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HCAL 2124/2020
[2026] HKCFI 714
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2124 OF 2020
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BETWEEN
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Mohammad Titu |
Applicant |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Respondent |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Director of Immigration” and the decision in respect of which relief is sought be amended to “Director of Immigration’s decision dated 10 July 2020”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
3. A Restricted Proceedings Order be made against the applicant in terms of the following:-
(1) The applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the applicant in the High Court, or any appeal, including this Order, without the leave of the Court of First Instance;
(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;
(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the applicant do file a copy of each such response together with his said application for leave;
(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;
(5) All applications made pursuant to this Order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;
(6) If the applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;
(7) Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;
(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;
(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the applicant within any period of 3 months;
(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge;
(11) This Order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and
(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 23 October 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of a decision which was described as follows:-
“The decision made on the date of 10th day of July 2020 but notified the Applicant after 22nd of September 2020.”
2. The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) made a decision dated 10 July 2020 (“the Director’s 2020 Decision”) refusing the applicant’s request (“the Request”) for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). The Request was made by way of two letters dated 14 October 2019 and 30 October 2019 respectively, with further information provided by another letter dated 18 November 2019.
3. It is clear that the decision in respect of which relief is sought in the Leave Application is the Director’s 2020 Decision. The applicant also confirmed at the oral hearing before this court on 13 November 2020 that the Director’s 2020 Decision was the subject matter of the Leave Application.
Amendments
4. In Form 86, the applicant named “Immigration Department” as the putative respondent, when the Director should be so named.
5. As aforesaid, the decision in respect of which relief is sought in the Leave Application should be the Director’s 2020 Decision.
6. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent is amended to “Director of Immigration” and the decision in respect of which relief is sought is amended to “Director of Immigration’s decision dated 10 July 2020”.
Procedural history of the applicant’s previous non-refoulement claim
7. The applicant is a male Bangladeshi who was arrested by the Hong Kong police on 19 March 2009. He made his first claim for non-refoulement protection by way of a written signification dated 22 March 2009.
8. The Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on the grounds of Torture Risk[1], BOR 3 Risk[2] and Persecution Risk[3] under the USM on 28 January 2015 (the Director’s 2015 Decision”), and further rejected the applicant’s claim on the ground of BOR 2 Risk[4] on 13 March 2017 (“the Director’s 2017 Decision”). The Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) rejected the applicant’s appeal/petition against the Director’s 2015 Decision on 5 December 2016 (“the Board’s 2016 Decision”), and his petition against the Director’s 2017 Decision on 25 August 2017 (“the Board’s 2017 Decision”).
9. The applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Board’s 2017 Decision on 6 October 2017 (“the Previous Leave Application”). The Court of First Instance (“the CFI”) refused the Previous Leave Application on 18 July 2018[5] (“the CFI’s 2018 Decision”).
10. The applicant appealed against the CFI’s 2018 Decision to the Court of Appeal and the appeal was dismissed on 15 November 2018[6].
11. On 23 November 2018, the applicant filed a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant’s notice of motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 January 2019[7]. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 8 January 2020.
The applicant’s subsequent claim
12. Before the Court of Final Appeal dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal, on 14 October 2019 and 30 October 2019, the applicant wrote two letters to the Director to make the Request and provided further information to the Director by his letter dated 18 November 2019.
13. The applicant continued to claim that he would be at risk of harm from people of the Awami League (“AL”) if he were to be refouled to Bangladesh and raised nine factors for the Director’s consideration as mentioned in paragraph 10 of the Director’s 2020 Decision.
14. On 11 June 2020, the applicant attended an interview to clarify the grounds for the Request. The matters that the applicant revealed or clarified were as mentioned in paragraph 13 of the Director’s 2020 Decision.
15. After consideration of all the information including the applicant’s previous non-refoulement claim, the Board’s 2016 Decision, the Board’s 2017 Decision, the Request, and the additional information in support of the Request submitted by the applicant, the Director refused the Request by way of the Director’s 2020 Decision.
