LIMBU LAXMI PRASAD v. BACHY SOLETANCHE GROUP LTD AND ANOTHER

DCPI 2190/2021

[2026] HKDC 251

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 2190 OF 2021

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BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  This personal injury action arises from an accident that occurred on 12 September 2018 (the “1^st Accident”). The plaintiff, Mr Limbu Laxmi Prasad (“Mr Limbu”), sustained injuries in the course of his employment with the 1^st defendant, Bachy Soletanche Group Ltd (the “Employer”), a sub-contractor of the 2^nd defendant, Build King – SK Ecoplant Joint Venture, which was the main contractor at the construction site located at Yau Cheung Road, Yau Ma Tei, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Central Kowloon Route – Yau Ma Tei East Contract No HY/2014/08 (the “Site”).

2.  At the commencement of this action, Mr Limbu was legally represented. Subsequently, on 17 March 2023, he filed a notice to act in person.

3.  In paragraph 2 of her opening submissions, Ms Lam, counsel for the defendants, stated that the defendants no longer contested liability. Accordingly, the sole issue for determination is the assessment of damages for personal injury.

4.  At the trial, Mr Limbu appeared in person, while Ms Lam represented the defendants. The only witness was Mr Limbu himself, as the defendants did not call any witnesses. His evidence concluded on 27 January 2026. At the close of the oral evidence, I directed the parties to lodge and serve their written closing submissions by 12:30 p.m. on 28 January 2026. Ms Lam duly complied, but Mr Limbu failed to lodge or serve any submissions[1]. Oral closing submissions commenced that afternoon. After Ms Lam concluded her submissions, Mr Limbu unexpectedly sought leave to lodge and serve written closing submissions. This was highly undesirable. Nevertheless, as Ms Lam raised no objection, I granted Mr Limbu an indulgence to lodge and serve his written submissions by 4:30 p.m. on 6 February 2026. He lodged his submissions with the Court, and I have considered them. However, he failed to serve them on the defendant’s solicitors. In light of the Court’s indication at the hearing on 28 January 2026 that judgment would be handed down after considering Mr Limbu’s written submissions on or before 27 February 2026, I directed on 10 February 2026 that the Court itself should fax the submissions to the defendants’ solicitors for their consideration. Having reviewed Mr Limbu’s written closing submissions, I now hand down judgment in this action.

B. FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE

B1. Mr Limbu’s Background

5.  As a result of the defendants’ concession on liability, the following facts regarding Mr Limbu’s background, the 1^st Accident, and the 2^nd Accident (as defined below) are not in dispute.

6.  Mr Limbu was borne in Nepal on 26 July 1972 and was 47 years old at the time of the 1^st Accident. He is now 54 years old.

7.  He received education up to the secondary level in Nepal. He speaks fluent Nepali, limited English and limited Cantonese.

8.  He came to Hong Kong in 1997 and worked as a general labourer at construction sites. In February 2010, he joined the Employer in the same capacity. After seven years, he was promoted to ganger, a position he held until the date of the 1^st Accident. He worked ten hours a day, six days a week. His duties included lifting, squatting, climbing, and performing general construction tasks. Prior to the 1^st Accident, he had worked as a ganger for approximately two years. On average, he earned about HK$34,000 per month.

9.  He is married with one child and currently residing in Hong Kong with his wife, who is a housewife.

10.  He does not smoke or drink. He is right-hand dominant and never experienced back pain, work-related injuries, or traffic accident injuries before the 1^st Accident.

B2. The 2^nd Accident

11.  Before addressing the 1^st Accident, which is the subject matter of Mr Limbu’s claim in this action, it is appropriate to consider the second accident of 17 June 2019, in which Mr Limbu sprained his back while holding a bentonite bag (the “2^nd Accident”), as it may bear upon the assessment of damages in this action.

12.  Following the 2^nd Accident, Mr Limbu commenced employees’ compensation proceedings (DCEC 2009/2019) (the “2^nd Accident EC Action”) on 21 August 2019, and common law proceedings (DCPI 963/2022) (the “2^nd Accident PI Action”) on 14 April 2022.

13.  Mr Limbu subsequently settled both the 2^nd Accident EC Action and the 2^nd Accident PI Action in the total sum of $720,000, apportioned as follows: -

(1) The 2^nd Accident EC Action was settled on 20 July 2022 in the sum of HK$520,000

(2) The 2^nd Accident PI Action was settled on 19 July 2022 in the sum of HK$200,000.

