KAMRAN JAVID (also known as AHMED KAMRAN) v. PERMANENT SECRETARY FOR SECURITY

CACV 144/2021

[2023] HKCA 30

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 144 OF 2021

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 2152 OF 2020)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the judgment of the court):

A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the judgment (“the Judgment”) dated 23 March 2021 of Yeung J (“the Judge”) dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  The applicant is a national of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan who was deported from Hong Kong for life pursuant to a deportation order dated 30 May 2000 (“the Deportation Order”)[1].  He subsequently returned to Hong Kong unlawfully on 8 October 2001 with his wife who is a Hong Kong permanent resident (“First Wife”).

3.  The applicant’s intended judicial review seeks to challenge the decision of the Permanent Secretary for Security (“the Permanent Secretary”) dated on 3 August 2020 (“the Decision”) refusing his application to rescind or suspend the Deportation Order.

4.  The applicant in his Form 86 advanced two grounds of review: (a) the Decision was tainted by procedural impropriety in that the Permanent Secretary had failed to give adequate reasons for the Decision, and (b) the Decision was Wednesbury unreasonable and thus irrational.

5.  After an inter partes hearing, where the applicant was represented by leading counsel, by way of the Judgment, the Judge dismissed the leave application as he found the proposed grounds of review not reasonably arguable.

6.  By way of Notice of Appeal lodged on 1 April 2021, the applicant appeals against the Judgment.  He is acting in person in this appeal.

7.  At the end of the hearing of the appeal, we directed the applicant and the Permanent Secretary (as the putative respondent) to lodge further written submissions relating to a recent authority, Riaz Hussain v Permanent Secretary for Security [2021] HKCA 1017[2].  The parties had since filed their respective further written submissions[3].

B.  BACKGROUND

8.  The unchallenged background facts leading to this appeal were set out in detail by the Judge at [5] ‑ [24] of the Judgment.  It is unnecessary for us to repeat them here, save for the following.

9.  The applicant entered Hong Kong twice under different identities.  He first came to Hong Kong on 9 March 1998 under the name of “Ahmed Kamran”.  On 30 May 2000, he was issued with the Deportation Order given his criminal convictions[4], and was deported for life to Pakistan on 8 June 2000. While he was in Pakistan, in September 2001, the applicant married the First Wife.  On 8 October 2001, the applicant arrived in Hong Kong again as a visitor but under his current identity.  On 18 April 2002, the applicant was allowed to remain in Hong Kong as the dependant of the First Wife[5].  The applicant and the First Wife have three children who were born in Hong Kong in 2009, 2011 and 2013 respectively, and have the right of abode in Hong Kong.

10.  In 2004, the applicant was again convicted of various criminal offences[6], including a breach of the Deportation Order.

11.  Between April 2004 and December 2011, the applicant and the First Wife had made repeated requests to the Director of Immigration (“the Director”), the Permanent Secretary and the Chief Executive for permission to allow the applicant to stay in Hong Kong on compassionate grounds for the main reasons that (a) he was married with the First Wife (a Hong Kong permanent resident) and had by then two children of tender ages, and (b) he had also become a good person and a good father who wanted the family to be together in Hong Kong so that the children could grow up and receive their education here[7].

12.  Having taken into consideration these submissions and the special circumstances of his case, including the applicant’s then close family ties to Hong Kong and that his children were of tender ages, by an internal minute M7 dated 22 February 2012 (“M7”), the Director recommended to the Permanent Secretary that the Deportation Order be suspended for a period of one year.  Adopting the recommendation, by a letter dated 23 February 2012 to the applicants’ then legal representatives, the Permanent Secretary in the exercise of her discretion granted the applicant a suspension of the Deportation Order for one year, but stating expressly in the letter that there was no justification to rescind the Deportation Order and the suspension decision was made solely on compassionate grounds.

13.  Thereafter, from February 2012 to February 2017, upon the applicant’s and the First Wife’s requests made every year, the suspension was re-granted on a yearly basis.  The last suspension was granted on 23 February 2017.

14.  On 16 January 2018, before the end of the suspension of the Deportation Order for that year, the applicant again by letter requested for the rescission or suspension of the Deportation Order so that he could continue to stay in Hong Kong with his family.  In the letter, he also informed the Director and the Secretary for Security that he had married another woman (“Second Wife”) on 3 June 2016 in Pakistan and that the Second Wife and their child (born in January 2017) lived in the Philippines.