The applicant’s case
16. In his first claim for non-refoulement protection, the applicant claimed that if returned to Bangladesh, he would be harmed or killed by Dalu and his associates and other members from AL (collectively “his Enemies”) because he refused to join AL.
17. The applicant’s claim in the Request was largely based on the previous claim of threat from AL. His alleged new risk of harm originated from the false accusation / false cases filed by his Enemies against him and the continuous harassment from Dalu to the applicant’s wife.
Late application
18. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the Director’s 2020 Decision was made.
19. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 23 October 2020, which was 3 months and 13 days after the Director’s 2020 Decision (made on 10 July 2020). The applicant was hence late for 13 days in making the Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave Application.
20. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration.
21. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and provided no explanation for the delay in making the Leave Application.
22. Although a delay of 13 days was not very significant, there is no merits in the intended judicial review at all as discussed in the ensuing paragraphs. Hence, there is no reason for this court to grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave Application to pursue a hopeless judicial review.
23. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone. Nevertheless, this court will discuss the merits of the Leave Application below.
Oral hearings
24. At the oral hearing before this court on 13 November 2025, the applicant confirmed that the problem he had was the same problem as in the Previous Leave Application and he was repeating the same claim. However, the applicant said that he did not know that he was not allowed to make a repeated claim.
25. When this court told him that a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) might be made against him and he would be allowed to make submission regarding the proposed RPO, the applicant asked for an adjournment to prepare his submission. The hearing was hence adjourned.
26. When the notice of hearing dated 28 November 2025 for the adjourned hearing on 13 January 2026 was served on the applicant, a copy of this court’s directions was also served together with the notice of hearing, which required the applicant to file evidence and/or submissions to oppose any RPO on or before 8 January 2026. However, the applicant did not file anything by the deadline.
27. At the resumed hearing on 13 January 2026, the applicant did not make any submission regarding the proposed RPO against him either. He merely asked this court to allow him to stay in Hong Kong for a few more months, as there would be an election in his country in about June or July this year. He also wanted to submit some documents from hospitals in Hong Kong to show that he had some medical appointments in 2 months’ and 4 months’ time.
Grounds for judicial review
28. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
29. The applicant did not advance any ground for his intended judicial review in Form 86. In his supporting affirmation dated 23 October 2020, the applicant alleged that he was a genuine non-refoulement claimant who faced all these dangerous problems, harassment and torture in his country and that the problems were getting more and more life-threatening day after day. He also complained that the Director rejected his claim without any proper inquiry and without carefully understanding his situation.
30. The contents as stated above were in fact used by many applicants in similar applications as their grounds for applying leave to judicially review the Director’s and/or the Board’s decisions. It is like a template for such applicants and they just used the grounds stated therein without any regard to their own situations.
31. The applicant also failed to elaborate on any of the grounds that were asserted in his affirmation or advance any ground for judicial review at the oral hearings before this court.
Discussion
32. First of all, the applicant’s assertion that the Director rejected his claim without any proper inquiry and without carefully understanding his situation was totally without any specificity.
33. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244, “general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to the facts of his case”.
34. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in his supporting affirmation could establish any valid ground to challenge the Director’s 2020 Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite particulars related to the applicant’s case.
35. His allegation that the situation in his home country was worsening was in fact included in the Request as a new threat to him. The country of origin information (“COI”) he submitted in support of the Request had all been considered by the Director. If the applicant intends to challenge the Director’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in a judicial review.
36. In any event, the Director did consider carefully the applicant’s previous claim and the new matters raised in the subsequent claim. The Director gave very detailed analysis and reasoning in rejecting the Request in the Director’s 2020 Decision. The allegation that the rejection was made without any proper inquiry and without carefully understanding his situation is totally unfounded.
37. The making of a subsequent claim is stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, which reads as follows:-
“Limitation on subsequent claim
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.
(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –
(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and
(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.
(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.
(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.
