BEIJING SONGXIANGHU ARCHITECTUAL DECORATION ENGINEERING CO., LTD v. KITTY KAM AS KNOWN AS WANG YUZHI

HCA 1289/2022

[2026] HKCFI 4876

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1289 OF 2022

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction and Background

1.  On 1 April 2026, I heard: (1) the Summons dated 3 April 2025, where D sought inter alia orders restraining P from pursing the English Injunction Application and the Singapore Discovery Application; and (2) the Inter Partes Summons dated 7 April 2025 to amend the Summons to include an order declaring the English Injunction Application was in breach of the Undertaking. At the end of the hearing, for the reasons given orally (which since then were reduced into writing, see [2026] HKCFI 2449 (“Decision”)), I allowed the orders sought in the Amended Summons. For ease of reference and consistency, save as otherwise herein indicated, I shall adopt the same abbreviations and definitions in the Decision. This decision should be read together with the Decision.

2.  By Summons dated 15 April 2026 (“Leave to Appeal Summons”), P seeks leave to appeal against the Decision and the orders granted on the grounds set out in the draft Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) as annexed thereto.

3.  Parties agreed that the Leave to Appeal Summons be disposed of on paper following the agreed timetable for lodging of submissions. This is my decision having considered the parties’ written submissions.

Applicable Principles

4.  The test for granting leave to appeal against an interlocutory order of the Court of First Instance is trite and not disputed. Under s.14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap.4 (“HCO”), leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. Reasonable prospects of success involve the notion that the prospects of succeeding must be “reasonable” and therefore more than “fanciful”, without having to be “probable”.

5.  Moreover, rehashing (or repeating) the arguments that were raised before the judge without demonstrating how and why the judge went wrong is of little assistance and does not make out a case that the judge’s conclusion is plainly wrong. See Harbour Front Limited v Money Facts Limited & Ors [2019] HKCA 916 at §9 per Kwan VP.

Discussion

6.  In NOA, §§1 and 2, it is submitted that I erred in the construction of the Second Leave Order.

7.  Firstly, it was submitted that I failed to properly consider that the natural and ordinary meaning of “enforce” is to compel observance which the English Injunction Application falls within by ensuring that there would be assets to meet the Part Judgment (see Skeleton Argument of P (“P’s Skeleton”), §§6-7 and 10). The Words and Phrases Legally Defined and case of The Zafiro are relied upon. It is clear from the Decision, §§15 and 16, I had considered the very same argument (thus it cannot be the case that I failed to consider it) but had rejected them for the reasons stated in §§19-22 (in short, that a Mareva injunction is not enforcement but just a step to pave way to enforcement). It is not clear how it is said that I erred in not properly considering the natural and ordinary meaning of the word “enforce”.

8.  Secondly, it was submitted that I failed to consider the purpose and context of the Second Leave Order (P’s Skeleton, §§8-10). Again, this is an unfair criticism as I had recorded Mr Lam’s submissions as to what he submitted were the intention and purpose at §17 of the Decision. In Annexes 1 and 2 of P’s Skeleton, it purports to set out dictum in previous court decisions (which I had referred and set out the specific paragraphs relied at §17) and the chronology of key events which is said to indicate Kam’s persistent breaches of order (which I was plainly aware of when I stated that there was “previous flouting of court orders by D”). As held by the Court of Appeal in Harbour Front Limited at §9 and Pang Kam Chuen v Pang Kam Bor [2026] 1 HKLRD 261 at §65, it is not necessary for a judge to deal expressly with every point so long as a judge says enough to show that care has been taken and the evidence as a whole has been properly considered. It is evident from §§23-24 of the Decision that I dealt with I considered was intended by the Judge and the purpose of the Second Leave Order by referring to what the Judge had said, which plainly is the most direct and clear statement of the purpose and object of granting the Second Leave Order.

9.  Thirdly, it was submitted that I erred to rely in the Decision at §§20 and 21 on the cases of Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd, Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd and Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd (in special administration) v Vgenopoulos (P’s Skeleton, §12) but provides no explanation why I erred apart from stating that they were decided in entirely different contexts. Those authorities support that a Mareva injunction is a step that may lead to enforcement rather than enforcement itself.

10.  Fourthly, it was submitted that the inference that the Judge intended to exclude foreign freezing orders in aid of enforcing the Part Judgment by reason of his dictum in §11 of [2025] HKCFI 219 was incorrect (P’s Skeleton, §13). In so far as the argument is raised again that when the Judge said that P “was not seeking to apply for an interlocutory Mareva injunction elsewhere in addition to the one it obtained in Hong Kong” he did not intend to exclude foreign freezing injunctions but was only addressing the argument concerning the Dadourian guidelines, I have addressed this in the Decision at §24. Again, P is simply rehashing arguments made which was rejected by me without stating how I erred in doing so.

