Prosecution case

4.  On 11 December 2013, the police, after conducting an undercover operation, arrested the appellant, Mr Li Shiu-ning (“Li”) and his wife Lam Shu-mui, Rany (“Lam”) for the offence of CAPPP.  

5.  During the operation, PC11243 played the role of a man named Michael (“Michael”).  Michael got in touch with the appellant, who was a tour guide, and told the appellant that he had two Japanese friends visiting Hong Kong as tourists.  Two other undercover police played the role of the Japanese tourists.

6.  The prosecution case was that it was the appellant who had told Michael that he could arrange for two prostitutes to provide sexual services to the two Japanese tourists at a fee of $1,400 per girl per hour.  The appellant then instructed Li and Lam to arrange for girls to be brought to the hotel rooms of the two Japanese tourists, to provide them with sexual services at a fee of $1,400 per girl per hour.  Of the $1,400, $350 would go to the “ma foo”, $400 to Li and the balance to the appellant. 

7.  Upon receiving these instructions, Li and Lam took two girls, through the arrangement of a “ma foo”, to the rooms of the Japanese tourists and collected from them the fees of $1,400 plus $100 tips each, totalling $3,000 for the sexual services to be provided.

8.  The two girls started to undress without saying anything and only stopped when the two undercover police revealed their police identities.

9.  When Li and Lam were arrested, the $3,000 (which was marked money) was recovered from Li.

10.  After the arrest of the appellant, and under caution for an offence of CAPPP in relation to the provision of two prostitutes to the undercover police posing as Japanese tourists, the appellant admitted Li had introduced the girls to his customers for drinking but denied any knowledge that the girls provided sexual services. The appellant also said that he had arranged with Michael to meet up at a nightclub in Tsim Sha Tsui.  However, he later arranged for the girls to go to the hotel room to have drinks with Michael according to the latter’s wish.  

11.  The prosecution also adduced the telephone records of calls of the appellant with Michael and with Li.   

12.  It is the prosecution case that the appellant would get a share of the money received from the Japanese tourists and had exercised control, direction or influence over the two girls for the purpose of or with a view to the prostitution of the said girls (Charges 1 and 4).

Defence case

13.  The appellant did not give evidence but called one defence witness Yiu Wai-kwong (“Yiu”).  The gist of Yiu’s evidence was that the appellant had called him on 11 December 2013 to arrange for a 7-seater tour van for the next day.  On 12 December 2013, he received a call from the appellant, informing him that the van had to be cancelled as there were no such customers.  Yiu’s evidence was ruled inadmissible due to its hearsay nature.

14.  From the cross-examination, the defence case was that the appellant had not suggested to Michael that girls could be arranged to provide sexual services to the two Japanese tourists.  The appellant had no idea as to such arrangement and he did not receive any payment for the sexual services to be provided by the girls.

Magistrate’s findings

15.  After setting out the elements of the offences, the evidence adduced and her analysis of the evidence, the magistrate found Michael to be an honest and reliable witness and accepted his evidence – despite the lack of record of the contents of his telephone conversations with the appellant and some discrepancies in Michael’s evidence in court, his police notebook record and his witness statement.  As to Li and Lam, the magistrate was aware that both had pleaded guilty to the offence of LEPO so there was a possibility that the purpose of them giving evidence was in the hope of a reduction in the sentence to be imposed.  The magistrate looked for supporting evidence and found it in the circumstantial evidence: telephone records of the calls between Michael and the appellant, and between the appellant and Li.  The magistrate also accepted Li’s explanation as to why he had exonerated both his wife Lam and the appellant when he gave his cautioned statement after arrest.  The magistrate accepted the evidence of both Li and Lam.  The magistrate set out the facts she found proved and found the appellant guilty of Charges 1 and 4.

