CFC v. HYS

FCMC 922/2024

[2025] HKFC 87

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 922 OF 2024

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J U D G M E N T

(Maintenance Pending Suit/Legal Costs Provision)

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Introduction

1.  The Petitioner is the Wife (“W”) and the Respondent is the Husband (“H”).

2.  In January 2024, W filed her petition for divorce relying on the fact of “Unreasonable Behaviour”. With legal representation, H filed his Acknowledgement of Service (Form 4) contesting the divorce. A week later, having changed to the present lawyers, H filed another Form 4 indicated that he did not contest the divorce. Decree Nisi has, however, yet to be granted at the time of this Judgment.

3.  On 28 March 2024, W filed a Summons (“W’s Summons”) seeking maintenance pending suit for herself (“MPS”) and also seeking legal costs provision (“LCP”). H opposed both applications but was minded to put forward Open Proposals for W to consider.

4.  Despite it is trite that the reliefs sought under W’s Summons are interim by nature and would only be determined by the Court on a so-called “broad brush” basis according to well established principles, I was provided with 22 lever arch files containing voluminous documents of over 2800 pages (including Form Es, questionnaires and answers) for the application.

5.  The affirmation evidence mainly includes :-

-  W’s supporting affirmation[1] (32 pages) with 19 exhibits (total 654 pages);

-  W’s supplemental affirmation[2] (17 pages) with 7 exhibits (total 139 pages);

-  H’s affirmation in opposition[3] (23 pages) with 12 exhibits (total 1203 pages);

-  W’s affirmation in reply[4] (46 pages) with 12 exhibits

(total 849 pages).

6.  In addition, there was also an affirmation filed by W’s younger sister CFLT[5] with 4 exhibits (total 19 pages).

7.  As per W’s Summons[6] at the time of filing, she sought MPS for herself at the rate of HK$400,000 a month (provided that accommodation be provided by H) and LCP at the rate of HK$400,000 a month until judgment on ancillary reliefs and the order (presumably both) be backdated to the date of the Petition.

8.  At the call-over hearing on 23 May 2024, Master G.T. Lung ordered interim interim maintenance at the rate of HK$250,000 a month be paid by H to W on the 5^th day of every calendar month until further order, first payment shall be made on 5^th June 2024[7].

9.  At the same hearing, Master G.T. Lung fixed today for the substantive hearing of W’s Summons with directions for filing of affirmation evidence in opposition and in reply by H and W respectively. At today’s hearing, W was represented by Counsel Miss Theresa Chow (“Miss Chow”) and H was represented by Counsel Miss Fiona Chong (“Miss Chong”).

10.  Counsel for both parties have lodged their respective Skeleton Submissions of no more than 15 pages as per directions granted by Master G.T. Lung.

11.  As per Miss Chow’s Skeleton Submissions, the updated breakdown of MPS sought became HK$455,000 per month comprising personal expenses of HK$281,592 and housing and related expenses of HK$173,000. Legal costs budget of HK$5.2 million and forensic expert costs of HK$1.25 million was sought up to FDR, totalling HK$6.45 million. Assuming FDR would take place in 16 months, an average of HK$400,000 a month on LCP was sought.

Some observation of the evidence filed

12.  At the outset, it is pertinent for me to repeat the underlying objectives under Order 1A rule 1 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 as to the need to increase costs-effectiveness in a case, to ensure procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings, to facilitate settlement of disputes and to ensure resources of the court are distributed fairly.

13.  Given the special dynamics in family cases, practitioners are expected and indeed encouraged to observe the said underlying objectives at each stage of the proceedings without any reminder from the courts.

14.  Within the hundreds of paragraphs and pages of the affirmation evidence from W, I observed that there are included a number of matters which are of controversies and in disputes and which would have to be resolved at the substantive trial of the ancillary reliefs when viva voce evidence would be received and parties’ credentials fully tested. Most importantly, putting forward those matters of controversies and disputes in the affirmation evidence for seeking MPS and LCP at this stage (my emphasis), in my view, would only significantly increase legal costs to the parties with no assistance whatsoever to the Court for determining W’s Summons, let alone escalating acrimony between the parties.