11.  Fifthly, it was submitted that I erred to find that the English Injunction Application was “freestanding” and separate from the Enforcement Action (P’s Skeleton, §§14-19). I relied upon the fact that the English Injunction Application was commenced by a Part 8 claim whereas the Enforcement Action was commenced by a separate Part 7 claim (Decision, §25). However, I expressly recognized that I should consider substance over form by considering what was in substance sought and I referred to the fact that the English Injunction Application was taken out under s.25 of CJJA, which the authorities make clear, are freestanding proceedings brought solely for the purpose of obtaining interim relief. The fact that I had not expressly addressed the explanation by P’s English lawyers (P’s Skeleton, §16) does not mean I had not considered or overlooked this but did not consider it materially affected my view. In Decision, at §26, I stated that “Even if procedurally the separate claim was required” which addressed in substance what P’s English lawyers had said that the Commercial Court Guide required the English Injunction Application to be made by a Part 8 Claim Form.

12.  I cannot see how the fact it is now submitted that the English Injunction Application are “closely allied” to the Enforcement Action (P’s Skeleton, §§17-18) demonstrates that I erred.

13.  In NOA, §3, it was submitted that I erred in the proper construction of the Undertaking. Specifically, it was submitted that I erred in finding: (a) a freezing injunction in aid of enforcing the Part Judgment was in relation to “the same subject matter” as the proceedings herein; and (b) D would be harassed more than necessary by proceeding in the UK in seeking further or greater relief on top of the Mareva obtained in Hong Kong (P’s Skeleton, §§21-26). As to (a), given the acceptance by P the lack of direct authorities on what constitutes “same subject matter” (P’s Skeleton, §§24-25), it plainly cannot be demonstrated that I erred in law. Clark & another v In Focus Asset Management & Tax Solutions Ltd (Financial Ombudsman Service intervening) (CA) [2014] 1 WLR 2502 (a case not cited previously) was a case concerning res judicata and doctrine of merger whereas Rubin & another v Eurofinace SA & others (Picard and others intervening) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC 236 simply held that where a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due, an action of debt may be commenced to enforce the judgment. Whilst the original cause of action may no longer be relevant when seeking to enforce a judgment obtained, in the present case, the English Injunction Application was to obtain a Mareva injunction which was in relation to the same subject matter and did rely on the underlying merits of the Hong Kong proceedings (see Decision, §28). As to (b), I have found that D would be harassed more than necessary in the Decision, §30. The fact that “coercive relief is eminently necessary” when the Part Judgment remains unpaid and there are insufficient assets in Hong Kong is irrelevant to the question of being harassed in another jurisdiction and do not demonstrate how I erred in coming to my view that D would be harassed.

14.  In NOA, §4, it was submitted that I erred to find that joining D as a nominal party to the Singapore Discovery Application would be outside the terms of the First Leave Order.

15.  Firstly, it was submitted I erred to adopt a strict and literal approach rather than to construe the First Leave Order according to the natural and ordinary meaning and that I should have considered the background at the time the order was made including its purpose (P’s Skeleton, §§30-32). In the Decision, §§32-33, I explained that the First Leave Order did not grant leave to commence discovery proceedings against third parties and against D or so long as no substantive orders are sought against D, and the justification for requiring clear words to those effect where breach of court orders may lead to contempt proceedings. The cases cited by P support a strict construction of orders: see JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (No 10) [2014] 1 WLR 1414, §37 and KMH v Lam Ho Chi [2023] HKCFI 2714 at §9(3). It is not clear from P’s submissions how I erred to fail to consider the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the First Leave Order, the purpose and context, when I held that it was clear from the terms of the First Leave Order that leave was required to commence discovery in Singapore against D and that is plainly how P understood the First Leave Order (see Decision, §32). I was aware of the purpose of the disclosure and the First Leave Order was to trace and obtain disclosure regarding D’s account held with SCS which P was not able to obtain in these proceedings (see Decision, §34).

16.  Secondly, as for my finding that it would be oppressive to join D as a defendant to the Singapore Discovery Application, none of the matters raised in P’s Skeleton, §33 demonstrate how I erred to so find. The fact that the Judge in [2024] HKCFI 3068 (§37) took the view D could not complain of any oppression for P to seek discovery from SCS does not demonstrate there is no oppression seeking discovery from D. The fact that D may not be required to attend or resist the Singapore Discovery Application, does not detract from the point, which Mr Lam accepted, D had the right to do so (see Decision, §34). The fact no relief was sought against D was not overlooked be me.

17.  Lastly, I do not agree the intended appeal raises any points of law for which appellate guidance is needed. Whether the English Injunction Proceedings concern the “same subject matter” (P’s Skeleton, §36(1) and whether foreign proceedings based on a domestic judgment constitute proceedings in respect of the same subject matter as the underlying domestic proceedings (ibid, §36(2)) must be fact-sensitive. None of these questions raise any general principle decided for the first time or a question of importance.

18.  In all, I am of the view that the intended appeal has no reasonable prospects of success nor is there some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

Disposition and Orders

19.  Accordingly, the Leave to Appeal Summons is dismissed. I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. P should pay to D forthwith the costs of the Leave to Appeal Summons, to be summarily assessed on paper. D should lodge and serve a Statement of Costs (limited to 3 pages) within 7 days from the handing down of this Decision and P should lodge and serve a List of Objections (limited to 2 pages) within 7 days thereafter.