Grounds of appeal re conviction

16.  Mr Cheng Huan SC leading Mr Edward Tang advanced 7 grounds of appeal on behalf of the appellant:

(1) The oral immunity and procedural irregularities arising therefrom;

(2) The erroneous ruling regarding the evidence of Yiu;

(3) The failure to rule out Lam’s evidence;

(4) The appellant’s telephone records and the drawing of inferences;

(5) The failure to consider the marked discrepancies between Li’s cautioned statement and his oral testimony;

(6) The erroneous findings that the appellant had exerted control over the prostitutes; and

(7) The failure to consider the inconsistencies and inherent probabilities between the evidence of Li and Lam.

Background

17.  Before dealing with the grounds of appeal, it is useful to set out some background here.

18.  Li and Lam were named as co-conspirators with the appellant in the two conspiracy charges faced by the appellant, ie Charges 2 and 3.

19.  Li and Lam, together with another person not involved in the present case (ie the “ma foo”), appeared before magistrate Dr Eric Cheung on 22 April 2014.  Mr Chandler was also the prosecutor on fiat on that occasion.  In gist, what had taken place was that the original charges of CAPPP against Li and Lam (who were D1 and D2) and the “ma foo” (who was D3) were severed.  There was an additional charge of LEPO against Li and Lam.  Plea was only taken from Li and Lam on the new additional charge (ie the LEPO offence), the original (severed) charge of CAPPP was left on the court file.  Li and Lam pleaded guilty to the LEPO offence.  Mitigation and sentence was adjourned.  The reason for the adjournment could be gleaned from the court record (Appeal Bundle (“AB”) 473 U to 474 J):

“MR CHANDLER: Well, there’s a matter which is progressing and I believe the application of D1 and D2, or I don’t speak on behalf of Mr Khosa, is to adjourn the matter of sentence which I would agree that being the most sensible course in the circumstances. I would also invite your Worship to agree or to adjourn the matter in relation to the exhibits. I think your Worship can proceed in respect of the sentence of D3 at this time. I don’t want to say anymore, it’s for Mr Khosa to elucidate.

COURT: So, you ask the court to adjourn the application -- to adjourn the sentence to tomorrow or?

MR CHANDLER: No, it will be longer than that. D1 and 2 are cooperating.

COURT: Yes.

MR CHANDLER:  The offer of cooperation came very late, just before the Easter break, and they have given statements as recently as Monday.  It is likely that that will lead to the arrest of the travel agent, Huen, and eventually, to his trial.  It would not be right for your Worship to sentence D1 and 2 until after your Worship is in a position, or some other magistrate was in a position, to assess the nature and extent of the cooperation offered and given.”  [My emphasis]

20.  From the court record, the appellant was charged with LEPO on 12 June 2014 – clearly after both Li and Lam offered to cooperate with the authorities and the mitigation and sentence having been adjourned.  Indeed, Mr Chandler mentioned the “arrest” of the appellant to Dr Eric Cheung.  The charge sheet was amended on 27 July 2014 so that the original charge of LEPO became Charge 1 and the other three charges (Charges 2 - 4) were added.

21.  Under cross-examination during the trial of the appellant, Li strenuously denied that he had ever offered to cooperate with the authorities.  He claimed that what Mr Chandler had told Dr Eric Cheung was in English and the same was not translated to him.  He asserted that he did not know the purpose of adjourning his sentence and he insisted it was the police who had asked him to go and give a statement.  He claimed the plea-bargaining and adjournment of his sentence were done without his instructions.

22.  Faced with the strong denial from Li despite the existence of the court record, Mr Cheng SC sought to rely on the contents of a letter written by Mr Chandler (marked MFI 2) responding to a letter from the solicitors acting for the appellant (marked MFI 1) in relation to the circumstances leading to Li and Lam giving statements on 21 April 2014 and entering their pleas on 22 April 2014. The contents of Mr Chandler’s response indicated that Li and Lam had approached the prosecution and offered to give evidence, which was contrary to what Li had testified in court.

23.  Lam, on her part, also claimed that she did not offer to cooperate with the authorities.  Again her assertion was contradicted by what Mr Chandler had told Dr Eric Cheung and the letter he wrote.  Lam said she was ignorant as to the circumstances under which she had pleaded guilty and how she became a prosecution witness.  She also claimed the plea-bargaining and adjournment of her sentence were done without her instructions.