15.  There are accusations of H’s marital conduct, to say a few amongst others, having had at least 5 extra-marital relationships, having discovered H having had a daughter born out of other wedlock, manipulation of his secretive wealth over the years of marriage, gambled heavily in Las Vegas and could lose US$1 million over a night and, as described by Miss Chow repeatedly in her Skeleton Submissions, developed a modus operandi to provide insufficient monthly maintenance to W over the years leaving her to “resolve it herself” thus ended up with W, a full time housewife having no resources, to borrow loans after loans and then awaiting H’s assistance for repayment later.[8]

16.  Suffice for me to say is that all these are factual matters of relevance and importance but only when it comes to the substantive trial of the ancillary reliefs. Matters of parties’ conduct, marital, litigation or otherwise, are within those factors under Section 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192 (“MPPO”) which the courts must consider in determining ancillary reliefs.

17.  With such observation, I would be brief and concise in my decision confining myself only to those areas of the affirmations that are relevant and material for my “broad brush” determination of the MPS and assessment of the LCP. I noticed that H readily shared my observation and would be responding only to those matters relevant to W’s present claim[9].

Background

18.  As at this hearing, H was aged 65 and W was aged 64.

19.  W was born in Hong Kong. She received education up to Form 3 and started working as a manufacturing worker in the textile industry. Eventually, she managed to establish herself and become a fashion buyer in the 80s.

20.  H was born in Mainland China. During his childhood, H’s father deserted the family and ended up with H’s mother, Madam Cheung, turning to H’s maternal uncle (that is, Madam Cheung’s brother) for supporting herself and H.

21.  The parties met with each other in 1981. At the time, H worked in a denim factory and they started courtship not long thereafter. According to W (which H disagreed), it was only 3 years into the courtship that on one occasion she received a call from H’s first wife. It was only then she discovered that H was married. Although she was distraught and wanted to leave H, she eventually succumbed and stayed in a relationship with H.

22.  In 1986 or 1987, W learnt that H had separated with his first wife and she then started to cohabit with H.

23.  In 1991, a wedding banquet was held without registration of their relationship. Thereafter she and H led a shared life as de facto married couple.

24.  In 1992, W gave birth to their first child, a son, “H” who was aged 32 at the time of this trial.

25.  In 1995, W gave birth to their second child, a daughter, “L” who was aged 29 at the time of this trial. While she was pregnant with the second child “L”, W left employment and became a full time homemaker ever since.

26.  In 1996, parties registered their marriage in Hong Kong. This was done as part of an immigration plan of H for W, their 2 children and H’s mother Madam Cheung to Canada, which was a popular destination for emigration at the time. Initially, W did not want to move to a country which was unfamiliar to her but she was later persuaded by H that immigrating to Canada would be in the best interests of the 2 children. Eventually W gave in and the 4 of them (including herself, the 2 children and Madam Cheung) moved to Toronto, Canada in 1997. H stayed in Hong Kong for work.

27.  Around the same time, H set up his own company “PFFM” in Hong Kong running his textile business. W stayed in Canada as a full time homemaker looking after the family (including Madam Cheung) whilst H would regularly visit them during holidays.

Standard of Living in Canada

28.  During their time in Canada, H supported the family expenses although W’s case was that H either did not provide sufficient maintenance to the family expenses or was late in making reimbursement to her after she had spent the family living expenses. Given that W was a full time homemaker with no income or resources, she had to borrow bridging loans after loans in order to keep the family running and only waited for H’s assistance on repayment later. This was disputed by H.

29.  W’s gave the reason that her borrowing ability was available due to her “employment” under PFFM. During the majority part of the marriage for approximately 29 years, she was named as a “Sales Director” of PFFM where she would receive financial provisions[10] and she could show to the lenders.

30.  In 2005, they bought a plot of land in Toronto, Canada of 2.3 acres in size for CAD 5.5 million and eventually sold at CAD 13 million. The house there was 14,800 square feet in size comprising 3 storeys with 11 rooms[11]. In 2012, parties started to build their new house on the land and there was significant building costs to be settled.[12] W said she was defrauded by money lenders from whom she borrowed money for settling the building costs, this had worsened her debts. She needed to borrow money to settle the debts as H did not provide her with enough funds on time. In any event, the family had not lived in the property on the plot of land.

31.  Whilst in Canada, W and the children lived in Richmond Hills, an affluent area in Toronto. The house there was built on land which was purchased by them earlier in 1996. The house was around 5,000 square feet in size with 3 storeys and 7 rooms. According to W, this property was purchased for CAD 500,000 and it could be sold at CAD 1.8 million[13].

