|
CACV 290/2026, [2026] HKCA 1025
On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 1486
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 290 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 325 OF 2022)
_________________
|
BETWEEN
|
| |
LUCAGBO AMOR MARCIAL |
Applicant |
| |
and |
|
|
TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/
NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE |
Putative
Respondent |
| |
and |
|
| |
DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION |
Putative |
| |
|
Interested Party |
_________________
| Before: |
Hon Au JA and Hon Eugene Fung J in Court |
| Date of Hearing: |
27 May 2026 |
| Date of Judgment: |
12 June 2026 |
_________________
J U D G M E N T
_________________
Hon Eugene Fung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Calvin Cheuk (“the Judge”) dated 17 March 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 1486) (“the Leave Decision”) refusing to grant extension of time and dismissing her application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 18 January 2022 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 2 September 2021, refusing her non‑refoulement claim.
2. The applicant is a national of the Republic of the Philippines. The basis of her non-refoulement claim is, if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her husband because she found out that her husband had a mistress. Her background, the basis of her claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting her appeal are all set out in the Board’s Decision: see [4] of the Leave Decision. The Judge has set out his reasons for refusing the Leave Application at [5] ‑ [21] of the Leave Decision. We will not repeat the details herein.
3. By the Notice of Appeal filed on 23 March 2026, the applicant stated:
“I do not agree with the decision of the Court of First Instance. The learned Judge just follow the way of Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision. The decision makers did not scrutinize my claim properly.”
4. In support of her appeal, the applicant also lodged written submissions on 12 May 2026. In those submissions, she mainly claimed that she would be killed by her enemies upon refoulement and that she did not agree with the Leave Decision. She further claimed that the Leave Decision was unreasonable, irrational, procedurally unfair and that the Judge failed to properly analyse her claim. She also complained that the Board failed to give her sufficient chance to arrange relevant evidence and failed to analyse and assess whether state protection existed in her home country.
5. As the applicant did not appear at the scheduled hearing on 27 May 2026, we shall accordingly determine the appeal on the basis of the available documents and materials.
OUR REASONS FOR DECISION
6. In assessing the merits of the appeal, we shall have regard to the legal principles, which this Court has adopted in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases. In particular, in the determination of an appeal against the refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if the appeal were a fresh application for judicial review. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11].
7. The applicant has not been able to demonstrate any error in the decision of the Judge or advance any viable ground of appeal against the Judge’s decision. Her assertions are all general, bare and vague allegations unsupported by specific particulars or evidence. General and bare assertions of her fear if refouled do not constitute valid grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. Clearly, her assertions do not constitute viable grounds of appeal and must fail.
8. In particular, the Judge had fully considered and dealt with her complaints at [11] to [21] of the Leave Decision and found them devoid of substance. The Judge rightly noted that the Board’s Decision was comprehensive with adequate reasons: see [18] of the Leave Decision. The Judge also noted that the Board had considered the relevant country of origin information and found that practical steps had been taken to improve the police’s effectiveness and to monitor their conduct: see [16] of the Leave Decision. The applicant was also given ample opportunities to present her case and evidence before the Board and the Judge, both orally and in writing.[1] There is no merit in her complaints and we see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.
9. For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.
(Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal
|
(Eugene Fung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
|
The applicant was unrepresented and did not appear.
[1] The applicant attended an oral hearing before the Board on 13 December 2021 and made submissions: see [30] – [31] of the Board’s Decision. She also attended an oral hearing before the Judge on 3 February 2026.
|