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HCAL 2757/2019
[2025] HKCFI 3419
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 2757 OF 2019
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BETWEEN
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Alam Md Didarul |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.
Observations for the Applicant:
1. The Applicant is a 39-year-old national of Bangladesh who entered Hong Kong illegally on 1 April 2019 and surrendered to the Immigration Department when he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to Bangladesh he would be harmed or killed by certain local supporters of the political party Awami League (“AL”) as he supported their rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) and also due to their personal dispute. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.
2. The Applicant was born and raised in Village Panchgaon Union, District Munshiganj, Bangladesh. After leaving school he worked as a driver to make his living, and followed his family’s tradition to support BNP regularly attended their local meetings and activities without holding any official post in the party, during which he and his fellow BNP supporters including his brother were often harassed and intimidated by local AL supporters which sometimes led to violent conflicts between them.
3. In February 2016 his brother was attacked and killed by certain local AL supporters, and one day in September 2018 the Applicant was also attacked by those AL supporters with knives and sticks that he suffered cuts and bruises all over his body.
4. After the attack the Applicant fled Chthatipara to take shelter in a friend’s place for several weeks before returning to his home village, but soon he was again confronted by those AL supporters who proceeded to attack him with wooden sticks, during which the Applicant tried to fend for himself by striking back with a bamboo stick that he found on the ground which hit one of the assailants and seriously injuring him, whereupon the Applicant made his escape from the scene and ran home.
5. However, when he heard that the AL supporter injured by him later had died from his injuries and that he was the younger brother of a local AL leader by the name of Ripon who had then swore to kill him in revenge, the Applicant became fearful for his life and fled to Dhaka and then Comilla to hide in his aunt’s home, and on 6 March 2019 he departed Bangladesh for China, and from there he later sneaked into Hong Kong and subsequently raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 20 June 2019 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).
6. By a Notice of Decision dated 16 July 2019 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
7. In his decision[1], [2] the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from Ripon and/or AL supporters upon his return to Bangladesh as low due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of any AL supporters to seriously harm or kill him other than to harass or intimidate him as rival political supporters or any political reason for them to specifically target him or to have any adverse interest in him given that he was just an ordinary BNP supporter without any official post in the party, while his dispute with Ripon was a private and personal matter between just the 2 of them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Bangladesh with a large population of 159 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 148,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Dhaka where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.
8. On 19 July 2019 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, but for which he requested that his appeal be dealt with on papers only without any oral hearing despite the Board’s advice for him to do so and to give oral evidence to substantiate his claim and to answer and clarify various issues raised of his claim, whereupon the Board proceeded to deal with his appeal in his absence and on paper based on the materials and information provided earlier by him to the Director and available in the hearing bundle before the Board. On 12 September 2019 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.
9. In its decision the Board found material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Applicant’s evidence that it doubted the credibility of his claim of fear of harm from those local AL supporters or Ripon or the Bangladeshi police that caused him to leave his country to come to Hong Kong to seek protection, that even if his such account of events prior to his departure of Bangladesh were true that there was no reliable evidence of any real intention of anyone to seriously harm or kill him, and that in any event it was a private personal dispute between him and Ripon without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Bangladesh as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by anyone that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.
10. On 19 September 2019 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward various grounds for his intended challenge, of which he confirmed at the hearing as follows:
(1) That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non-refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from extra-judicial killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;
(2) That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his claim;
(3) That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;
(4) That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in her country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void; and
(5) That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions.
11. These are however all just bare and vague assertions of the Applicant containing a few key words or phrases but without any particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy were state acquiescence or extra-judicial killings to the Applicant’s case when on the factual basis of even his own case that it was essentially a personal dispute between him and Ripon without any official involvement or political element at all. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.
12. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
13. In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has also been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in the Applicant’s claim even if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Bangladesh, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.
14. In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.
15. For all these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.
Dated the 14th day of August 2025
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(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant on 14 August 2025
Alam Md Didarul
Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 14 August 2025
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 16102/19/7/68/B2061
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 471/19 (Formerly RBCZ 10341/19)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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