32.  According to W, whilst in Canada, the family was provided with 4 cars to use which includes one van mainly used by Madam Cheung, one Porsche 911, one Carrera and one Panarama[14].

33.  Besides, W would purchase luxurious brand handbags such as Louis Vuitton, Chanel etc. W would also use expensive cosmetic and skincare products including Dior, Chanel, La Mer[15].

34.  There are also frequent travel every year to Las Vegas, Japan and Singapore for holidays. Most of the flights to Japan would be business class[16].

Standard of Living in Hong Kong

35.  In 2019, W and Madam Cheung returned to Hong Kong at H’s invitation. H continued to support W’s living costs by the “salary” arrangement paid through PFFM and there were also “reimbursements” made to W. However, the modus operandi in Canada also continued when W was back to Hong Kong. W would need to borrow money from financial institutions and, whilst in Hong Kong, W also borrowed from her younger sister to support her living costs[17] and that H would repay the loans later.

36.  Whilst in Hong Kong prior to the separation, W resided in a 2,588 square feet property at Mid-Levels which property valued at over HK$88 million. The market rental of the property is in the region of HK$112,000 to HGK$142,000 a month. There are 4 bedrooms with one helper room and 5 toilets. The parties hired 2 domestic helpers and a driver which W often used[18].

37.  W said in 2018 before her return to Hong Kong, she was “gifted” by H the property by the name “The Gloucester” for her to use as a mah-jong place.[19] After returning to Hong Kong, W used to dine in at clubs and high-end restaurants. H is a member of the Clearwater Bay Gold and Country Club, Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club, Hong Kong Gold Coast Yacht & Country Club and the Pacific Club. W always had access to some of the clubs and enjoyed luxurious meals and wines there. W was given the membership of the Pacific Club by H.[20]

38.  H continue to make basic financial provisions to W through her “employment” a “Sales Director” of PFFM at the monthly basic salary of HK$93,000 plus allowance and petty cash of around HK$50,000 a month, making a total of HK$143,000[21].

39.  Overall speaking, W said throughout the marriage, the parties enjoyed an extremely high standard of living, whether in Canada or in Hong Kong. Any maintenance pending suit should commensurate with the marital standard of living according to established legal principles.

W’s MPS Budget

40.  W’s general expenses and personal expenses listed at Parts 4.1 and 4.2 of her Form E are as follows[22] :-

“General Expenses

Item	Amount (HKD)
Rent (total HK$85,500 for 3 months in hotel as a temporary arrangement)	28,500
Mortgage instalments
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone & water, & phone)
Management fees
Food
Household expenses
Car expenses
Insurance premia
Domestic helper(s)
Other (specify)

 

Total monthly household expenses :

28,500

 

Personal expenses

Item	Amount (HKD)
Meals out of home	25,000
Transport (taxi for days without driver)	18,000
Clothing/Shoes	70,000
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetic)	20,000
Entertainment/presents	30,000
Holiday	25,000
Medical/Dental (including insurance premia)	12,000
Tax
Insurance premia
Interim maintenance
Contribution to parents
Dependent family members
Other (specify) Loan Repayment 1. Maxcolm Finance Limited 2. UA Finance 3. Credit Station Legal Expenses	55,306 57,670 + 10,181 13,741 To be confirmed

 

Total monthly personal expenses :

336,898 = TBC”

 

41.  Since January 2024 when W moved out from the former matrimonial home at Mid-Levels, she stayed at Hyatt Regency Hotel in Shatin which costs HK$28,500 a month. Since 15 July 2024 (that is, a month before this hearing)[23], W moved to a service apartment in the Mid-Levels at HK$69,000 a month which W considered is far below the marital standard of living. The former matrimonial home attracts a monthly rental in the region of HK$112,000 to HK$142,000.

42.  With the sale of the property “The Gloucester”, the mortgage payment of HK$55,306 owed to Maxcolm Finance Limited no longer existed and this brought the total amount of personal expenses (excluding accommodation) in the table above down to HK$281,592 (that is HK$336,898 – HK$55,306) a month.