24.  Despite the fact that the prosecution was well aware that both Li and Lam were accomplices; that they had only pleaded guilty to the charge of LEPO (with the charge of CAPPP being left on the court file), and that they were expected to give evidence against the appellant on the two conspiracy charges and the charge of CAPPP, no immunity was given to them.

25.  When Li was giving evidence, Mr Cheng SC brought to the magistrate’s attention that Li was “not an immunised witness” and suggested Li to be warned (AB 362 R), where upon Mr Chandler gave Li an oral immunity (AB 363 B – 364 L):

“MR CHANDLER: No, I’ll give him immunity, verbal immunity.

MR CHENG: Well, you can’t give him verbal immunity.

MR CHANDLER: I can.

MR CHENG: Well, …

MR CHANDLER: Well, I can. I can; I do.

MR CHENG: … let me hear the verbal immunity.

MR CHANDLER: Yes.

‘I’m authorised to indicate to you that, provided you’ve given full and true evidence, in respect of any offences disclosed by you in connection with that evidence, in relation to the matters that you are currently giving evidence about, you will not be prosecuted for those -- for -- in relation to that evidence for any offences disclosed by you.’

COURT: Provided that it is true and …

MR CHENG: Madam, I …

COURT: I think …

MR CHENG: Sorry.

COURT: What did prosecutor said?

MR CHENG: It’s been translated properly.

COURT: Some more than that, right?

MR CHENG: Some …

COURT: Provided that it is true and accurate.

A. All what I’ve been saying are all accurate and true.

MR CHENG: Madam, I formally object to the giving of a oral immunity and maybe this person’s entitled, he should be told about, his right to legal advice.

COURT: Yes, perhaps, I’ll invite this witness to go out first for some submissions.

MR CHENG: I’ve made my point, Madam. That I’m objecting to this -- I’m objecting to the offering of a …

COURT: I’d like to ask more details from the prosecutor, Mr Chandler.

MR CHENG: … verbal immunity, which, in my respectful submission, is improper with respect to my learned friend here.

MR CHANDLER: Yes, well, I’ve heard what my friend has to say and, in the circumstances, I would be perfectly happy for your Worship to warn the witness.

MR CHENG: What?

MR CHANDLER: Warn him.

MR CHENG: I see.

COURT: Mr Li, now, I’m giving you a warning. You are not obliged to answer any question which may incriminate you. Is it all what you want to say?

MR CHENG: Well, he’s entitled independent legal advice, with respect.

COURT: And if you are in doubt, you can -- you are entitled to seek legal advice, yes. Do you understand?

A. (In English) Okay.” 

26.  It is unclear whether the oral/verbal immunity was withdrawn.  There is also no indication from the transcript whether Li was aware of the withdrawal of the oral immunity, if it had indeed been withdrawn.

27.  Later on, after what appears to be a morning break, the magistrate raised the following with counsel (AB 368 R – 369 I):

“COURT: I’m going to raise some issues for discussion. Just now, it seems that the issues arise -- I think the same issue may arise in future witness, …

MR CHANDLER: Yes.

COURT: … maybe with Miss Lam. I’m thinking whether the prosecution will turn the verbal immunity into written form?

MR CHANDLER: No, I won’t do that again. No, I promise I will not do that again.

COURT: ‘No’? No need to turn the -- that into written form?

MR CHANDLER: I think not.

COURT: Thank you.

MR CHANDLER: In the circumstances, I’ll proceed in the same way as we’re proceeding in the case of Mr Li.

COURT: Okay.

MR CHANDLER: Not perfect but a lot is not perfect in this case and not only in this case but it’s the best way in my view.

COURT: Okay. Then we can carry on with the …

MR CHENG: I’ve made my position known … (indistinct).  Thank you.” 