B3. The 1^st Accident

14.  Turning to the 1^st Accident, Mr Limbu’s pleaded case is that on 12 September 2018, at around 2:00pm, he was working in the vicinity of the Site. He was assigned by a Chinese foreman, Fat Tsai Lau, to carry 200 bags of bentonite, each weighing 25 kg, and to place them into the mixture on his own. While lifting the last bag of bentonite and mixing it with water, he suffered a serious back pain as a result of working under time constraints.

C. ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

C1. Mr Limbu’s credibility

15.  Before assessing damages, I shall first address the issue of Mr Limbu’s credibility.

16.  The test for assessing credibility of a party’s case on a particular issue is well established. The Court should take into consideration the following factors: (1) whether the party’s case is inherently plausible or implausible; (2) whether the party’s case is, in a material way, contradicted by other evidence (documentary or otherwise) which is undisputed or indisputable; (3) whether it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one or more matters to which he has given evidence using the above tests. This is relevant to the assessment of his overall credibility; and (4) the demeanour of the witnesses. See Lee Fu Wing v Yan Po Ting Paul [2009] 5 HKLRD 513 at [53] per DHCJ Thomas Au (as he then was).

17.  Applying the above principles, I regret to conclude that Mr Limbu is not a credible or reliable witness. His evidence on material aspects is contradicted by contemporaneous documents. I analyse his evidence under the following material aspects.

(a) Whether Mr Limbu worked on 13 September 2018

18.  It is Mr Limbu’s pleaded case that the 1^st Accident occurred on 12 September 2018. However, his work record with the Employer (the “Work Record”) shows that he was working on 13 September 2018, the date immediately following the 1^st Accident, from 06:40 to 18:46. Under cross-examination, Mr Limbu changed his evidence multiple times on the simple issue of whether he worked on 13 September 2018.

19.  Initially, Mr Limbu stated that he clearly remembered not going to work on 13 September 2018 because he was in pain and went to the Accident & Emergency Department of Yan Chai Hospital (“YCH A&E”). However, when shown the sick leave certificate issued by YCH A&E dated 14 September 2018, he conceded that he went to YCH on 14 September 2018 instead, and then asserted that he could not recall whether he worked on 13 September 2018.

20.  When further questioned as to why he waited for two days after the 1^st Accident to seek medical treatment, if he was in severe pain, he changed his evidence again. He said he had “thought about” of going to the hospital on 13 September 2018. When asked whether he actually went, he claimed that he did, adding that he might have gone on both 13 September 2018 and 14 September 2018.

21.  Mr Limbu was then confronted with paragraph (9) of his witness statement, which stated that he went to YCH A&E two days after the 1^st Accident, ie on 14 September 2018. Upon being shown this evidence in his own witness statement, he agreed he attended the hospital two days after the accident, ie on 14 September 2018, but alleged that he had forgotten everything.

22.  Alarmingly, upon further questioning, Mr Limbu changed his evidence yet again, stating that he might have visited Dr Fu Wai Kee (“Dr Fu”), a specialist in orthopaedics and traumatology, before attending YCH A&E. However, when confronted with paragraph (9) of his witness statement, in which he stated that he went to see “company doctor in Central” – a reference to Dr Fu – after attending YCH A&E, Mr Limbu once more resorted to the response, “I have forgotten.”

23.  At the conclusion of cross-examination, when questioned about medical expenses, Mr Limbu stated that, apart from consultations with Dr Fu, he had only received medical treatment once at YCH A&E and once at Lady Trench General Out Patient Clinic (“LTGOPC”).

24.  Mr Limbu’s evidence that he did not work on 13 September 2018 is neither reliable nor credible. His evidence is directly contradicted by the Work Record, a contemporaneous document. As he confirmed under cross-examination, he was required to sign in and sign out every day at work, and the method of clocking in and out was by palm print. Therefore, no one other than Mr Limbu could have clocked in and out on his behalf on 13 September 2018. Furthermore, his evidence that he did not attend work that day because he went to YCH A&E for medical treatment is equally incredible, being contradicted by contemporaneous documents and by his own witness statement. The medical certificate issued on 14 September 2018, together with his witness statement, confirmed that Mr Limbu attended YCH A&E on 14 September 2018, not 13 September 2018. There is no evidence that supports Mr Limbu’s contention that he attended YCH A&E on 13 September 2018.