43.  Hence, W’s MPS budget was adjusted to take into account her change of accommodation with anticipated costs for the scenario of renting alternative accommodation and staying at residence to be provided by H. At paragraph 71 of W’s Affirmation, she sets out the following table :-

	Service Apartment	Rental Apartment	Respondent’s Apartment
Item	Amount (HK$)
Rent	120,000	95,000	-
Mortgage instalments	-	-	-
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone & water & phone)	-	5,000	5,000
Management fees	-	-	-
Food	8,000	8,000	8,000
Household expenses (including replacement of furniture and appliance)	-	17,000	17,000
Car expenses (including driver)	40,000	40,000	40,000
Insurance premia	-	-	-
Dosmetic helper (s)	-	8,000	8,000
Other (specify)	-	-	-
Total Monthly Household Expenses	168,000	173,000	78,000

W’s LCP claim

44.  W in her 3^rd Affirmation updated the amount of the projected LCP from HK$3,050,000[24] to HK$5,200,000[25], an increase of HK$2,150,000 within a period of 4 months between March 2024[26] and July 2024[27]. In addition, there was a claim as part of LCP for forensic expert costs which estimated for another HK$1.25 million, thus making the total projected LCP in the sum of HK$6.45 million (that is HK$5.2 million + HK$1.25 million).

45.  According to W, the evasive and incomplete financial disclosure of H coupled with the complex financial arrangement and H’s massive assets made it inevitable that a specific discovery application would have to be taken. It was also expected that a further round of questionnaires and forensic expert analysis would be required to ascertain H’s actual financial position.

46.  W’s only sole name property of “The Gloucester” had been sold for HK$8,680,000 with the completion took place on 27 September 2024. The net proceeds of sale had been deployed for (a) settling the outstanding mortgage owed to Hang Seng Bank at HK$3,914,414.51; (b) the outstanding mortgage loan owed to Maxcolm Finance Limited at H$2,833,905.70. The balance only came up to around HK$1,931,679.79 which would barely sufficient to cover W’s outstanding legal costs of HK$1.90 million presently owed to her lawyers.

H’s ability to pay MPS and LCP

47.  There could hardly be any dispute that H holds substantial assets. In his 87-page Form E[28], H or via his companies owned real estate portfolio, tens of high-end cars, over 100 expensive wristwatches and fine jewellery. The entire property portfolio (including those held via corporate vehicles) extends to 86 landed properties and is worth in excess of HK$1.3 billion.

48.  In the past 3 years, H has sold around 35 landed properties with total sale proceeds of around HK$550 million[29] which he alleged have been used to repay loans of his company PFFM was not supported by evidence.

49.  H’s solely owned company PFFM running his textiles business had factories in 6 cities in Mainland China. W instructed an accountant firm Sirius Corporate, to try and analyse H’s financial disclosure and revealed an understatement in value of 99.9% of H’s corporate structure up to HK$173,381,676.77[30] which remained unexplained by H.

50.  In June 2022, H opened a cigar bar in Sheung Wan and the renovation costs were at least HK$10 million. From reading the credit card statement disclosed by H, within 3 months between January and March 2024, H had spent at least HK$500,000 a month on cigars[31].

51.  H also purchased a F.P. Journe watch for HK$2 million which H’s solicitors confirmed to be the case stating that it was for investment. W believed that H also owned 2 luxury brand Audemars Piguet watches of the model of “Royal Oak” worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.[32]

52.  W believed H has in his possession a sizeable collection of timepieces (over 100 piece) each of which is worth at least hundreds of thousands of dollars. W also submitted that H has jade jewelleries which worth millions which H did not disclose.[33]

53.  Further, W alleged H failed to disclose a yacht purchased for EUR 10 million (around HK$ 95 million) back in 2021. This was denied by H in his Answer[34] as the purchase was terminated in March 2024 due to his inability to meet the payments on schedule.

H’s position and response on W’s claim

54.  H’s Counsel Miss Chong in her Skeleton Submissions, at paragraph 5 said :-

“H holds significant assets. Yet W has ignored their illiquidity or their liabilities. H spends more money than W does. She is a housewife and he is a businessman. W talks at length about the wealth H holds. But she has paid no heed to the marital standard of living she enjoyed or H’s historical payments of maintenance.”

55.  Further, Miss Chong in her Skelton Submissions, at paragraph 12 said :-

“The marital standard that W seeks to portray is overstated. Generally, it seems that W cannot decide whether her case is that the family enjoyed a no-holds-barred wealthy lifestyle, or whether H was stingy and failed to pay maintenance to her.”

56.  Miss Chong then went on at paragraph 17 of her Skeleton Submissions (referring to paragraph 15(5) of W’s Counsel Miss Chow’s Skeleton Submissions) said :-

“Thus on W’s own case, it is incorrect that “money is no object” or that there was “unbridled discretionary spending on luxurious and branded items” as alleged.”

