KHATUN MST KHADEJA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5138 · HCAL 1116/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1116/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5138
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1116 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Khatun Mst Khadeja |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 7 July 2023, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in
respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the
Board”) dated 29 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s
Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1116_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board rejected the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection
as not substantiated on all the applicable grounds under the Unified
Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board confirmed the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 8
December 2022, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. In Form 86, the applicant named “Fraser SYME Member of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board” as the putative respondent and the Board as the
putative interested party.
4. In fact, the Board should be named as the putative respondent, and the
Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the name
of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the
name of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision,
which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if
refouled to Bangladesh, she might be harmed or even killed by two loan
sharks named Mr S1 and Mr S2 due to her inability to repay the loans
obtained from them. The applicant claimed that the loan sharks were
rich and powerful leaders of the ruling party Awami League.
Oral hearing
8. The applicant requested for an oral hearing and her case was heard on 3
September 2026.
9. When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of her intended
judicial review, the applicant merely told this court that she wanted
to stay in Hong Kong as she could not repay her loans, she was injured
on her neck near the chin and hand, her son told her that he was trying
to repay her debt as soon as possible but he wanted some more time to
do so.
Grounds for judicial review
10. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
11. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
12. In her supporting affirmation dated 7 July 2023, the applicant merely
mentioned that she did not want to return back to her country because
her life was still in danger there.
Discussion
13. First of all, the applicant’s danger in her country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
14. What the applicant said at the oral hearing could not amount to any
valid grounds for judicial review at all.
15. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of
judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
16. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the
lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
17. In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held an oral
hearing on 31 May 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the Board in
person.
18. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had extensively
questioned the applicant at the Board’s hearing in order to try to
understand her case better.
19. The Board had laid out its findings and assessment of the applicant’s
claims in paragraphs 28 to 39 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not
necessary to repeat the same here.
20. In gist, the Board found that the applicant was not a credible witness
due to the multiple, material inconsistencies and implausibilities in
her evidence, her inventing evidence at the Board’s hearing and non-
persuasive explanations. The Board rejected that (1) the applicant
ever borrowed any money from Mr S1 or Mr S2; (2) the applicant was in
debt to Mr S1 or Mr S2; (3) Mr S1 and Mr S2 or their followers had ever
assaulted the applicant’s husband; (4) Mr S1 or Mr S2 had ever
threatened to harm the applicant; and (5) the applicant overstayed in
Hong Kong in fear of harm from Mr S1 or Mr S2.
21. The Board considered that the applicant had fabricated her claims so as
to create a basis upon which to apply for protection in Hong Kong. On
the evidence before the Board, it did not find that the applicant faced
a real risk of the proscribed harm from Mr S1 or Mr S2 on any of the
applicable grounds under the USM, if she was refouled to Bangladesh.
22. Thus, the Board rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim as not
substantiated on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
23. Although the Board did not consider state protection and internal
relocation, it was unnecessary to make findings on the availability of
state protection as the Board found that the applicant did not face any
real risk of harm.
24. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that she qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in her home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
25. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of any
of the proscribed forms of harm upon her return to Bangladesh, it is
not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation.
26. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence and risk of
harm, was primarily within the realm of the Board in dealing with her
appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come to its own conclusion.
This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board
reached its conclusion.
27. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high
standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
28. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave
must be refused.
Conclusion
29. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 16/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties as |
|directions given within|Nil |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave| |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, | |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 21282 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 1098/22 (formerly|
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ 5000973/22) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1