25.  Therefore, I prefer the Work Record and find, as a matter of fact, that Mr Limbu attended work on 13 September 2018 from 06:40 to 18:46. I accordingly reject his evidence that he did not attend work on that date.

(b) Whether Mr Limbu reported the 1^st Accident to the defendants

26.  Mr Limbu’s evidence on this issue is extremely confusing.

27.  At one point, he stated that he had reported the 1^st Accident to his supervisors and was therefore only required to observe, without performing heavy duties at work. However, under cross-examination, he admitted that he first reported the 1^st Accident to the defendants when he filed his Notification of Accident with the Labour Department on 9 January 2020. Immediately after giving that answer, he changed his evidence again, claiming that, before going to work, he had spoken with his supervisors and managers.

28.  The documentary evidence does not support Mr Limbu’s claim that he reported the 1^st Accident to the defendants immediately or shortly thereafter.

29.  Mr Limbu’s evidence is that on 12 September 2018, he informed his supervisor that he had injured himself, and that his supervisors then told him to rest in the changing room until the end of his workday. Such evidence is highly implausible and defies logic. There is no reasonable explanation as to why his supervisors would instruct him merely to sit and wait until the end of his shift without seeking medical treatment. In any event, Mr Limbu admittedly did not seek medical treatment even after clocking out from work on 12 September 2018. His account is rendered even more implausible by the fact that he was paid an “Accident Free Bonus” of HK$500 for the period from 26 August 2018 to 25 September 2018, which included the date of the 1^st Accident. Mr Limbu admitted under cross-examination that the “Accident Free Bonus” was only payable if no workplace injuries occurred at the Site during the relevant period. It is therefore reasonable to infer that, had Mr Limbu reported the 1^st Accident to his supervisors, he would not have received the “Accident Free Bonus” for that period.

30.  In making the above observation, I have not overlooked the fact that on 20 September 2018 Mr Limbu consulted Dr Fu, whom he described as the “company doctor”. However, it is unclear from Dr Fu’s medical report dated 27 May 2021 who referred Mr Limbu to him, as Dr Fu merely stated that Mr Limbu was referred. Furthermore, the Notification of Accident was signed by Mr Limbu on 9 January 2020, approximately one year and four months after the 1^st Accident. If Mr Limbu had reported the 1^st Accident to his supervisor shortly after it occurred, it is inexplicable that he would have waited so long to sign the Notification of Accident.

(c) Mr Limbu’s evidence regarding the date of the 1^st Accident

31.  As noted above, it is Mr Limbu’s pleaded case that the 1^st Accident occurred on 12 September 2018. However, in Dr Fu’s medical report, he recorded that when he first saw Mr Limbu on 20 September 2018, Mr Limbu told him that he had sprained his back while lifting a heavy object at work on 13 September 2018. Furthermore, in Dr Fu’s medical notes dated 20 September 2018, the date of injury (“DOI 意外日期”) was stated to be 13 September 2018.

32.  Under cross-examination, Mr Limbu alleged that Dr Fu had made a mistake regarding the date of the 1^st Accident. I do not find this evidence convincing. While Dr Fu’s medical report is dated 27 May 2021, his medical notes were contemporaneously recorded on 20 September 2018, the date of his first consultation with Mr Limbu. In my view, it is inherently improbable that Dr Fu would have made such an error. I find that Dr Fu did not make the mistake alleged by Mr Limbu, and that during his first consultation, Mr Limbu informed Dr Fu that he had sprained his back while lifting a heavy object at work on 13 September 2018. Although Ms Lam did not challenge the pleaded date of the 1^st Accident as 12 September 2018, I consider that Mr Limbu’s statement to Dr Fu on 20 September 2018, identifying the date as 13 September 2018, renders his evidence unreliable.

33.  In conclusion, apart from the undisputed facts stated in section B above and the medical evidence referred to below, I find Mr Limbu to be an unreliable and incredible witness, and I reject his evidence as summarized above.