57.  There could hardly be any dispute as to H’s ability to pay MPS given his substantial assets. H’s contention was confined to liquidity and liabilities rather than his ability to pay. Given the parties had reached consensus for disposal of part of the landed properties for “cash-in” during these proceedings, I decided that there would be no issue as to H’s ability to pay MPS. It was only a matter of how and when to liquidate those remaining landed properties in stock to pay whatever MPS decided in favour of W.

H’s Open Proposals

58.  Given the size of the landed property portfolio, H was agreeable to provide accommodation to W by using one his properties “Bon-Point” (including the balcony and utilities platform) commencing 1 November 2024; directly paying W’s service apartment fees of HK$69,000 a month from August to October 2024; reimburse W’s reasonable expenses for changing the door lock of the “Bon-Point” property; arranging cleaning/touch up and purchase necessary furniture/appliances prior to W moving in; directly paying the management fees, government rent and rates of the “Bon-Point” property.

59.  H shall pay HK$150,000 per month as MPS to W on the last working day of the month until conclusion of these proceedings or further order.

60.  H shall pay HK$100,000 per month as LCP on the last working day of the month until FDR or until further order; whichever is the earlier, such payments shall be made directly to the firm of solicitors representing W.

61.  Once the car parking space at The Waterfront is sold, half of the net proceeds of sale be given to W, in addition to the properties to be sold as the parties had agreed and signed the consent summons (if available).

62.  It is worth to mention that parties had been negotiating upon the sale of some of H’s landed properties whilst these proceedings are ongoing.

Applicable legal principles

(a)  Maintenance pending suit

63.  Section 3 of the MPPO provides the Court with the discretionary power to make interim orders requiring one party to the marriage to make to the other party periodical payments for his or her maintenance as the court thinks reasonable having considered all the circumstances of the case (see HJFG v. KCY [1012] 1 HKLRD 95). The overriding principle is one of ‘reasonableness’.

64.  It is useful to recite those paragraphs of Hartmann JA (as he then was) in the HJFG case :-

“33. Jurisdiction to award maintenance pending suit to a spouse is statutory, being governed by the provisions of s.3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192. By that section the court is given a discretion to make an order requiring either party to the marriage to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her ‘maintenance’ as the court thinks ‘reasonable’, subject to the condition that the duration of any such order is limited to the period of what may broadly be called the divorce litigation.

34. By definition, therefore, maintenance pending suit is restricted to payments which constitute ‘maintenance’, which are reasonable in the circumstances and which will endure for no longer than it takes to determine the divorce litigation. ‘Maintenance’ is a broad concept. I do not seek to define its exact meaning but it seems to me that it must be restricted to those payments necessary to meet the recurring costs of living at whatever standard of living is appropriate. That being the case, no matter how great the wealth of the parties and how unevenly distributed that wealth may be at the time an application for interim maintenance is made, the court has no jurisdiction to make orders which for all practical purposes result in a form of pre-trial capital re-balancing. In the present case, the judge recognised the long-established approach of looking to the “immediate and reasonable needs” of the wife and son.

35. As to the amount of maintenance pending suit that may be paid, the Ordinance provides only that it must be ‘reasonable’, that is having regard to the circumstances of the case, that it must be fair.

36. An important factor in determining fairness is a consideration of the marital standard of living. In this regard, each case must be considered according to its own circumstances. It is not simply to be assumed that great wealth equates to great extravagance. Some married couples who enjoy great wealth spend with comparative modesty and with a discipline born of discretion, others enjoy consumption on a grand scale.

37. The principles that have emerged over time to guide judges in matters of interim maintenance have been fashioned in the main to ensure fairness. This is well illustrated in the judgment of Nicholas Mostyn, QC, sitting then as a deputy High Court judge, in TL v. ML and Others (Ancillary Relief : Claim against Assets of Extended Family) [2006] 1 FLR 1263, at 1289, in which, having looked at earlier authorities, he derived the following principles that speak specifically to fairness or are based on the need to ensure it.

For present purposes, it is sufficient to cite the relevant principles without citing the judge’s reference to the source of those principles :

a. The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is ‘reasonableness’, which is synonymous with ‘fairness’.

b. A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living. This is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard.

c. In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing. That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration.

d. Where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources. In such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee.

