JAVED MUHAMMAD v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 152/2020

[2025] HKCFI 4410

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 152 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By my decision dated 3 June 2025, I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “TCAB”) dated 7 January 2020 which refused the Applicant’s non-refoulement protection claim.

2.  By a summons issued on 20 June 2025, the Applicant seeks extension of time to appeal against my above decision. As the 14-day appeal period under O.53, r.3(4) of the RHC expired on 17 June 2025, the Applicant is out of time in his intended appeal by 3 days.

3.  The applicable principles are trite: the court shall have regard to (a) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time were granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226 and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346).

4.  The delay in the present case was rather short but the only explanation offered in the supporting affirmation was that he did not understand court procedures and was not aware of the deadline to file a Notice of Appeal.

5.  The above notwithstanding and more importantly, there is nothing in either the present summons or the supporting affirmation to indicate even an attempt to raise any proposed grounds of appeal, or any error in the decision he seeks to appeal against. When asked at the hearing on 1 September 2025, the Applicant handed up copies of various documents that he claimed to have lost but now found. However, having considered the documents (on a de bene esse basis) I do not see anything new that had not been considered by either the TCAB or me. As such I fail to see any prospect of success in his intended appeal.

6.  In the premises, it would be pointless to extend the time for the Applicant’s intended appeal. I therefore dismiss the application.