15.  By a memo of 15 February 2018 to the Secretary for Security, after taking into account all the circumstances of the applicant, including his second marriage and the new-born child, the Director recommended that the request for suspension or rescission of the Deportation Order be refused.

16.  After receiving the Director’s recommendation, the Security Bureau in an internal minute dated 14 March 2018 (“M13”) also recommended that the request for suspension or rescission be rejected, as the grounds put forward in the request did not sufficiently justify the suspension of the Deportation Order.  M13 stated relevantly as follows:

“Rescission of Deportation Order

24. The deportation of Mr Kamran was the consequence of his criminal convictions in Hong Kong. In the absence of any overwhelming factors, there is no extenuating ground that may warrant rescission of the deportation order at this junction.

Suspension of Deportation Order

25. Mr Kamran’s deportation order was first suspended in 2012 on compassionate grounds to facilitate his provision of paternal care to his tender aged children in Hong Kong. Without any circumstantial change, Mr Kamran’s deportation order had been suspended for six times with a total of six consecutive years. However, in the present request, a recent major circumstantial change was brought to our attention, that is, Mr Kamran solemnized his second marriage with [redacted] and a daughter was born between them during his second last suspension period. We also noted from the Director’s information that Mr Kamran’s length of stay outside Hong Kong in the recent two years was comparatively longer than the previous years.

26. The deportation order against Mr Kamran, if in force, only prevents him from coming to Hong Kong again. It would not deprive him of his freedom to stay with Madam Mak and take care of their three children in any places outside Hong Kong if they wish to do so. Even if Madam Mak does not choose to reside in a place outside Hong Kong with Mr Kamran, she and their children are still free to travel abroad to visit Mr Kamran any time they wish.

27. Having regard to all relevant factors and comments/advices from the CP [Commissioner of Police], the Director and DoJ, and having balanced all factors, including those have been considered in previous suspension requests, and the recent major circumstantial change, it is considered that the grounds put forth in the present request do not sufficiently justify suspension of the deportation order made against Mr Kamran. We recommend that the request for suspension of the deportation order made against Mr Kamran be rejected.” (emphasis added)

17.  By a letter dated 22 March 2018, the Permanent Secretary informed the applicant that his request for suspension or rescission of the Deportation Order was refused as she was not able to find sufficient justification to suspend the order after taking into account all the circumstances of his case.

18.  Thereafter, from 22 February 2019 to 15 January 2020, the applicant again applied for the rescission or suspension of the Deportation Order.  On 25 February 2020, the Director recommended that the applicant’s request be rejected.  By a letter dated 22 May 2020, the applicant through his legal representatives repeated the request to the Permanent Secretary.

19.  On 30 July 2020, the Security Bureau in an internal minute “M1” (“M1”) recommended the refusal of the applicant’s request.  The relevant considerations recommending the rejection of the 1^st applicant’s rescission/suspension application were stated as follows:

“Comments from the Commissioner of Police

16. The Commissioner of Police (‘CP’) has been consulted. He was of the view that there were no grounds to support the current request for suspension/rescission of the deportation order made against Mr Kamran [Annex F to (44)].

Comments from the Director of Immigration

17. The deportation order against Mr Kamran was made on the basis of his criminal convictions of serious offences in Hong Kong. Mr Kamran is a repeated offender who shows no respect for the laws of Hong Kong. As a returned deportee, he was convicted of breach of deportation order and other serious offences, and was sentenced to imprisonment. Being a subject of deportation order, he should not have any expectation that the prohibition of his stay in Hong Kong could be lifted to enable him to lead a normal family life in Hong Kong.

18. Mr Kamran has family connections both in the Philippines and Hong Kong. The Director is of the view that his HKPR wife and children are free to travel outside Hong Kong to reunite with him should they wish to do so.

19. After careful consideration of all circumstances of the case, the Director cannot find any extenuating grounds which may warrant the rescission / suspension of Mr Kamran’s deportation order. It is therefore recommend [sic] that the current request for rescission / suspension of the deportation order in respect of Mr Kamran be rejected.

20. In any event, it is not duly bound to take into account any local family connection in exercising discretion to suspend / rescind a deportation order.

21. ...