38. Finally, it is to be noted that in applications for interim maintenance, when the amount to be paid is for a limited period only and not all of the evidence is necessarily before the court, it is not appropriate, nor indeed in most cases possible, for the court to conduct a detailed investigation into the finances of the parties. While, in order to determine what is or is not reasonable, some analysis is always required, that analysis can be conducted on a ‘broad-brush’ basis.

65.  As for the matters which the court should consider in assessing an application for maintenance pending suit, Rayden and Jackson on Divorce and Family Matters, 18^th Edition, said as follows:

“16.17 …. There is no hard and fast rule, and no fixed proportion: each case depends on its own facts. It has been said that the approach to maintenance pending suit should be empirical, and that ‘in the ordinary sort of case the district judges who deal with these applications will have to take a broad view of means on the one hand and income on the other and come to a ‘rough and ready’ conclusion, or take a ‘broad brush’ approach. The overriding consideration is the actual needs of the parties pending suit. Although the provisions of s 25 of the MCA 1973 are expressed to arise only when the court is deciding whether to exercise its powers under s 23, 24 or 24A, the court may nonetheless have regard to the criteria listed in s 25 on an application for maintenance pending suit.

16.18 In practice, as oral evidence is rarely given, it will be unusual for the court on an application for maintenance pending suit to be in a position to make findings of fact on issues in dispute sufficient, for example, to deal with conduct or allegations of non disclosure. However, if it is demonstrated that the paying party has not performed his duty to make full and frank disclosure of his financial resources, then the court can take a broad and robust view of his means, and it does not have to accept and proceed on the basis of the assertions of the paying party as to his means and an inability to pay. The court can look at the reality of the situation and take into account voluntary funding from third parties. Any under provision or over provision in the order for maintenance pending suit can always be corrected when the account comes to be taken at the substantive hearing when there every opportunity to do fairness by set-off…….”

66.  In the often cited unreported case of C v. F (FCMC No.1701 of 2000), my learned brother Judge Bruno Chan at paragraph 14 of the Judgment said, which I respectfully agree :

“14. Although the sole statutory guideline in considering maintenance pending suit is that the award shall be “reasonable”, the Court will nevertheless bear in mind all the factors drawn to its attention relating to the marriage and the parties to it (my emphasis), and perhaps the 2 most outstanding matters in every case, as in this one, are the standard of living of the parties, and the ability of the husband to pay.”

67.  In all maintenance pending suit applications, the Court would not be expected to carry out any detailed and minute investigation of finances and expenditures since there would be no cross examination of the parties’ affirmation evidence to determine their credentials for the Court to make any findings of fact on the information produced. Nonetheless, the Court would adopt a so-called ‘broad brush’ approach on the information before it and determine whether it is ‘reasonable’ to grant such order and; if so, what the amount should be.

(b)  Legal Costs Provisions

68.  Section 3 of the MPPO also empowers the Court to include an element of contribution towards a party’s legal costs in maintenance pending suit applications (see KGL v. CKY & Anor [2003] 2 HKC 512).

69.  The guiding principles for making orders for legal costs provisions are also set out in the Court of Appeal decision in HJFG v. KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 where Hartmann JA (as he then was) adopted the English Court of Appeal case of Currey v. Currey (No.2) [2007] Costs LR 227 which is commonly called the “Currey” tests.

70.  The pre-conditions to be satisfied under the “Currey” tests are :-

(a) that the applicant has no assets or none that can be reasonably deployed;

(b) that he/she can provide no security for borrowing or none which could reasonably be offered;

(c) that he/she cannot reasonably obtain legal services by offering a charge on the outcome of the litigation;

(d) that he/she cannot secure publicly funded legal help at a level of expertise apt to the proceedings.

71.  With the above principles in mind, I will now consider W’s application.

Discussion

72.  I will deal with W’s MPS first. I will examine the budget starting with W’s accommodation needs.

(a)  Maintenance pending suit

73.  H’s main contention was that W’s MPS budget was exaggerated; in particular, W could not justify her refusal to move to the “Bon Point” property offered by him for her accommodation needs. The “Bon-Point” property is a 3-bedroom flat with a market value of HK$17.7 million. When refusing to move into the “Bon-Point” property, W would have to “build-in” an item of accommodation expenses in the MPS budget which she reckoned should commensurate with the former matrimonial home.

74.  The “reason” given by W was that H had unilaterally changed the door lock of the property “The Gloucester” in March 2024 which made her feel uncomfortable to stay in H’s properties. H denied having changed the door lock. W also made the submission that H possessed “lethal weapons” which H also denied.

