SITI KHOTIMAH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 328/2021

[2021] HKCFI 2419

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 328 of 2021

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;     or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.      Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.      A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 4 January 2021 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after her earlier claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.   

2.  The Applicant is a 43-year-old national of Indonesia who last arrived in Hong Kong on 19 July 2012 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract on 19 July 2014 or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her employment was prematurely terminated on 27 February 2014, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and was arrested by police on 24 April 2014. After she was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, she raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia she would be harmed or killed by her husband’s creditor over his outstanding debts.

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim     

3.  By a Notice of Decision dated 10 December 2015 and a Further Decision dated 20 January 2017 the Applicant’s claim was rejected by the Director on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.  In his decisions the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and found her claim based entirely on speculations and hearsays without any reliable evidence of any involvement in her husband’s loan or any threats from his creditor that there is no valid ground or reason to believe that she would face any real risk of harm upon her return to Indonesia, that in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 253 million people spread across a vast territory that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of Indonesia away from her home district in large cities such as Jakarta where it would be difficult if not impossible for her husband’s creditor to locate her.

5.  The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decisions was dismissed by the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) on 1 December 2017 after hearing her in evidence and submissions and which also confirmed the Director’s decisions.

6.  The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was refused by this court on 12 October 2018 upon finding none of her proposed grounds reasonably arguable for her intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in her process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in her intended application (HCAL 316/2018 [2018] HKCFI 2262).

7.  The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 8 April 2019 (CACV 527/2018 [2019] HKCA 401).

8.  The Applicant’s application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 2 August 2019 ([2019] HKCA 850), and then by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal on 29 September 2020 under Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap 484A.

Request to Make Subsequent Claim

9.  Meanwhile on 3 January 2020 the Applicant was arrested by police for possession of a forged identity card and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to prison for 15 months, during which she on 15 April 2020 requested in writing to the Immigration Department to make a subsequent claim on the same basis as before that she still fears of being harmed or killed by her husband’s creditor if refouled to Indonesia as she has been told that her husband had passed away in 2018 without paying off his debts.

10.  There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous

claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in   

 support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic  

 prospect of success.

 (3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

11.  On 19 May 2020 the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of her request within 14 days, which she subsequently did via her lawyer from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”). 

12.  By a Notice of Decision dated 4 January 2021 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that the basis thereof essentially the same as that of her previous claim, and that she failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since her previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of her previous claim would give her subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success.

13.  On 10 March 2021 the Applicant applied in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in her Form, and in her supporting affirmation filed on the same day she just attached a copy of the decision without putting forth any proper ground for her intended challenge, nor was she able to do so at the hearing of her application.

14.  In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request for subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and I accordingly refuse her leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

15.  Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal dated 29 September 2020, yet the Applicant still tried to re-litigate her case by making this subsequent claim without any proper basis, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against her.

16.  Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a) may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

17.  In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.  

18.  His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

19.  In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate her non-refoulement claim without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against her, she will likely continue to do so and thereby wasting precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

20.  Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, without leave of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with her said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order; and

(11)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court. 

Disposition

21.  The Applicant’s application is dismissed.

22.  A RPO in terms of paragraph 20 be made against the Applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1