Decision Sought

22. The deportation of Mr Kamran was the consequence of his criminal convictions in Hong Kong. In the absence of any overwhelming factors, there is no extenuating ground that may warrant rescission / suspension of the deportation order at this juncture.

23. The representations put forth regarding Mr Kamran’s family connections in Hong Kong and his second marriage have been fully considered. In fact, the representations given in the present request were mostly the same as those given in the request for rescission / suspension of deportation order submitted in 2017/2018, which the then PS for S had fully considered when she decided to reject the rescission / suspension request back in 2018 at M.13 of Pt. 2. Based on the available information, it can be concluded that there was no circumstantial change since the rescission / suspension request was last rejected in 2018.

24. That said, the deportation order against Mr Kamran, if in force, only prevents him from coming to Hong Kong again. It would not deprive him of his freedom to stay with Madam Mak and take care of their three children in any places outside Hong Kong if they wish to do so. Even if Madam Mak does not choose to reside in a place outside Hong Kong with Mr Kamran, she and their children are still free to travel abroad to visit Mr Kamran any time they wish.

25. Having regard to all relevant factors and comments/ advices from the CP, the Director and DoJ, and having balanced all factors, including the fact that there being no circumstantial change since the rescission / suspension request was last rejected in 2018, it is considered that the grounds put forth in the present request do not sufficiently justify rescission / suspension of the deportation order made against Mr Kamran. We recommend that the request for rescission / suspension of the deportation order made against Mr Kamran be rejected.” (emphasis added)

20.  By a letter dated 3 August 2020, the Permanent Secretary again rejected the applicant’s request and stated as follows (ie, the Decision):

“…

Your request has been carefully considered by the Permanent Secretary.  Having taken into account all the circumstances of the case, the Permanent Secretary is not able to find sufficient justification for suspending/rescinding the deportation order made against [the applicant]. In the circumstances, the decision to deport [the applicant] from Hong Kong for life still stands.”

21.  On 28 October 2020[8], the applicant applied for leave to judicially review the Decision.

C.  THE JUDGMENT

22.  The Judge held a hearing of the leave application where the applicant was represented by leading counsel.  By way of the Judgment, the Judge refused to grant leave to the applicant for the following reasons:

(1)  In rejecting the ground on the Permanent Secretary’s failure to give reasons, the Judge found that, when the Decision was read together with M13 and M1, the applicant was sufficiently informed of the reasons for the refusal.  The applicant was in any event not materially prejudiced due to the alleged lack of reasons: [27] ‑ [32] of the Judgment;

(2)  In rejecting the ground that the Decision was Wednesbury as the Permanent Secretary had wrongly taken into account the applicant’s second marriage, which was an irrelevant factor:

(a)  the Judge held that in the particular circumstances of this case, in considering whether there was sufficient compassionate ground based on a close family tie in Hong Kong to justify suspending the Deportation Order, the second marriage was clearly a relevant factor for the Permanent Secretary to have regard to: [34] ‑ [38] of the Judgment;

(b)  the Judge also dismissed the applicant’s contention that the second marriage was an irrelevant factor as it was not validly recognised in Hong Kong under its conflict of law rules.  He concluded that it cannot be denied that the applicant factually had established a second family, which was properly taken into account by the Permanent Secretary as a recent major change of circumstance: [39] - [41] of the Judgment.

D.  THIS APPEAL

D1.  Grounds of appeal

23.  The applicant appears in person in this appeal.  In his Notice of Appeal, the applicant effectively repeated the two grounds advanced before the Judge.  In summary, they are as follows:

(1)  The Judge was wrong to hold that the Permanent Secretary was entitled to take into account his second marriage as it was a “recent major circumstantial change”.  He further contended that the Permanent Secretary had also failed to take into account other relevant considerations (“Ground 1”); and

(2)  The Judge was wrong to hold that the applicant was fairly and sufficiently informed of the reasons for the refusal (“Ground 2”).