C2. Mr Limbu’s claim for damages for personal injury contained in his Statement of Damages

34.  In the Statement of Damages filed on 20 July 2021 (the “SOD”), Mr Limbu claimed that following damages:

		HK$
(1)	PSLA:	200,000.00
(2)	Pre-trial loss of earnings:	11,333.33
(3)	Pre-trial loss of MPF	566.67
(4)	Loss of earning capacity	100,000.00
(5)	Special damages	7,000.00
	Total:	318,900.00

35.  Pursuant the orders of Master J Chow dated 23 January 2025 and 7 April 2025, unless Mr Limbu filed and served his revised Statement of Damages (“RSOD”), verified by a Statement of Truth, by 28 April 2025 at the latest, he would be debarred from filing any RSOD. Mr Limbu failed to comply with these unless orders and is therefore debarred from filing any RSOD.

36.  Both in his oral opening and under cross-examination, Mr Limbu stated that he “wants $3 million for everything,” repeatedly emphasized that he disagreed with the pleaded figure of HK$318,900 in the SOD. In my view, Mr Limbu is bound by the SOD and should not be permitted to raise an unpleaded case at trial:

(1) In Sinoearn International Ltd v Hyundai-CCECC Joint Venture (2013) 16 HKCFAR 632, Ribeiro PJ referred to (at [27]) the “extraordinary situation” of a party being allowed at trial to run an unpleaded case. In Kwok Chin Wing v 21 Holdings Ltd (2013) 16 HKCFAR 663, Ma CJ stated (at [21] – [22]) that “it is the pleadings that will define the issue in a trial and dictate the course of proceedings both before and at trial” and that “issues… must be properly pleaded.”

(2) A statement of damages is a pleading, and the plaintiff is bound by it: Cheung Hon Yu v Chun Lee Engineering Company Limited & Anor. [2021] HKCFI 1687 at §128.

(3) I acknowledge that Mr Limbu is acting in person. However, the Courts have emphasized that a litigant in person is not subject to a looser and lower standard compared to a litigant who is legally represented: Leung So Hung Siem v Carson Wen [2019] HKCA 1428 at [16] per Lam VP (as he then was); Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 at [18] per Lord Sumption JSC.

37.  Mr Limbu did not apply for leave to amend the SOD. Even if he had, I would have refused to grant leave for the following reasons:

(1) Any application to amend the SOD would have been extremely late. On 2 June 2025, more than six months ago, Master J Chow set this action down for trial.

(2) Mr Limbu failed to provide any explanation for the delay.

(3) The defendants would suffer prejudice if any leave to amend the SOD were granted.

38.  In conclusion, Mr Limbu is bound by the SOD and should not be permitted to depart from it.

C3. Mr Limbu’s failure to adduce expert medical evidence

39.  On 21 August 2024, Master Vivian Lee made an unless order directing Mr Limbu to provide the name of his nominated single joint expert to the defendants by 4:00 p.m. on 19 September 2024. The order further provided that if Mr Limbu failed to do so, he would be deemed to have elected not to adduce expert medical evidence at trial. Upon his failure to comply, Master J Chow, by order dated 23 January 2025, debarred Mr Limbu from adducing medical expert evidence at trial. At the same hearing, the defendants confirmed that they elect not to adduce any medical expert evidence.

40.  Accordingly, no medical expert evidence has been adduced in the present case. I note that a joint orthopedics expert report and a joint supplemental report obtained for the purposes of the 2^nd Accident EC Action were included in the trial bundle. However, the expert opinions contained in those reports are not admissible as expert evidence in the present case, since no leave has been granted to adduce expert evidence: see O 38, r 36(1) of the Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H).

C4. Mr Limbu’s injuries and treatment

41.  In support of his claim, Mr Limbu adduced 2 medical reports:

(1) Medical report prepared by Dr David Ip (“Dr Ip”) dated 15 November 2019.

(2) Medical report prepared by Dr Fu dated 27 May 2021.

42.  Although Dr Ip also referred to the 1^st Accident in his report, it appears that Mr Limbu’s visit to Dr Ip was in relation to the 2^nd Accident, as his first attendance at Dr Ip’s clinic was on 24 June 2019, approximately one week after the 2^nd Accident. Accordingly, Dr Ip’s report is unrelated to the 1^st Accident.

43.  Based on the limited medical evidence, I make the following findings of fact regarding Mr Limbu’s injuries and treatment arising from the 1^st Accident.

44.  Following the 1^st Accident, Mr Limbu did not seek immediate medical attention. On 14 September 2018, two days after the 1^st Accident, he attended YCH A&E. He was granted sick leave from 14 September 2018 to 20 September 2018. According to Dr Fu’s medical report, on that occasion an X-ray was performed, which revealed no fracture. He was then discharged with medication and diagnosed with a back sprain.