28.  Since the magistrate was asking whether the prosecution would turn the verbal immunity into written form in the case of the next witness Lam, it would appear that in her mind the oral immunity given by Mr Chandler to Li was still valid.  If Mr Chandler had indeed withdrawn the oral immunity and the magistrate had understood that to be the case, she would not have raised that issue.  Mr Chandler promised he would not “do that again” and confirmed that there was no need to turn the oral immunity into a written form.  Indeed no immunity was offered to Lam when she gave evidence.  She was duly warned by the magistrate against self-incrimination. However, at no time did Mr Chandler appear to have withdrawn the oral immunity given to Li, he merely confirmed that he would not “do that again”.  Moreover, in its written final submission (AB 50 para 83) and during oral submission in court (AB 270 S), the defence submitted that the oral immunity offered to Li by the prosecution was wrong in law, citing the authority of HKSAR v Leung Kai Chung [2002] 1 HKLRD 771.  There was nothing from either Mr Chandler or the magistrate to indicate that the oral immunity had been withdrawn and was therefore no longer a live issue.  

A consideration of the grounds of appeal against conviction

29.  Although there are 7 grounds of appeal, I will deal with all the grounds globally.

30.  I will however, first deal with the issue of the oral immunity and how it affects the evidence of Li.

31.  As indicated earlier, there does not appear to be a withdrawal of the oral immunity given to Li.

32.  What surprises me is that the magistrate, in her Statement of Findings, did not say a single word about the oral immunity given to Li, nor the authority of Leung Kai Chung cited by the defence.  She also did not refer to the denial of both Li and Lam in relation to their offer to cooperate with the authorities and their claim that they did not know why their sentence was adjourned.

33.  This case is in some way similar to that of Leung Kai Chung.  In that case, no immunity was given to the accomplices who gave evidence (though it was a deliberate decision of the prosecution).  During the trial, oral immunity was given to the accomplice witnesses.  After the giving of the oral immunity, the trial judge went on to warn them against self-incrimination. On appeal, Stock JA (as he then was), giving judgment of the court, said (at page 788 para 41):

“… the grant of an immunity is a serious matter, not to be treated lightly or, as we find happened in this case, loosely. A decision to grant an immunity is a decision which should be made only by those duly authorised to make it, and the terms of the immunity to be granted must receive careful attention. The person to whom it is offered is entitled to know precisely what is properly expected of him, if the immunity is to hold good, and in respect of precisely what conduct the immunity extends, subject to the overriding consideration that what is expected is the full truth.”

34.  Reference was made in that judgment to a policy document produced by the Department of Justice, which states (at page 789 para 42):

“The Director of Public Prosecutions and his Deputies are authorized to grant full or partial immunity to persons suspected or accused of offences in return for their undertaking to give truthful evidence on behalf of the Prosecution. The immunity will be in writing and where necessary, translated. A copy of the immunity should be provided to the Court and the Defence at trial.” [My emphasis]

35.  The granting of the oral immunity in this case was done loosely and not in accordance with established practice.  Further, Mr Chandler, being a counsel on fiat – not the Director of Public Prosecutions or his Deputies – does not have the authority to grant any immunity to Li in any event.  There is a material irregularity here.

36.  The importance of the prosecution’s duty to disclose the full terms of the immunity is clearly stated in the cases of R v Tsui Lai-ying and Others [1987] HKLR 857 and HKSAR v Sit Kam-tai, unreported, HCMA 1355/2000.

37.  In Tsui Lai-ying, which involved the giving of “conditional immunity”, the Court of Appeal said (at p 873 A-B):

“It is clear beyond peradventure that in cases like this the accomplice should be presented to the court warts and all. The defence is entitled to know everything about him, the terms of the immunity and any matters surrounding it which could affect the credibility of his evidence.”

38.  In Sit Kam-tai, a case in which the assertion by the defence – that the contents of the immunity granted to the witnesses were never communicated to them – was not contradicted by the prosecution, and the terms of the immunity was not made known to the magistrate, the Court was of the view that (at para 17 of the judment):

“… the contents of the terms of the immunity must be made known to the court as they are relevant to the assessment of the credibility of such tainted witnesses. The witness testifying under immunity should also be shown that he/she understood the terms and his/her undertaking. The failure to disclose the terms of the immunity to the learned magistrate amounted to an irregularity. …”

39.  In the present case, the magistrate, Li and defence were made aware of the contents of the oral immunity, but only during the trial when Mr Chandler purported to grant it orally.  It was done in a loose manner not in accordance with established practice, quite apart from the fact that Mr Chandler does not have the authority to grant it.  

