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MITRIANA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
MITRIANA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6285 · HCAL 2034/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2034/2023 [2026] HKCFI 6285 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2034 of 2023 BETWEEN Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following; Order by Deputy High Court Judge To: Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused. Observations for the Applicant: Introduction This is the Applicant’s application by Form 86 filed on 14 November 2023 for leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 3 November 2023 (the “Decision”) dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) in his Notice of Decision refusing her application for non-refoulement protection (the “Notice”). The Applicant is an Indonesian national, now aged 44. She last arrived in Hong Kong on 2 September 2018 to work as a foreign domestic helper. She overstayed since 9 January 2019. She was arrested by the police on 7 December 2020 and referred to the Immigration Department. On 10 December 2020, she lodged a non-refoulement claim by written signification. In due course, her claim was assessed on all four applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (the “USM”), namely: Torture Risk; BOR 3 Risk; Persecution Risk; and BOR 2 Risk and rejected by the Director’s Notice. Her appeal against the Notice was dismissed by the Board’s Decision. She now applies for leave to apply for judicial review of that Decision. The Applicant’s case The Applicant’s personal background, the basis of her claim, the arguments she advanced, the finding of the Board and the reasons for its Decision are set out in details in the Board’s Decision. These will not be repeated here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below for reference. In gist, she claims, if returned to Indonesia, she will be harmed or killed by a loan shark for being unable to repay her loan owing to the loan shark. The Applicant was first married in 2002 and has two children by that marriage. She divorced her husband in 2009. She married her second husband in 2016. Then she came to work in Hong Kong. Due to the separation her relationship with her second husband deteriorated. In 2018, she started a new relation with a boyfriend (the “boyfriend”) in Hong Kong. In January 2019, her second husband learned about her romantic relation and confronted her over the telephone. The Applicant did not give any direct response. Her second husband then came to Hong Kong to confront her. The Applicant suggested a divorce. They had a quarrel during which her second husband slapped her face. He refused to divorce and threatened to kill her if she returned to Indonesia. The Applicant had not seen him since January 2019. After her second husband had returned to Indonesia, he harassed the Applicant’s mother, asked her about the Applicant’s return and threatened to hurt or kill the Applicant. A neighbour also told the Applicant’s mother that her second husband had threatened to kill the Applicant. Her second husband stopped harassing her mother since April 2020. Nevertheless, the Applicant thought hewas frantic and emotionally unstable. She fears that he would seriously harm or kill her when she returned to Indonesia. The Applicant’s mother had reported the threat and harassment from the second husband to the police, but the police refused to accept the case due to lack of evidence. Thus, the Applicant did not consider state protection accessible. She also did not consider internal relocation feasible because her second husband could locate her anywhere in Indonesia and harm her. Besides, the Applicant said internal relocation is not feasible as she had to look after her mother and it was not viable for her mother to move to other places. The Board’s Decision The Applicant testified before the Board. She conceded that she could now safely return to her home country and live in cities outside her home area, such as Bali or Jakarta. The Board assessed her claim on the basis of the case as she asserted, the country of origin information (“COI”) and some necessary finding of fact based on her evidence. It found the Applicant’s issues with her husband are private in nature in which neither the Indonesian government nor any public official nor person acting in a public capacity was involved or had assisted, consented or encouraged. It found the injuries inflicted on the Applicant by second husband when he confronted her in January 2019 in Hong Kong were not serious and that her second husband had seized harassing her mother in Indonesia since April 2020. It found neither the Applicant nor her mother was concerned about the threats made by her second husband. Indeed, the Applicant conceded that her second husband had no real intention to seriously harm or kill her and that she could now safely return to her home country and live in Bali or Jakarta. Having regard to all the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the past ill-treatment by the second husband, the Board did not consider any ill-treatment which the Applicant may occasion from her second husband would reach the required level of severity and that the risk of future harm upon her return to Indonesia would not be foreseeable or substantial. It found there are no substantial grounds for believing that the Applicant will be subjected any proscribed harm and that the ill-treatment inflicted on the Applicant was not on account of a reason enumerated under 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Board found while there was a widespread perception that bribery, corruption and extortion are endemic in Indonesia, the government has incurred much efforts in fighting corruption and monitoring the police conduct and improving their efficiency. It found it was the Applicant’s mother’s choice not to seek police assistance from other police stations or higher authorities after having been rejected by the local police station. On balance, it was satisfied that adequate state protection would be available to the Applicant on her return to Indonesia. The Board considered the Applicant’s risk was localized in her home area. Given the geographical and