24.  In his written submissions filed on 28 July 2021 and his oral elaborations at the hearing, the applicant had focused his arguments on Ground 1, which are in essence as follows:

(1)  First, he relied on Singh v Secretary for Security [1996] 6 HKPLR 440 and Sabir Mohammed v Permanent Secretary for Security (unreported, HCAL 114/2015, 27 January 2017) and submitted that in making the Decision, the Permanent Secretary was required to undertake a balancing exercise between the threat posed to the law and order in Hong Kong by his continued presence here and the hardship which the deportation would cause to him and the innocent third parties (ie, his Hong Kong family).  He contended that the Judge erred in not finding that the Permanent Secretary had failed to undertake the necessary balancing exercising in failing to take into account the following considerations:

(a)  He was no longer a threat to Hong Kong as (i) he did not commit any crime since his release from prison; (ii) he had assisted the law enforcement in combatting crimes; and (iii) the Deportation Order had already been previously suspended six times;

(b)  He has been living in Hong Kong for 13 years and, if the Deportation Order is not suspended or rescinded, there would be great hardship caused to him and his family in Hong Kong.

(2)  Second, the applicant contended that the second marriage was an irrelevant factor in any event as it should not be considered as a “recent major circumstantial change” because:

(a)  the applicant had already divorced the Second Wife on 31  March 2021[9];

(b)  despite his overseas trips, his fulfillment of responsibilities to his Hong Kong family was not lessened; and

(c)  it was religious discrimination for the Director to deport the applicant based on his second marriage which was allowed under Islamic law.

(3)  In light of the above, he submitted that the Decision was Wednesbury unreasonable and thus irrational.

25.  In support of the aforesaid contentions, the applicant further sought to produce to this court two sets of documents: (a) copies of five letters respectively dated 17 July 2019, 29 September 2020, 5 March 2021, 16 April 2021 and 13 July 2021 from the Commissioner of Police to the applicant in relation to the assistance that he had rendered in their various operations.  He also attached to these letters a newspaper report on a successful anti‑narcotics operation by the police; and (b) copy of two divorce notices dated 31 March 2021 purportedly related to the second marriage.

26.  Except for the letter dated 5 March 2021 and the newspaper report, the rest of the documents were not placed before the Judge nor the Permanent Secretary.  However, for the present purpose, we will consider the new evidence on de bene esse basis.

D2.    Discussion

27.  The grounds of appeal are without any merits.  We will explain why.

D3.  Ground 1

28.  Under this ground, the applicant now effectively contended that the Decision is Wednesbury unreasonable in that the Permanent Secretary had failed to carry out a proper balancing exercise as required under Singh in making the Decision.  In particular, the applicant contended that the Permanent Secretary had failed to carry out the balancing exercise as she had not properly taken into account (a) the fact he had since become a good resident and no longer posed any threat to the law and order in Hong Kong, and (b) his invaluable assistance to the police in various criminal investigations.

29.  The applicant’s reliance on Singh and Sabir Mohammad is plainly misplaced.

30.  First, in Riaz Hussian, a similar argument was run and rejected by this court.  In that case, the applicant also sought to challenge the Permanent Secretary’s decision not to suspend the deportation order.  His counsel argued, based on Singh, that in exercising the discretion under section 20(1) of the IO to decide whether to suspend or rescind a deportation order, the Permanent Secretary as a matter of law had to balance an applicant’s threat to law and order (if any) against any hardship that may be caused to him and his family members.  Lam VP (as he then was) observed at [25] that this argument was misplaced.

31.  His Lordship, after reviewing various authorities, held that the exercise of discretion under section 20(1) is unfettered and the Permanent Secretary is not bound to consider whether an applicant posed a threat to law and order in Hong Kong.  Lam VP further emphasized that, the questions of the threat to law and order and hardship (if any) are only one of the factors that the Permanent Secretary in her wide discretion is free to decide whether to take into account or not (subject to Wednesbury challenge) in deciding whether she should exercise her discretion to suspend or rescind a deportation order under general compassionate or humanitarian considerations[10]. See: Riaz Hussain, [26] ‑ [36], endorsing M, L v Permanent Secretary for Security [2019] HKCA 507 and Sabir Mohammed v Permanent Secretary for Security, HCAL 114/2015, 27 Jaunary 2017, Au J).

32.  For the same reason, Sabir is also against, instead of in support of, the applicant’s contention.

33.  Second and in any event, as observed by Lam VP in M, L v Permanent Secretary at [11], Singh was decided in its very special factual circumstances, where the applicant in that case was an ordinary resident in Hong Kong and had been lawfully here for a substantial period of time.  Lam VP has emphasized that different considerations ought to apply in the context where an applicant in question does not have permission to remain in Hong Kong.  The applicant in the present case is not a person who has the right to enter or remain in Hong Kong at the time when he made the application to rescind or further suspend the Deportation Order, as he was subject to the Deportation Order and his earlier permission to remain in Hong Kong was already invalidated upon the making of the Deportation Order[11]. Singh is therefore also materially distinguishable from the present case.