40.  Further, when the immunity is granted orally in such a loose fashion, it is unclear whether everyone concerned, including the magistrate, the witness and the defence, fully understood its contents.  In the case of the defence, being informed of such an immunity during the trial, it is also questionable whether they were in a position to know everything about Li which could affect his credibility – particularly when Li strenuously denied that he had offered to cooperate with the authorities and practically denied that his sentence was adjourned pending his giving evidence for the prosecution against the appellant (an aspect which I will elaborate in greater detail later).  

41.  There is an added problem here, in that Li was given a warning against self-incrimination by the magistrate (admittedly at the request of Mr Cheng SC, after he objected to the granting of the oral immunity).  Since there is no indicia that the oral immunity was withdrawn, or that Li was informed of its withdrawal, if it had indeed been withdrawn, the giving of such a warning to Li does not sit together with him having been granted an immunity. 

42.  This situation also occurred in Leung Kai Chung.  Stock JA (as he then was) has this to say (at page 793 para 52):

“52. With respect, the two did not sit together. The privilege against self-incrimination … [in] the current setting, it is the privilege which a witness has not to disclose information which will or may result in his prosecution for a criminal offence. It must follow that once the witness’s exposure to the risk of criminality, in the sense of liability to prosecution, is removed, the privilege does not exist. …”

43.  The learned judge further elaborated (in the same para 52), after referring to a passage in Wigmore on Evidence,

“In other words, the privilege against self-incrimination goes once an immunity is granted, because there is then no risk of exposure to criminality in the sense intended by the privilege.”

44.  Ms Audrey Parwani for the respondent submitted that judging from the cross-examination, the defence was not hindered by the granting of the oral immunity, so there was no unfairness or prejudice even if there is an irregularity.  Ms Parwani also submitted that the magistrate hadtaken into account the possibility of Li and Lam hoping to have a reduction in sentence when she assessed and accepted their evidence. 

45.  While I accept that a magistrate does not have to set out his/her whole thought process, in this case, the issue of oral immunity is of such importance that the magistrate should have dealt with it.  As I have indicated, the oral immunity does not appear to have been withdrawn.  That being the case, Li was told on the one hand, he had immunity from prosecution if he tells the truth about matters outside the charge of LEPO he had already pleaded guilty to, and on the other hand, he was given the warning, that he could claim privilege against self-incrimination.  There is no way of knowing how the magistrate dealt with Li’s evidence in view of these two contradictions.

46.  The defence did not know under what circumstances Li and Lam became prosecution witnesses.  Both Li and Lam quite blatantly denied that they had offered to cooperate with the authorities.  They also denied that they were aware of the reason why the mitigation and sentence for the LEPO charge they had pleaded guilty was adjourned.  After the perusal of the court record, and having perused the letter (marked MFI 2) written by Mr Chandler, it is clear beyond doubt that there was an offer from Li and Lam (no doubt conducted on their behalf by their legal representatives) to assist the authorities by giving evidence for the prosecution against the appellant.  The sentence was adjourned so that the sentencing judge could assess the extent of their cooperation before passing sentence.  Yet both denied, under oath, that they were aware of the position.

47.  I have already mentioned that the appellant was only charged after Li and Lam had given their statements on 21 April 2014 and entering their pleas on 22 April 2014.  When Li was arrested, he exonerated his wife and the appellant when he was interviewed under caution.  He specifically said that the appellant did not share any of the fees collected from the two Japanese tourists.  When he gave evidence against the appellant, he gave a version contrary to what he had said earlier.  The circumstance of how he came to be a prosecution witness is of vital importance here.

48.  The magistrate did not mention this aspect of their evidence at all.  All she said was (AB 147 para 24):

“… Although Li (PW5) and Lam (PW6) had not said in evidence that one of the reasons they were giving evidence was the hope of a reduction in sentence, this was something I could not and did not overlook.”

