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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF HONG KONG
SUMMARY JURISDICTION
Action No. 14 of 1947
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Wong Shin Hang |
Plaintiff |
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The Shui Hing Company |
Defendant |
Coram: T. J. Gould, Additional Judge
Date of Judgment: 28 March 1947
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JUDGMENT
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1. The
plaintiff claims that on the 2nd day of the first Chinese lunar
month of the year 1947, he was wrongfully dismissed without notice by the
defendant and claims $180 as salary for that month together with $180 as one
month’s salary in lieu of notice.
It is clear from the evidence that no specific arrangement either verbal
or in writing was made concerning the rights of either party to determine the
contract of employment but from the course of conduct of the parties, it is
abundantly apparent that the plaintiff was employed on a lunar monthly basis.
2. This
being so the plaintiff would normally be entitled to the usual notice if the
defendant desired to dispense with his services, but the defendant relies upon
a general trade usage which, he alleges, exists among all merchants in Hong
Kong whose business it is to import foreign goods. This usage is said to be that employees of such firms engaged
on a lunar monthly basis may be dismissed without notice on the 2nd
day of the first Chinese lunar month in any year. A corresponding right, it is alleged, exists in the
employees to terminate their contracts on that day.
3. To
establish this custom, the manager of the defendant firm gave evidence himself
and called as a witness one Chan Chung Chee, the Chairman of an association of
importers of foreign goods called Ho Yik Association. As to the former, he alleged in broad terms that the custom
had existed for many years but he was shown to have left school only in 1944
and had not ever since that date been manager of the firm for the whole
period. He cannot therefore be
said to be of ripe experience though he may of course have become acquainted
with the custom from others in the trade.
The defendant relies more strongly on the evidence of Mr Chan Chung Chee
who states that the Ho Yik Association of Importers of foreign goods has a
membership of eighty firms and has been in existence for forty-nine years. He himself has been in Hong Kong for 38
years and has known of the usage during that period. In his evidence in chief he stated that “I can say that most
Chinese in Hong Kong knew this practice.
Everyone who is concerned in importing firms knows this practice – it
has been going on for tens of years.”
4. In
cross-examination however, Mr Chan said this: “I do not say that every one of these firms follows
the practice but most of them do.
Only some continue to observe the Chinese customs. The large department stores observe the
European style – they use a new style of book-keeping. But I can’t say whether they observe
(the European customs) fully or only in part”. To the Court he said, “I think the same practice is still
followed in Hong Kong by many firms.
I use it in my own firm.”
5. In
order that a trade usage such as that alleged may be binding, it must be shown
to be certain and reasonable and so universally or generally known throughout
the particular trade that every person in that trade knows it, or could have
known it if he had taken the pains to inquire. Blaice v. Allcock & Foster & Finlaysen 1074. The general practice has been that such
a usage is proved by the evidence of a number of persons who have become aware
of its existence by reasons of their occupation, trade or position. The evidence must be clear, convincing
and consistent. 10 Hailsham p.80.
6. Thus
in the Matthews, Ex parte Howell (1875) 1 Ch.D. 501 C.A. the affidavits of
three furniture dealers were relied upon.
In Murray v. Currie (1836) 1 C. & J. 584 “several land agents” were
called as witnesses. In Cohen v.
Baget (1814) 4 Cambell 95, the usage was established by “a number of witnesses”;
in Rainy v. Vernon (1040) 9 C. & J. 559 by three auctioneers; in Blake v. Meyer 1813 3 Campbell 412
by “a great number of brokers and merchants.” Where there was a conflict of evidence between the
witnesses called, it was held that the conflict showed that the custom was not
universally admitted by those engaged in or conversant with the trade. Williams v. Ayers 3 A.C. 133 B.C.
at p. 140.
7. In
the present case, I have not been referred to any decided case in which the
usage has been recognized and it is my view that the defendant has not
sufficiently discharged the onus upon him to show that the usage was so
generally known and acted upon that nobody need have remained ignorant of
it. I do not say that such a usage
could never be proved by the evidence of one witness alone, but there I do not
find the evidence of the only disinterested witness sufficiently definite and
convincing to enable me to hold that the onus has been discharged. It would seem that nothing would have
been similar than to have called as witnesses representatives of some of the
large departmental stores similar to that of the defendant. It is admitted by Mr Chan Chung Chee
that some of those large stores have, at least in part, departed from Chinese
customs in favour of the more modern European style; this renders it probable
that even if the alleged usage was once universal, it has now fallen partially
into disuse and is no longer so.
8. This
being my view, it is not necessary to decide whether the usage is reasonable,
though in view of its disproportionate value to the employer as compared with
the employee, it may possibly fall within the principle enunciated by Brett J.
in Robinson v. Mallett 1675 L.R. 7 H.L. 862 at p. 818. A further point which appears on the
evidence to be in favour of the plaintiff is that the departmental stores
admittedly have other lines of business as well as that of foreign goods importers
in respect of which trade alone the usage is allowed to exist. Can it be said that the plaintiff, who
was employed as a watch repairer and denying as he does, any knowledge of the
usage, is sufficiently connected with the importing business to be bound by its
usages even if established.
Finally, I should mention that on the evidence, I do not agree with the
contention of the defendant that the plaintiff is estopped from making this
claim by his conduct at the time of dismissal. It is true that he made no protest at the time, but he may
not have known what his rights were.
He consulted a solicitor four days later and the first letter of demand
was sent at the expiration of a week after that time. This in my view constitutes neither acquiescence nor laches.
9. No
argument was addressed to me on either side on the subject of the measure of
damages. Undoubtedly the plaintiff
is entitled to a month’s wages as damages in lieu of notice but it has not been
shown to me that there exists any recognized custom that the month’s notice can
only be given so as to expire at the end of a month. In the case of domestic servants, there is authority to the
contrary. Fayzu v. Hennsford 1918
2 K.B. 348 might be construed as authority that notice to determine a weekly
hiring need not expire at the end of a week. On a general view of the authorities, I find that the
plaintiff is not entitled to more than wages for the first two days of the
month in which he was dismissed, in addition to damages equal to a month’s wages. This being my view I do not think it
should be altered by reason of the fact that the defendant paid a more liberal
amount to an employee previously dismissed.
10. I
give judgment for the plaintiff for $180 plus two day’s wages amounting to $12 –
in all, the sum of $192 and the costs of the action.
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(sd) T. J. Gould
Additional Judge
28.3.47 |
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