75.  I failed to see why W could not have the choice of her own dwelling simply because H had a sizeable portfolio of flats for him to choose where W should live. On the other hand, H was unable to persuade me that he has the right to dictate or decide where W should live. Hence, I decided that W be provided with accommodation costs rather than taking “Bon-Point” or any other properties of H.

76.  I find and decide that W’s accommodation costs of HK$100,000 would be reasonable.

77.  H’s proposed monthly general expenses at HK$19,000 (in a 1-person household).[35] W claimed monthly general expenses at HK$168,000 (live in service apartment); or HK$173,000 (live in rental apartment); or HK$78,000 (live in H’s apartment).[36]

78.  Since I have decided that W be given accommodation costs and not taking up H’s apartment, I would assess W’s monthly general expenses (without the accommodation costs of HK$100,000) as follows :-

Item	W’s claim (HK$)	H’s proposed amount (HK$)	Court’s assessment and comments
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone & water	5,000	3,000	5,000 (should take into account size of flat for the item of electricity)
Management fees	N/A	N/A	N/A
Food	8,000	8,000 (agreed)	8,000
Household expenses	17,000 (including replacement of furniture and appliances)	3,000 (I shall be responsible for any necessary and reasonable replacement of furniture and appliance (if any))	12,000 (will be fair and reasonable given that furniture and appliances are “one-off” expenses)
Car expenses	40,000 (including driver)	0	20,000 (to match with marital standard of living)
Insurance premia	N/A	N/A
Domestic helper(s)	8,000	5,000	5,000 (1 domestic helper)
Other (specify)	N/A	N/A

Sub-total :

78,000

19,000

50,000

79.  I find and decide W’s general expenses at HK$50,000 a month to be reasonable.

80.  The following are monthly personal expenses claimed by W, proposed by H and assessed by me :-

Item	W’s claim (HK$)	H’s proposed amount (HK$)	Court’s assessment and comments
Meals out of home	25,000	15,000	15,000 (will be fair and reasonable)
Transport	18,000	10,000	10,000 (will be fair and reasonable)
Clothing/Shoes	70,000	15,000	30,000 (will be fair and reasonable)
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics)	20,000	4,000	10,000 (will be fair and reasonable)
Entertainment / presents	30,000	5,000	10,000 (will be fair and reasonable)
Holiday	25,000	3,000	20,000 (will be fair and reasonable)
Medical / Dental	12,000	5,000	8,000 (will be fair and reasonable)
Tax	N/A	N/A	N/A
Insurance premia	N/A	N/A	N/A
Interim maintenance	N/A	N/A	N/A
Contribution to parents	N/A	N/A	N/A
Dependent family members	N/A	N/A	N/A
Others (specify)	136,898 (Maxcolm + UA Finance + Credit Station)	0	0

Sub-total :	336,898	57,000	103,000
Grand Total :	414,898	76,000	253,000

81.  I find and decide W’s personal expenses at HK$103,000 a month to be reasonable.

82.  I am satisfied that the accommodation costs, general expenses and personal expenses all of them are immediate and recurring needs of W which satisfies the criteria for granting maintenance pending suit. At the expense of repetition, W is a housewife with no income from any employment. The “employment” by PFFM was terminated on 24 January 2024.[37]

83.  Had W’s “employment” by PFFM not been terminated and was continuously receiving financial provisions of HK$143,000 (that is HK$93,000 + HK$50,000) a month[38], with no issue of accommodation as W would be residing at the former matrimonial home, the “salary” from PFFM would still fall short of HK$10,000 from the maintenance pending suit (on general expenses and personal expenses) at HK$153,000 that I found and decided above.

84.  In conclusion, my decision on the amount of W’s MPS is HK$253,000 a month comprises of :-

-  Accommodation costs HK$100,000[39];

-  General expenses HK$50,000[40]; and

-  Personal expenses HK$103,000[41]

(b)  Legal costs provision

85.  As to W’s financial disclosure on liabilities as per her Form E[42], she was indebted to her younger sister CFLT the sum of HK$14,150,827 which was confirmed by CFLT’s affirmation dated 7 March 2024[43]. Most importantly, CFLT under her affirmation had confirmed that she was unable to continue with lending money to W.