49.  With respect, it is not simply that “Li and Lam had not said in evidence that one of the reasons they were giving evidence was the hope of a reduction in sentence”, they positively denied that was the case and in any reading of their evidence, when compared with the court record and the letter from Mr Chandler (marked MFI 2), they were not telling the truth.  The failure on the part of the magistrate to properly and adequately evaluate this aspect of their evidence, in my view, throws doubt on the correctness in accepting their evidence against the appellant.

50.  The evidence of Li is of utmost importance.  It was his evidence that linked the appellant to the payment of $3,000 for the sexual services to be provided.  The $3,000 marked money was not found in the possession of the appellant.  It was only Li’s words that the appellant had suggested how the money received from the Japanese tourists was to be divided and how the appellant would have a share of it.

51.  Although Lam claimed to have heard the telephone conversations between Li and the appellant, so arguably her evidence about what was said between Li and the appellant was not hearsay, the magistrate had not, in my view, evaluated how reliable this piece of evidence really was.  Granted, sometimes one can indeed hear what was said by a person on the other side of the telephone line, in the present case, was it really credible that Lam not only heard, but knew it was the appellant who had called her husband Li without Li telling her?  Coupled with Lam’s denial of knowledge about the plea-bargaining; the offer to cooperate; and the reason for the adjournment for sentence, the magistrate should have looked at Lam’s evidence closely before deciding whether to accept the evidence.

52.  No doubt, both Li and Lam did arrange with the “ma foo” to bring two prostitutes to the undercover policemen, but the crux of the matter was whether the appellant was expected to share the fees for the sexual services provided by those prostitutes, which is an important element for the charge of LEPO.

53.  Without the evidence of Li and Lam, the only evidence against the appellant came from Michael (apart from the telephone records which do not really assist the prosecution).  Taking the prosecution case to the highest (but without the evidence of Li and Lam), at most the appellant had offered to arrange for two prostitutes at a fee of $1,400 per girl per hour to the two Japanese tourists, and later two prostitutes arrived and charged the same fees mentioned by the appellant.

54.  Such evidence is not enough to support a charge of LEPO.  Simply receiving money from a prostitute is not enough to prove that one is living on the earning of prostitution, let alone there is no evidence of any money received by one (see Archbold 2015 para 21-226 and the cases cited therein).  There was insufficient evidence to give rise to any inference that the appellant was living on the earnings of prostitution. 

55.  In the case of Sin Kam Wah and Another v HKSAR [2005] 8 HKCFAR 192, the Court of Final Appeal held that the words “control, direction or influence” in relation to this charge should be given their ordinary meaning and do not import any element of coercion. There is no evidence that the appellant has any control, direction or influence over those two prostitutes, who were brought along by the “ma foo” – whether directly, or by inference. 

56.  I will just briefly touch on ground 2 – ruling out of the evidence of Yiu on the ground of hearsay.

57.  After perusing the transcript, it is clear to me that the way the defence led the evidence from Yiu gives one the impression that the appellant was relying on the truth of the contents of those telephone conversations, and not just the fact that Yiu had received the telephone calls from the appellant on 11 and 12 December 2013.  It is also of importance to note that when this piece of evidence was objected to by Mr Chandler, Mr Cheng SC did not make it clear to the magistrate on how Yiu’s evidence was not hearsay.  Instead, after the magistrate ruled that such evidence was hearsay, Mr Cheng SC left the matter (AB 466 M-N).  

58.  In any event, Yiu’s evidence is of minimal importance in this case.  Whether there was an arrangement for a tour the next morning is not relevant to whether prostitutes were provided to the tourists the night before.

Conclusion

59.  For the reasons given, I find that the convictions on both Charges 1 and 4 are unsafe and unsatisfactory.  I am unable, on appeal by way of rehearing, to say that the evidence in this case supports those two charges.  I allow the appellant’s appeal and I quashed the conviction and sentence on Charges 1 and 4.  There is no need for me to further deal with the grounds of appeal in relation to the sentence.