45.  On 20 September 2018, Mr Limbu attended Dr Fu’s clinic, complaining of back pain that was improving, with no lower limb symptoms. Physical examination revealed tenderness over right paraspinal muscle and decreased range of movement of the back. The straight leg raising test was full. He was treated with medication and physiotherapy and advised to undertake light duties.

46.  According to a sick leave certificate issued by LTGOPC, Mr Limbu attended for a sprained back injury on 21 September 2018 and was granted sick leave from 21 to 24 September 2018.

47.  On 4 October 2018, Mr Limbu attended Dr. Fu’s clinic again, reporting decreased pain with no lower limb symptoms. He was treated conservatively. No sick leave was granted, and he was assessed as fit to return to work with modified duties.

48.  On 19 October 2018, Mr Limbu attended a further follow-up with Dr Fu, reporting that his back pain had significantly improved, with pain only upon heavy exertion. Physical examination revealed no tenderness. He was discharged from Dr Fu’s clinic on the same day and assessed as fit to resume normal duties.

49.  I note that other medical notes, records, and reports were included in the trial bundles. However, in my view, save for the records referred to above, the remaining documents are unrelated to the 1^st Accident.

C5. PSLA

50.  Mr Limbu claims $200,000 for PSLA on the basis of his persistent back pain, his inability to lift objects weighing more than 5kg and his ianability to enjoy sports as he did before the 1^st Accident.

51.  Ms Lam drew my attention to Lau Tat Wing v Lo Oi Ming [2018] HKDC 1203 and submitted that, in light of Mr Limbu’s ability to return to work and the minor nature of his injuries, a nominal sum of $10,000 for PSLA is sufficient. In that case, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was knocked down by a reversing vehicle driven by the 1^st defendant. The plaintiff was granted a total of 11 days’ sick leave. He alleged that he continued to suffer from various symptoms, including intermittent needle-prick sensation in the neck and right hand; occasional neck pain and soreness with occasional radiation to the upper limbs; easy fatigue and inability to lift heavy objects; and limited range of body movements. Given the absence of expert medical evidence and the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was not a truthful or reliable witness, the court found that he was not suffering from the alleged symptoms. Although the plaintiff’s claim on liability was ultimately dismissed, the judge indicated that he would have awarded HK$10,000 on PSLA had the claim been established.

52.  Ms Lam also drew my attention to the following cases:

(1) Yip Kwok Shing v Fung Chau Tim, DCPI 2627/2015 (unrep, 26 June 2017). In that case, the plaintiff was assaulted by the defendant. Contemporaneous medical records noted redness and tenderness over the lower back region, with limited lumbar movement but no neurological deficit. The plaintiff was prescribed analgesics and was discharged without sick leave. He subsequently attended A&E on two further occasions and was granted a total of 10 days’ sick leave, together with a referral to physiotherapy, which he attended for seven sessions. The plaintiff alleged that he continued to suffer from persistent back pain despite treatment and that he could no longer participate in basketball and football due to residual symptoms. However, there was objective evidence rebutting his claim that he was unable to engage in sport activities. Dr Fu, acting as the single joint expert, opined that the plaintiff suffered a soft tissue injury of the back and should be able to return to his pre-existing work, albeit with mild reduction in efficiency due to back pain. Ultimately, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s allegations regarding residual symptoms and held that any residual pain would be minor and negligible. The Court awarded HK$60,000 for PSLA.

(2) Haider Awais v Intrafor Hong Kong Ltd & Anor [2022] HKCFI 3043. In that case, the plaintiff suffered back injury in an industrial accident. Upon dismissing the plaintiff’s case on liability, the court ruled that it would have awarded HK$80,000 for PSLA. The experts agreed that the plaintiff had sustained a soft tissue injury to the lower back but disagreed on the extent and severity of the injury. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s case on quantum was unsupported by contemporaneous medical evidence. Specifically, the medical records showed that the plaintiff was fully conscious at all times, suffered no neurological deficits, and had sustained only a minor back sprain.