86.  W was also indebted to banks and financial institutions in the region around HK$4 million odd dollars. Besides, there was legal expenses due and unpaid which, as per page 3 of Form H3 dated 9 August 2024, the amount outstanding was HK$2,145,733. Further, there was additional costs that need to be paid was estimated at HK$314,540 + TBC.

87.  As to W’s financial disclosure on bank account(s) balance, monies owed by PFFM, valuable personal items, Pacific Club membership and MPF balance, which are as follows :-

-  Bank account(s) balance[44]	-    HK$ 109,274.76
-  Monies owed by PFFM[45]	-    HK$ 268,330.95
-  Valuable personal items[46]	-    HK$ 1,060,000 (around)
-  Pacific Club membership[47]	-    HK$ 1,000,000
-  MPF[48]	-    HK$ 1,086,439.21
	HK$ 3,524,044.92

88.  As per W’s lawyers’ letter dated 22 May 2024 where it was said W’s MPF accrued value had depreciated down to HK$870,000 which W had liquidated and, upon receiving the same, she had repaid HK$500,000 to her younger sister CFLT.[49] Rightly or wrongly for W to do so would have to be resolved at the ancillary reliefs trial. Suffice for me to say is the fact remains is that this item of “resources” was no longer available for W to deploy to meet her legal costs provision (presently outstanding and anticipated).

89.  As to the valuable personal items of approx. HK$1,060,000, in respect of which may have been covered by those valuable items which H alleged in his Affirmation in opposition[50] that W possessed, W in her 3^rd Affirmation[51] gave an account on 16 items (from (a) to (p)) of her valuable personal items. Since this is not the time for detailed and minute investigation on the exact values of assets, save and except to form the views whether there are assets readily available to be deployed for meeting legal costs, I find the valuable personal items even if they still existed, are grossly insufficient to be deployed for meeting W’s legal costs provision (presently outstanding and anticipated).

90.  As to the Pacific Club membership worth around HK$1,000,000, there is no evidence before me that it could be cashed out to meet W’s legal costs provision (presently outstanding and anticipated).

91.  As to W’s cash bank balances of HK$109,274.76 and moneys owed by PFFM at HK$268,330.95, totalling HK$377,605.71, I decided that such total sum of money (if still existed) was grossly insufficient to be deployed for meeting W’s legal costs (presently outstanding and anticipated).

92.  For the above reasons, I am satisfied that W meets condition (a) of the Currey tests for lack of assets or resources reasonably (my emphasis) to be deployed. On the evidence available for this hearing, I am also satisfied that conditions (b) and (d) of the Currey tests are met. Condition (c) was not applicable in any event.

93.  I decided to grant an order for LCP to W.

94.  As to the amount of the LCP, I am not persuaded that the anticipated forensic expert costs be taken into account upfront at this stage, especially when expert directions had yet to be granted (which might even be contested). For the remaining LCP application of HK$5.2 million, with the anticipation of time span of the FDR coming up in 16 months, given the significant amount of assets in this case, I am agreeable with the estimation of the projected LCP and the time span.

95.  Hence, I decided the amount of LCP to be HK$325,000 a month (that is HK$5,200,000 x 1/16).

Backdating of the MPS Order ?

96.  Given my decision on W’s MPS at HK$253,000[52] which coincidentally and closely matched with the interim interim maintenance Order of HK$250,000 granted by Master G.T. Lung[53] which had been in effect since 5 June 2024, I decided that there be no backdating of the MPS Order.

Costs

97.  I decided that the costs of this application be in the cause of the ancillary reliefs. This is a costs order nisi which would become absolute if no application to vary the same was taken out within 14 days of the date of this Judgment.

98.  There be Certificate for Counsel.

Decision

99.  For all the above reasons, I grant the following Orders in respect of W’s Summons :-

(1)  H do pay to W MPS at the rate of HK$253,000 a month to commence on 5 June 2025 and thereafter on or before the 5^th day of each and every succeeding month until further Order;

(2)  H do pay to W LCP at the rate of HK$325,000 a month commencing 5 June 2025 and thereafter on or before the 5^th day of each and every succeeding month until FDR or further Order;

(3)  The interim interim maintenance Order of Master G.T. Lung dated 23 May 2024 ceased upon 5 June 2025;

(4)  Costs order nisi in respect of this application, including all costs reserved, be in the cause of the ancillary reliefs, to be taxed if not agreed;

(5)  There be Certificate for Counsel.

100.  Last but not least, I wish to express my gratitude to both Counsel and the legal teams for their valuable assistance to this Court.