(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”
38. It is clear that the Director had fully complied with the above provisions when considering the Request.
39. The Director gave detailed reasons in paragraphs 9 to 17 of the Director’s 2020 Decision for its conclusion not to accept that the applicant’s alleged risk of harm in the Request upon his return to Bangladesh constituted a significant change of circumstances warranting his making of a subsequent claim. This court agrees with the Director’s conclusion and the reasoning supporting it. Thus, there was no significant change of circumstances that would enable the applicant to make a subsequent claim.
40. As aforesaid, the Director also considered the COI provided by the applicant in the Request. The Director found that the applicant would not face any risk of harm from AL members due to his political affiliation to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. The submitted COI might show a significant change in the country condition in Bangladesh after the applicant’s previous claim was finally determined. However, the Director did not accept that such a change would give the applicant’s intended subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success, when considered together with the other materials submitted in the Request and those submitted in support of his previous claim. The applicant’s Request was therefore refused.
41. These were findings of facts within the exclusive ambit of the Director, and this court in a judicial review will not interfere with them save when such findings involved errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.
42. Having considered the applicant’s Request, and having rigorously examined the Director’s 2020 Decision with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Director had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the making of a subsequent claim under section 37ZO, correctly identified the issues, and analyzed the evidence with due care. The Director observed a very high standard of fairness. This court finds no errors of law in the Director’s 2020 Decision or procedural unfairness in the making of that decision. The Director’s 2020 Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.
43. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.
Restricted Proceedings Order
44. It is clear that the applicant has abused the judicial process by making the Leave Application, as the applicant’s non-refoulement claim had already been determined by the Director’s 2015 Decision, the Director’s 2017 Decision, the Board’s 2016 Decision, the Board’s 2017 Decision and the CFI’s 2018 Decision.
45. The applicant had also exhausted all the available means of appeal, including appealing to the Court of Appeal in respect of the Previous Leave Application and seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. His appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was finally dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 8 January 2020.
46. The court has inherent jurisdiction to prevent an applicant from abusing its process by making an extended order against such an applicant (see Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 473).
47. RPO is an appropriate measure to prevent abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants (see Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991).
48. However, this court has to exercise its discretion by reference to the circumstances of the case and the principle of proportionality. A RPO is in substance an injunction and this court has the power to grant an injunction to safeguard the proper administration of justice. At the same time, the exercise of such power has to be balanced against a litigant’s right of access to the court (see The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa [2006] 1 HKLRD 679).
49. Generally, such an order is called for when a vexatious litigant has already involved the appellate process unsuccessfully but persisted by re-litigating his wholly unmeritorious case all over again (see Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration [2022] HKCA 327 and Indah v Director of Immigration [2022] HKCA 564).
50. This court has called upon the applicant to show cause why a RPO should not be made against him. As aforesaid, the applicant did not make any submission regarding the proposed RPO which might be made against him. The applicant merely asked this court to give him a few more months to stay in Hong Kong.
51. This court finds that the applicant is indeed a vexatious litigant who has already involved the appellate process unsuccessfully but persisted by re-litigating his wholly unmeritorious case all over again, and a RPO should be ordered against him to prevent him from abusing the judicial process endlessly.
52. Accordingly, this court makes a RPO against the applicant in the terms as detailed in paragraph 3 of the orders stated above.
Conclusion
53. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed and a RPO is made against the applicant.
Dated the 4th day of February 2026
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( Irene LEE )
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
Notes for the applicant:
If leave has been granted, the applicant or his solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors
on: 4 February 2026
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 4 February 2026
Director of Immigration
Putative respondent’s ref. no.:
L/M (20116) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (formerly RBCZ/716/09, RBCZ/9001371/16)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115.
[2] Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383.
[3] Risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to Status of Refugees.
[4] Risk of violation of right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383.
[5] HCAL 724/2017, [2018] HKCFI 1584
[6] CACV 355/2018, [2018] HKCA 812
[7] CACV 355/2018, [2019] HKCA 7
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