(3) Yip Mau Kei v Wong Kam Tim, DCPI 1905/2013, (unrep, 10 February 2015). In that case, the plaintiff, a taxi driver, suffered a back injury from a road traffic accident and allegedly encountered two subsequent accidents. As a result of the first accident, the plaintiff was granted 94 days of sick leave. The orthopedic experts in that case disagreed on the causation of the herniation of the plaintiff’s lumbar intervertebral disc, the extent of the impairment on his work efficiency, and whether he exaggerated his symptoms during the joint examination. After analyzing all the evidence, the Court found that, as a result of the first accident, the plaintiff had suffered only a soft tissue injury to his back, with residual symptoms that would have only mild adverse effects. In light of the length of sick leave and the nature of the injuries, the Court awarded HK$90,000 for PSLA.

(4) Cheung Chung v Softrans Supply Chain (Hong Kong) Co Ltd [2018] HKCFI 2781. In that case, the plaintiff, a container truck driver, claimed that he suffered a slip and fall while alighting from the container truck, resulting in a serious back injury. The plaintiff’s case on liability was dismissed. The Court did not accept his evidence regarding the severity of his residual symptoms. Instead, the Court accepted the evidence of the plaintiff’s expert and found that he had only suffered from tenderness with a reduced range of motion of the lumbar spine. Had liability been established, the Court would have awarded HK$100,000 for PSLA.

(5) Tsang Chung Ming v Caritas – Hong Kong [2019] HKCFI 1035. In that case, the plaintiff, a chef, injured his waist while removing a container of steamed rice from a steamer. His claim was dismissed on liability. The joint orthopedic experts agreed that the plaintiff had suffered a low back sprain which did not affect his lumbar spine. They further agreed that the plaintiff exaggerated his symptoms and that he was capable of returning to his pre-accident job. The plaintiff’s expert added that his work efficiency and endurance might be reduced due to residual symptoms. The Court ruled that a reasonable sick leave period would be three months. In light of the experts’ agreed opinions, the Court’s assessment of the plaintiff’s credibility, and the duration of sick leave, the Court awarded HK$100,000 for PSLA.

53.  In my view, the injuries suffered by Mr Limbu were far less serious than those sustained by the plaintiffs in Haider Awais, Yip Mau Kei, Cheung Chung, and Tsang Chung Ming. While Mr Limbu was granted a total of 11 days’ sick leave (14 to 24 September 2018), the Work Record shows that he worked on 21 September 2018 (night shift from 19:45 on 21 September 2018 to 06:21 on 22 September 2018) and 24 September 2018 (day shift from 07:46 to 17:01). The fact that he was able to work during his sick leave strongly indicates that his injuries could not have been serious.

54.  On the other hand, I do not consider this to be a case where only nominal damages should be awarded. Notably, Dr Fu’s evidence shows that when Mr Limbu first consulted him on 20 September 2018, he complained of back pain; physical examination revealed tenderness over the right paraspinal muscle and deceased range of movement of the back. Dr Fu further opined that Mr Limbu was fit only for restricted duties between 20 September 2018 and 4 October 2018, and recommended physiotherapy.

55.  In these circumstances, I find that Yip Kwok Shing is most closely analogous to the present case. However, regarding Mr Limbu’s claim that he was unable to engage in sports following the 1^st Accident, his evidence has been inconsistent. In the SOD, he pleaded that as a result of the 1^st Accident, he could no longer play volleyball, football, basketball, or swim, all of which he had enjoyed prior to the 1^st Accident. Yet, in his witness statement, he alleged only that he had enjoyed playing volleyball in his spare time before the 1^st Accident, and that afterwards he could not participate in “any of the sports”. It is unclear what “sports” he was referring to, and there was no mention of football, basketball, or swimming. Given that it is undisputed that Mr Limbu returned to work for the Employer in the same capacity without any reduction in salary, I do not accept his evidence that he was unable to play volleyball following the 1^st Accident – if indeed he played volleyball before the 1^st Accident at all.

56.  Ms Lam submitted that, in support of his claim for PSLA in the 2^nd Accident PI Action, Mr Limbu relied on the same particulars of disability as in the present action, and therefore the Court should adjust the award for PSLA to avoid double compensation. With respect, I do not agree. In the Statement of Damages filed in the 2^nd Accident PI Action on 14 April 2022, the 1^st Accident was mentioned only in the context of Mr Limbu’s “pre-accident health,” and the particulars of PSLA set out therein refer to his injuries arising from the 2^nd Accident alone. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the settlement sum for the 2^nd Accident PI Action related exclusively to the 2^nd Accident and was not intended to cover the 1^st Accident.