34.  Further, these matters were in any event already taken into account by the Permanent Secretary in reaching the Decision.  As evident in M1, the Permanent Secretary had recorded the applicant’s grounds for his request, and considered the same, including that he had been a law abiding citizen since his release from prison and his family connections in Hong Kong (at paragraphs 14, 23 ‑ 25). It is also pertinent to note that the Permanent Secretary had also consulted the Commissioner of Police who was of the view that there were no grounds to support the applicant’s request for suspension/deportation of the deportation order.

35.  For the above reasons, it is not reasonably arguable that the Permanent Secretary failed to take into account relevant considerations.

36.  Further, it is equally not reasonably arguable that the Decision was irrational or unreasonable in taking into account the second marriage.

37.  The main thrust of the applicant’s argument is that the second marriage did not have any material impact on his family ties in Hong Kong and thus, given the unchanged family connections that supported the previous six suspensions, the Permanent Secretary was plainly wrong (and thus irrational) in making the Decision not to grant him the suspension.

38.  There is nothing in this contention.

39.  As shown in M13 and M1 (see [16] and [19] above), the Permanent Secretary had taken into consideration a number of matters, including the second marriage, as a whole in deciding that there were no strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds to support the suspension of the Deportation Order this time.  These factors included:

(1)  that there was a major circumstantial change in the applicant solemnizing his second marriage with a daughter born under that marriage;

(2)  the applicant’s length of stay outside Hong Kong in those two years was comparatively longer than the previous years;

(3)  the Deportation Order, if in force, only prevented the applicant from coming to Hong Kong again, it would not deprive him of his freedom to stay with the First Wife and take care of their three children in any place outside Hong Kong if they wished to do so; even if the First Wife did not choose to reside in a place outside Hong Kong with the applicant, she and their children were still free to travel abroad to visit the applicant any time they wished; and

(4)  all relevant facts and comments / advices from the Commissioner of Police, the Director and the Department of Justice, and having balanced all factors, including those which had been considered in previous suspension requests, and the then major change of circumstance.

40.  As the courts at all levels have consistently emphasized, in the immigration context in Hong Kong, the decision-maker (including the Permanent Secretary and the Director) in the exercise of her wide discretion relating to immigration matters is not obliged to take into account compassionate or humanitarian considerations, even where family ties may be affected.  When she does, it is for the decision-maker to assess the relevance of various matters and the weight to be attached to the same, subject only to a Wednesbury challenge.  However, in that respect, the court will give a wide margin of appreciation to the decision‑maker’s views given the very broad nature of the discretion, the high policy content on immigration matters, and the fact that the court does not have the relevant expertise in immigration matters.  In the premises, the hurdle for challenging the decision-maker’s decision on Wednesbury grounds in relation to compassionate or humanitarian considerations is very high[12]. Thus, this court in PVQ v Permanent Secretary for Security [2021] HKCA 444 reiterated again at [59][13]:

“59. Further and in any event, this court (differently constituted) in BI has clearly stated the limited extent the court would intervene on Wednesbury ground in the authority’s exercise of discretion in relation to humanitarian and compassionate considerations. In scrutinizing immigration‑related decisions in its supervisory role, the court should give a wide margin of appreciation to the authority as the court does not possess the relevant expertise in and all the relevant information necessary for making an immigration decision. Hence, this court has reiterated in BI at [105] that ‘as a matter of Hong Kong law, the weight to be attached to a particular humanitarian consideration in a particular case at a particular point in time is a matter for the Director [and by extension the Permanent Secretary]’, and not for the court.”

41.  Bearing the above principles in mind, it is plain that after taking into account a host of factors, including the second marriage, as summarized above, it was plainly open to the Permanent Secretary to form the view that there were no strong compassionate reasons to justify the suspension of the Deportation Order this time:

(1)  Given the second marriage, where the Second Wife and the young daughter are living in the Philippines, the applicant invariably would have to spend more time and attention on them.  This would, as a matter of logic and common sense, affect his time and attention spent in Hong Kong on the family here.  This plainly constituted a material change in circumstances compared with the situation when he made his previous suspension applications, which in turn weakens any compassionate or humanitarian basis to justify suspending the Deportation Order.

