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JARUTHONGCHAI JAKRIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
JARUTHONGCHAI JAKRIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6217 · HCAL 271/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 271/2026
[2026] HKCFI 6217
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 271 of 2026
BETWEEN
| | Jaruthongchai Jakrin |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. No extension of time be granted to the applicant to file the
application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application to apply for leave for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 28 January 2026, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 11 July 2024 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing
the applicant's appeal against the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 2 February 2024 rejecting the applicant's non-
refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision
can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
0271_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. In the Form 86, the applicant named the “Director of Immigration
Torture Claims Appeal Board” as the proposed respondent and the
applicant himself as the proposed interested party. As the Board
should have been the proper putative respondent and the Director, the
proper putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended
accordingly on the court’s own motion.
3. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Thailand,
he would be harmed or killed by the men sent by his step-father who
disapproved of the applicant’s sexual orientation as a gay man. The
Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s
Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless
otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and
descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
4. As no request for a hearing was made in the Leave Application, this
court will determine the Leave Application without a hearing: O.53,
r.3 (3) of the Rules of the High Court.
Discussion
5. A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is
no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after
considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly, and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no
such grounds.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality. In the present case, the
Board found that the applicant’s evidence was inconsistent and
unbelievable, and that he was not an honest witness. The Board
therefore rejected the applicant’s claims. It further found that
internal relocation would be reasonably available. The Board
therefore dismissed the applicant’s appeal. These are findings of
fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with,
subject to there being any public law errors.
8. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant provided no
grounds at all in support of the Leave Application. The applicant has
not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality
in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the
Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects
of success such that would enable this court to grant leave.
Whether to grant extension of time
9. Another matter I need to consider is the delay in the Leave
Application. Pursuant to O 53 r 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court,
an application to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and
in any event within 3 months from the date of the Board’s Decision.
In the present case, the Leave Application was late for more than 1
year and 3 months, which is lengthy.
10. The applicant provided no reason at all for the delay. Having regard
to the conclusion above that the intended challenge does not have any
prospect of success, this court declines to exercise its discretion to
grant an extension of time for the late filing of the Leave
Application.
Order
11. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
12. No extension of time be granted to the applicant to file the
application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.
13. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 13th day of November 2026
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 13/11/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Jaruthongchai Jakrin|Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days | |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Applicant’s ref. no:|the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule |Nil. |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |13/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: USM 23052 |
|53, rule 5; and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every other| |Putative Interested |
|party copies of every | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|affidavit which the | |1578/23 (formerly RBCZ |
|Applicant proposes to | |5001573/23) |
|use at the hearing, | | |
|including the affidavit | |Department of Justice, |
|in support of | |Senior Assistant Law |
|the application for | |Officer |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |(Civil Law) |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers
to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the
risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under
Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description
of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor
[2015] 3 HKC 293.