57.  In conclusion, I award HK$60,000 for PSLA.

C6. Pre-trial loss of earnings & MPF

58.  There is no dispute that Mr Limbu’s pre-accident average monthly salary was HK$34,000.

59.  Mr Limbu was granted sick leave from 14 to 24 September 2018.

60.  However, according to the Work Record, Mr Limbu worked on the following days during his sick leave period:

(1) 21 September 2018;

(2) 22 September 2018:

(3) 24 September 2018.

61.  Accordingly, Mr Limbu suffered no loss of earnings for these three days.

62.  Therefore, Mr Limbu’s pre-trial loss of earning and MPF are calculated as follows:

(HK$34,000 + HK$1,500)/30 x 8 = HK$9,467

C7. Loss of earning capacity

63.  It is well established that this head of claim covers the risk that, at some future point during the plaintiff’s working life, he may lose his employment and suffer financial loss due to his disadvantage in the labour market. The Court must evaluate the present value of that future risk: Chan Wai Tong v Li Ping Sun (1985) HKLR 176 at 183 per Lord Fraser. The risk must be substantial: Moeliker v A Reyrolle & Co Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 132 at 141 per Brown LJ.

64.  As noted above, it is not disputed that, following the 1^st Accident, Mr Limbu returned to work for the Employer in the same capacity without any reduction in salary. It is further undisputed that he is currently working as a security guard. The issue in the present case is the relevant period for assessing any loss of earning capacity arising from the 1^st Accident.

65.  I agree with Ms Lam that the relevant period should run from the expiry of sick leave until the 2^nd Accident. The evidence demonstrates that Mr Limbu suffered no loss of earning capacity during this period as a result of the 1^st Accident: (1) he sustained no actual loss of earnings upon the expiry of his sick leave on 24 September 2018; and (2) he did not suffer any disadvantage in the labour market.

66.  As stated in Moliker, the test is whether there is a “substantial” risk, rather than a “fanciful” or “speculative” risk. In the present case, it is undisputed that Mr Limbu remained employed by the Employer until 19 June 2019, when he was laid off due to the completion of the construction project. He has adduced no evidence to show that, as a result of the alleged disabilities arising from the 1^st Accident, there was a substantial risk of disadvantage in the labour market.

67.  Applying Moeliker and Chan Wai Tong, I am of the view that no award should be made for loss of earning capacity, given Mr Limbu’s ability to return to his pre-accident job and the absence of evidence that he suffered any disadvantage in the labour market during the relevant period as a result of the 1^st Accident.

D7. Special damages

68.  Mr Limbu claims HK$7,000 under this head, comprising:

(1) HK$5,000 for medical expenses; and

(2) HK$2,000 for travelling expenses.

69.  Mr Limbu has provided no documentary evidence in support of this claim. Under cross-examination, he confirmed that he did not pay for Dr Fu’s consultation. His only medical expenses were incurred at: (1) YCH A&E; and (2) LTGOPC. He agreed that the consultation fee at YCH A&E was HK$180. Although he could not recall the cost of the consultation at LTGOPC, he accepted that it would not exceed the fee charged at YCH A&E. I therefore assess medical expenses at HK$180 per consultation, amounting to HK$360 in total.

70.  As regards travel expenses, Mr Limbu stated that he walked to YCH A&E and LTGOPC. Since he incurred no travel expenses, no award should be made under this head.

E. CONCLUSION

71.  The defendants confirm that no periodical payments have been made to Mr Limbu in relation to the 1^st Accident; accordingly, no deduction is necessary.

72.  Based on the above, I assess damages for personal injury arising from the 1^st Accident as follows:

	HK$
PSLA	60,000
Pre-trial loss of earnings and MPF	9,467
Loss of earning capacity	Nil
Special damages	360
Total:	69,827

72.  I therefore order the defendants to pay HK$69,827 as damages to Mr Limbu, together with interest as follows.

73.  Interest on PSLA shall be 2% per annum from the date of service of the writ until judgment, and thereafter at the judgment rate. Interest on pre-trial losses and special damages shall be at half the judgment rate from the date of the accident until judgment, and thereafter at the judgment rate.

74.  The defendants shall pay the plaintiff’s costs of this action, to be taxed if not agreed.

74.  Finally, I thank Ms Lam for her able assistance.