population size of Indonesia, it considered it very difficult for the Applicant’s second husband to locate her anywhere in Indonesia. As the Applicant had left Indonesia for more than five years, the Board considered it doubtful that her second husband would even come to know of her return or have the means, inclination or ability to locate her if she were to settle outside her home area. In view of her age, education and working experience, the Board found the Applicant would have no difficulties relocating to any other cities in Indonesia, such as Bali, Jakarta, Denpasar. Applying the law applicable to non-refoulement protection to the facts it found, the Board found the Applicant had failed to establish her entitlement to protection under any of the applicable grounds under the USM. Legal principles applicable to judicial review The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration. Grounds for judicial review The Applicant had not advanced any grounds of application in her Form 86. In her supporting affirmation, she annexed a statement of grounds complaining against the Board for procedural unfairness. The essence of her complaint is that the Board was not neutral and did not truly consider her claim. It alleged that the Board was prepared to dismiss her claim before the oral hearing and using some bad arguments. She also accused the duty lawyer assigned to help her was unhelpful. Though the lawyer came everyday, he just slept, leaving her to talk to the interpreter. When asked for particulars and elaborations on the statement, the Applicant at first said that these grounds were prepared by her with the assistance of an interpreter and the Duty Lawyer. She told the interpreter her case in Indonesian. The interpreter interpreted what she said in English and she wrote it down in English and put down ticks on the non-refoulement claim form. The arrangement does not make sense. Later, when she was unable to answer the Court’s request for particulars and elaborations, she changed and said the grounds were prepared by her friend and she just signed. She said this friend helped a lot of people. She told the friend her story and the friend wrote out the grounds. The friend never told her what was written. This Court thinks this version of her evidence is closer to the truth. The statement of grounds is a photocopy from an original with the name of the deponent replaced. This Court has seen identical statement of grounds, except for the name of the deponent, in other supporting affirmations. It appears to be a standard or formatted ground provided by people assisting non-refoulement claimants, whether voluntarily or for reward, which may or may not have any bearing to the application in issue. Regardless of the origin of the information in the statement of grounds, the Court’s principle concern is whether there is any truth in the grounds which would give the intended judicial review any prospect of success. The issues are whether there is any evidence that the lawyer was sleeping when preparing the non-refoulement claim form (“NCF”) or at the screening interview; whether the Board’s Decision was pre-determined not neutral as evidenced by bad arguments. The Applicant’s ultimate evidence is that a lawyer was present and assisted her during the preparation of the NCF. The lawyer talked to the interpreter and the interpreter explained to the Applicant what was said by the lawyer. The lawyer was not sleeping during that process. The Applicant did not know if a lawyer was present during the screening interview. She could not be sure whether there was any other persons were present during the interview apart from herself, the interpreter and an immigration officer who conducted the interview and prepared the record of interview. She could not identify any bad argument to support the accusation that the Board was predetermined to dismiss her appeal or was not neutral. In conclusion, this Court could not find any evidence, not even bare allegation, in support of these grounds. Indeed, the Applicant’s ultimate evidence is that the grounds were not advanced by her. They were written by her friend, had not been explained to her and she did not adopt those grounds in her application. Nevertheless, the Court will bear these grounds in mind in its overall scrutiny of the Board’s Decision. Overall scrutiny Having rigorously examined the Decision, the papers and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles applicable to non-refoulement protection under the USM; the burden of proof and standard of proof; correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. The Board basically assessed the Applicant’s claim on the basis of the case as she had asserted. It made some further necessary finding of facts based on her evidence and the COI. It found on the basis of the COI, that adequate state protection is available in Indonesia. On the evidence, it was open to the Board to make the finding as it did. Then, applying the law applicable to non-refoulement protection to the Applicant’s case and the further finding of fact, it found the Applicant had failed to establish the factual basis to support her claim to protection under any of the four applicable grounds under the USM. These are mixed finding of fact and of the law. Insofar as they are finding of the law, they are absolutely correct. Insofar as they are findings of fact, they are exclusively within the realm of the Board, which the Court on a judicial review will not interfere, save when such finding was made as result of error of law or procedural unfairness or that the Decision is irrational. The Court could detect no error of law or procedural unfairness in the Decision. The Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test. It is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. Basically, the Applicant failed to discharge her burden of proving her fears and risks. The Decision is utterly without fault. The proposed judicial review has no realistic prospect of success. Conclusion As the proposed judicial review has no realistic prospect of success, the Applicant’s leave application is refused. Dated the 13th day of November 2026 ( Seline Sze ) for Registrar, High Court Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence Form CALL-1