(2)  As a matter of fact, the immigration record showed that the applicant’s length of stay outside Hong Kong from 2016 to 2018 was relatively longer compared to previous years.  This also pointed to less time and attention being spent on the family in Hong Kong (regardless of whether this was due to the second marriage or, as the applicant asserted, the need to travel more for business purposes), which again also weakens any compassionate or humanitarian basis to justify suspending the Deportation Order.

(3)  On the other hand, the fact that the First Wife and her three children could relocate or travel to visit the applicant outside of Hong Kong if they wish to do so reduces any hardship to them if the applicant is to be deported.  This also negates any strong compassionate or humanitarian basis to justify suspending the Deportation Order.

(4)  When these were considered as a whole, and given that the weight that should be attached to any of the factors is entirely a matter for the Permanent Secretary but not the court, in our view, it is not only reasonably, but also plainly, open to her to conclude that, given the change of circumstances, there were no strong compassionate or humanitarian considerations in the applicant’s case to justify further suspending the Deportation Order this time.

42.  As mentioned above, the applicant further relied on two documents to purportedly support the latest allegation that he already divorced his Second Wife on 30 March 2020.  This reliance is plainly misplaced:

(1)  The two documents, titled “Notice Divorce” and “Divorce Deed/Notice” respectively are not produced to this court properly by way of an affirmation and in any event are submitted without leave.  There is no way for the Permanent Secretary as the putative respondent or this court to verify and accept their authenticity and to ascertain their true legal effect.  We would not admit them as evidence in this appeal.

(2)  In any event, even if it is true (as to which we do not express a view one way or the other) that the applicant has by now divorced the Second Wife, this is a matter that occurred after the Decision, and thus could not constitute a proper ground to challenge the Decision since this matter was not before the Permanent Secretary when she made the Decision.

43.  For all the above reasons, Ground 1 is entirely without merits and must fail.

44.  For the same reasons, all the new evidence sought to be submitted and relied on by the applicant in this appeal is irrelevant.  We would not admit it.

D4.  Ground 2

45.  In his Notice of Appeal, the applicant complained that the Judge was wrong to say that he was informed sufficiently of the Permanent Secretary’s reasons through M13 and M1.  He said that M1 was only disclosed in the affidavit of Chan Suet Yee dated 2 March 2021 and that M13 was only disclosed to his then solicitors in June or July 2019.  At the time of the Decision, he said, he did not know the detailed reasons for the refusal.

46.  This ground is a non-starter and can be disposed of briefly:

(1)  It is clear from the evidence that the Permanent Secretary adopted the reasons set out in M1, which in turn referred to the reasons in M13, in making the Decision.  It has now been firmly established that these reasons in the internal minute constituted reasons for the Decision and the court can have regard to them in a reasons challenge: Safder Tehseen v Permanent Secretary for Security (2014) 17 HKCFAR 567 at [18] ‑ [19], per Fok PJ.

(2)  In any event, it is clear that although these reasons were only disclosed to the applicant subsequent to the Decision, he has suffered no material prejudice by that as he and his legal advisers had no difficulty in formulating various grounds in mounting the application seeking to challenge the Decision by way of judicial review.

(3)  In the premises, the court would not grant any relief in judicial review to set aside the Decision for lack of reasons or for procedural unfairness, as the challenge is academic: Dembele Salifou (HCAL 44/2014, unreported, 22 April 2016, Au J) at [106(3)].

E.  CONCLUSION

47.  For all the above reasons, this appeal is without merit and we dismiss it.  There is no reason why costs should not follow the event.  We therefore further order on a nisi basis that costs be to the putative respondent, to be summarily assessed.

48.  For that purpose, the Permanent Secretary has lodged a revised statement of costs for summary assessment dated 31 August 2021, claiming a total sum of HK$78,099.00.  We will therefore further direct that the applicant should lodge and serve his written comments, if any, on the revised statement of costs within 14 days of this judgment.  The written comments should not be more than two pages.  Upon receipt of the applicant’s written comments, unless otherwise directed, this court will assess the costs on paper.  If the written comments exceed the 2-page limit, the court will disregard them in its assessment.